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SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDSummary judgment is proper if the moving party can demonstrate... - 0 views

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    Did you mean: SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD Summary judgment is proper of the moving party can demonstrate that there is no genuineissue of material fact and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In considering whether genuine issues of material fact exist, the Co Search Results 877 F.2d 728 Id. Under that standard, summary judgment is proper only where "the pleadings, ... If the moving party satisfies this burden, the opponent must set forth specific ... Such an issue of fact is only a genuine issue if it can reasonably be ... of material fact exists no longer precludes the use of summary judgment. ... bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F2/877/877.F2d.728.87-4418.html - 30k - Cached - Similar pages - DOJ Appeal Brief Re Summary Judgment Requirements / Antitrust Laws ... 4 2 The central economic fact about delivering circulars to households is that, .... if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is ... If Advo met that standard, summary judgment was improper even if, .... In considering whether to attempt entry, a prospective entrant would ... www.lect law .com/files/ant14.htm - 48k - Cached - Similar pages - [PDF] IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF ... File Format: PDF/Adobe Acrobat no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled .... the court must consider "whether or not the individual can perform the essential functions of the ..... defendant Penn-Del Directory Company for summary judgment (Document No. ... defendant is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law, ... www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/opinions/99D0387P.pdf - Similar pages - Brief for Amicus Curiae United States of America in Support of ... Summary judgment is properly granted only
Nye Frank

THE CANADIAN INSTITUTE Litigating Personal Injury Damages DAMAGES FOR EMOTIONAL DISTRES... - 0 views

