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Making Existing Reactors More Secure against Terrorist Attacks The NRC should revise its assumptions about terrorists' capabilities to ensure nuclear plants are adequately protected against credible threats, and these assumptions should be reviewed by U.S. intelligence agencies. The NRC should modify the way it judges force-on-force security exercises by assessing a plant's "margin to failure," rather than whether the plant merely passes or fails. The U.S. government should establish a program for licensing private security guards that would require successful completion of a federally supervised training course and periodic recertification. Making New Reactors More Secure against Terrrorist Attacks The NRC should require new reactor designs to be safer than existing reactors. The NRC should require new reactor designs to be more secure against land- and water-based terrorist attacks.

Improving the NRC's Cost-Benefit and Risk-Informed Analyses The NRC should increase the value it assigns to a human life in its cost-benefit analyses so the value is consistent with other government agencies. The NRC should require plant owners to calculcate the risk of fuel damage in spent fuel pools as well as reactor cores in all safety analyses. The NRC should not make decisions about reactor safety using probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs) until it has corrected its flawed application of this tool. Ensuring Public Participation The NRC should fully restore the public's right to obtain information and question witnesses in hearings about changes to existing power plant licenses and applications for new licenses.

The United States and Euratom have a long and productive history of cooperation on nuclear security and nonproliferation that dates back more than 30 years. The cooperative work under this agreement will be managed by NNSA’s Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). NGSI is a robust, multi-year program to develop the policies, concepts, technologies, expertise, and international infrastructure necessary to strengthen and sustain the international safeguards system.

Euratom was created in 1957 to establish the conditions for the development of nuclear energy in Europe by sharing resources, protecting the general public, and associating other countries and international organizations with this work.

Readiness Preparedness is an essential prerequisite for effective nuclear emergency management. International exercises are held systematically to determine whether the national systems in place are prepared and can respond swiftly and effectively. The USIE system is designed to support such exercises. "For the first time, this simple-to-use and effective system streamlines mechanisms for reporting and sharing information about incidents and emergencies in a secure information exchange channel," said Elena Buglova, the Head of the IAEA's Incident and Emergency Centre. This innovation strengthens international coordination, she noted, "which will improve the speed and effectiveness of the global response to nuclear and radiological emergencies of all types."

Background

Until the Chernobyl nuclear accident in 1986, there was no information exchange system. Immediately following that accident, the IAEA's Member States negotiated the so-called Emergency Conventions to ensure that in the event of a nuclear accident, the country that suffers an accident would issue timely, authenticated information, while the Member States that could field technical support, would do so in a coordinated fashion, if such support is requested by the State concerned. When concerns regarding the malicious use of nuclear or radioactive materials grew, the IAEA established the IEC in 2005 to serve as a global focal point for emergency preparedness and response to nuclear and radiological incidents and emergencies. The IEC develops standards, guidelines and tools like USIE. The IEC staff provide support, training, global event reporting, information exchange and around-the-clock assistance to Member States dealing with nuclear and radiological events. Fundamentally, the IEC is a global coordinator for international expertise from the IAEA, as well as from other international organizations, such as the FAO, WHO, or WMO.

Before USIE's launch in June 2011, two secure websites were operated to provide emergency and support information: The Emergency Notification and Assistance Convention Website, or ENAC, was set up to exchange information on nuclear accidents or radiological emergencies. The Nuclear Event Web-based System, or NEWS, is a joint project of the IAEA, OECD/NEA and World Association of Nuclear Operators that provides authoritative information on nuclear and radiological events, using the International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale, or INES. See Story Resources for more information.

Many ICS have lifespans of 30 years and mitigation and compensation measures to help them mesh with the newer technologies are creating additional weak links and vulnerabilities.

Another worrisome change involves tens of millions of wireless "smart meters" being installed in homes and businesses for faster, more efficient two-way communications with local utilities via the Internet. Utilities, in turn, are networked with the big transmission operators and bulk power generators. More than 300,000 smart meters are installed in Ottawa homes and small businesses.The concern is that they potentially expose the system to hackers and other cyber attacks.

This kind of open-market assurance would lessen the perceived need for a country to develop its own suite of nuclear fuel facilities as Iran has done. Chu said Iran has a choice: "it can comply with its obligations and restore international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear activities, or it can face deepening isolation and international censure." He praised the IAEA board for referring the status of nuclear programs in Iran, Syria and North Korea to the UN Security Council.   Chu's statement contained a message from President Barack Obama: "The tragic events at Fukushima make clear that nuclear energy, which holds great promise for global development and as a carbon-free source of power, also brings significant challenges to our collective safety and security... We must aim for a future in which peaceful nuclear energy is not only safe, but also accessible by all nations that abide by their obligations."

