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Nye Frank

Law School Outline - Constitutional Law - NYU School of Law - Pildus - 0 views

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    1 C ONSTITUTIONAL L AW O UTLINE I. The Building Blocks Marbury v. Madison (1803) Marshall - political struggle between John Adams and Federalists and successor Thomas Jefferson and the Republicans - Commissions for justices signed by Adams but not yet delivered when he left office; Jefferson administration refused to honor appointments for which commissions had not actually been delivered - Marbury : would-be justice of the peace; brought suit directly in S.Ct. sought writ of mandamus compelling Madison to deliver their commissions - Madison : Secretary of State for Jefferson - Which branch shall have final say interpreting the Constitution? Q1: Does Marbury have a RIGHT to commission? Q2: Does he have a REMEDY? Q3: Is remedy a MANDAMUS? Q4: Can a mandamus be issued from THIS COURT? Marshall's Decision: a. Right to Commission: Yes, on facts and law he has a legal right b. Remedy: Yes, judicial remedy will not interfere improperly with executive's constitutional discretion (Marshall acknowledged that there are some Qs which legislature is better equipped to deal with but this is not one of them) c. Mandamus not allowed i. § 13 of Judiciary Act of 1789 allows Court to issue mandamus ii. Article III § 2(2) gives Court original jurisdiction in a few cases and appellate jurisdiction in the rest. Writ of mandamus not among the cases as to which original jurisdiction is conferred on S.Ct. Congressional statute at odds with Constitution d. Supremacy of Constitution: If S.Ct. identifies a conflict between const. provision and congressional statute, the Court has the authority (and the duty) to declare the statute unconstitutional and to refuse to enforce it. i. Constitution is paramount: The very purpose of written constitution is to establish fundamental and paramount law. An act which is repugnant to C cannot become law of the land. ii. Who interprets: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicia
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    1 C ONSTITUTIONAL L AW O UTLINE I. The Building Blocks Marbury v. Madison (1803) Marshall - political struggle between John Adams and Federalists and successor Thomas Jefferson and the Republicans - Commissions for justices signed by Adams but not yet delivered when he left office; Jefferson administration refused to honor appointments for which commissions had not actually been delivered - Marbury : would-be justice of the peace; brought suit directly in S.Ct. sought writ of mandamus compelling Madison to deliver their commissions - Madison : Secretary of State for Jefferson - Which branch shall have final say interpreting the Constitution? Q1: Does Marbury have a RIGHT to commission? Q2: Does he have a REMEDY? Q3: Is remedy a MANDAMUS? Q4: Can a mandamus be issued from THIS COURT? Marshall's Decision: a. Right to Commission: Yes, on facts and law he has a legal right b. Remedy: Yes, judicial remedy will not interfere improperly with executive's constitutional discretion (Marshall acknowledged that there are some Qs which legislature is better equipped to deal with but this is not one of them) c. Mandamus not allowed i. § 13 of Judiciary Act of 1789 allows Court to issue mandamus ii. Article III § 2(2) gives Court original jurisdiction in a few cases and appellate jurisdiction in the rest. Writ of mandamus not among the cases as to which original jurisdiction is conferred on S.Ct. Congressional statute at odds with Constitution d. Supremacy of Constitution: If S.Ct. identifies a conflict between const. provision and congressional statute, the Court has the authority (and the duty) to declare the statute unconstitutional and to refuse to enforce it. i. Constitution is paramount: The very purpose of written constitution is to establish fundamental and paramount law. An act which is repugnant to C cannot become law of the land. ii. Who interprets: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
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    1 C ONSTITUTIONAL L AW O UTLINE I. The Building Blocks Marbury v. Madison (1803) Marshall - political struggle between John Adams and Federalists and successor Thomas Jefferson and the Republicans - Commissions for justices signed by Adams but not yet delivered when he left office; Jefferson administration refused to honor appointments for which commissions had not actually been delivered - Marbury : would-be justice of the peace; brought suit directly in S.Ct. sought writ of mandamus compelling Madison to deliver their commissions - Madison : Secretary of State for Jefferson - Which branch shall have final say interpreting the Constitution? Q1: Does Marbury have a RIGHT to commission? Q2: Does he have a REMEDY? Q3: Is remedy a MANDAMUS? Q4: Can a mandamus be issued from THIS COURT? Marshall's Decision: a. Right to Commission: Yes, on facts and law he has a legal right b. Remedy: Yes, judicial remedy will not interfere improperly with executive's constitutional discretion (Marshall acknowledged that there are some Qs which legislature is better equipped to deal with but this is not one of them) c. Mandamus not allowed i. § 13 of Judiciary Act of 1789 allows Court to issue mandamus ii. Article III § 2(2) gives Court original jurisdiction in a few cases and appellate jurisdiction in the rest. Writ of mandamus not among the cases as to which original jurisdiction is conferred on S.Ct. Congressional statute at odds with Constitution d. Supremacy of Constitution: If S.Ct. identifies a conflict between const. provision and congressional statute, the Court has the authority (and the duty) to declare the statute unconstitutional and to refuse to enforce it. i. Constitution is paramount: The very purpose of written constitution is to establish fundamental and paramount law. An act which is repugnant to C cannot become law of the land. ii. Who interprets: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
Nye Frank

