Skip to main content

Home/ Nyefrank/ Group items tagged order

Rss Feed Group items tagged

Nye Frank

Victim Rights Manual - 0 views

  •  
    A defendant may be released on bail for all offenses except capital crimes. Public safety is the primary consideration in setting the bail amount. The court must conduct a hearing before deviating from the scheduled bail for a violent felony or for threatening a witness in a rape, domestic violence or criminal threat case. The court must state its reasons for deviating from the bail schedule. (Cal.Const Art. 1 Sect. 28, PC 1270.1, and PC 1275.)In violent felony cases, the district attorneys office, Division of Victim Services and the probation department are responsible for notifying victims and witnesses that they can request notification regarding the defendant's release. The Division of Victim Services will provide the forms to those victims and witnesses. (PC 679.03(a).)Inmates convicted of murder, voluntary manslaughter, life cases, stalking or a case where the defendant inflicted great bodily injury, cannot be released on parole within 35 miles of a victim or witness. However, the victim or witness must file the appropriate form with CDCR, and CDCR must find there is a need to protect the safety and well being of the victim or witness. (PC 3003.)Upon request, when a defendant is sent to state prison, the victim or next of kin will be notified of the defendant's release to work furlough or a reentry program at least 60 days prior to placement. If the inmate escapes, the victim must be given immediate notification. The victim should keep his or her request and current address on file using a form that can be obtained through the Division of Victim Services. (PC 679.02(a)(6), PC 11155.)The Right to be Protected13 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 17 An employer with more than 25 employees may not discriminate against an employee who has been a victim of a sex crime or domestic violence when that employee seeks medical attention or counseling. (LC 230.1.)Employers must allow crime victims or family members t
Nye Frank

we asked for a safe way to report Building A Financial Abuse Case for the Criminal Just... - 0 views

  • Identify other sources of information Health care professionals Paramedics and EMTs Family and friends Who did victim tell first Importance of asking about and documenting the victim's demeanor and reason for making contact Not for police action but for safety, health needs, seek help
  • Crawford v. Washington  Critical importance of witnesses to whom victim and suspect have spoken Identify non governmental witnesses to statements Document spontaneous statements and demeanor Calls for help and medical care
  •  
    Page 1 FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE DECEMBER 1, 2008 UN UM E PLURIBUS Printed for the use of THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Page 2 110 TH C ONGRESS " COMMITTEE PRINT ! No. 8 2nd Session FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE DECEMBER 1, 2008 UN UM E PLURIBUS Printed for the use of THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES U . S . GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON : 2008 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001 Page 3 COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY O NE H UNDRED T ENTH C ONGRESS JOHN CONYERS, J R ., Michigan, Chairman HOWARD L. BERMAN, California RICK BOUCHER, Virginia JERROLD NADLER, New York ROBERT C. ''BOBBY'' SCOTT, Virginia MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina ZOE LOFGREN, California SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas MAXINE WATERS, California WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts ROBERT WEXLER, Florida LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California STEVE COHEN, Tennessee HANK JOHNSON, Georgia BETTY SUTTON, Ohio LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois BRAD SHERMAN, California TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York ADAM B. SCHIFF, California ARTUR DAVIS, Alabama DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota LAMAR SMITH, Texas F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, J R ., Wisconsin HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina ELTON GALLEGLY, California BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia STEVE CHABOT, Ohio DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California CHRIS CANNON, Utah RIC KELLER, Florida DARRELL ISSA, California MIKE PENCE, Indiana J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia STEVE KING, Iowa TOM FEENEY, Florida TRENT FRANKS, Arizona LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas JIM JORDAN, Ohio P ERRY A PELBAUM , Staff Director and Chief Counsel S EAN M C L AUGHLIN , Minority Chief of Staff and General Counsel ( II ) Page 4 FOREWORD This document contains the Federal Rules of Evidence, as amended to December 1, 2008. The rules were enacted by Public Law 93-595 (approved January 2, 1975) and have be
  •  
    Page 1 FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE DECEMBER 1, 2008 UN UM E PLURIBUS Printed for the use of THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Page 2 110 TH C ONGRESS " COMMITTEE PRINT ! No. 8 2nd Session FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE DECEMBER 1, 2008 UN UM E PLURIBUS Printed for the use of THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES U . S . GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON : 2008 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001 Page 3 COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY O NE H UNDRED T ENTH C ONGRESS JOHN CONYERS, J R ., Michigan, Chairman HOWARD L. BERMAN, California RICK BOUCHER, Virginia JERROLD NADLER, New York ROBERT C. ''BOBBY'' SCOTT, Virginia MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina ZOE LOFGREN, California SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas MAXINE WATERS, California WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts ROBERT WEXLER, Florida LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California STEVE COHEN, Tennessee HANK JOHNSON, Georgia BETTY SUTTON, Ohio LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois BRAD SHERMAN, California TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York ADAM B. SCHIFF, California ARTUR DAVIS, Alabama DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota LAMAR SMITH, Texas F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, J R ., Wisconsin HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina ELTON GALLEGLY, California BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia STEVE CHABOT, Ohio DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California CHRIS CANNON, Utah RIC KELLER, Florida DARRELL ISSA, California MIKE PENCE, Indiana J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia STEVE KING, Iowa TOM FEENEY, Florida TRENT FRANKS, Arizona LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas JIM JORDAN, Ohio P ERRY A PELBAUM , Staff Director and Chief Counsel S EAN M C L AUGHLIN , Minority Chief of Staff and General Counsel ( II ) Page 4 FOREWORD This document contains the Federal Rules of Evidence, as amended to December 1, 2008. The rules were enacted by Public Law 93-595 (approved January 2, 1975) and have be
  •  
    Page 1 FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE DECEMBER 1, 2008 UN UM E PLURIBUS Printed for the use of THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Page 2 110 TH C ONGRESS " COMMITTEE PRINT ! No. 8 2nd Session FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE DECEMBER 1, 2008 UN UM E PLURIBUS Printed for the use of THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES U . S . GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON : 2008 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001 Page 3 COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY O NE H UNDRED T ENTH C ONGRESS JOHN CONYERS, J R ., Michigan, Chairman HOWARD L. BERMAN, California RICK BOUCHER, Virginia JERROLD NADLER, New York ROBERT C. ''BOBBY'' SCOTT, Virginia MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina ZOE LOFGREN, California SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas MAXINE WATERS, California WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts ROBERT WEXLER, Florida LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California STEVE COHEN, Tennessee HANK JOHNSON, Georgia BETTY SUTTON, Ohio LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois BRAD SHERMAN, California TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York ADAM B. SCHIFF, California ARTUR DAVIS, Alabama DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota LAMAR SMITH, Texas F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, J R ., Wisconsin HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina ELTON GALLEGLY, California BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia STEVE CHABOT, Ohio DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California CHRIS CANNON, Utah RIC KELLER, Florida DARRELL ISSA, California MIKE PENCE, Indiana J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia STEVE KING, Iowa TOM FEENEY, Florida TRENT FRANKS, Arizona LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas JIM JORDAN, Ohio P ERRY A PELBAUM , Staff Director and Chief Counsel S EAN M C L AUGHLIN , Minority Chief of Staff and General Counsel ( II ) Page 4 FOREWORD This document contains the Federal Rules of Evidence, as amended to December 1, 2008. The rules were enacted by Public Law 93-595 (approved January 2, 1975) and have be
Nye Frank

Illinois Pro Bono | Senior Citizens Handbook - Protection from Abuse and Neglect - 0 views

  •  
    PrintPrint EmailEmail Share Author: Prairie State Legal Services Last updated: March 2009 (Chapter 8 Section 1 of Senior Citizens Handbook) * The Elder Abuse and Neglect Act * The Illinois Domestic Violence Act * Self Neglect * Criminal Laws * Where to Get Help In this section, we discuss laws intended to protect our elder citizens from abuse, neglect, and exploitation by family members, caregivers, and others. These laws provide protection through the Court, including Orders of Protection and criminal prosecution. Each county in Illinois has a designated agency to investigate reports of abuse, neglect, and/or exploitation of persons age 60 or older. These agencies also assist persons in obtaining needed services. The Elder Abuse and Neglect Act The Purpose of the Act This statute assures that local agencies will be funded by the Illinois Department on Aging in order to offer help to persons age 60 and older who may be abused, neglected, or exploited by family, household members, or caregivers. Any person who suspects the abuse, neglect, or financial exploitation of such a person may report this suspicion to the designated local agency. Any person making a report under the belief that it is in the senior's best interests is immune from any criminal or civil liability, or professional disciplinary action on account of making the report. The identity of a person making a report cannot be disclosed by the agency or by the Department on Aging to anyone else unless it is with that person's consent or by court order. Certain kinds of persons are required by law to make reports if they suspect abuse of a senior and have reason to believe that the senior is unable to seek assistance for himself or herself. They are called mandated reporters. Examples: Social workers, policemen, teachers, and doctors are mandated reporters. Note: The law exempts attorneys, legal service providers and bankers from mandatory reporting. The Procedure When A
  •  
    PrintPrint EmailEmail Share Author: Prairie State Legal Services Last updated: March 2009 (Chapter 8 Section 1 of Senior Citizens Handbook) * The Elder Abuse and Neglect Act * The Illinois Domestic Violence Act * Self Neglect * Criminal Laws * Where to Get Help In this section, we discuss laws intended to protect our elder citizens from abuse, neglect, and exploitation by family members, caregivers, and others. These laws provide protection through the Court, including Orders of Protection and criminal prosecution. Each county in Illinois has a designated agency to investigate reports of abuse, neglect, and/or exploitation of persons age 60 or older. These agencies also assist persons in obtaining needed services. The Elder Abuse and Neglect Act The Purpose of the Act This statute assures that local agencies will be funded by the Illinois Department on Aging in order to offer help to persons age 60 and older who may be abused, neglected, or exploited by family, household members, or caregivers. Any person who suspects the abuse, neglect, or financial exploitation of such a person may report this suspicion to the designated local agency. Any person making a report under the belief that it is in the senior's best interests is immune from any criminal or civil liability, or professional disciplinary action on account of making the report. The identity of a person making a report cannot be disclosed by the agency or by the Department on Aging to anyone else unless it is with that person's consent or by court order. Certain kinds of persons are required by law to make reports if they suspect abuse of a senior and have reason to believe that the senior is unable to seek assistance for himself or herself. They are called mandated reporters. Examples: Social workers, policemen, teachers, and doctors are mandated reporters. Note: The law exempts attorneys, legal service providers and bankers from mandatory reporting. The Procedure When A
Nye Frank