Low wages

The relationship between the cause of Mr. Osumi's death and radiation exposure is unknown. However, it is still the radiation exposure that is most worrisome for the workers who work at Fukushima I Nuke Plant to wind down the accident. The radiation exposure limit was lowered back to the normal "maximum 50 millisieverts per year" and "100 millisieverts in 5 years" on December 16 last year. It was done on the declaration of "the end of the accident" by Prime Minister Noda that day.

The radiation exposure limit was raised to 250 millisieverts per year right after the accident, as a special measure. The Ministry of Health and Labor argued that the number was based on the international standard for a severe accident which was 500 millisieverts. But the real purpose was to increase the number of hours that can be put in by the workers and to increase the number of workers to promptly wind down the accident.

However, as the prime minister wanted to appeal "the end of the accident", the limit was lowered back to the normal limit.

According to TEPCO, the radiation exposure levels of workers exceeded [annualized?] 250 millisieverts in some cases right after the accident, but since April it has been within 100 millisieverts.

However, the workers voice concerns over the safety management. One of the subcontract workers told the newspaper:

He also says the safety management cannot be fully enforced by TEPCO alone, and demands the national government to step in. "They need to come up with the management system that include the subcontract workers. Unless they secure the [safe] work environment and work conditions, they cannot deal with the restoration work that may continue for a long while."

From Tokyo Shinbun (1/27/2012):(The first half of the article is asbout Mr. Osumi, the first worker to die in May last year after the plant "recovery" work started. About him and his Thai wife, please read my post from July 11, 2011.)

Then the workers start working at the site. But there are not enough radiation control personnel who measure radiation levels in the high-radiation locations, and warn and instruct the workers. There are too many workers because the nature of the work is to wind down the accident. There are workers who take off their masks or who smoke even in the dangerous [high radiation] locations. I'm worried for their internal radiation exposures."

In the rest area where the workers eat lunch and smoke, the radiation level is 12 microsieverts/hour. "Among workers, we don't talk about radiation levels. There's no point."

The worker divulged to us, "For now, they've managed to get workers from all over Japan. But there won't be enough workers by summer, all bosses at the employment agencies say so." Local construction companies also admit [to the scarcity of workers by summer.]

"Local contractors who have been involved in the work at Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant do not work there any more. It's dangerous, and there are jobs other than at the nuke plant, such as construction of temporary housing. The professional migrant workers who hop from one nuclear plant to another all over Japan avoid Fukushima I Nuke Plant. The pay is not particularly good, so what is the point of getting high radiation to the max allowed and losing the opportunity to work in other nuclear plants? So, it's mostly amateurs who work at the plant right now. Sooner or later, the supply of workers will dry up."

As to the working conditions and wage levels of the subcontract workers, TEPCO's PR person explains, "We believe the subcontracting companies are providing appropriate guidance." As to securing the workers, he emphasizes that "there is no problem at this point in sourcing enough workers. We will secure necessary workers depending on how the work progresses."

However, Katsuyasu Iida, Director General of Tokyo Occupational Safety and Health Center who have been dealing with the health problems of nuclear workers, points out, "Workers are made to work in a dangerous environment. The wage levels are going down, and there are cases of non-payment. It is getting harder to secure the workers."

As to the safety management, he said, "Before you start working at a nuclear power plant, you have to go through the "training before entering radiation control area". But in reality the training is ceremonial. The assumptions in the textbook do not match the real job site in an emergency situation. There were some who could not read, but someone else filled in the test for them at the end of the training."

Memo from the desk [at Tokyo Shinbun]: Workers at Fukushima I Nuke Plant are risking their lives. Some are doing it for 8000 yen per day. A councilman who also happens to work for TEPCO earns more than 10 million yen [US$130,000] per year. Executives who "descended from heaven" to cushy jobs in the "nuclear energy village" are alive and well. To move away from nuclear power generation is not just about energy issues. It is to question whether we will continue to ignore such "absurdity".

Well said. Everybody in the nuclear industry in Japan knew that the industry depended (still does) on migrant workers who were (still are) hired on the cheap thorough layer after layer of subcontracting companies. Thanks to the Fukushima I Nuclear Plant accident, now the general public know that. But there are plenty of those who are still comfortable with the nuclear power generated by the nuclear power plants maintained at the expense of such workers and see nothing wrong with it.

