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Dennis OConnor

About IDEO's Open Innovation Practice - OpenIDEO - 0 views

www.openideo.com/approach

design-thinking innovation

shared by Dennis OConnor on 24 Feb 20 - No Cached
  • Dennis OConnor on 24 Feb 20
     
    "We Design for Good Design thinking is in our genes. For decades, IDEO has pioneered the human-centered design approach to solving complex problems.  In 2010, IDEO asked-how might we open up our method, enabling people everywhere to spark innovation where it's needed most? Our answer: OpenIDEO."
Dennis OConnor

Health Design Thinking | The MIT Press - 0 views

mitpress.mit.edu/...health-design-thinking

design-thinking

shared by Dennis OConnor on 03 Dec 20 - No Cached
  • Dennis OConnor on 03 Dec 20
     
    "Applying the principles of human-centered design to real-world health care challenges, from drug packaging to early detection of breast cancer."
Dennis OConnor

ŌURA + Helsinki Design Museum - How did you sleep last night? - 1 views

designmuseum.ouraring.com

tracking design-thinking Apollo ecosystem

shared by Dennis OConnor on 08 Nov 19 - No Cached
  • Dennis OConnor on 08 Nov 19
     
    "Want to see your sleep data at the Helsinki Design Museum? ŌURA is proud to be participating in "Enter and Encounter", a joint exhibition by Helsinki Design Museum and the Finnish Association of Designers Ornamo. This unique exhibition celebrates contemporary Finnish design and Finland's centenary anniversary. As part of the exhibition, we are happy to invite 100 active ŌURA users to share their sleep data and participate in the media installation "How did you sleep last night?"."
Dennis OConnor

What Went Wrong with Coronavirus Testing in the U.S. | The New Yorker - 0 views

www.newyorker.com/...-coronavirus-testing-in-the-us

covid testing research

shared by Dennis OConnor on 18 Mar 20 - No Cached
  • n February 5th, sixteen days after a Seattle resident who had visited relatives in Wuhan, China, was diagnosed as having the first confirmed case of COVID-19 in the United States, the Centers for Disease Control, in Atlanta, began sending diagnostic tests to a network of about a hundred state, city, and county public-health laboratories⁠. Up to that point, all testing for COVID-19 in the U.S. had been done at the C.D.C.; of some five hundred suspected cases⁠ tested at the Centers, twelve had confirmed positive. The new test kits would allow about fifty thousand patients to be tested, and they would also make testing much faster, as patient specimens would no longer have to be sent to Atlanta to be evaluated.
  • Before a state or local lab could use the C.D.C.-developed tests on actual patients
  • verification
  • ...33 more annotations...
  • larger number, about thirty-six of them, received inconclusive⁠ results from one of the reagents.
  • Another five,
  • had problems with two reagents
  • On February 8th
  • e cascading effects that they’ve had on the country’s COVID-19 preparations suggest a much larger problem with the way the United States has structured its pandemic response.
  • the verification problems were “part of the normal procedures⁠.” In the meantime, she said, until new reagents could be manufactured, all COVID-19 testing in the United States would continue to take place exclusively at the C.D.C⁠.
  • The public-health-laboratory network was never intended to provide widespread testing in the event of a pandemic.
  • the three-week delay caused by the C.D.C.’s failure to get working test kits into the hands of the public-health labs came at a crucial time.
  • The void created by the C.D.C.’s faulty tests made it impossible for public-health authorities to get an accurate picture of how far and how fast the disease was spreadin
  • In hotspots like Seattle, and probably elsewhere, COVID-19 spread undetected for several weeks, which in turn only multiplied the need for more tests.
  • The problem was that containment was not done very well.
  • we’re looking at exponential growth, and we need to figure out how to meet an exponential demand.”
  • Yet flexibility was not what Jerome and his lab found when they tried to get an E.U.A. for their COVID-19 test.
  • problem was exacerbated by a President who has simultaneously underplayed the severity of the outbreak and overpromised the means available to fight it
  • problems with COVID-19 testing in the United States have obscured
  • several labs reported their problems to the C.D.C. In a briefing a few days later,
  • Chinese scientists uploaded a copy of the virus’s genome to an online repository⁠, and virologists around the world set to work to develop diagnostic tests for the new disease
  • January 21st, a team in Berlin, led by Christian Drosten, one of the scientists who discovered the original SARS virus, in 2003, submitted the first paper to describe a protocol for testing for SARS-CoV-2.
  • That protocol would form the basis for a test disseminated, early on, by the World Health Organization
  • That same day, Messonnier announced that the C.D.C. had finalized its own test⁠, which it used to confirm the first known case of COVID-19 in the U.S.
  • The U.W. virology lab
  • started, probably in earnest in mid-January, to prepare what we call a laboratory-developed test,⁠
  • It took a team at the lab, working under the direction of Alex Greninger, about two weeks to develop a working version
  • But, as soon as Alex Azar, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, declared a public-health emergency, on February 4th, a new regulatory regime took effect. From that point on, any lab that wanted to conduct its own tests for the new coronavirus would first need to secure something called an Emergency Use Authorization from the F.D.A.
  • This shift in the regulations sounds perverse, since it restricts the use of new tests at precisely the moment they’re most needed.
  • E.U.A. process is supremely flexible.
  • triumph of modern medical science
  • hen there’s a big emergency and we feel like we should really do something, it gets hard. It’s a little frustrating. We’ve got a lot of scientists and doctors and laboratory personnel who are incredibly good at making assays. What we’re not so good at is figuring out all the forms and working with the bureaucracy of the federal government.”
  • At one point, he was very frustrated because he’d e-mailed them what we were doing so they could review it,”
  • Here we are in this SARS-CoV-2 crisis, and you have to send them something through the United States Postal Service. It’s just shocking.
  • Despite these difficulties, Jerome said, the F.D.A. ultimately proved responsive to the lab’s entreaties. “They had good and substantive feedback that made our testing better, and the response time was typically just a couple of days.”
  • believe it was, February 29th,” he said. “And then we got a specimen from one of the people who were the two original cases in Washington
  • The E.U.A. regulations, however, prohibited the lab from reporting the results to the doctors who had ordered the tests for their patients.
  • Dennis OConnor on 18 Mar 20
     