Law School Outline - Constitutional Law - NYU School of Law - Pildus - 0 views

  •  
    1 C ONSTITUTIONAL L AW O UTLINE I. The Building Blocks Marbury v. Madison (1803) Marshall - political struggle between John Adams and Federalists and successor Thomas Jefferson and the Republicans - Commissions for justices signed by Adams but not yet delivered when he left office; Jefferson administration refused to honor appointments for which commissions had not actually been delivered - Marbury : would-be justice of the peace; brought suit directly in S.Ct. sought writ of mandamus compelling Madison to deliver their commissions - Madison : Secretary of State for Jefferson - Which branch shall have final say interpreting the Constitution? Q1: Does Marbury have a RIGHT to commission? Q2: Does he have a REMEDY? Q3: Is remedy a MANDAMUS? Q4: Can a mandamus be issued from THIS COURT? Marshall's Decision: a. Right to Commission: Yes, on facts and law he has a legal right b. Remedy: Yes, judicial remedy will not interfere improperly with executive's constitutional discretion (Marshall acknowledged that there are some Qs which legislature is better equipped to deal with but this is not one of them) c. Mandamus not allowed i. § 13 of Judiciary Act of 1789 allows Court to issue mandamus ii. Article III § 2(2) gives Court original jurisdiction in a few cases and appellate jurisdiction in the rest. Writ of mandamus not among the cases as to which original jurisdiction is conferred on S.Ct. Congressional statute at odds with Constitution d. Supremacy of Constitution: If S.Ct. identifies a conflict between const. provision and congressional statute, the Court has the authority (and the duty) to declare the statute unconstitutional and to refuse to enforce it. i. Constitution is paramount: The very purpose of written constitution is to establish fundamental and paramount law. An act which is repugnant to C cannot become law of the land. ii. Who interprets: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicia
  •  
    1 C ONSTITUTIONAL L AW O UTLINE I. The Building Blocks Marbury v. Madison (1803) Marshall - political struggle between John Adams and Federalists and successor Thomas Jefferson and the Republicans - Commissions for justices signed by Adams but not yet delivered when he left office; Jefferson administration refused to honor appointments for which commissions had not actually been delivered - Marbury : would-be justice of the peace; brought suit directly in S.Ct. sought writ of mandamus compelling Madison to deliver their commissions - Madison : Secretary of State for Jefferson - Which branch shall have final say interpreting the Constitution? Q1: Does Marbury have a RIGHT to commission? Q2: Does he have a REMEDY? Q3: Is remedy a MANDAMUS? Q4: Can a mandamus be issued from THIS COURT? Marshall's Decision: a. Right to Commission: Yes, on facts and law he has a legal right b. Remedy: Yes, judicial remedy will not interfere improperly with executive's constitutional discretion (Marshall acknowledged that there are some Qs which legislature is better equipped to deal with but this is not one of them) c. Mandamus not allowed i. § 13 of Judiciary Act of 1789 allows Court to issue mandamus ii. Article III § 2(2) gives Court original jurisdiction in a few cases and appellate jurisdiction in the rest. Writ of mandamus not among the cases as to which original jurisdiction is conferred on S.Ct. Congressional statute at odds with Constitution d. Supremacy of Constitution: If S.Ct. identifies a conflict between const. provision and congressional statute, the Court has the authority (and the duty) to declare the statute unconstitutional and to refuse to enforce it. i. Constitution is paramount: The very purpose of written constitution is to establish fundamental and paramount law. An act which is repugnant to C cannot become law of the land. ii. Who interprets: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
  •  
    1 C ONSTITUTIONAL L AW O UTLINE I. The Building Blocks Marbury v. Madison (1803) Marshall - political struggle between John Adams and Federalists and successor Thomas Jefferson and the Republicans - Commissions for justices signed by Adams but not yet delivered when he left office; Jefferson administration refused to honor appointments for which commissions had not actually been delivered - Marbury : would-be justice of the peace; brought suit directly in S.Ct. sought writ of mandamus compelling Madison to deliver their commissions - Madison : Secretary of State for Jefferson - Which branch shall have final say interpreting the Constitution? Q1: Does Marbury have a RIGHT to commission? Q2: Does he have a REMEDY? Q3: Is remedy a MANDAMUS? Q4: Can a mandamus be issued from THIS COURT? Marshall's Decision: a. Right to Commission: Yes, on facts and law he has a legal right b. Remedy: Yes, judicial remedy will not interfere improperly with executive's constitutional discretion (Marshall acknowledged that there are some Qs which legislature is better equipped to deal with but this is not one of them) c. Mandamus not allowed i. § 13 of Judiciary Act of 1789 allows Court to issue mandamus ii. Article III § 2(2) gives Court original jurisdiction in a few cases and appellate jurisdiction in the rest. Writ of mandamus not among the cases as to which original jurisdiction is conferred on S.Ct. Congressional statute at odds with Constitution d. Supremacy of Constitution: If S.Ct. identifies a conflict between const. provision and congressional statute, the Court has the authority (and the duty) to declare the statute unconstitutional and to refuse to enforce it. i. Constitution is paramount: The very purpose of written constitution is to establish fundamental and paramount law. An act which is repugnant to C cannot become law of the land. ii. Who interprets: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
Nye Frank

Winter, Thus, a request for information under the Freedom of Information Act n49 is a j... - 0 views