One possible barrier to renewed industry growth is the 20-year mummification of the industry’s supply sector. However, this is changing, with membership of the UK Nuclear Industry Association (NIA) booming as companies realise that there will be many new opportunities in this sector as the UK returns to building reactors. Another possible negative, namely the need to ensure a strict world non-proliferation regime, has been reinforced by the North Korean and Iranian cases, to which endless column inches and analyses have been devoted.  On the other hand, three highly important factors have moved very strongly in the industry’s favour: the industry’s own operating performance, the greenhouse gas emissions debate and concerns over energy security of supply

The 435 reactors around the world generate electricity very cheaply and earns significant profits for their owners, irrespective of the power market, whether it is liberalised or regulated. The challenge for the industry is to cut the capital investment costs of new reactors to enable many new reactor projects to go forward. Concerns over climate change and the perceived need to moderate greenhouse gas emissions has worked strongly in the industry’s favour and, at the very least, have opened an opportunity for the industry as a viable mitigation technology. The argument for more nuclear power as a means of securing additional energy security of supply has also become increasingly important, particularly in those countries who perceive themselves as becoming increasingly reliant on supplies from geopolitically unstable or otherwise unattractive countries. It is important to recall that this was the main argument that prompted both France and Japan, now numbers two and three in world nuclear generation, to go down this path in the 1970s in the aftermath of two “oil shocks”.

ADDRESSES: The Draft SWEIS and its reference material are available for review on the NNSA/NSO Web site at: http://nnsa.energy.gov/nepa.

Firstly, 'spent fuel' is defined as fuel whose elements have been removed from the reactor because the fissionable material they contain has been depleted to a level near where it can no longer sustain a chain reaction. The high concentration of radioactive fission products in spent power-reactor fuel creates a gamma-radiation field, which at a distance of a metre would be lethal. South Africa, or more accurately Necsa, no longer has any use for this material.

Secondly, the US and South Africa have been working constructively for a number of years on various peaceful use applications of nuclear material and in particular on the need to minimise the use of HEU. Examples of such co-operation are the conversion of South Africa's SAFARI-1 reactor to low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel as well as training in medical responses to nuclear and radiological emergencies. Indeed, today South Africa is leading the transition to produce the medical isotope molybdenum-99 (Mo-99) with LEU rather than HEU.

Zuma was one of only five African Heads of State or government invited to develop concrete measures towards ensuring that nuclear materials under their control are not stolen or diverted (the others being Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Nigeria). They pledged to improve security as changing conditions may require, and to exchange best practices and practical solutions for doing so. The Summit's final communiqué also highlighted the fact that 'highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium require special precautions'.

Thirdly, the return is not unique. The repatriation of used and unused HEU fuel to its country of origin - either the US or Russia - has been an international goal since the early 1980s. Some 1,249kg of US-origin highly enriched uranium from sites around the world have already been returned, including from Chile in April 2010 just after the earthquake the previous February.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the spent fuel storage facility at Necsa is not, and has never been, 'vulnerable' - in the sense of being in danger of being accessed by organisations or persons with criminal intent or worse, with terrorist ideologies.

Since the Liberal Democratic Party selected him as prime minister in September 2006, the hawkish Abe repeatedly called for Japan to move beyond the postwar formula of a strictly defensive posture and non-nuclear principles. Advocacy of a nuclear-armed Japan arose from his family tradition. His grandfather Nobusuke Kishi nurtured the wartime atomic bomb project and, as postwar prime minister, enacted the civilian nuclear program. His father Shintaro Abe, a former foreign minister, had played the Russian card in the 1980s, sponsoring the Russo-Japan College, run by the Aum Shinrikyo sect (a front for foreign intelligence), to recruit weapons scientists from a collapsing Soviet Union.   The chief obstacle to American acceptance of a nuclear-armed Japan was the Pentagon, where Pearl Harbor and Hiroshima remain as iconic symbols justifying American military supremacy.The only feasible channel for bilateral transfers then was through the civilian-run Department of Energy (DoE), which supervises the production of nuclear weapons.

Camp David Go-Ahead   The deal was sealed on Abe's subsequent visit to Washington. Wary of the eavesdropping that led to Richard Nixon's fall from grace, Bush preferred the privacy afforded at Camp David. There, in a rustic lodge on April 27, Bush and Abe huddled for 45 minutes. What transpired has never been revealed, not even in vague outline.   As his Russian card suggested, Abe was shopping for enriched uranium. At 99.9 percent purity, American-made uranium and plutonium is the world's finest nuclear material. The lack of mineral contaminants means that it cannot be traced back to its origin. In contrast, material from Chinese and Russian labs can be identified by impurities introduced during the enrichment process.