Officer Liability -- State Law Torts and the FTCA (podcast transcript) - Federal Law En... - 0 views

shared by Nye Frank on 16 Apr 09 - Cached
  • Miller:    Who’s considered a law enforcement officer for purposes of the Federal Tort Claims Act? Solari:    A law enforcement officer for purposes of the FTCA is anyone who can make arrests for violations of federal law, or seize evidence, or execute seizures.  If you qualify, then Uncle Sam will pay for intentional torts like assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, and abuse of process if those torts were committed while within scope.  Limiting that intentional tort provision to law enforcement officers makes sense, if you think about it.  The federal government asks its law enforcement officers to arrest people, conduct searches, and seize evidence.  And as we know, that often involves doing things like grabbing people, knocking them down, hitting them with an ASP… whatever.  So you’d expect law enforcement officers to be doing things that look like intentional torts.  On the other hand, you know, a person who gives out checks at the social security office shouldn’t be grabbing anybody or knocking them down, or hitting them with sticks.  Uncle Sam just doesn’t ask them to do that, so the federal government’s not going to pay when they do.
    • Nye Frank
       
      A law enforcement officer for purposes of the FTCA is anyone who can make arrests for violations of federal law, or seize evidence, or execute seizures. If you qualify, then Uncle Sam will pay for intentional torts like assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, and abuse of process if those torts were committed while within scope. Limiting that intentional tort provision to law enforcement officers makes sense, if you think about it. The federal government asks its law enforcement officers to arrest people, conduct searches, and seize evidence. And as we know, that often involves doing things like grabbing people, knocking them down, hitting them with an ASP… whatever. So you'd expect law enforcement officers to be doing things that look like intentional torts. On the other hand, you know, a person who gives out checks at the social security office shouldn't be grabbing anybody or knocking them down, or hitting them with sticks. Uncle Sam just doesn't ask them to do that, so the federal government's not going to pay when they do.
Nye Frank