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    Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, 5 ed. (1984), p. 360.th7Linden, Canadian Tort Law, 7th ed., at pp. 389
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    In addition, the7judicial system has proven time and again the capacityto differentiate between deserving cases andgroundless actions. The appropriate response, when concerned about fraudulent lawsuits, is avigorous pursuit of the truth, not in the abdication of judicial responsibility.8 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 5 Toronto Railway Co. V. Toms (1911), 44 S.C.R. 268 at 274.9See Dulieu v. White & Sons, [1901] 2 K.B. 669.10See Hinz v. Berry [1970] 2 Q.B. 40, where Lord Denning explained thatdamages are11recoverable for "nervous shock, or, to put it in medical terms, for any recognizablepsychiatric illness caused by the breach of duty by the defendant."See Linden, Canadian Tort Law, supra 1, at pp. 389-92.12Eventually, the courts began awarding damages for emotional distress, but onlywhere therewas an accompanying physical injury. The court reasoned that, where a person suffers physicalinjury, however slight, damages could be claimed for the fright occasioned thereby. Subsequently,9the physical injury requirement was discarded when it was decided that damages resulting fromnervous shock generated byfright maybe recoverable in a negligence action, even whereno physicalinjury has occurred.10IV.The Components of a Claim for Emotional DistressA claim for damages for emotional distress can come in a variety of forms. One may beclaiming, in the words of Lord Denning, damages for "nervous shock". Other commonly used11terms are damages for emotional upset, intentional infliction of mental distress, negligent inflictionof emotional distress or negligent infliction of psychiatric damage. The common element to theseclaims is that, under Canadian law, the complainant must establish two components: first, thepsychological injury suffered by the plaintiff was a foreseeable consequence of the defendant'snegligent conduct, and second, that the psychological injury was so serious that it resulted in arecognizable p
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    In addition, the7judicial system has proven time and again the capacityto differentiate between deserving cases andgroundless actions. The appropriate response, when concerned about fraudulent lawsuits, is avigorous pursuit of the truth, not in the abdication of judicial responsibility.8 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 5 Toronto Railway Co. V. Toms (1911), 44 S.C.R. 268 at 274.9See Dulieu v. White & Sons, [1901] 2 K.B. 669.10See Hinz v. Berry [1970] 2 Q.B. 40, where Lord Denning explained thatdamages are11recoverable for "nervous shock, or, to put it in medical terms, for any recognizablepsychiatric illness caused by the breach of duty by the defendant."See Linden, Canadian Tort Law, supra 1, at pp. 389-92.12Eventually, the courts began awarding damages for emotional distress, but onlywhere therewas an accompanying physical injury. The court reasoned that, where a person suffers physicalinjury, however slight, damages could be claimed for the fright occasioned thereby. Subsequently,9the physical injury requirement was discarded when it was decided that damages resulting fromnervous shock generated byfright maybe recoverable in a negligence action, even whereno physicalinjury has occurred.10IV.The Components of a Claim for Emotional DistressA claim for damages for emotional distress can come in a variety of forms. One may beclaiming, in the words of Lord Denning, damages for "nervous shock". Other commonly used11terms are damages for emotional upset, intentional infliction of mental distress, negligent inflictionof emotional distress or negligent infliction of psychiatric damage. The common element to theseclaims is that, under Canadian law, the complainant must establish two components: first, thepsychological injury suffered by the plaintiff was a foreseeable consequence of the defendant'snegligent conduct, and second, that the psychological injury was so serious that it resulted in arecognizable psyc
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    A claim for damages for emotional distress can come in a variety of forms. One may beclaiming, in the words of Lord Denning, damages for "nervous shock". Other commonly used11terms are damages for emotional upset, intentional infliction of mental distress, negligent inflictionof emotional distress or negligent infliction of psychiatric damage. The common element to theseclaims is that, under Canadian law, the complainant must establish two components: first, thepsychological injury suffered by the plaintiff was a foreseeable consequence of the defendant'snegligent conduct, and second, that the psychological injury was so serious that it resulted in arecognizable psychiatric illness.12 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 6 McLoughlin v. Arbor Memorial Services Inc. [2004] O.J. No. 5003.13Enunciated by the House of Lords in White v. Chief Constable of South Yorkshire, [1998] 314W.L.R. 1509 (H.L.), and approved by MacPhearson J.A. in Vanek v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Companyof Canada Limited (1999) 48 O.R. (3d) 228 (O.C.A.).Ibid.15A.What is meant by "foreseeable"?Foreseeability has generally been interpreted as what a "reasonable person" would foresee.In thecontext of an accident,foreseeableemotional distress meanspsychiatricinjuryas areasonablyforeseeable consequence of exposure to the trauma of the accident and its aftermath.13In general, the law expects its citizens to be reasonably robust and hesitates to imposeliabilityfor the exceptional frailtyof certain individuals. Before beingheld to be in breach of a dutyto an accident bystander, a defendant must have exposed him to a situation where it was reasonablyforeseeablethat apersonof reasonable robustness andfortitudewouldbelikelyto suffer psychiatricinjury.14The Ontario Court of Appeal addressed this issue in Vanek v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Co.Of Canada Limited ("Vanek"). In this case, an 11-year-old girl consumed a small amount of foul15tasti
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    Even where the plaintiff has suffered a psychiatric illness triggered by the defendant'sinabilityto fulfil adutyofcare, thecourts willsometimes denyliabilityiftheindividual's psychiatricdamage is a result of their own particular "hypersensitivity". The courts like to use, as a baseline,18the ordinary person of reasonable mental fortitude. Where this fictional individual would notnormally suffer psychiatric damage, a uniquely vulnerable person who does suffer damage wouldbe barred from recovery
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    With all due respect to Dr. Herbert Modlin, his thesis does not do justice to the manyinnocent accident victims who suffer pain in silence, with indescribable sadness and with despair.Reactions to traumatic events effect people biologically, psychologically and socially. As23Hoffman, et al., state ,24"At the psychological level, traumatic reactions affect thinking, feeling andbehaviour. In the acute phaseafter a period of shock theremaybe anxiety, insomnia,nightmares,sensitivityto noise, fatigueandpain intrusiverecollectionsofthetraumain thoughts or images, either spontaneously or when reminded of the trauma. In thelong term there may be emotional disability (with or without physical injury) that iscomplicated by depression, irritability, philosophical pessimism, loss of hope anddecreased expectations in life, which eventually lead to personality change."(Underlining mine)According to Hoffman et al., "accident victims may feel uncontrollable anger (similar tovictims of crimes), guilt and self-blame (like victims in child abuse) or passivity, futility anddemoralization (similar to some Holocaust survivors). Unfortunately, the victims of civilianpersonal injuries tend to feel isolated and alone in their pain because there are no group experiencesor social support system to allow them to share their experiences with other victims."25How then, does plaintiff's counsel go about establishing and building a claim for emotionaldistress? -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 11 (1998) 38 O.R. (3d) 651.26[2001] O.J. No. 5756 (S.C.J.).27VII. Building the Claim - The Insurance ActClaims for emotional distress have long been recognized and, since 1994, have beenpermitted bythe various incarnations of the InsuranceAct. It maybeuseful to recall that theOntarioMotorist Protection Plan (the first no-fault legislation which governed motor vehicle accident casesbetween June 22, 1990 and December 31, 1993), allowed compensation
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    According to Hoffman et al., "accident victims may feel uncontrollable anger (similar tovictims of crimes), guilt and self-blame (like victims in child abuse) or passivity, futility anddemoralization (similar to some Holocaust survivors). Unfortunately, the victims of civilianpersonal injuries tend to feel isolated and alone in their pain because there are no group experiencesor social support system to allow them to share their experiences with other victims."25How then, does plaintiff's counsel go about establishing and building a claim for emotionaldistress? -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 11 (1998) 38 O.R. (3d) 651.26[2001] O.J. No. 5756 (S.C.J.).27VII. Building the Claim - The Insurance ActClaims for emotional distress have long been recognized and, since 1994, have beenpermitted bythe various incarnations of the InsuranceAct. It maybeuseful to recall that theOntarioMotorist Protection Plan (the first no-fault legislation which governed motor vehicle accident casesbetween June 22, 1990 and December 31, 1993), allowed compensation only if an injured person'simpairments were physical in nature. Claims for emotional distress unadorned with any physicalcomponent resulted in the claim being dismissed.However, if the emotional distress claim could be characterized as a "chronic pain claim"with both physical and psychological aspects, compensation was permitted (see in this regard,Chrappa v Ohm).During the OMPP era plaintiffs' counsel went to great lengths to meld26psychological distress with a physical component in order to be free of the rigid straightjacket of theOMPP threshold.With Bill 164, which took effect on January 1, 1994 and governed motor vehicle accidentcases until October 31, 1996, there was no impediment to obtaining compensation for a "seriousimpairment of an important physical, mental or psychological function". Bill 59 (which applies tomotor vehicle accidents between November 19
Nye Frank