The flow of coolant water into the storage pools ceased, quickening evaporation. Fission of the overheated cores led to blasts and mushroom-clouds. Residents in mountaintop Iitate village overlooking the seaside plant saw plumes of smoke and could "taste the metal" in their throats.   Guilty as Charged   The Tohoku earthquake and tsunami were powerful enough to damage Fukushima No.1. The natural disaster, however, was vastly amplified by two external factors: release of the Stuxnet virus, which shut down control systems in the critical 20 minutes prior to the tsunami; and presence of weapons-grade nuclear materials that devastated the nuclear facility and contaminated the entire region.   Of the three parties involved, which bears the greatest guilt? All three are guilty of mass murder, injury and destruction of property on a regional scale, and as such are liable for criminal prosecution and damages under international law and in each respective jurisdiction.

An unannounced reason for Cheney's visit was to promote a quadrilateral alliance in the Asia-Pacific region. The four cornerstones - the US, Japan, Australia and India - were being called on to contain and confront China and its allies North Korea and Russia.. From a Japanese perspective, this grand alliance was flawed by asymmetry: The three adversaries were nuclear powers, while the U.S. was the only one in the Quad group.   To further his own nuclear ambitions, Abe was playing the Russian card. As mentioned in a U.S. Embassy cable (dated 9/22), the Yomiuri Shimbun gave top play to this challenge to the White House : "It was learned yesterday that the government and domestic utility companies have entered final talks with Russia in order to relegate uranium enrichment for use at nuclear power facilities to Atomprom, the state-owned nuclear monopoly." If Washington refused to accept a nuclear-armed Japan, Tokyo would turn to Moscow.

Throughout the Pantex caper, from the data theft to smuggling operation, Bush and Cheney's point man for nuclear issues was DoE Deputy Director Clay Sell, a lawyer born in Amarillo and former aide to Panhandle district Congressman Mac Thornberry. Sell served on the Bush-Cheney transition team and became the top adviser to the President on nuclear issues. At DoE, Sell was directly in charge of the U.S. nuclear weapons complex, which includes 17 national laboratories and the Pantex plant. (Another alarm bell: Sell was also staff director for the Senate Energy subcommittee under the late Sen. Ted Stevens of Alaska, who died in a 2010 plane crash.)   An Israeli Double-Cross   The nuclear shipments to Japan required a third-party cutout for plausible deniability by the White House. Israel acted less like an agent and more like a broker in demanding additional payment from Tokyo, according to intelligence sources. Adding injury to insult, the Israelis skimmed off the newer warhead cores for their own arsenal and delivered older ones. Since deteriorated cores require enrichment, the Japanese were furious and demanded a refund, which the Israelis refused. Tokyo had no recourse since by late 2008 principals Abe had resigned the previous autumn and Bush was a lame duck.

The Japanese nuclear developers, under the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, had no choice but to enrich the uranium cores at Fukushima No.1, a location remote enough to evade detection by nonproliferation inspectors. Hitachi and GE had developed a laser extraction process for plutonium, which requires vast amounts of electrical power. This meant one reactor had to make unscheduled runs, as was the case when the March earthquake struck.   Tokyo dealt a slap on the wrist to Tel Aviv by backing Palestinian rights at the UN. Not to be bullied, the Israeli secret service launched the Stuxnet virus against Japan's nuclear facilities.   Firewalls kept Stuxnet at bay until the Tohoku earthquake. The seismic activity felled an electricity tower behind Reactor 6. The power cut disrupted the control system, momentarily taking down the firewall. As the computer came online again, Stuxnet infiltrated to shut down the back-up generators. During the 20-minute interval between quake and tsunami, the pumps and valves at Fukushima No.1 were immobilized, exposing the turbine rooms to flood damage.

The Texas Job   BWXT Pantex, America's nuclear warhead facility, sprawls over 16,000 acres of the Texas Panhandle outside Amarillo. Run by the DoE and Babcock & Wilson, the site also serves as a storage facility for warheads past their expiration date. The 1989 shutdown of Rocky Flats, under community pressure in Colorado, forced the removal of those nuclear stockpiles to Pantex. Security clearances are required to enter since it is an obvious target for would-be nuclear thieves.   In June 2004, a server at the Albuquerque office of the National Nuclear Security System was hacked. Personal information and security-clearance data for 11 federal employees and 177 contractors at Pantex were lifted. NNSA did not inform Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman or his deputy Clay Sell until three months after the security breach, indicating investigators suspected an inside job.

The White House, specifically Bush, Cheney and their co-conspirators in the DoE, hold responsibility for ordering the illegal removal and shipment of warheads without safeguards.   The state of Israel is implicated in theft from U.S. strategic stockpiles, fraud and extortion against the Japanese government, and a computer attack against critical infrastructure with deadly consequences, tantamount to an act of war.   Prime Minister Abe and his Economy Ministry sourced weapons-grade nuclear material in violation of constitutional law and in reckless disregard of the risks of unregulated storage, enrichment and extraction. Had Abe not requested enriched uranium and plutonium in the first place, the other parties would not now be implicated. Japan, thus, bears the onus of the crime.