questions documents statement of fact for summary judgement. - 0 views

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    Estate of Coleman v. Casper Concrete Co. 1997 WY 64 939 P.2d 233 Case Number: 96-30 Decided: 05/19/1997 Supreme Court of Wyoming -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Cite as: 1997 WY 64, 939 P.2d 233 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The ESTATE OF KEITH D. COLEMAN, Deceased, By and Through its Personal Representative, Janice Coleman, Appellant(Plaintiff), v. CASPER CONCRETE COMPANY, a Wyoming Corporation; and Skorcz Electric, Inc., a Wyoming Corporation, Appellees(Defendants). Appeal from the District Court, Natrona County, The Honorable Dan Spangler, Judge Representing Appellant: Dallas J. Laird, Casper; and Richard R. Jamieson, Casper. Representing Appellee: Richard R. Wilking, Casper; and Earl J. Hanson of Hanson, Roybal, Lee & Todd, P.C., Billings, for Appellee Casper Concrete Company. Rebecca A. Lewis of Lewis & Associates, P.C., Laramie, for Appellee Skorcz Electric, Inc. Before TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN,* and LEHMAN, JJ. * Chief Justice at time of oral argument. TAYLOR, Chief Justice. [¶1] In 1989, the State of Wyoming contracted with appellees to build a highway intersection and install traffic lights. In June of 1993, during a malfunction of those lights, a young man was killed in a collision with a drunk driver at the intersection. Although the State successfully sought shelter in immunity and the drunk driver eventually settled with the decedent's estate, suit survived against appellees on disparate theories of negligence, strict liability and res ipsa loquitur. From an adverse summary judgment, the decedent's estate prosecutes this appeal. We affirm. I. ISSUES [¶2] The decedent's mother, Janice Coleman, as personal representative of her son's estate (appellant), states the following issues: I. Whether the district court properly granted summary judgmen
Nye Frank

THE CANADIAN INSTITUTE Litigating Personal Injury Damages DAMAGES FOR EMOTIONAL DISTRES... - 0 views