  • The democracy conundrum The most appealing justification of standing law is that, in preserving the separation of powers, it protects the majoritarian political process from undue intrusion by the unelected judiciary. But not all issues are amenable to the political process. All too often, the inevitable consequence of a decision denying standing is "that the most injurious and widespread Governmental actions c[an] be questioned by nobody." n60 In those cases, standing law undermines the notion of accountability that supports a constitutional system premised on the rule of law. In Sections VI C and D, I propose a means of recapturing these values.
  •  
    The traditional answer places heavy emphasis on the function of the common law writ system to do the work now done by the concept of standing. n27 According to this analysis, the concept of standing could only arise after the breakdown of the writ system and of common law pleading. Standing then developed as an elaboration of the essence of the private causes of action previously embodied in the writs. n28 As such, the modern concept of standing, with its focus on injury-in-fact, is thought to be only the preservation of the private rights model n29 of adjudication known to the Framers.
  • ...5 more comments...
  •  
    On one level, Lyons represents a jurisprudential dispute between the majority and the dissent over the relative efficacy of retrospective damage remedies and prospective injunctive relief to deter constitutional violations. On another level, this case concerns a related dispute about the role of federal courts in our system. But there was an underlying reality: Human lives were at stake. Mr. Lyons obtained a preliminary injunction against the chokehold practice; both the court of appeals and the Supreme Court issued a stay of that order while the appeal was pending. Six additional people were choked to death by Los Angeles police while the courts determined that no one had standing to stop the practice. n18 Yet, two years later when the Court considered the same substantive constitutional theory in a related factual context, it held that it was unconstitutional for the police to use deadly force against nondangerous suspects. This holding was precisely the same as that sought by Mr. Lyons on the merits of his case. n19On one level, Lyons represents a jurisprudential dispute between the majority and the dissent over the relative efficacy of retrospective damage remedies and prospective injunctive relief to deter constitutional violations. On another level, this case concerns a related dispute about the role of federal courts in our system. But there was an underlying reality: Human lives were at stake. Mr. Lyons obtained a preliminary injunction against the chokehold practice; both the court of appeals and the Supreme Court issued a stay of that order while the appeal was pending. Six additional people were choked to death by Los Angeles police while the courts determined that no one had standing to stop the practice. n18 Yet, two years later when the Court considered the same substantive constitutional theory in a related factual context, it held that it was unconstitutional for the police to use deadly force against nondangerous suspects. This holding w
  •  
    Thus, a request for information under the Freedom of Information Act n49 is a justiciable controversy even without the usual showing that the person has suffered any "palpable injury." n50
  •  
    Thus, a request for information under the Freedom of Information Act n49 is a justiciable controversy even without the usual showing that the person has suffered any "palpable injury." n50
  •  
    On one level, Lyons represents a jurisprudential dispute between the majority and the dissent over the relative efficacy of retrospective damage remedies and prospective injunctive relief to deter constitutional violations. On another level, this case concerns a related dispute about the role of federal courts in our system. But there was an underlying reality: Human lives were at stake. Mr. Lyons obtained a preliminary injunction against the chokehold practice; both the court of appeals and the Supreme Court issued a stay of that order while the appeal was pending. Six additional people were choked to death by Los Angeles police while the courts determined that no one had standing to stop the practice. n18 Yet, two years later when the Court considered the same substantive constitutional theory in a related factual context, it held that it was unconstitutional for the police to use deadly force against nondangerous suspects. This holding was precisely the same as that sought by Mr. Lyons on the merits of his case. n19On one level, Lyons represents a jurisprudential dispute between the majority and the dissent over the relative efficacy of retrospective damage remedies and prospective injunctive relief to deter constitutional violations. On another level, this case concerns a related dispute about the role of federal courts in our system. But there was an underlying reality: Human lives were at stake. Mr. Lyons obtained a preliminary injunction against the chokehold practice; both the court of appeals and the Supreme Court issued a stay of that order while the appeal was pending. Six additional people were choked to death by Los Angeles police while the courts determined that no one had standing to stop the practice. n18 Yet, two years later when the Court considered the same substantive constitutional theory in a related factual context, it held that it was unconstitutional for the police to use deadly force against nondangerous suspects. This holding w
  •  
    Thus, a request for information under the Freedom of Information Act n49 is a justiciable controversy even without the usual showing that the person has suffered any "palpable injury." n50
  •  
    On one level, Lyons represents a jurisprudential dispute between the majority and the dissent over the relative efficacy of retrospective damage remedies and prospective injunctive relief to deter constitutional violations. On another level, this case concerns a related dispute about the role of federal courts in our system. But there was an underlying reality: Human lives were at stake. Mr. Lyons obtained a preliminary injunction against the chokehold practice; both the court of appeals and the Supreme Court issued a stay of that order while the appeal was pending. Six additional people were choked to death by Los Angeles police while the courts determined that no one had standing to stop the practice. n18 Yet, two years later when the Court considered the same substantive constitutional theory in a related factual context, it held that it was unconstitutional for the police to use deadly force against nondangerous suspects. This holding was precisely the same as that sought by Mr. Lyons on the merits of his case. n19On one level, Lyons represents a jurisprudential dispute between the majority and the dissent over the relative efficacy of retrospective damage remedies and prospective injunctive relief to deter constitutional violations. On another level, this case concerns a related dispute about the role of federal courts in our system. But there was an underlying reality: Human lives were at stake. Mr. Lyons obtained a preliminary injunction against the chokehold practice; both the court of appeals and the Supreme Court issued a stay of that order while the appeal was pending. Six additional people were choked to death by Los Angeles police while the courts determined that no one had standing to stop the practice. n18 Yet, two years later when the Court considered the same substantive constitutional theory in a related factual context, it held that it was unconstitutional for the police to use deadly force against nondangerous suspects. This holding w
  •  
    On one level, Lyons represents a jurisprudential dispute between the majority and the dissent over the relative efficacy of retrospective damage remedies and prospective injunctive relief to deter constitutional violations. On another level, this case concerns a related dispute about the role of federal courts in our system. But there was an underlying reality: Human lives were at stake. Mr. Lyons obtained a preliminary injunction against the chokehold practice; both the court of appeals and the Supreme Court issued a stay of that order while the appeal was pending. Six additional people were choked to death by Los Angeles police while the courts determined that no one had standing to stop the practice. n18 Yet, two years later when the Court considered the same substantive constitutional theory in a related factual context, it held that it was unconstitutional for the police to use deadly force against nondangerous suspects. This holding was precisely the same as that sought by Mr. Lyons on the merits of his case. n19On one level, Lyons represents a jurisprudential dispute between the majority and the dissent over the relative efficacy of retrospective damage remedies and prospective injunctive relief to deter constitutional violations. On another level, this case concerns a related dispute about the role of federal courts in our system. But there was an underlying reality: Human lives were at stake. Mr. Lyons obtained a preliminary injunction against the chokehold practice; both the court of appeals and the Supreme Court issued a stay of that order while the appeal was pending. Six additional people were choked to death by Los Angeles police while the courts determined that no one had standing to stop the practice. n18 Yet, two years later when the Court considered the same substantive constitutional theory in a related factual context, it held that it was unconstitutional for the police to use deadly force against nondangerous suspects. This holding w
Nye Frank

FindLaw | Cases and Codes - 0 views

  • To sustain a S 1983 civil rights action, a plaintiff must show "(1) that the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) that [such] conduct deprived the plaintiff of a federal constitutional or statutory right." 2 Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 938 (1990). Here, it is undisputed that defendants were acting under color of state law. At issue here is whether Officer Smith, the Sacramento County Sheriff's Department, or Sacramento County engaged in conduct that deprived Lewis of a federally protected righ
  • F.2d 272 (6th Cir. 1990) (noting that the Supreme Court's reasoning in Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), likely "preserve[d] Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process analysis for those instances in which a free citizen is denied his or her constitutional right to life through means other than a law enforcement official's arrest, investigatory stop or other seizure"), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 851 (1990).
  • But when a law enforcement officer arbitrarily acts to deprive a person of life and personal security in the course of pursuing his official duties, constitutional due process rights may be implicated. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331 ("The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government."). Section 1983 "contains no state-of-mind requirement independent of that necessary to state a violation of the underlying constitutional right." Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330 . See Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330 . The underlying constitutional rights at issue here are substantive due process rights to life and liberty or personal security. In Daniels, the Supreme Court held that where an official's or government entity's conduct constitutes mere negligence, no substantive due process violation occurs. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 328 . Daniels expressly left open the question whether something less than intentional conduct such as recklessness or gross negligence would suffice "to trigger the protections of the Due Process Clause." Id. at 334 n.3. But in City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989), the Court held that nonintentional government conduct can violate the Due Process Clause and thus lead to S 1983 liability. City of Canton held that a municipality may be liable for a failure to train its employees when such failure demonstrates "deliberate indifference to rights of persons with whom police come into contact." Id. at 388.
  • ...9 more annotations...
  • Five circuits have addressed S 1983 liability in the context of high-speed pursuits. These circuits have applied various labels to the standard of conduct that may lead to liability. See, e.g., Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296 (3rd Cir. 1994) (en banc) (overruling previous reckless indifference standard and adopting shocks the conscience standard); Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1496 (10th Cir. 1992) (reckless disregard); Temkin v. Frederick County Comm'rs, 945 F.2d 716, 723 (4th Cir. 1991) (shocks the conscience), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1095 (1992); Roach v. City of Fredericktown, 882 F.2d 294, 297 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding gross negligence insufficient but not stating what standard should be applied); Jones v. Sherrill, 827 F.2d 1102, 1106 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding gross negligence or outrageous conduct sufficient in some circumstances). 4
  • In one such due process case, we held that either "gross negligence, recklessness, or `deliberate indifference'" was sufficient to state a substantive due process violation. Wood v. Ostrander, 851 F.2d 1212, 1214 (9th Cir. 1988) ("Wood
  • I"), reh'g granted and opinion modified by, 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989) ("Wood II"), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 938 (1990). Relying on the standard set out in Wood I, we later held that "grossly negligent or reckless official conduct that infringes upon an interest protected by the Due Process Clause is actionable under S 1983." Fargo v. City of San Juan Bautista, 857 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1988). But Fargo's grossly negligent standard was explicitly based on Wood I, which was modified on rehearing and superseded by Wood II. In Wood II, we stepped back from the grossly negligent standard. We noted that an intervening Supreme Court decision, City of Canton, 489 U.S. 378 , had called into question this standard as set forth in Wood I and Fargo. Wood II, 879 F.2d at 588.
  • In Fargo, we defined gross negligence as "`more than ordinary inadvertence or inattention, but less perhaps than conscious indifference to the consequences.'" Fargo, 857 F.2d at 641 (quoting W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts S 34, at 212 (5th ed. 1984)). We also noted that an officer's state of mind is not an issue in a claim based on gross negligence, "although the contrary may be true where the claim involves recklessness." Id. at 642. Although we declined to decide whether an innocent state of mind would negate recklessness or "whether recklessness may be presumed conclusively from conduct," we did note that recklessness and deliberate indifference are equivalent in the sense that they both generally refer to conduct involving "a `conscious disregard' of public safety." Id. at 642 n.7. We also said that, "where state officials have notice of the possibility of harm, `negligence can rise to the level of deliberate indifference to or reckless disregard for' the victim." Id. (quoting Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 357 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)). Because we concluded that a triable issue of fact remained as to whether the police officer's conduct might have been grossly negligent, we found it unnecessary to determine whether the officer's conduct might have risen to the more culpable standard of recklessness. Id. at 643
  • In Wood II, we redefined the standard forS 1983 substantive due process violations by police officers. As explained above, we recognized that the Supreme Court's decision in City of Canton, 489 U.S. 378 , had called into question our decisions in Wood I and Fargo that gross negligence was sufficient. Wood II, 879 F.2d at 588. Analyzing the facts in Wood under City of Canton's deliberate indifference standard, we concluded that there remained a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the police officer in Wood had been deliberately indifferent to the plaintiff's interest in her personal security. Id. at 588.
  • Wood II makes clear that, in this circuit, an officer can be held liable for a S 1983 claim if that officer's conduct is delib erately indifferent to or in reckless disregard of a person's right to life and personal security.
  • Here, plaintiffs have alleged that Officer Smith violated the Sacramento County Sheriff's Department General Order regarding pursuits ("General Order")6 by instituting and then continuing the pursuit even when a reasonable officer would have known that to do so was in reckless disregard of Lewis's and Willard's safety. A violation of police procedures is relevant to determine whether a substantive due process violation has occurred. Fargo, 857 F.2d at 642. Police procedures are designed, in part, to guide officers when they engage in conduct that poses a serious risk of harm to either a suspect or to the general public. See id.
  • The General Order requires an officer to communicate his intention to pursue a vehicle to the sheriff's department dispatch center. But defendants concede that Smith did not contact the dispatch center. The General Order requires an officer to consider whether the seriousness of the offense warrants a chase at speeds in excess of the posted limit. But here, the only apparent "offense" was the boys' refusal to stop when another officer told them to do so. The General Order requires an officer to consider whether the need for apprehension justifies the pursuit under existing conditions. Yet Smith apparently only "needed" to apprehend the boys because they refused to stop. The General Order requires an officer to consider whether the pursuit presents unreasonable hazards to life and property. But taking the facts here in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, there existed an unreasonable hazard to Lewis's and Willard's lives. The General Order also directs an officer to discontinue a pursuit when the hazards of continuing outweigh the benefits of immediate apprehension. But here, there was no apparent danger involved in permitting the boys to escape. There certainly was risk of harm to others in continuing the pursuit.
  • In City of Canton the Supreme Court held that deliberate indifference was the minimum standard of culpability necessary to maintain a S 1983 due process action against a municipality for a policy or custom of inadequate training of police officers. City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388 . The Court reasoned that a municipality's inadequate training of its employees can only constitute a "policy or custom" when such inadequate training "evidences a `deliberate indifference' to the rights of its inhabitants." Id. at 389. But the Court also specified that the deliberate indifference standard "does not turn upon the degree of fault (if any) that a plaintiff must show to make out an underlying claim of a constitutional violation." Id. at 388 n.8. City of Canton thus did not explicitly overrule our decisions in either Wood I or Fargo because they involved claims of substantive due process violations against individual police officers.
  •  
    The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a particular amendment `provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, `that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
  • ...1 more comment...
  •  
    The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a particular amendment `provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, `that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
  •  
    The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a particular amendment `provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, `that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
  •  
    The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a particular amendment `provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, `that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
Nye Frank