prosecutor, brady material, violations, duty - 0 views

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    Results 1 - 10 for prosecution's Brady obligation with Safesearch on. (0.14 seconds) Ads by Google Buy Brady Product Shop Labels, Ribbons, Tapes & More. Great Deals on Bulk Qty. Order Now! www.MSCDirect.com Brady Distributor The entire Brady catalog available to purchase online. All New Site. www.HansenSupply.com #1 Brady Dealer in the US The Best Selection and Lowest Price 31 drums in stock-Ships fast & free ForksDrumCloset.com/Brady_Drums Obligations en Bourse Achetez, Vendez, Comparez en Ligne Faites vos Opérations Boursières ! Obligations.fr.Ask.com Custom Search Second Circuit Blog: Prosecutor Cannot Avoid Brady Obligation by ...Aug 22, 2006 ... Prosecutor Cannot Avoid Brady Obligation by Claiming that He Did Not ... the prosecutor's failure to abide by his obligations under Brady. ... circuit2.blogspot.com/2006/08/prosecutor-cannot-avoid-brady.html [PDF] The Prosecution's Obligations to Disclose Witness ProffersFile Format: PDF/Adobe Acrobat - View as HTML tion's obligations under Brady and Jencks to dis- close proffer materials have significant ramifica- tions. For the prosecution, the boundaries of its ... www.birdmarella.com/articles/Prosecution%20Obligations.pdf Possible Brady Material In The Possession Of Law Enforcement ...The prosecution has no obligation to communicate preliminary, challenged or .... triggers his or her Brady obligation, the trial deputy shall review this ... da.co.la.ca.us/sd02-08.htm Legal Defense Fund - News ArticlesBecause the prosecution is obligated to turn over information that is under its control, the prosecution increases it Brady obligations each time it ... www.porac.org/ldf/articles/october%201%202002.html Federal Criminal Law Newsletter (Visitor's Edition) - September 24 ...Sep 24, 2001 ... Fair Trials and the Prompt Release of Brady/Giglio Materials to the .... principle that a prosecutor's Brady obligation is independent of a ... www.fedcrimlaw
Nye Frank