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    Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, 5 ed. (1984), p. 360.th7Linden, Canadian Tort Law, 7th ed., at pp. 389
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    In addition, the7judicial system has proven time and again the capacityto differentiate between deserving cases andgroundless actions. The appropriate response, when concerned about fraudulent lawsuits, is avigorous pursuit of the truth, not in the abdication of judicial responsibility.8 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 5 Toronto Railway Co. V. Toms (1911), 44 S.C.R. 268 at 274.9See Dulieu v. White & Sons, [1901] 2 K.B. 669.10See Hinz v. Berry [1970] 2 Q.B. 40, where Lord Denning explained thatdamages are11recoverable for "nervous shock, or, to put it in medical terms, for any recognizablepsychiatric illness caused by the breach of duty by the defendant."See Linden, Canadian Tort Law, supra 1, at pp. 389-92.12Eventually, the courts began awarding damages for emotional distress, but onlywhere therewas an accompanying physical injury. The court reasoned that, where a person suffers physicalinjury, however slight, damages could be claimed for the fright occasioned thereby. Subsequently,9the physical injury requirement was discarded when it was decided that damages resulting fromnervous shock generated byfright maybe recoverable in a negligence action, even whereno physicalinjury has occurred.10IV.The Components of a Claim for Emotional DistressA claim for damages for emotional distress can come in a variety of forms. One may beclaiming, in the words of Lord Denning, damages for "nervous shock". Other commonly used11terms are damages for emotional upset, intentional infliction of mental distress, negligent inflictionof emotional distress or negligent infliction of psychiatric damage. The common element to theseclaims is that, under Canadian law, the complainant must establish two components: first, thepsychological injury suffered by the plaintiff was a foreseeable consequence of the defendant'snegligent conduct, and second, that the psychological injury was so serious that it resulted in arecognizable p
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    In addition, the7judicial system has proven time and again the capacityto differentiate between deserving cases andgroundless actions. The appropriate response, when concerned about fraudulent lawsuits, is avigorous pursuit of the truth, not in the abdication of judicial responsibility.8 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 5 Toronto Railway Co. V. Toms (1911), 44 S.C.R. 268 at 274.9See Dulieu v. White & Sons, [1901] 2 K.B. 669.10See Hinz v. Berry [1970] 2 Q.B. 40, where Lord Denning explained thatdamages are11recoverable for "nervous shock, or, to put it in medical terms, for any recognizablepsychiatric illness caused by the breach of duty by the defendant."See Linden, Canadian Tort Law, supra 1, at pp. 389-92.12Eventually, the courts began awarding damages for emotional distress, but onlywhere therewas an accompanying physical injury. The court reasoned that, where a person suffers physicalinjury, however slight, damages could be claimed for the fright occasioned thereby. Subsequently,9the physical injury requirement was discarded when it was decided that damages resulting fromnervous shock generated byfright maybe recoverable in a negligence action, even whereno physicalinjury has occurred.10IV.The Components of a Claim for Emotional DistressA claim for damages for emotional distress can come in a variety of forms. One may beclaiming, in the words of Lord Denning, damages for "nervous shock". Other commonly used11terms are damages for emotional upset, intentional infliction of mental distress, negligent inflictionof emotional distress or negligent infliction of psychiatric damage. The common element to theseclaims is that, under Canadian law, the complainant must establish two components: first, thepsychological injury suffered by the plaintiff was a foreseeable consequence of the defendant'snegligent conduct, and second, that the psychological injury was so serious that it resulted in arecognizable psyc
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    A claim for damages for emotional distress can come in a variety of forms. One may beclaiming, in the words of Lord Denning, damages for "nervous shock". Other commonly used11terms are damages for emotional upset, intentional infliction of mental distress, negligent inflictionof emotional distress or negligent infliction of psychiatric damage. The common element to theseclaims is that, under Canadian law, the complainant must establish two components: first, thepsychological injury suffered by the plaintiff was a foreseeable consequence of the defendant'snegligent conduct, and second, that the psychological injury was so serious that it resulted in arecognizable psychiatric illness.12 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 6 McLoughlin v. Arbor Memorial Services Inc. [2004] O.J. No. 5003.13Enunciated by the House of Lords in White v. Chief Constable of South Yorkshire, [1998] 314W.L.R. 1509 (H.L.), and approved by MacPhearson J.A. in Vanek v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Companyof Canada Limited (1999) 48 O.R. (3d) 228 (O.C.A.).Ibid.15A.What is meant by "foreseeable"?Foreseeability has generally been interpreted