It could be argued that the costs to the United States of providing such services for the rest of the world are modest, but that is ultimately a judgment call. To be sure, the dollar costs will not bankrupt us as a nation, but Americans spend $2,700 per person on our military, while the average European spends less than $700. The bottom line is that Europeans have little incentive to spend more because they don't feel particularly threatened, and they aren't anxious to take on responsibilities that are ably handled by the United States. The advocates of hegemonic stability theory would declare that a feature, not a bug. Mission accomplished. And that might be true, if the greatest threat to global security were a resurgence of conflict in Europe, and if it is truly in the U.S. interest to forever have allies with few capabilities and many liabilities. But that seems extremely shortsighted. The sweeping political and economic integration in Europe has dramatically reduced the likelihood of another European war. In the meantime, the fact that we have many allies with little to offer by way of military assets, and even less political will to actually use them, is forcing the U.S. military to bear the disproportionate share of the burdens of policing the planet. And in the medium- to long-term, while I doubt that we will be facing "a militarily superior, post-Soviet Russia," allies with usable military power might ultimately serve a purpose if Moscow proves as aggressive (and capable) as the hawks claim.

"And once they do figure it out, of course, they could never rid themselves of it because the minority never had an interest in letting go of their advantage. Binder's history doesn't have much bearing on whether the filibuster is a good thing or a bad thing. Plenty of accidents are happy accidents. But it should put to rest the idea that the filibuster somehow represents the will of the Founders, or it was adopted as part of a conscious effort to protect minority rights. The filibuster was an accident. It has been reformed a number of times (notably in 1917, when cloture was set at 67 votes, and in 1975, when cloture was lowered to 60 votes). It can be kept in its current state, strengthened, weakened or abolished. There is nothing sacred about it."

"Real, live Germans are not heartless ants, and the Greeks are not broke because they are giddy crickets who sing their summers away. Greece is a grown-up country with grown-up problems: rough, tough politics, and a lot of recent history, not all of it very nice. And it is precisely that recent history, and rough politics, that are at the core of Greece's fiscal woes today. Take the painful question of the huge public sector, and all those civil servants with jobs for life, and unusually generous retirement packages. The existence of those jobs for life is not a cultural quirk, in which Greek officials simply like coffee and backgammon too much to do any work. It is the end result of a brutal, multi-decade power struggle between the left and the right: a struggle that got people killed within living memory."

"After all, Germany is now run by a generation with no personal memories of the war. Germany's historical debate is now focused on the fate of Germans who suffered from wartime bombing and postwar deportation, not with the fate of Germany's victims-in Greece or anywhere else. Sooner or later, the Germans will collectively decide that enough sacrifices have been made and that the debt to Europe has been paid. Thanks to the ungrateful Greeks with their island villas and large pensions, that day may arrive more quickly that we thought it would."

"If I were to describe the first year of Barack Obama's presidency, it would be as that of a trimmer. He represented change - but not the radical kind the left wanted or the revolutionary kind the right still suspects. In the wake of the rigid, white-knuckled George W Bush and Dick Cheney, he appeared as a lithe and nimble, cat-like creature. Time after time he seems to have given way to opponents and to have bent too easily in the prevailing winds.\n\n[...]\n\nAll the way he seemed weak, reactive, vacillating, vague. He has given his supporters as little emotional satisfaction as he has given some of his allies (Britain included). In fact, he has driven his friends a little crazy and allowed his enemies to greet his open hand with contempt. He has bent to the prevailing winds and not picked battles when he was unsure he could win them. But in the end there isn't weakness here. There is a suppleness and pragmatism that is a kind of strength."

"I regard the establishment of the Jewish state as one of the West's high-points in the 20th Century. Like America's founding, it was not immaculate, and its survival has been a brutal struggle in which Israel has not been as innocent as some want to believe, but whose enemies' anti-Semitism and hatred is tangible and omnipresent and despicable. But the Palestinians' legitimate grievances are very real and utterly human and perfectly understandable. Israel, for its part, remains, in its own proper borders, a model state for that part of the world; its openness and democracy vastly exceed any neighboring regime's; it has made more of a tiny strip of land than most of its neighbors have of their vastly greater territory and resources put together. If I were Jewish, I'd be proud. But I'm not, and I can still admire a great deal. There is a huge amount to admire."

"The No. 2 official on the Federal Reserve Board said Monday that he will retire, opening a third seat on what may be the world's most powerful economic body and giving President Obama a historic opportunity to reshape the central bank.\n\n[...]\n\nThe changes come at a time of epic transformation in, and intense scrutiny of, the Fed's mission. During the past two years, the Fed has taken extraordinary actions to contain a financial crisis and prop up the economy. Now the institution must decide how and when to wind down some of those emergency measures."

"Is globalisation inevitable and irreversible? This column argues that globalisation is a policy choice. It examines the relationship between military expansion and international trade flows, finding that increased nationalist and militarist sentiments are negatively associated with trade. A 10% increase in military spending between 1985 and 2005 is associated with a reduction in the trade share of GDP of around 2%."

"And yet, all of these people sense dimly that there is some larger process at work, a process that gives coherence and order to the daily headlines. the twentieth century saw the developed world descend into a paroxysm of ideological violence, as liberalism contended first with the remnants of absolutism, then bolshevism and fascism, and finally an updated Marxism that threatened  to lead to  the ultimate apocalypse of nuclear war.  But the century that began full of self-confidence in the ultimate triumph of Western  liberal democracy seems at its close to be returning full circle to where it started: not to an "end of ideology" or a convergence between capitalism and socialism, as earlier predicted, but to an unabashed victory of economic and political liberalism."

"IT IS TIME to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common view of the world, or even that they occupy the same world. On the all-important question of power - the efficacy of power, the morality of power, the desirability of power - American and European perspectives are diverging. Europe is turning away from power, or to put it a little differently, it is moving beyond power into a self-contained world of laws and rules and transnational negotiation and cooperation. It is entering a post-historical paradise of peace and relative prosperity, the realization of Kant's "Perpetual Peace." The United States, meanwhile, remains mired in history, exercising power in the anarchic Hobbesian world where international laws and rules are unreliable and where true security and the defense and promotion of a liberal order still depend on the possession and use of military might. That is why on major strategic and international questions today, Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus: They agree on little and understand one another less and less. And this state of affairs is not transitory - the product of one American election or one catastrophic event. The reasons for the transatlantic divide are deep, long in development, and likely to endure. When it comes to setting national priorities, determining threats, defining challenges, and fashioning and implementing foreign and defense policies, the United States and Europe have parted ways."