The International Criminal Court has sufficient grounds for taking up a case that involves the health of millions of people in Japan, Canada, the United States, Russia, the Koreas, Mongolia, China and possibly the entire Northern Hemisphere. The Fukushima disaster is more than an human-rights charge against a petty dictator, it is a crime against humanity on par with the indictments at the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals. Failure to prosecute is complicity.   If there is a silver lining to every dark cloud, it's that the Tohoku earthquake and tsunami saved the world from even greater folly by halting the drive to World War III.

Yet in the entire history of the nuclear industry, there have been three major reactor accidents: Three Mile Island in Pennsylvania, Chernobyl in Russia and Fukushima. And apart from Chernobyl — which was caused by a flawed reactor design that is not employed anywhere in the United States — no nuclear workers or members of the public have ever died as a result of exposure to radiation from a commercial nuclear plant. This fact is attributable to sound designs, strong construction, a culture in which safety always comes first, a highly trained, conscientious workforce, and rigorous government oversight.

Nuclear power plants are constantly upgraded.Unlike cars or appliances that are typically run until they break down, U.S. nuclear plants have a proactive aging-management program that replaces equipment well before it has the opportunity to malfunction. Using the car analogy, think of it this way: While the body of the car may have been manufactured years ago, its engine and safety systems are upgraded and rebuilt continuously with state-of-the-art components over time.In 2009 alone, the U.S. nuclear industry invested approximately $6.5 billion to upgrade plant systems with the latest technology. Continuous upgrades have always been the standard for U.S. nuclear plants for many reasons — most importantly protecting the health and safely of the public and workers. This industry considers continuous improvement to be a necessary investment rather than "optional" expense.

The amount of spent fuel is small and can be managed safely.In many cases, the issue of storing used fuel is discussed without proper context.Used nuclear fuel is in the form of solid pellets about the size of a pencil eraser. The fact is, the total amount of waste generated by the entire U.S. nuclear industry over more than 60 years of operation would fit in the area of one football field. For this entire time, we have safely and securely stored this fuel on-site in specially-designed pools and in strongly-engineered dry storage containers.

Nobody would argue that the on-site storage of used fuel is ideal. But it is a responsible option for now, since the relative amount of used fuel is so small; because multiple levels of safety and security protection have proven to be effective; more than 50 years of scientific research, engineering and experience proves that it can be stored with little environmental impact; and on-site storage is the only option utilities have until the federal government fulfills its responsibility to identify a long-term disposal solution.Moreover, only a small percentage of the available energy has been harvested from this fuel at the point when regulations require it to be stored on-site. This fuel should be recycled and re-used, as other countries have successfully concluded. But until political barriers in this country allow for this logical path, it must be stored on-site.

Nuclear plants have more government oversight than any other industry.The rigor and comprehensiveness of nuclear safety oversight in the United States is extraordinary. Our licensing and regulatory process is studied and emulated worldwide.Every nuclear power plant in the United States has multiple government inspectors on-site, year-round. They are top experts in the field and have unrestricted access to all vital areas of the plant, including plant records. In addition to these daily oversight activities, each plant frequently undergoes multiple evaluations and inspections that include detailed reviews of security, emergency planning, environmental protection, industrial safety, critical plant systems, plant culture and safety processes — all of which are aimed at ensuring the continued safe operation of these facilities.

Honest questioning from concerned citizens regarding nuclear energy is understandable. A thinking society should continuously strive for accurate, credible validation of its technologies. As to the safety and security of U.S. nuclear plants, the facts are reassuring. I firmly believe that these — and other facts — should be the basis for any discussion on the future of nuclear energy here in America.

Commitment to Continuous Learning, Safety

The U.S. industry—through its commitment to continuous learning and relentless pursuit of excellence in safe operations—has taken significant action to ensure that American reactors are operated safety and securely. This includes actions in the following areas: Command and control: key operational and response decisions remain with shift supervisor—Decision-making remains on site with licensed operators. Reactor operators drill on accident scenarios several times each year and are prepared to respond to a wide range of potential severe events.

Operator licensing and training—U.S. reactor operators are licensed by the NRC and must re-qualify for their license every two years. U.S. reactor operators spend one week out of six in simulator training, which is more continuous training than pilots and doctors. Safety culture—The industry’s safety culture is transparent and encourages and facilitates the reporting of problems or concerns by employees through several channels. A commitment to safety culture is evidenced by employees who embrace continuous learning and maintain a questioning attitude regarding safety. This attitude gives rise to tools like corrective actions programs.