    "Sharfstein, too, thinks that it's fair to criticize the federal government for not recognizing that its pandemic plans had a single point of failure. The C.D.C. quickly developed a working test, and it was understandable, at some level, that people at the Centers thought that fixing the faulty reagents for the public-health labs would be faster than shifting to an entirely different protocol. Nevertheless, Sharfstein said, "Why are we relying only on the C.D.C.? What the F.D.A. could have done, and eventually did do, is say, 'You can use other approaches.' " Even so, he said, "I don't think it's quite fair to totally blame the F.D.A. for this. The F.D.A. can design an approach to support the public-health strategy, but someone has to tell F.D.A. the public-health goal." The delay in clearly establishing those goals, he said, shows why the decision to shut down the N.S.C. directorate was so consequential. "People talk about, like, why does it matter that they closed the White House office on pandemic preparedness? This is one reason.""
Dennis OConnor

Health Design - UCSD Design Lab - 0 views

designlab.ucsd.edu/...health-design

ecosystem UCSD Apollo design-thinking

shared by Dennis OConnor on 29 May 18 - No Cached
  • Dennis OConnor on 29 May 18
     
    "Center for Health Design, Director: Eliah Aronoff-Spencer The Center for Health Design's mission is to foster human-technology teamwork in healthcare by taking a people-centered approach to health's greatest challenges. We work with global stakeholders, from village innovators, community volunteers and patient advocates to researchers, clinicians, government and industry. Together we aim to solve the "wicked" health problems that require not just singular scientific advances but innovation in multidisciplinary and distributed teamwork."
Dennis OConnor

The Design Lab - UC San Diego - 0 views

designlab.ucsd.edu

design-thinking ecosystem

shared by Dennis OConnor on 29 May 18 - No Cached
  • Dennis OConnor on 29 May 18
     
    he UC San Diego Design Lab works on major societal issues, such as large-scale education, automation, healthcare, visualization of complex phenomena and data, social interactions, citizen science, and the ethical issues that are of ever-increasing importance.
Dennis OConnor

The Digital Revolution: The Potential Promise and Ethical Perils in Research - 0 views

mailchi.mp/...ash-eliza-smith-2019-1525289

ethics research design-thinking Camille-Nebeker

shared by Dennis OConnor on 14 Nov 19 - No Cached
  • Dennis OConnor on 14 Nov 19
     
    Camille Nebeker* 11/13
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