as what a "reasonable person" would foresee.In thecontext of an accident,foreseeableemotional distress meanspsychiatricinjuryas areasonablyforeseeable consequence of exposure to the trauma of the accident and its aftermath.13In general, the law expects its citizens to be reasonably robust and hesitates to imposeliabilityfor the exceptional frailtyof certain individuals. Before beingheld to be in breach of a dutyto an accident bystander, a defendant must have exposed him to a situation where it was reasonablyforeseeablethat apersonof reasonable robustness andfortitudewouldbelikelyto suffer psychiatricinjury.14The Ontario Court of Appeal addressed this issue in Vanek v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Co.Of Canada Limited ("Vanek"). In this case, an 11-year-old girl consumed a small amount of foul15tasti
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    Even where the plaintiff has suffered a psychiatric illness triggered by the defendant'sinabilityto fulfil adutyofcare, thecourts willsometimes denyliabilityiftheindividual's psychiatricdamage is a result of their own particular "hypersensitivity". The courts like to use, as a baseline,18the ordinary person of reasonable mental fortitude. Where this fictional individual would notnormally suffer psychiatric damage, a uniquely vulnerable person who does suffer damage wouldbe barred from recovery
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    With all due respect to Dr. Herbert Modlin, his thesis does not do justice to the manyinnocent accident victims who suffer pain in silence, with indescribable sadness and with despair.Reactions to traumatic events effect people biologically, psychologically and socially. As23Hoffman, et al., state ,24"At the psychological level, traumatic reactions affect thinking, feeling andbehaviour. In the acute phaseafter a period of shock theremaybe anxiety, insomnia,nightmares,sensitivityto noise, fatigueandpain intrusiverecollectionsofthetraumain thoughts or images, either spontaneously or when reminded of the trauma. In thelong term there may be emotional disability (with or without physical injury) that iscomplicated by depression, irritability, philosophical pessimism, loss of hope anddecreased expectations in life, which eventually lead to personality change."(Underlining mine)According to Hoffman et al., "accident victims may feel uncontrollable anger (similar tovictims of crimes), guilt and self-blame (like victims in child abuse) or passivity, futility anddemoralization (similar to some Holocaust survivors). Unfortunately, the victims of civilianpersonal injuries tend to feel isolated and alone in their pain because there are no group experiencesor social support system to allow them to share their experiences with other victims."25How then, does plaintiff's counsel go about establishing and building a claim for emotionaldistress? -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 11 (1998) 38 O.R. (3d) 651.26[2001] O.J. No. 5756 (S.C.J.).27VII. Building the Claim - The Insurance ActClaims for emotional distress have long been recognized and, since 1994, have beenpermitted bythe various incarnations of the InsuranceAct. It maybeuseful to recall that theOntarioMotorist Protection Plan (the first no-fault legislation which governed motor vehicle accident casesbetween June 22, 1990 and December 31, 1993), allowed compensation
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    According to Hoffman et al., "accident victims may feel uncontrollable anger (similar tovictims of crimes), guilt and self-blame (like victims in child abuse) or passivity, futility anddemoralization (similar to some Holocaust survivors). Unfortunately, the victims of civilianpersonal injuries tend to feel isolated and alone in their pain because there are no group experiencesor social support system to allow them to share their experiences with other victims."25How then, does plaintiff's counsel go about establishing and building a claim for emotionaldistress? -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 11 (1998) 38 O.R. (3d) 651.26[2001] O.J. No. 5756 (S.C.J.).27VII. Building the Claim - The Insurance ActClaims for emotional distress have long been recognized and, since 1994, have beenpermitted bythe various incarnations of the InsuranceAct. It maybeuseful to recall that theOntarioMotorist Protection Plan (the first no-fault legislation which governed motor vehicle accident casesbetween June 22, 1990 and December 31, 1993), allowed compensation only if an injured person'simpairments were physical in nature. Claims for emotional distress unadorned with any physicalcomponent resulted in the claim being dismissed.However, if the emotional distress claim could be characterized as a "chronic pain claim"with both physical and psychological aspects, compensation was permitted (see in this regard,Chrappa v Ohm).During the OMPP era plaintiffs' counsel went to great lengths to meld26psychological distress with a physical component in order to be free of the rigid straightjacket of theOMPP threshold.With Bill 164, which took effect on January 1, 1994 and governed motor vehicle accidentcases until October 31, 1996, there was no impediment to obtaining compensation for a "seriousimpairment of an important physical, mental or psychological function". Bill 59 (which applies tomotor vehicle accidents between November 19
Nye Frank