Untitled - 0 views

  •  
    Page 1 Page 2 1 3/8/05 Commentary on The Rules of Practice of the Court of Appeals 22 NYCRR part 500, Effective September 1, 2005 A. Structure The Rules of Practice of the Court of Appeals apply to civil and noncapital criminal appeals, motions, criminal leave applications and certified questions from the Supreme Court of the United States, United States courts of appeal and state courts of last resort. The Court of Appeals recently rescinded in its entirety 22 NYCRR part 500 and approved a new part 500 which will be effective September 1, 2005. In addition to reflecting substantive changes and additions to the old Rules of Practice, the new Rules are organized into broad categories to eliminate duplication and provide a more logical sequence. New Rules 500.1 through 500.8 set out requirements applicable to all filings under these Rules. New Rules 500.9 through 500.19 relate to civil and noncapital criminal appeals. New Rule 500.20 contains procedures concerning criminal leave applications. Motions are addressed in new Rules 500.21 through 500.24. Orders to show cause, the Primary Election Session and certified questions are addressed in new Rules 500.25, 500.26 and 500.27, respectively. Finally, old Rule 500.13, relating to real property actions, was deleted as unnecessary. Page 3 2 B. General Requirements 500.1 General Requirements [Old Rule 500.1] New Rule 500.1 states the general requirements for papers submitted to the Court of Appeals. The Rule generally applies to "papers filed," which is defined in section 500.1(b) as all briefs, papers filed pursuant to sections 500.10 (Examination of Subject Matter Jurisdiction) and 500.11 (Alternative Procedure for Selected Appeals), motion papers and appendices. The typeface and font requirements match those recently adopted by the Appellate Division Departments following repeal of the portion of CPLR 5529 that set out specifications for such matters. New Rule 500.1(h) informs self-represented litigants that illegibl
  •  
    Page 1 Page 2 1 3/8/05 Commentary on The Rules of Practice of the Court of Appeals 22 NYCRR part 500, Effective September 1, 2005 A. Structure The Rules of Practice of the Court of Appeals apply to civil and noncapital criminal appeals, motions, criminal leave applications and certified questions from the Supreme Court of the United States, United States courts of appeal and state courts of last resort. The Court of Appeals recently rescinded in its entirety 22 NYCRR part 500 and approved a new part 500 which will be effective September 1, 2005. In addition to reflecting substantive changes and additions to the old Rules of Practice, the new Rules are organized into broad categories to eliminate duplication and provide a more logical sequence. New Rules 500.1 through 500.8 set out requirements applicable to all filings under these Rules. New Rules 500.9 through 500.19 relate to civil and noncapital criminal appeals. New Rule 500.20 contains procedures concerning criminal leave applications. Motions are addressed in new Rules 500.21 through 500.24. Orders to show cause, the Primary Election Session and certified questions are addressed in new Rules 500.25, 500.26 and 500.27, respectively. Finally, old Rule 500.13, relating to real property actions, was deleted as unnecessary. Page 3 2 B. General Requirements 500.1 General Requirements [Old Rule 500.1] New Rule 500.1 states the general requirements for papers submitted to the Court of Appeals. The Rule generally applies to "papers filed," which is defined in section 500.1(b) as all briefs, papers filed pursuant to sections 500.10 (Examination of Subject Matter Jurisdiction) and 500.11 (Alternative Procedure for Selected Appeals), motion papers and appendices. The typeface and font requirements match those recently adopted by the Appellate Division Departments following repeal of the portion of CPLR 5529 that set out specifications for such matters. New Rule 500.1(h) informs self-represented litigants that illegibl
Nye Frank

victim restitution funds, victims right to jury trial if denied - Google Search - 0 views

  •  
    Results 1 - 10 of about 6,840 for victim restitution funds , victims right to jury trial if denied . ( 0.43 seconds) Did you mean: victim restitution funds, victims right to jury trial is denied Search Results [DOC] Chapter 3 - 6 visits - Apr 21 File Format: Microsoft Word - View as HTML It reminds the judge, jury, court personnel, and parole boards of the real ..... Restitution is the oldest victim right. The concept of restitution dates back ..... hearings at which they were denied the opportunity to receive notice, ..... by the Crime Victims Fund, which is administered by the Office for Victims ... https://www.ovcttac.gov/nvaa2008/documents/participants_text/03%20Basic%20 Victims '%20 Right s.doc - Similar pages - [DOC] Draft changes to Ohio Revised Code 2930 & related Victim Rights - 2 visits - Mar 28 File Format: Microsoft Word - View as HTML Oct 1, 2008 ... A few Ohio judges have denied the right of victims to present both an oral and ... 8) Summary - Victims will have the right to restitution through a mandatory ... If a motion is made for modification of a restitution order, ... the Ohio Victim Compensation Fund, that restitution amount shall be paid ... www.ovwa.org/_uploaded/69.doc - Similar pages - [PDF] THE VICTIM IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM File Format: PDF/Adobe Acrobat - View as HTML then be communicated to the issuing body (judge or grand jury). ... sentencing, the judge denied victims the right to speak. ... noted earlier, victims controlled the trial of their victimizer, but as the state took on the .... received in crime victim compensation funds. Unlike restitution and compensation ... meetings.abanet.org/webupload/commupload/CR300000/newsletterpubs/ victims report.pdf - Similar pa
Nye Frank

Alliance: Factsheets: Elder Abuse and the Law - 0 views

  • Elder Abuse Laws Numerous accounts of maltreatment led policy makers to pass a series of laws intended to protect elderly victim. The passage of the federal Older Americans Act of 1965 (OAA) (3) and the creation of the Vulnerable Elder Rights Protection Program (4) in 1992 were instrumental in promoting state laws to address the needs and concerns of the elderly. The Vulnerable Elder Rights Protection Program legislation promoted advocacy efforts through ombudsmen offices; abuse, neglect and exploitation prevention programs; and legal assistance on behalf of older Americans. It also offered federal funding incentives which made it possible for states to develop and maintain programs designed to assist the elderly. In many respects, state elder abuse laws are patterned after legislation designed to address the problem of child abuse and neglect, and, like the response to child maltreatment, often involve the combined efforts of both criminal justice officials and social services staff. Criminal Elder Abuse Laws In an effort to deter crimes against elderly victims, and to express society's abhorrence toward such offenses, many state legislatures have created special offenses involving crimes against the elderly. Laws criminalizing abuse of the elderly are in effect in all states and the District of Columbia. Generally, these laws define the conduct which constitutes a specific form of abuse, and may make a distinction between abuse committed in a domestic, as opposed to an institutional, setting. At least two states -- Massachusetts and North Carolina -- have laws which subject anyone over the age of 18 who has sufficient means, but neglects or refuses to support a parent who is unable to support him/herself due to age or disability, to a fine or imprisonment. (5)
  •  
    ivil Remedies A few states have special provisions for the bringing of civil actions by the elderly. If an older person in Nevada suffers personal injury or death caused by abuse or neglect or suffers a loss of money or property by exploitation, the offender may be ordered to pay up to two times the actual damages incurred. If the offender acted with recklessness, oppression, fraud, or malice, the court shall order the person to pay the attorney's fees and costs of the person who initiated the lawsuit. In Georgia, the elderly may recover actual and punitive damages and attorney's fees for injury resulting from unfair or deceptive business practices.
Nye Frank