Independent regulator that includes resident inspectors—The NRC is an independent agency whose sole mission is protection of public health and safety. NRC inspectors located at each of America’s nuclear energy facilities have unfettered access to workers and data as part of their daily inspections. Creation of the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations—INPO was formed by the industry after the Three Mile Island accident to drive industry toward operational excellence and above and beyond NRC requirements. Post 9/11 security contingency measures—The NRC and industry took several actions after 9/11 to enhance security at America’s nuclear energy facilities. These features also would help mitigate extreme events, such as large fires or explosions.

(Also see NEI’s graphic: “Commitment to Continuous Learning, Safety.”)

In the WEO’s central New Policies Scenario, which assumes that recent government commitments are implemented in a cautious manner, primary energy demand increases by one-third between 2010 and 2035, with 90% of the growth in non-OECD economies. China consolidates its position as the world’s largest energy consumer: it consumes nearly 70% more energy than the United States by 2035, even though, by then, per capita demand in China is still less than half the level in the United States. The share of fossil fuels in global primary energy consumption falls from around 81% today to 75% in 2035. Renewables increase from 13% of the mix today to 18% in 2035; the growth in renewables is underpinned by subsidies that rise from $64 billion in 2010 to $250 billion in 2035, support that in some cases cannot be taken for granted in this age of fiscal austerity. By contrast, subsidies for fossil fuels amounted to $409 billion in 2010.

Here’s the summary of the main points, released today by the agency: “Growth, prosperity and rising population will inevitably push up energy needs over the coming decades. But we cannot continue to rely on insecure and environmentally unsustainable uses of energy,” said IEA Executive Director Maria van der Hoeven. “Governments need to introduce stronger measures to drive investment in efficient and low-carbon technologies. The Fukushima nuclear accident, the turmoil in parts of the Middle East and North Africa and a sharp rebound in energy demand in 2010 which pushed CO2 emissions to a record high, highlight the urgency and the scale of the challenge.”

The use of coal – which met almost half of the increase in global energy demand over the last decade – rises 65% by 2035. Prospects for coal are especially sensitive to energy policies – notably in China, which today accounts for almost half of global demand. More efficient power plants and carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology could boost prospects for coal, but the latter still faces significant regulatory, policy and technical barriers that make its deployment uncertain.Fukushima Daiichi has raised questions about the future role of nuclear power. In the New Policies Scenario, nuclear output rises by over 70% by 2035, only slightly less than projected last year, as most countries with nuclear programmes have reaffirmed their commitment to them. But given the increased uncertainty, that could change. A special Low Nuclear Case examines what would happen if the anticipated contribution of nuclear to future energy supply were to be halved. While providing a boost to renewables, such a slowdown would increase import bills, heighten energy security concerns and make it harder and more expensive to combat climate change.

The future for natural gas is more certain: its share in the energy mix rises and gas use almost catches up with coal consumption, underscoring key findings from a recent WEO Special Report which examined whether the world is entering a “Golden Age of Gas”. One country set to benefit from increased demand for gas is Russia, which is the subject of a special in-depth study in WEO-2011. Key challenges for Russia are to finance a new generation of higher-cost oil and gas fields and to improve its energy efficiency. While Russia remains an important supplier to its traditional markets in Europe, a shift in its fossil fuel exports towards China and the Asia-Pacific gathers momentum. If Russia improved its energy efficiency to the levels of comparable OECD countries, it could reduce its primary energy use by almost one-third, an amount similar to the consumption of the United Kingdom. Potential savings of natural gas alone, at 180 bcm, are close to Russia’s net exports in 2010.

In the New Policies Scenario, cumulative CO2 emissions over the next 25 years amount to three-quarters of the total from the past 110 years, leading to a long-term average temperature rise of 3.5°C. China’s per-capita emissions match the OECD average in 2035. Were the new policies not implemented, we are on an even more dangerous track, to an increase of 6°C.“As each year passes without clear signals to drive investment in clean energy, the “lock-in” of high-carbon infrastructure is making it harder and more expensive to meet our energy security and climate goals,” said Fatih Birol, IEA Chief Economist. The WEO presents a 450 Scenario, which traces an energy path consistent with meeting the globally agreed goal of limiting the temperature rise to 2°C. Four-fifths of the total energy-related CO2 emissions permitted to 2035 in the 450 Scenario are already locked-in by existing capital stock, including power stations, buildings and factories. Without further action by 2017, the energy-related infrastructure then in place would generate all the CO2 emissions allowed in the 450 Scenario up to 2035. Delaying action is a false economy: for every $1 of investment in cleaner technology that is avoided in the power sector before 2020, an additional $4.30 would need to be spent after 2020 to compensate for the increased emissions.