Justice For Nye Frank, Court documents filed Riverside County - 0 views

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    There is over 20 officials that have participated in the cover up of homicide of 68 year old Nye Frank. That means that 20 people are owe favors to each other to help cover up crimes for family and friends. Nye and Lee never have had issues with the law. We never expected him to be killed. Lee witnessed the whole thing. Then the stalking and revictiming from officials has been devistating to the family.
Nye Frank

Untitled - 0 views

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    Page 1 Page 2 1 3/8/05 Commentary on The Rules of Practice of the Court of Appeals 22 NYCRR part 500, Effective September 1, 2005 A. Structure The Rules of Practice of the Court of Appeals apply to civil and noncapital criminal appeals, motions, criminal leave applications and certified questions from the Supreme Court of the United States, United States courts of appeal and state courts of last resort. The Court of Appeals recently rescinded in its entirety 22 NYCRR part 500 and approved a new part 500 which will be effective September 1, 2005. In addition to reflecting substantive changes and additions to the old Rules of Practice, the new Rules are organized into broad categories to eliminate duplication and provide a more logical sequence. New Rules 500.1 through 500.8 set out requirements applicable to all filings under these Rules. New Rules 500.9 through 500.19 relate to civil and noncapital criminal appeals. New Rule 500.20 contains procedures concerning criminal leave applications. Motions are addressed in new Rules 500.21 through 500.24. Orders to show cause, the Primary Election Session and certified questions are addressed in new Rules 500.25, 500.26 and 500.27, respectively. Finally, old Rule 500.13, relating to real property actions, was deleted as unnecessary. Page 3 2 B. General Requirements 500.1 General Requirements [Old Rule 500.1] New Rule 500.1 states the general requirements for papers submitted to the Court of Appeals. The Rule generally applies to "papers filed," which is defined in section 500.1(b) as all briefs, papers filed pursuant to sections 500.10 (Examination of Subject Matter Jurisdiction) and 500.11 (Alternative Procedure for Selected Appeals), motion papers and appendices. The typeface and font requirements match those recently adopted by the Appellate Division Departments following repeal of the portion of CPLR 5529 that set out specifications for such matters. New Rule 500.1(h) informs self-represented litigants that illegibl
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    Page 1 Page 2 1 3/8/05 Commentary on The Rules of Practice of the Court of Appeals 22 NYCRR part 500, Effective September 1, 2005 A. Structure The Rules of Practice of the Court of Appeals apply to civil and noncapital criminal appeals, motions, criminal leave applications and certified questions from the Supreme Court of the United States, United States courts of appeal and state courts of last resort. The Court of Appeals recently rescinded in its entirety 22 NYCRR part 500 and approved a new part 500 which will be effective September 1, 2005. In addition to reflecting substantive changes and additions to the old Rules of Practice, the new Rules are organized into broad categories to eliminate duplication and provide a more logical sequence. New Rules 500.1 through 500.8 set out requirements applicable to all filings under these Rules. New Rules 500.9 through 500.19 relate to civil and noncapital criminal appeals. New Rule 500.20 contains procedures concerning criminal leave applications. Motions are addressed in new Rules 500.21 through 500.24. Orders to show cause, the Primary Election Session and certified questions are addressed in new Rules 500.25, 500.26 and 500.27, respectively. Finally, old Rule 500.13, relating to real property actions, was deleted as unnecessary. Page 3 2 B. General Requirements 500.1 General Requirements [Old Rule 500.1] New Rule 500.1 states the general requirements for papers submitted to the Court of Appeals. The Rule generally applies to "papers filed," which is defined in section 500.1(b) as all briefs, papers filed pursuant to sections 500.10 (Examination of Subject Matter Jurisdiction) and 500.11 (Alternative Procedure for Selected Appeals), motion papers and appendices. The typeface and font requirements match those recently adopted by the Appellate Division Departments following repeal of the portion of CPLR 5529 that set out specifications for such matters. New Rule 500.1(h) informs self-represented litigants that illegibl
Nye Frank

Important, Please Read!!! Nye Frank!!!! - OFN Forums - 0 views

Nye Frank

Center Court - 0 views

shared by Nye Frank on 07 Apr 09 - Cached
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    The National Center for State Courts, working alongside the members of the Elder Abuse and the Courts Working Group, is involved in a number of follow-up activities to develop services the courts can use. For more information on the Elder Abuse and the Courts Working Group, con-tact Brenda Uekert, Ph.D. (buekert@ncsc.dni.us) of NCSC's Research and Technol-ogy Division. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 3 3Courts looking for the latest information on ways to improve jury service can turn to a new edition of Jury Trial Innovations (JTI), the National Center for State Courts' best-selling guide to techniques used nationwide to make jury service more appealing to the public and to help jurors become more effective decision makers. This new edition was updated by G. Thomas Munsterman and Paula L. Hannaford-Agor, of NCSC's Center for Jury Studies, and G. Marc White-head, chair of the Jury Initiatives Task Force of the American Bar Association's Section of Litigation, who were editors of the original edition published in 1997.This new edition looks at innova-tions courts have tried in the decade since the first edition was published, especially those involving the model of "the interactive juror"-that is, innovations focused on how jurors organize information, how to keep jurors actively involved in trial proceedings, The new edition of Jury Trial Innovations will be available in July 2006 and can be ordered through NCSC's online bookstore accessible through the "Communications" page on NCSC's Web site (www.ncsconline.org).NCSC Updates Jury Trial Innovationsand how jurors test what they see and hear against their own beliefs and values. After exploring "How Jurors Make Decisions: The Value of Trial Innovations," JTI discusses innovations in six areas:1. Jury Administration and Management 2. Voir Dire3. Pretrial Management4. Trial Procedures5. Jury Instructions and Deliberations6. Post-Verdict Co
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