Statutory Protection of Older Persons - Accidents and Injuries - 0 views

  • In most states, there is a system of adult protective services for investigating and remedying reported abuses. Moreover, some states have laws giving victims of abuse, neglect or exploitation a civil cause of action. Finally, in most states, the abuse or neglect of older people is also a crime.
  • All states have a system for reporting allegations of abuse, neglect and exploitation of the elderly, for investigating the allegations and, if the allegations are founded, for providing services to the older person to remedy the problems and prevent their recurrence. In fact, most states have mandatory reporting requirements with respect to such allegations. If an agency concludes that an allegation is founded, it will respond by offering the older person appropriate services, such as medical assistance, counseling, special transportation, assistance with money management, or placement in a different residential setting
  •  
    LakinChapman, LLC Nationwide www.lakinlaw.com/PracticeAreas/Nursing-Home-Neglect.asp Pioneers in nursing home abuse law 866-839-2021 Statutory Protection of Older Persons Today, all states have laws concerning the abuse, neglect or exploitation of older people, but these states may follow different approaches. In most states, there is a system of adult protective services for investigating and remedying reported abuses. Moreover, some states have laws giving victims of abuse, neglect or exploitation a civil cause of action. Finally, in most states, the abuse or neglect of older people is also a crime. Adult Protective Services Typically, before any civil or criminal action is commenced against a nursing home, a report will have been made to your state's adult protective services agency, or other system in place for the reporting and investigation of allegations of the abuse, neglect or exploitation of the elderly. All states have a system for reporting allegations of abuse, neglect and exploitation of the elderly, for investigating the allegations and, if the allegations are founded, for providing services to the older person to remedy the problems and prevent their recurrence. In fact, most states have mandatory reporting requirements with respect to such allegations. If an agency concludes that an allegation is founded, it will respond by offering the older person appropriate services, such as medical assistance, counseling, special transportation, assistance with money management, or placement in a different residential setting. Civil Actions Based on Statutes Some state legislatures have created causes of action involving the abuse, neglect, or exploitation of older people, which allow victims to bring civil actions against the perpetrators and/or their employees. These causes of action may authorize damages awards to victims, but may also authorize the issuance of injunctions and restraining or protective orders, for immediate relief from ongoing abuse
  •  
    LakinChapman, LLC Nationwide www.lakinlaw.com/PracticeAreas/Nursing-Home-Neglect.asp Pioneers in nursing home abuse law 866-839-2021 Statutory Protection of Older Persons Today, all states have laws concerning the abuse, neglect or exploitation of older people, but these states may follow different approaches. In most states, there is a system of adult protective services for investigating and remedying reported abuses. Moreover, some states have laws giving victims of abuse, neglect or exploitation a civil cause of action. Finally, in most states, the abuse or neglect of older people is also a crime. Adult Protective Services Typically, before any civil or criminal action is commenced against a nursing home, a report will have been made to your state's adult protective services agency, or other system in place for the reporting and investigation of allegations of the abuse, neglect or exploitation of the elderly. All states have a system for reporting allegations of abuse, neglect and exploitation of the elderly, for investigating the allegations and, if the allegations are founded, for providing services to the older person to remedy the problems and prevent their recurrence. In fact, most states have mandatory reporting requirements with respect to such allegations. If an agency concludes that an allegation is founded, it will respond by offering the older person appropriate services, such as medical assistance, counseling, special transportation, assistance with money management, or placement in a different residential setting. Civil Actions Based on Statutes Some state legislatures have created causes of action involving the abuse, neglect, or exploitation of older people, which allow victims to bring civil actions against the perpetrators and/or their employees. These causes of action may authorize damages awards to victims, but may also authorize the issuance of injunctions and restraining or protective orders, for immediate relief from ongoing abuse
  •  
    LakinChapman, LLC Nationwide www.lakinlaw.com/PracticeAreas/Nursing-Home-Neglect.asp Pioneers in nursing home abuse law 866-839-2021 Statutory Protection of Older Persons Today, all states have laws concerning the abuse, neglect or exploitation of older people, but these states may follow different approaches. In most states, there is a system of adult protective services for investigating and remedying reported abuses. Moreover, some states have laws giving victims of abuse, neglect or exploitation a civil cause of action. Finally, in most states, the abuse or neglect of older people is also a crime. Adult Protective Services Typically, before any civil or criminal action is commenced against a nursing home, a report will have been made to your state's adult protective services agency, or other system in place for the reporting and investigation of allegations of the abuse, neglect or exploitation of the elderly. All states have a system for reporting allegations of abuse, neglect and exploitation of the elderly, for investigating the allegations and, if the allegations are founded, for providing services to the older person to remedy the problems and prevent their recurrence. In fact, most states have mandatory reporting requirements with respect to such allegations. If an agency concludes that an allegation is founded, it will respond by offering the older person appropriate services, such as medical assistance, counseling, special transportation, assistance with money management, or placement in a different residential setting. Civil Actions Based on Statutes Some state legislatures have created causes of action involving the abuse, neglect, or exploitation of older people, which allow victims to bring civil actions against the perpetrators and/or their employees. These causes of action may authorize damages awards to victims, but may also authorize the issuance of injunctions and restraining or protective orders, for immediate relief from ongoing abuse
Nye Frank

Search Results - THOMAS (Library of Congress) - 0 views

  • 27. H.R.448 : To protect seniors in the United States from elder abuse by establishing specialized elder abuse prosecution and research programs and activities to aid victims of elder abuse, to provide training to prosecutors and other law enforcement related to elder abuse prevention and protection, to establish programs that provide for emergency crisis response teams to combat elder abuse, and for other purposes.Sponsor: Rep Sestak, Joe [PA-7] (introduced 1/9/2009)      Cosponsors (5) Committees: House Judiciary; Senate Judiciary Latest Major Action: 2/12/2009 Referred to Senate committee. Status: Received in the Senate and Read twice and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.
  •  
    The Library of Congress > THOMAS Home > Bills, Resolutions > Search Results THIS SEARCH THIS DOCUMENT GO TO Next Hit Forward New Bills Search Prev Hit Back HomePage Hit List Best Sections Help Contents Display Limited To: DATES FROM 01/01/2007-01/01/2010 31 Bills from the 111th Congress ranked by relevance on "probation " . 31 bills containing your phrase (or variants of its words) in the same order . Listing of 31 bills containing your phrase (or variants of its words) in the same order . 1 . CAN DO Act of 2009 (Introduced in House) [H.R.1303.IH] 2 . Ex-Offenders Voting Rights Act of 2009 (Introduced in House) [H.R.59.IH] 3 . MEGA (Introduced in House) [H.R.330.IH] 4 . Whereas there are approximately three million Americans employed within the justice system; (Engrossed as Agreed to or Passed by House) [H.RES.45.EH] 5 . SERV Act (Introduced in Senate) [S.902.IS] 6 . SERV Act (Introduced in House) [H.R.2138.IH] 7 . Whereas there are approximately three million Americans employed within the justice system; (Introduced in House) [H.RES.45.IH] 8 . Safeguarding America's Seniors and Veterans Act of 2009 (Introduced in House) [H.R.746.IH] 9 . Managing Arson Through Criminal History (MATCH) Act of 2009 (Introduced in House) [H.R.1727.IH] 10 . Calling on the Government of Vietnam to release from prison, end the detention without trial, and cease the harassment and house arrest of the people who signed the Manifesto on Freedom... (Introduced in House) [H.RES.334.IH] 11 . Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that the President of the United States should not issue pardons to senior members of his administration during the final 90 days... (Introduced in House) [H.RES.9.IH] 12 . National Criminal Justice Commission Act of 2009 (Introduced in Senate
Nye Frank

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDSummary judgment is proper if the moving party can demonstrate... - 0 views

  •  
    Did you mean: SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD Summary judgment is proper of the moving party can demonstrate that there is no genuineissue of material fact and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In considering whether genuine issues of material fact exist, the Co Search Results 877 F.2d 728 Id. Under that standard, summary judgment is proper only where "the pleadings, ... If the moving party satisfies this burden, the opponent must set forth specific ... Such an issue of fact is only a genuine issue if it can reasonably be ... of material fact exists no longer precludes the use of summary judgment. ... bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F2/877/877.F2d.728.87-4418.html - 30k - Cached - Similar pages - DOJ Appeal Brief Re Summary Judgment Requirements / Antitrust Laws ... 4 2 The central economic fact about delivering circulars to households is that, .... if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is ... If Advo met that standard, summary judgment was improper even if, .... In considering whether to attempt entry, a prospective entrant would ... www.lect law .com/files/ant14.htm - 48k - Cached - Similar pages - [PDF] IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF ... File Format: PDF/Adobe Acrobat no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled .... the court must consider "whether or not the individual can perform the essential functions of the ..... defendant Penn-Del Directory Company for summary judgment (Document No. ... defendant is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law, ... www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/opinions/99D0387P.pdf - Similar pages - Brief for Amicus Curiae United States of America in Support of ... Summary judgment is properly granted only
Nye Frank

