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udge Kaplan commented that at-will employees who have been discharged from working for the State government use mandamus, since there is no appeal authorized for an at-will employee who has been wrongfully discharged. Mr. Sykes pointed out this would come under regular mandamus, which is applicable when there is no record. When an agency makes a final decision affecting the rights of parties, an appeal is effected by administrative mandamus if there is no statutory right of appeal.

Mr. Gohn noted that he did not believe that under administrative or regular mandamus, there would be the necessity to file the entire file. Ms. Baron may have been looking at the certiorari rule, which does not apply.

The Sentencing Commission has only issued "advisory policy statements" applicable to revocations of probation and supervised release instead of mandatory guidelines. U.S.S.G. Ch. 7, Pts. A1, A3(a); see also United States v. George, 184 F.3d 1119, 1121 (9th Cir. 1999) ("Because the Commission has not yet issued guidelines relating to revocation of supervised release or changed its view that the Chapter 7 policy statements are merely advisory, we see no reason to reduce the flexibility of district courts in sentencing supervised release violators."). We have held that a district court, when revoking supervised release, has discretion to go outside the suggested sentencing range of the policy statements up to the statutory maximum listed in 18 U.S.C. S 3583(e)(3). See George, 184 F.3d at 1122-23 (finding no error where the district court considered the 7to 13-month range in the policy statements of Chapter 7, rejected it, and sentenced the defendant to 23 months imprisonment). The policy statement range for Musa's violation of the conditions of his supervised release is three to nine months, see U.S.S.G. S7B1.4, but the statutory maximum, as previously noted, is three years, see 18 U.S.C. S 3583(e)(3).

In their suit, Appellants alleged that Scheer violated their rights to procedural due process by refusing to allow them to participate in his telephone conversation with the City Solicitor. They alleged that he violated their rights to substantive due process by pursuing the investigation without probable cause, misrepresenting facts to Solicitor Maser, inducing CHOP to falsify records, and attempting to suborn perjury by Dr. Henretig.2

. Plaintiffs also contend on appeal that the District Court erred by making credibility judgments in its summary judgment ruling. Specifically, they argue that the District Court should not have determined that the actions of Scheer were reasonable or made in good faith. We reject this argument summarily. As discussed above, plaintiffs proffered no evidence of acts by Scheer that rose to a level of arbitrariness that shocks the conscience and therefore failed to state the kind of deprivation that might rise to the level of a constitutional violation. in the District Court's construction of Scheer's behavior in this case

Rule 201. Judicial Notice of Adjudicative Facts (a) Scope of rule.—This rule governs only judicial notice of adju- dicative facts. (b) Kinds of facts.—A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2

capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned

While Totten and Reynolds are closely related in that both protect a state secret from disclosure, the rules announced in those cases differ in subtle but important respects. Most importantly, the state secrets privilege in Reynolds permits the government to withhold otherwise relevant discovery from a recognized cause of action (e.g., an FTCA case), while the Totten doctrine permits the dismissal of a lawsuit because it is non-justiciable before such evidentiary questions are ever reached.

In Kasza, we relied on the Reynolds rule that "the state secrets privilege is a common law evidentiary privilege that allows the government to deny discovery of military secrets." Id. at 1165. After reviewing the applicable law, we reasoned that the application of the state secrets privilege can have different effects, depending on whether it is used to exclude evidence or to dismiss a cause of action. Id. at 1166. First, we found that the government's invocation of the privilege over particular evidence may completely remove the evidence from the case. Id. If a plaintiff cannot make out her prima facie case without the secret evidence, the court may dismiss her claim. Id. Second, the privilege may deprive a defendant of information that would otherwise give the defendant a valid defense to the claim. Id. In these cases, the court may grant summary judgment to the defendant. Id.

Part IV acknowledges the tension between the difficulty of proving causation in legal malpractice actions and one of the goals of legal malpractice, which is to allow litigants recovery when their attorneys are negligent. The part then considers the "loss of chance" doctrine, which is used in medical malpractice cases, as a possible alternative to the rigorous "but for" causation requirement in legal malpractice. Since a shift away from the "but for" standard is likely to cause more problems than it solves, and because adequate protections already exist for litigants, Part IV argues that the current causation requirements should be maintained for litigants who allege that they suffered an injury during Supreme Court oral argument. [*pg 115]

The opportunity to convince [the Justices] of the merits of your position is at its highpoint."47

See 3 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 15, § 29.41, at 772 ("In presenting the underlying appeal in the subsequent legal malpractice action, the parties must specify the issues that should have been urged in the underlying action."). Failure to specify the issues is a failure to prove causation. See id. 146. See infra note 151 and accompanying text. 147. See Smith v. Lewis, 530 P.2d 589, 595 (Cal. 1975). 148. See Lysick v. Walcom, 258 Cal. App. 2d 136, 153 (Ct. App. 1968). The attorney's action need not be the sole cause of the client's loss, just a substantial factor. See id. at 153 n.7. 149. See infra note 213 and accompanying text.

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