questions documents statement of fact for summary judgement. - 0 views

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    Estate of Coleman v. Casper Concrete Co. 1997 WY 64 939 P.2d 233 Case Number: 96-30 Decided: 05/19/1997 Supreme Court of Wyoming -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Cite as: 1997 WY 64, 939 P.2d 233 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The ESTATE OF KEITH D. COLEMAN, Deceased, By and Through its Personal Representative, Janice Coleman, Appellant(Plaintiff), v. CASPER CONCRETE COMPANY, a Wyoming Corporation; and Skorcz Electric, Inc., a Wyoming Corporation, Appellees(Defendants). Appeal from the District Court, Natrona County, The Honorable Dan Spangler, Judge Representing Appellant: Dallas J. Laird, Casper; and Richard R. Jamieson, Casper. Representing Appellee: Richard R. Wilking, Casper; and Earl J. Hanson of Hanson, Roybal, Lee & Todd, P.C., Billings, for Appellee Casper Concrete Company. Rebecca A. Lewis of Lewis & Associates, P.C., Laramie, for Appellee Skorcz Electric, Inc. Before TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN,* and LEHMAN, JJ. * Chief Justice at time of oral argument. TAYLOR, Chief Justice. [¶1] In 1989, the State of Wyoming contracted with appellees to build a highway intersection and install traffic lights. In June of 1993, during a malfunction of those lights, a young man was killed in a collision with a drunk driver at the intersection. Although the State successfully sought shelter in immunity and the drunk driver eventually settled with the decedent's estate, suit survived against appellees on disparate theories of negligence, strict liability and res ipsa loquitur. From an adverse summary judgment, the decedent's estate prosecutes this appeal. We affirm. I. ISSUES [¶2] The decedent's mother, Janice Coleman, as personal representative of her son's estate (appellant), states the following issues: I. Whether the district court properly granted summary judgmen
Nye Frank

Untitled - 0 views

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    Page 1 Page 2 1 3/8/05 Commentary on The Rules of Practice of the Court of Appeals 22 NYCRR part 500, Effective September 1, 2005 A. Structure The Rules of Practice of the Court of Appeals apply to civil and noncapital criminal appeals, motions, criminal leave applications and certified questions from the Supreme Court of the United States, United States courts of appeal and state courts of last resort. The Court of Appeals recently rescinded in its entirety 22 NYCRR part 500 and approved a new part 500 which will be effective September 1, 2005. In addition to reflecting substantive changes and additions to the old Rules of Practice, the new Rules are organized into broad categories to eliminate duplication and provide a more logical sequence. New Rules 500.1 through 500.8 set out requirements applicable to all filings under these Rules. New Rules 500.9 through 500.19 relate to civil and noncapital criminal appeals. New Rule 500.20 contains procedures concerning criminal leave applications. Motions are addressed in new Rules 500.21 through 500.24. Orders to show cause, the Primary Election Session and certified questions are addressed in new Rules 500.25, 500.26 and 500.27, respectively. Finally, old Rule 500.13, relating to real property actions, was deleted as unnecessary. Page 3 2 B. General Requirements 500.1 General Requirements [Old Rule 500.1] New Rule 500.1 states the general requirements for papers submitted to the Court of Appeals. The Rule generally applies to "papers filed," which is defined in section 500.1(b) as all briefs, papers filed pursuant to sections 500.10 (Examination of Subject Matter Jurisdiction) and 500.11 (Alternative Procedure for Selected Appeals), motion papers and appendices. The typeface and font requirements match those recently adopted by the Appellate Division Departments following repeal of the portion of CPLR 5529 that set out specifications for such matters. New Rule 500.1(h) informs self-represented litigants that illegibl
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    Page 1 Page 2 1 3/8/05 Commentary on The Rules of Practice of the Court of Appeals 22 NYCRR part 500, Effective September 1, 2005 A. Structure The Rules of Practice of the Court of Appeals apply to civil and noncapital criminal appeals, motions, criminal leave applications and certified questions from the Supreme Court of the United States, United States courts of appeal and state courts of last resort. The Court of Appeals recently rescinded in its entirety 22 NYCRR part 500 and approved a new part 500 which will be effective September 1, 2005. In addition to reflecting substantive changes and additions to the old Rules of Practice, the new Rules are organized into broad categories to eliminate duplication and provide a more logical sequence. New Rules 500.1 through 500.8 set out requirements applicable to all filings under these Rules. New Rules 500.9 through 500.19 relate to civil and noncapital criminal appeals. New Rule 500.20 contains procedures concerning criminal leave applications. Motions are addressed in new Rules 500.21 through 500.24. Orders to show cause, the Primary Election Session and certified questions are addressed in new Rules 500.25, 500.26 and 500.27, respectively. Finally, old Rule 500.13, relating to real property actions, was deleted as unnecessary. Page 3 2 B. General Requirements 500.1 General Requirements [Old Rule 500.1] New Rule 500.1 states the general requirements for papers submitted to the Court of Appeals. The Rule generally applies to "papers filed," which is defined in section 500.1(b) as all briefs, papers filed pursuant to sections 500.10 (Examination of Subject Matter Jurisdiction) and 500.11 (Alternative Procedure for Selected Appeals), motion papers and appendices. The typeface and font requirements match those recently adopted by the Appellate Division Departments following repeal of the portion of CPLR 5529 that set out specifications for such matters. New Rule 500.1(h) informs self-represented litigants that illegibl
Nye Frank

