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The Sentencing Commission has only issued "advisory policy statements" applicable to revocations of probation and supervised release instead of mandatory guidelines. U.S.S.G. Ch. 7, Pts. A1, A3(a); see also United States v. George, 184 F.3d 1119, 1121 (9th Cir. 1999) ("Because the Commission has not yet issued guidelines relating to revocation of supervised release or changed its view that the Chapter 7 policy statements are merely advisory, we see no reason to reduce the flexibility of district courts in sentencing supervised release violators."). We have held that a district court, when revoking supervised release, has discretion to go outside the suggested sentencing range of the policy statements up to the statutory maximum listed in 18 U.S.C. S 3583(e)(3). See George, 184 F.3d at 1122-23 (finding no error where the district court considered the 7to 13-month range in the policy statements of Chapter 7, rejected it, and sentenced the defendant to 23 months imprisonment). The policy statement range for Musa's violation of the conditions of his supervised release is three to nine months, see U.S.S.G. S7B1.4, but the statutory maximum, as previously noted, is three years, see 18 U.S.C. S 3583(e)(3).

Court Opinions US Supreme Court US Tax Court Board of Patent Appeals State Laws Alabama Arizona California Florida Georgia Illinois Indiana Massachusetts Michigan Nevada New Jersey New York North Carolina Oregon Pennsylvania Texas Virginia Washington US Code Copyrights Crimes Labor Patents Shipping US Constitution Preamble Art. I - Legislative Art. II - Executive Art. III - Judicial Art. IV - States' Relations Art. V - Mode of Amendment Art. VI - Prior Debts Art VII - Ratification California Evidence Code Section 669 Legal Research Home > California Lawyer > Evidence Code > California Evidence Code Section 669 Sponsored Links google_protectAndRun("ads_core.google_render_ad", google_handleError, google_render_ad); google_protectAndRun("ads_core.google_render_ad", google_handleError, google_render_ad); (a) The failure of a person to exercise due care is presumed if: (1) He violated a statute, ordinance, or regulation of a public entity; (2) The violation proximately caused death or injury to person or property; (3) The death or injury resulted from an occurrence of the nature which the statute, ordinance, or regulation was designed to prevent; and (4) The person suffering the death or the injury to his person or property was one of the class of persons for whose protection the statute, ordinance, or regulation was adopted. (b) This presumption may be rebutted by proof that: (1) The person violating the statute, ordinance, or regulation did what might reasonably be expected of a person of ordinary prudence, acting under similar circumstances, who desired to comply with the law; or (2) The person violating the statute, ordinance, or regulation was a child and exercised the degree of care ordinarily exercised by persons of his maturity, intelligence, and capacity under similar circumstances, but the presumption may not be rebutted by such proof if the violation occurred in the course of an activity normally engaged in only by adults and requiring adult qualifications. Section: Previous  660  662  663  664  665  666  667  668  669  669.1  669.5  670  Next Last modified: January 12, 2009 google_protectAndRun("ads_core.google_render_ad", google_handleError, google_render_ad);border: medium none ; margin: 0pt; paddin

State immunity because the ADA is appropriate legislation under the Constitution to remedy the history of pervasive discrimination against people with disabilities.