THE CANADIAN INSTITUTE Litigating Personal Injury Damages DAMAGES FOR EMOTIONAL DISTRES... - 0 views

  •  
    Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, 5 ed. (1984), p. 360.th7Linden, Canadian Tort Law, 7th ed., at pp. 389
  • ...4 more comments...
  •  
    In addition, the7judicial system has proven time and again the capacityto differentiate between deserving cases andgroundless actions. The appropriate response, when concerned about fraudulent lawsuits, is avigorous pursuit of the truth, not in the abdication of judicial responsibility.8 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 5 Toronto Railway Co. V. Toms (1911), 44 S.C.R. 268 at 274.9See Dulieu v. White & Sons, [1901] 2 K.B. 669.10See Hinz v. Berry [1970] 2 Q.B. 40, where Lord Denning explained thatdamages are11recoverable for "nervous shock, or, to put it in medical terms, for any recognizablepsychiatric illness caused by the breach of duty by the defendant."See Linden, Canadian Tort Law, supra 1, at pp. 389-92.12Eventually, the courts began awarding damages for emotional distress, but onlywhere therewas an accompanying physical injury. The court reasoned that, where a person suffers physicalinjury, however slight, damages could be claimed for the fright occasioned thereby. Subsequently,9the physical injury requirement was discarded when it was decided that damages resulting fromnervous shock generated byfright maybe recoverable in a negligence action, even whereno physicalinjury has occurred.10IV.The Components of a Claim for Emotional DistressA claim for damages for emotional distress can come in a variety of forms. One may beclaiming, in the words of Lord Denning, damages for "nervous shock". Other commonly used11terms are damages for emotional upset, intentional infliction of mental distress, negligent inflictionof emotional distress or negligent infliction of psychiatric damage. The common element to theseclaims is that, under Canadian law, the complainant must establish two components: first, thepsychological injury suffered by the plaintiff was a foreseeable consequence of the defendant'snegligent conduct, and second, that the psychological injury was so serious that it resulted in arecognizable p
  •  
    In addition, the7judicial system has proven time and again the capacityto differentiate between deserving cases andgroundless actions. The appropriate response, when concerned about fraudulent lawsuits, is avigorous pursuit of the truth, not in the abdication of judicial responsibility.8 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 5 Toronto Railway Co. V. Toms (1911), 44 S.C.R. 268 at 274.9See Dulieu v. White & Sons, [1901] 2 K.B. 669.10See Hinz v. Berry [1970] 2 Q.B. 40, where Lord Denning explained thatdamages are11recoverable for "nervous shock, or, to put it in medical terms, for any recognizablepsychiatric illness caused by the breach of duty by the defendant."See Linden, Canadian Tort Law, supra 1, at pp. 389-92.12Eventually, the courts began awarding damages for emotional distress, but onlywhere therewas an accompanying physical injury. The court reasoned that, where a person suffers physicalinjury, however slight, damages could be claimed for the fright occasioned thereby. Subsequently,9the physical injury requirement was discarded when it was decided that damages resulting fromnervous shock generated byfright maybe recoverable in a negligence action, even whereno physicalinjury has occurred.10IV.The Components of a Claim for Emotional DistressA claim for damages for emotional distress can come in a variety of forms. One may beclaiming, in the words of Lord Denning, damages for "nervous shock". Other commonly used11terms are damages for emotional upset, intentional infliction of mental distress, negligent inflictionof emotional distress or negligent infliction of psychiatric damage. The common element to theseclaims is that, under Canadian law, the complainant must establish two components: first, thepsychological injury suffered by the plaintiff was a foreseeable consequence of the defendant'snegligent conduct, and second, that the psychological injury was so serious that it resulted in arecognizable psyc
  •  
    A claim for damages for emotional distress can come in a variety of forms. One may beclaiming, in the words of Lord Denning, damages for "nervous shock". Other commonly used11terms are damages for emotional upset, intentional infliction of mental distress, negligent inflictionof emotional distress or negligent infliction of psychiatric damage. The common element to theseclaims is that, under Canadian law, the complainant must establish two components: first, thepsychological injury suffered by the plaintiff was a foreseeable consequence of the defendant'snegligent conduct, and second, that the psychological injury was so serious that it resulted in arecognizable psychiatric illness.12 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 6 McLoughlin v. Arbor Memorial Services Inc. [2004] O.J. No. 5003.13Enunciated by the House of Lords in White v. Chief Constable of South Yorkshire, [1998] 314W.L.R. 1509 (H.L.), and approved by MacPhearson J.A. in Vanek v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Companyof Canada Limited (1999) 48 O.R. (3d) 228 (O.C.A.).Ibid.15A.What is meant by "foreseeable"?Foreseeability has generally been interpreted as what a "reasonable person" would foresee.In thecontext of an accident,foreseeableemotional distress meanspsychiatricinjuryas areasonablyforeseeable consequence of exposure to the trauma of the accident and its aftermath.13In general, the law expects its citizens to be reasonably robust and hesitates to imposeliabilityfor the exceptional frailtyof certain individuals. Before beingheld to be in breach of a dutyto an accident bystander, a defendant must have exposed him to a situation where it was reasonablyforeseeablethat apersonof reasonable robustness andfortitudewouldbelikelyto suffer psychiatricinjury.14The Ontario Court of Appeal addressed this issue in Vanek v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Co.Of Canada Limited ("Vanek"). In this case, an 11-year-old girl consumed a small amount of foul15tasti
  •  
    Even where the plaintiff has suffered a psychiatric illness triggered by the defendant'sinabilityto fulfil adutyofcare, thecourts willsometimes denyliabilityiftheindividual's psychiatricdamage is a result of their own particular "hypersensitivity". The courts like to use, as a baseline,18the ordinary person of reasonable mental fortitude. Where this fictional individual would notnormally suffer psychiatric damage, a uniquely vulnerable person who does suffer damage wouldbe barred from recovery
  •  
    With all due respect to Dr. Herbert Modlin, his thesis does not do justice to the manyinnocent accident victims who suffer pain in silence, with indescribable sadness and with despair.Reactions to traumatic events effect people biologically, psychologically and socially. As23Hoffman, et al., state ,24"At the psychological level, traumatic reactions affect thinking, feeling andbehaviour. In the acute phaseafter a period of shock theremaybe anxiety, insomnia,nightmares,sensitivityto noise, fatigueandpain intrusiverecollectionsofthetraumain thoughts or images, either spontaneously or when reminded of the trauma. In thelong term there may be emotional disability (with or without physical injury) that iscomplicated by depression, irritability, philosophical pessimism, loss of hope anddecreased expectations in life, which eventually lead to personality change."(Underlining mine)According to Hoffman et al., "accident victims may feel uncontrollable anger (similar tovictims of crimes), guilt and self-blame (like victims in child abuse) or passivity, futility anddemoralization (similar to some Holocaust survivors). Unfortunately, the victims of civilianpersonal injuries tend to feel isolated and alone in their pain because there are no group experiencesor social support system to allow them to share their experiences with other victims."25How then, does plaintiff's counsel go about establishing and building a claim for emotionaldistress? -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 11 (1998) 38 O.R. (3d) 651.26[2001] O.J. No. 5756 (S.C.J.).27VII. Building the Claim - The Insurance ActClaims for emotional distress have long been recognized and, since 1994, have beenpermitted bythe various incarnations of the InsuranceAct. It maybeuseful to recall that theOntarioMotorist Protection Plan (the first no-fault legislation which governed motor vehicle accident casesbetween June 22, 1990 and December 31, 1993), allowed compensation
  •  
    According to Hoffman et al., "accident victims may feel uncontrollable anger (similar tovictims of crimes), guilt and self-blame (like victims in child abuse) or passivity, futility anddemoralization (similar to some Holocaust survivors). Unfortunately, the victims of civilianpersonal injuries tend to feel isolated and alone in their pain because there are no group experiencesor social support system to allow them to share their experiences with other victims."25How then, does plaintiff's counsel go about establishing and building a claim for emotionaldistress? -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 11 (1998) 38 O.R. (3d) 651.26[2001] O.J. No. 5756 (S.C.J.).27VII. Building the Claim - The Insurance ActClaims for emotional distress have long been recognized and, since 1994, have beenpermitted bythe various incarnations of the InsuranceAct. It maybeuseful to recall that theOntarioMotorist Protection Plan (the first no-fault legislation which governed motor vehicle accident casesbetween June 22, 1990 and December 31, 1993), allowed compensation only if an injured person'simpairments were physical in nature. Claims for emotional distress unadorned with any physicalcomponent resulted in the claim being dismissed.However, if the emotional distress claim could be characterized as a "chronic pain claim"with both physical and psychological aspects, compensation was permitted (see in this regard,Chrappa v Ohm).During the OMPP era plaintiffs' counsel went to great lengths to meld26psychological distress with a physical component in order to be free of the rigid straightjacket of theOMPP threshold.With Bill 164, which took effect on January 1, 1994 and governed motor vehicle accidentcases until October 31, 1996, there was no impediment to obtaining compensation for a "seriousimpairment of an important physical, mental or psychological function". Bill 59 (which applies tomotor vehicle accidents between November 19
Nye Frank