On the technical end, it appears that the underlying cause of the three core meltdowns, the hydrogen explosions, and the subsequent release of radioactive material was the loss of coolant to the nuclear cores, which was ultimately due to the loss of electrical power to the reactors. Without power to circulate the water that cooled the fuel rods, nothing could have prevented the core meltdowns. In light of this failure, questions center on reactor design and handling of nuclear fuel. Can reactors be designed without a reliance on electrical power to maintain the proper core temperature? In the event of system failure, are there better alternatives to human intervention? Stronger safety designs have been proposed in the past -- ones that are more straightforward and less Rube Goldberg-like than the complicated systems currently used. Why haven't they been developed? Meanwhile, the handling of nuclear fuel continues to defy logic: Why is spent fuel still stored at power plants -- raising the odds of damage and the subsequent release of radioactive materials in accidents? What exactly are the obstacles to placing spent fuel in long-term storage repositories?

A second set of questions focuses on operations, regulation, and public knowledge about nuclear reactors. How can regulatory agencies maintain independence from the nuclear industry and enforce rigorous safety standards? What prevents the industry from being more transparent about operations, especially when leaks and mishaps occur? If existing regulatory arrangements appear inadequate, then could a different structure of economic incentives encourage utilities to make their nuclear power plants safer and more secure? In the United States, for example, current law limits industry liability in the event of an accident. Does the limit on legal liability in the event of an accident reduce firms' incentives not only to develop the safest designs possible but also to ensure the most rigorous oversight of maintenance and operations?

More broadly, how can societies and communities meet their energy needs with the least risk and the greatest payoff for economic development? Are there alternatives based on precautionary principles -- first do no harm -- that involve less peril to safety, health, and community than nuclear or fossil-fueled power? Are we locked into the current energy development path? How should we think about the trade-offs between injury and disruption from energy technologies and future injury and disruption from climate change?

But have we learned anything? These questions are difficult to answer and the trade-offs nearly impossible to calculate. Even harder, however, will be implementing policy recommendations in a world of vested interests tied to old technologies. Over the past 100 years or so, the world's "energy portfolio" did not diversify very much -- as electric and gas-fueled engines powered industrial development. Renewable energy technologies like wind, solar, and biofuels hold great potential, but require much more rapid development to substitute for fossil fuels and nuclear power in the near term. So it appears now that there are few good choices: Either warm the planet's atmosphere and oceans, with dire consequences for human societies as the climate rapidly changes, or place communities in jeopardy from nuclear plant accidents and releases of deadly radioactive materials. However, in January 2012, when the Bulletin deliberates about moving the hand of the Doomsday Clock, the most important question will be: What have governments, firms, and citizens learned from the Fukushima disaster about managing Earth-altering technologies? And will they act on what they have learned in time to avert future disaster?

All countries with well-established nuclear programs have found themselves requiring spent fuel storage in addition to spent fuel pools at reactors. Some, like the US, use dry storage designs, such as individual casks or storage vaults that are located at reactor sites; other countries, Germany for one, use away-from-reactor facilities. Sweden has a large underground pool located at a centralized facility, CLAB, to which different reactors send their spent fuel a year after discharge, so spent fuel does not build up at reactor sites. Dry storage tends to be cheaper and can be more secure than wet storage because active circulation of water is not required. At the same time, because dry storage uses passive air cooling, not the active cooling that is available in a pool to keep the fuel cool, these systems can only accept spent fuel a number of years after discharge.6

The United States had been working toward developing a high-level waste repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada; this fell through in 2010, when the Obama administration decided to reverse this decision, citing political “stalemate” and lack of public consensus about the site. Instead, the Obama administration instituted the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future to rethink the management of the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle.8 The US can flaunt one success, though. The Waste Isolation Pilot Project (WIPP), located near Carlsbad in southern New Mexico, is actually the only operating deep geologic repository for intermediate level nuclear waste, receiving waste since 1998. In the case of WIPP, it only accepts transuranic wastes from the nuclear weapons complex. The site is regulated solely by the Environmental Protection Agency, and the state of New Mexico has partial oversight of WIPP through its permitting authority established by the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. The city of Carlsbad is supportive of the site and it appears to be tolerated by the rest of the state.9

France has had more success after failing in its first siting attempt in 1990, when a granite site that had been selected drew large protests and the government opted to rethink its approach to nuclear waste disposal entirely. In 2006, the government announced that it needed a geologic repository for high-level waste, identified at least one suitable area, and passed laws requiring a license application to be submitted by 2015 and the site to begin receiving high-level waste by 2025.