conspiracy case 99-6050 -- U.S. v. Rahseparian -- 11/07/2000 - 0 views

  •  
    SEYMOUR , Chief Judge. After a joint jury trial, co-defendants Ardashir (aka Ardie) and Daryoush (aka Steve), along with Jalal (aka Jack) Rahseparian, were convicted of conspiracy to commit mail fraud, mail fraud, and money laundering. All three appealed. Jack's appeal is addressed in the companion opinion, see United States v. Rahseparian, No. 99-6031 (Nov. 7, 2000). Ardie contends on appeal that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. Ardie and Steve contend a new trial is necessary due to the prosecutor's comment on their failure to testify in violation of Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). Steve further claims a new trial is required because of certain incriminating hearsay statements elicited by the prosecutor in violation of Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). We affirm. I BACKGROUND Ardie and Steve Rahseparian are the sons of Jack Rahseparian. At the time of the conduct for which they were charged, Steve resided in Altoona, Pennsylvania, Ardie resided in Fort Smith, Arkansas, and Jack resided and worked in Shawnee, Oklahoma. The government contended at trial that Ardie and Steve Rahseparian formed Genesis Marketing, a telemarketing company, through which they and their father conspired to commit and did commit mail fraud from May 1994 to May 1995. The government further successfully argued that Ardie, Steve, and Jack Rahseparian laundered the proceeds from the telemarketing scheme through Jack's business checking accounts. Brad Russell, the company's only employee other than the Rahseparians themselves, testified on behalf of the government. Mr. Russell was a personal friend of Ardie. The two worked out of Ardie's apartment in Fort Smith as the sole telemarketers for Genesis Marketing. Mr. Russell testified that he and Ardie would entice customers over the telephone to buy products, such as water purifiers and "Say No to Drugs" kits, at highly inflated pric
Nye Frank

how to prove specific intent of conspiracy of prosecutor - Google Search - 0 views

  •  
    Results 1 - 10 of about 140,000 for how to prove specific intent of conspiracy of prosecutor . ( 0.38 seconds) Did you mean: how to provide specific intent of conspiracy of prosecutor Search Results Conspiracy (crime) - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Conspiracy law usually does not require proof of the specific intent by the ... based on the fact that the prosecutor would be unable to prove beyond a ... en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Conspiracy _(crime) - 54k - Cached - Similar pages - 1. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda-genocide-conspiracy ... defendant's co-conspirators acted with specific intent would "tend to prove" that the. 40. See Prosecutor v. Bagasora et al., Case Nos. ICTR-98-41-AR93, ... papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID951847_code366348.pdf?abstractid=951847&rulid=263109&mirid=4 - Similar pages - by A Decision E Law: Conspiracy to Commit Genocide: Prosecutor v Jean Kambanda ... [48] In order to prove the existence of a conspiracy, ..... that an accused might have the specific intent required to commit genocide and also to act ... The Trial Chamber held that the Prosecutor relied on the same intent of the two ... www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v8n1/obote-odora81.html - 1k - Cached - Similar pages - [PDF] CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF ... File Format: PDF/Adobe Acrobat - View as HTML Where the prosecutor did not charge conspiracy as an offense, but introduced evidence of a conspiracy to prove liability, the court had a sua sponte duty to ... an agreement between two or more people with the specific intent to agree ... www.courtinfo.ca.gov/opinions/archive/B199059.PDF - Similar pages - [PDF] [J-28-99] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENN
Nye Frank

LADA Victim-Witness Assistance Program - 0 views

  •  
    Law, Tort, Administrative, Hate Crimes, Corruption, Sheriff,
  •  
    Victim Rights in California [ TOP ] Victims of crime and the families of homicide victims have the right to: Know the current status of your court case. Be assisted if called as a witness. Attend all sentencing proceedings. Speak in person; address the court in writing; or be represented by an attorney at the time of felony sentencing to express your views concerning the defendant, the crime, and its effects on you and your family. Have the court order restitution from the convicted person. Request the Board of Prison Terms to provide notice of any hearing to review or consider parole eligibility or parole-setting for prisoner(s) in your case. You must keep the Board of Prison Terms informed of your current address if you wish to be notified. Speak personally; submit a letter, tape recording or video tape; or send an attorney to the parole hearing to express your views about the crime and the person responsible. Program Services Available [ TOP ] The following mandatory and optional services, mandated by the Office of Emergency Services, are provided: Mandatory Services Crisis Intervention Emergency Assistance Resource and Referral Assistance Follow-up Assistance Property Return Assistance Orientation to the Criminal Justice System Victim Impact Statement Assistance Court Escort/Court Support Case Status/Case Disposition Information Notification of Family/Friends Employer Notification Victim of Crime Claims Assistance Restitution Assistance Optional Services Creditor Intervention Child Care Assistance Witness Notification Funeral Arrangement Assistance Crime Prevention Information Witness Protection Assistance Temporary Restraining Order Information Transportation Assistance Court Waiting Area Employer Intervention Language Capabilities: Confidential language service available to translate all languages. State Victim of Crime Compens
Nye Frank

Position Outline for Elder Abuse Policy (Rough Draft) - 0 views

  • 29 NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, (2 nd ed. 1991), Standard 26.7, p. 94. 30 NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, (2 nd ed. 1991), Standard 26.3, p. 93. 31 See NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, (2 nd ed. 1991), Standard 26.7, p.92
  •  
    Page 1 Page 2 NATIONAL DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION POLICY POSITIONS ON THE PROSECUTION OF ELDER ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND FINANCIAL EXPLOITATION Adopted: March 22, 2003 by the Board of Directors in New Orleans, Louisiana National District Attorneys Association 99 Canal Center Plaza, Suite 510 Alexandria, Virginia 22314 Telephone: 703-549-9222 Facsimile: 703-836-3195 Page 3 i INDEX TOPIC PAGE NO. Magnitude of Elder Abuse …………………………………………….. 1-2 Current Elder Population ……………………………………… 2-3 Projected Increase in the Elder Population …………………… 3 Number of Individuals in Nursing Homes ……………………. 3 Elder Abuse in Domestic Settings ……………………………… 3-4 Elder Abuse in Institutional Settings ………………………...... 4-5 Elder Abuse and the Prosecutor's Office Office Organization ……………………………………………... 5-6 Training Training to Understand Crimes against Elders ……………….. 7-9 Training to Understand the Elder Victim ……………………… 9 Victim's Services ………………………………………………………… 10-13 Funding …………………………………………………………………… 13-14 Multidisciplinary Approach …………………………………………….. 14-15 Public Awareness ………………………………………………………… 15-17 State Legislation State Criminal Laws ………………………………………………. 17 State Mandatory Reporting Laws ………………………………… 18 Special Trial Procedures and Evidentiary Rules ………………… 18-19 Page 4 1 NATIONAL DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION POLICY POSITIONS ON THE PROSECUTION OF ELDER ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND FINANCIAL EXPLOITATION Introduction: Since May of 1986, the National District Attorneys Association has become increasingly concerned about the growing problem of eld
  •  
    Page 1 Page 2 NATIONAL DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION POLICY POSITIONS ON THE PROSECUTION OF ELDER ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND FINANCIAL EXPLOITATION Adopted: March 22, 2003 by the Board of Directors in New Orleans, Louisiana National District Attorneys Association 99 Canal Center Plaza, Suite 510 Alexandria, Virginia 22314 Telephone: 703-549-9222 Facsimile: 703-836-3195 Page 3 i INDEX TOPIC PAGE NO. Magnitude of Elder Abuse …………………………………………….. 1-2 Current Elder Population ……………………………………… 2-3 Projected Increase in the Elder Population …………………… 3 Number of Individuals in Nursing Homes ……………………. 3 Elder Abuse in Domestic Settings ……………………………… 3-4 Elder Abuse in Institutional Settings ………………………...... 4-5 Elder Abuse and the Prosecutor's Office Office Organization ……………………………………………... 5-6 Training Training to Understand Crimes against Elders ……………….. 7-9 Training to Understand the Elder Victim ……………………… 9 Victim's Services ………………………………………………………… 10-13 Funding …………………………………………………………………… 13-14 Multidisciplinary Approach …………………………………………….. 14-15 Public Awareness ………………………………………………………… 15-17 State Legislation State Criminal Laws ………………………………………………. 17 State Mandatory Reporting Laws ………………………………… 18 Special Trial Procedures and Evidentiary Rules ………………… 18-19 Page 4 1 NATIONAL DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION POLICY POSITIONS ON THE PROSECUTION OF ELDER ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND FINANCIAL EXPLOITATION Introduction: Since May of 1986, the National District Attorneys Association has become increasingly concerned about the growing problem of eld
Nye Frank

Dereliction and Collusion - City of Seattle Contra Cabal 711-08-10 - 0 views

  •  
    This is the html version of the file http://contracabal.org/NewFiles/711-08-10-06-0317.pdf. Google automatically generates html versions of documents as we crawl the web. Page 1 © Copyright 2006 by Paul Trummel. Contra Cabal #711-08-10/06-0317-2011. Page 1 of 5 Dereliction and Collusion - City of Seattle Contra Cabal 711-08-10 Alleged Dereliction and Unlawful Collusion among Thomas A. Carr, Seattle City Attorney, his assistants Michael J. Finkle and Robert W. Hood, in a consort with Stephen A. M-tch-ll, a Council House administrator, his directors, and their lawyers. Seattle Jewish Mafia (SJM), a faith-based initiative similar to Al Quaeda, has destroyed Contra Cabal web site three times. It attempted to silence the author and to cover up elder abuse by Council House directors using unlawful means to prevent constitutionally protected speech. [Seattle Jewish Mafia] [Kill the Messenger - WIP] With similar intent, Seattle City Attorney Thomas A. Carr, has issued six criminal indictments against the author. He has attempted to intimidate, silence, and return the author to jail on trumped-up charges - charges similar to those used by Judge James A. Doerty to jail and place him in solitary confinement (2002). Doerty's decision now awaits review by Washington Supreme Court. [Supreme Court Review] Carr's behavior, as an elected official, ranks as truly kafkaesque. In an attempt to preempt the Supreme Court decision, he has evidently tried to pervert the course of justice. Fabricating or interfering with evidence and threatening or intimidating witnesses both classify as criminal offenses punishable by a jail sentence. SJM has shown a pattern of racketeering (defined by the Civil Rights Act and RICO statute). A RICO pattern means two or more organized criminal acts which indicate ensuant activity. Those acts include conspiracy to commit crimes of coercion by wrongful use of force or fear. Instead of challenging the perpetrators, Carr and his team of lawyers have collud
  •  
    This is the html version of the file http://contracabal.org/NewFiles/711-08-10-06-0317.pdf. Google automatically generates html versions of documents as we crawl the web. Page 1 © Copyright 2006 by Paul Trummel. Contra Cabal #711-08-10/06-0317-2011. Page 1 of 5 Dereliction and Collusion - City of Seattle Contra Cabal 711-08-10 Alleged Dereliction and Unlawful Collusion among Thomas A. Carr, Seattle City Attorney, his assistants Michael J. Finkle and Robert W. Hood, in a consort with Stephen A. M-tch-ll, a Council House administrator, his directors, and their lawyers. Seattle Jewish Mafia (SJM), a faith-based initiative similar to Al Quaeda, has destroyed Contra Cabal web site three times. It attempted to silence the author and to cover up elder abuse by Council House directors using unlawful means to prevent constitutionally protected speech. [Seattle Jewish Mafia] [Kill the Messenger - WIP] With similar intent, Seattle City Attorney Thomas A. Carr, has issued six criminal indictments against the author. He has attempted to intimidate, silence, and return the author to jail on trumped-up charges - charges similar to those used by Judge James A. Doerty to jail and place him in solitary confinement (2002). Doerty's decision now awaits review by Washington Supreme Court. [Supreme Court Review] Carr's behavior, as an elected official, ranks as truly kafkaesque. In an attempt to preempt the Supreme Court decision, he has evidently tried to pervert the course of justice. Fabricating or interfering with evidence and threatening or intimidating witnesses both classify as criminal offenses punishable by a jail sentence. SJM has shown a pattern of racketeering (defined by the Civil Rights Act and RICO statute). A RICO pattern means two or more organized criminal acts which indicate ensuant activity. Those acts include conspiracy to commit crimes of coercion by wrongful use of force or fear. Instead of challenging the perpetrators, Carr and his team of lawyers have collud
Nye Frank

27. H.R.448 : To protect seniors in the United States from elder abuse by establishing ... - 0 views

shared by Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09 - Cached
  •  
    1. pecialized elder abuse prosecution and research programs and activities to aid ... Latest Major Action: 4/27/2009 Referred to House subcommittee. ... thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/?&Db=d111... - Cached - Similar - 2. View Bill | C-SPAN Congressional Chronicle, Created by Cable ... 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31 ... To protect seniors in the United States from elder abuse by establishing specialized elder abuse prosecution and research programs and activities to aid victims of elder abuse, to provide training to prosecutors ... DEBATE - The House proceeded with forty minutes of debate on H.R. 448 . ... www.c-spanarchives.org/congress/?q=node/77535&id... - Cached - Similar - 3. Search Results - THOMAS (Library of Congress) H.R.448 : To protect seniors in the United States from elder abuse by establishing specialized elder abuse prosecution and research programs .... Latest Major Action: 1/27/2009 Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. ... www.thomas.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/?&Db=d111... - Cached - Similar - 4. CD2 Trent Franks | Arizona Congress Watch H. R. 448, the Elder Abuse Victims Act, passed the House 397 - 25. The bill seeks to protect seniors in the United States from elder abuse by establishing specialized elder abuse prosecution and research programs and activities to aid victims of elder abuse, to provide training to prosecutors ... 27, 28, 29, 30, 31 ... www.azcongresswatch.com/?cat=18 - Cached - Similar - 5. [DOC] Intricate File Format: Microsoft Word - View as HTML The Elder Abuse Victims Act of 2009 (H.R.448), sponsored by Representative ... protect seniors in the United States from elder abuse by establishing specialized elder abuse prosecution and research programs and activities .... The amendment was proposed on April 23, 2009, and considered by the Senate on April 27. ... www.ncea.aoa.gov/NCEAroot/Main_Site/.../May_Newsletter.doc - Simi
  •  
    1. pecialized elder abuse prosecution and research programs and activities to aid ... Latest Major Action: 4/27/2009 Referred to House subcommittee. ... thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/?&Db=d111... - Cached - Similar - 2. View Bill | C-SPAN Congressional Chronicle, Created by Cable ... 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31 ... To protect seniors in the United States from elder abuse by establishing specialized elder abuse prosecution and research programs and activities to aid victims of elder abuse, to provide training to prosecutors ... DEBATE - The House proceeded with forty minutes of debate on H.R. 448 . ... www.c-spanarchives.org/congress/?q=node/77535&id... - Cached - Similar - 3. Search Results - THOMAS (Library of Congress) H.R.448 : To protect seniors in the United States from elder abuse by establishing specialized elder abuse prosecution and research programs .... Latest Major Action: 1/27/2009 Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. ... www.thomas.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/?&Db=d111... - Cached - Similar - 4. CD2 Trent Franks | Arizona Congress Watch H. R. 448, the Elder Abuse Victims Act, passed the House 397 - 25. The bill seeks to protect seniors in the United States from elder abuse by establishing specialized elder abuse prosecution and research programs and activities to aid victims of elder abuse, to provide training to prosecutors ... 27, 28, 29, 30, 31 ... www.azcongresswatch.com/?cat=18 - Cached - Similar - 5. [DOC] Intricate File Format: Microsoft Word - View as HTML The Elder Abuse Victims Act of 2009 (H.R.448), sponsored by Representative ... protect seniors in the United States from elder abuse by establishing specialized elder abuse prosecution and research programs and activities .... The amendment was proposed on April 23, 2009, and considered by the Senate on April 27. ... www.ncea.aoa.gov/NCEAroot/Main_Site/.../May_Newsletter.doc - S
Nye Frank

06-ORD-265 - 0 views

  •  
    While it is thus true that this office generally defers to a law enforcement agency's classification of an investigation as active, inactive, or closed, fully recognizing that we have no statutory authority to order the agency to close an investigation for open records purposes , we have had occasion to question an agency's reliance on KRS 61.878(1)(h) and KRS 17.150(2), and its classification of an investigation as open, where several years have elapsed and the agency fails to provide an adequate explanation or otherwise meet its statutory burden of proof. See, e.g., OAG 86-80 (eight years); OAG 90-143 (one and one-half years); 02-ORD-20 (ten years). In so doing, we were guided by the language found in KRS 17.150(3), echoed in KRS 61.878(1)(h), and the statement of legislative policy that appears at KRS 61.871, declaring that "free and open examination of public records is in the public interest" and that the referenced exceptions to public inspection must be "strictly construed" to promote the public's right to know. Underlying these decisions was the recognition that "[s]ecret police activity without some overriding justification is repugnant to the American system of government," OAG 80-54, p. 3, and that when an investigation has been inactive for an inordinate period of time, the public's interest in seeing an offender brought to justice may have to yield to the public's right to review the conduct of the police in discharging their statutory duties
  •  
    While it is thus true that this office generally defers to a law enforcement agency's classification of an investigation as active, inactive, or closed, fully recognizing that we have no statutory authority to order the agency to close an investigation for open records purposes , we have had occasion to question an agency's reliance on KRS 61.878(1)(h) and KRS 17.150(2), and its classification of an investigation as open, where several years have elapsed and the agency fails to provide an adequate explanation or otherwise meet its statutory burden of proof. See, e.g., OAG 86-80 (eight years); OAG 90-143 (one and one-half years); 02-ORD-20 (ten years). In so doing, we were guided by the language found in KRS 17.150(3), echoed in KRS 61.878(1)(h), and the statement of legislative policy that appears at KRS 61.871, declaring that "free and open examination of public records is in the public interest" and that the referenced exceptions to public inspection must be "strictly construed" to promote the public's right to know. Underlying these decisions was the recognition that "[s]ecret police activity without some overriding justification is repugnant to the American system of government," OAG 80-54, p. 3, and that when an investigation has been inactive for an inordinate period of time, the public's interest in seeing an offender brought to justice may have to yield to the public's right to review the conduct of the police in discharging their statutory duties
1 - 20 of 43 Next › Last »
Showing 20 items per page