Canada recently rethought the siting process for nuclear waste disposal and began a consensus-based participatory process. The Canadian Nuclear Waste Management Organization was established in 2002, after previous attempts to site a repository failed. The siting process began with three years’ worth of conversations with the public on the best method to manage spent fuel. The organization is now beginning to solicit volunteer communities to consider a repository, though much of the process remains to be decided, including the amount and type of compensation given to the participating communities.

the most difficult part of the back end of the fuel cycle is siting the required facilities, especially those associated with spent fuel management and disposal. Siting is not solely a technical problem—it is as much a political and societal issue. And to be successful, it is important to get the technical and the societal and political aspects right.

After weathering the Fukushima accident, and given the current constraints on carbon dioxide emissions and potential for growth of nuclear power, redefinition of a successful nuclear power program is now required: It is no longer simply the safe production of electricity but also the safe, secure, and sustainable lifecycle of nuclear power, from the mining of uranium ores to the disposal of spent nuclear fuel. If this cannot be achieved and is not thought out from the beginning, then the public in many countries will reject nuclear as an energy choice.

Certain elements—including an institution to site, manage, and operate waste facilities—need to be in place to have a successful waste management program. In some countries, this agency is entirely a government entity, such as the Korea Radioactive Waste Management Organization. In other countries, the agency is a corporation established by the nuclear industry, such as SKB in Sweden or Posiva Oy in Finland. Another option would be a public– private agency, such as Spain’s National Company for Radioactive Waste or Switzerland’s National Cooperative for the Disposal of Radioactive Waste.

Funding is one of the most central needs for such an institution to carry out research and development programs; the money would cover siting costs, including compensation packages and resources for local communities to conduct their own analyses of spent fuel and waste transportation, storage, repository construction, operations, security and safeguards, and future liabilities. Funds can be collected in a number of ways, such as putting a levy on electricity charges (as is done in the US) or charging based on the activity or volume of waste (Hearsey et al., 1999). Funds must also be managed—either by a waste management organization or another industry or government agency—in a way that ensures steady and ready access to funds over time. This continued reliable access is necessary for planning into the future for repository operations.

the siting process must be established. This should include decisions on whether to allow a community to veto a site and how long that veto remains operational; the number of sites to be examined in depth prior to site selection and the number of sites that might be required; technical criteria to begin selecting potential sites; non-technical considerations, such as proximity to water resources, population centers, environmentally protected areas, and access to public transportation; the form and amount of compensation to be offered; how the public is invited to participate in the site selection process; and how government at the federal level will be involved.

The above are all considerations in the siting process, but the larger process—how to begin to select sites, whether to seek only volunteers, and so on—must also be determined ahead of time. A short list of technical criteria must be integrated into a process that establishes public consent to go forward, followed by many detailed studies of the site—first on the surface, then at depth. There are distinct advantages to characterizing more than one site in detail, as both Sweden and Finland have done. Multiple sites allow the “best” one to be selected, increasing public approval and comfort with the process.

he site needs to be evaluated against a set of standards established by a government agency in the country. This agency typically is the environmental agency or the nuclear regulatory agency. The type of standards will constrain the method by which a site will be evaluated with regard to its future performance. A number of countries use a combination of methods to evaluate their sites, some acknowledging that the ability to predict processes and events that will occur in a repository decrease rapidly with each year far into the future, so that beyond a few thousand years, little can be said with any accuracy. These countries use what is termed a “safety case,” which includes multiple lines of evidence to assure safe repository performance into the future.

Moving forward

France, Canada, and Germany also have experienced a number of iterations of repository siting, some with more success than others. In the 1970s, Germany selected the Gorleben site for its repository; however, in the late 1990s, with the election of a Red–Green coalition government (the Greens had long opposed Gorleben), a rethinking of repository siting was decreed, and the government established the AkEnd group to re-evaluate the siting process. Their report outlined a detailed siting process starting from scratch, but to date too much political disagreement exists to proceed further.

Notes

Nuclear wastes are classified in various ways, depending on the country or organization doing the classification. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) notes six general categories of waste produced by civil nuclear power reactors: exempt waste, very short-lived waste, and very low level waste can be stored and then disposed of in landfill-type settings; low level waste, intermediate level waste, and high-level waste require more complex facilities for disposal.

Sweden is currently the country closest to realizing a final solution for spent fuel, after having submitted a license application for construction of a geologic repository in March 2011. It plans to open a high-level waste repository sometime after 2025, as do Finland and France.

Some countries, such as Sweden, Finland, Canada, and, until recently, the US, plan to dispose of their spent fuel directly in a geologic repository. A few others, such as France, Japan, Russia, and the UK have an interim step. They reprocess their spent fuel, extract the small amount of plutonium produced during irradiation, and use it in new mixed oxide (MOX) fuel. Then they plan to dispose of the high-level wastes from reprocessing in a repository.