foia damages, tort No. 03-1395: Doe v. Tenet - Appendix (Petition) - 0 views

  • While Totten and Reynolds are closely related in that both protect a state secret from disclosure, the rules announced in those cases differ in subtle but important respects. Most importantly, the state secrets privilege in Reynolds permits the government to withhold otherwise relevant discovery from a recognized cause of action (e.g., an FTCA case), while the Totten doctrine permits the dismissal of a lawsuit because it is non-justiciable before such evidentiary questions are ever reached.
  • In Kasza, we relied on the Reynolds rule that "the state secrets privilege is a common law evidentiary privilege that allows the government to deny discovery of military secrets." Id. at 1165. After reviewing the applicable law, we reasoned that the application of the state secrets privilege can have different effects, depending on whether it is used to exclude evidence or to dismiss a cause of action. Id. at 1166. First, we found that the government's invocation of the privilege over particular evidence may completely remove the evidence from the case. Id. If a plaintiff cannot make out her prima facie case without the secret evidence, the court may dismiss her claim. Id. Second, the privilege may deprive a defendant of information that would otherwise give the defendant a valid defense to the claim. Id. In these cases, the court may grant summary judgment to the defendant. Id.
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    IFurther, Weinberger concerned in the main an explicit statutory exemption to the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"). See Weinberger, 454 U.S. at 144, 102 S. Ct. 197. FOIA analysis is governed strictly by statute, while the state secrets privilege is governed solely by judge-made law. Also, FOIA cases involve a determination of what information can be released to the public without any restriction on the information's dissemination. In contrast, the state secrets privilege governs what material can be used by individual litigants who need such information to make their cases, under such restrictions of access as may be necessary, including in camera review, closed proceedings, and sealed records. Weinberger therefore dealt principally with the substantive question whether the sensitive material at issue could be made public and only as a subsidiary matter with the handling of that material within the confines of litigation. Weinberger did refer to Totten at the end of the opinion as an explanation, by analogy, concerning why the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") inquiry could not go forward in court. It also referred, however, in the same context, to Reynolds, the seminal state secrets privilege case. Weinberger, 454 U.S. at 147, 102 S. Ct. 197. The brief reference to Totten in Weinberger therefore cannot be read as prescribing the application of Totten without regard to the later-developed state secrets privilege doctrine, and Kasza evidently did not so read it. We therefore conclude that Totten is applicable to the case before us only as applied through the prism of current state secrets doctrine. C. To invoke the state secrets privilege, a formal claim of privilege must be "lodged by the head of the department which has control over the matter, after actual personal consideration [of the evidence] by that officer." Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7-8, 73 S. Ct. 528 (footnotes omitted); see also Kasza, 133 F.3d at 1165. After that, "[t]he court itself
Nye Frank

Metropolitan Police Department main page - 0 views

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    Department of Justice guidelines state that "A law enforcement agency clears a crime by exceptional means when elements beyond its control prevent the placing of formal charges against the offender
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    Metropolitan Police Department Main Page Home Bibliography Calendar Columns Dorothy Brizill Bonnie Cain Jim Dougherty Gary Imhoff Phil Mendelson Mark David Richards Sandra Seegars DCPSWatch DCWatch Archives Council Period 12 Council Period 13 Council Period 14 Election 1998 Election 2000 Election 2002 Elections Election 2004 Election 2006 Government and People ANC's Anacostia Waterfront Corporation Auditor Boards and Com BusRegRefCom Campaign Finance Chief Financial Officer Chief Management Officer City Council Congress Control Board Corporation Counsel Courts DC2000 DC Agenda Elections and Ethics Fire Department FOI Officers Inspector General Health Housing and Community Dev. Human Services Legislation Mayor's Office Mental Health Motor Vehicles Neighborhood Action National Capital Revitalization Corp. Planning and Econ. Dev. Planning, Office of Police Department Property Management Public Advocate Public Libraries Public Schools Public Service Commission Public Works Regional Mobility Panel Sports and Entertainment Com. Taxi Commission Telephone Directory University of DC Water and Sewer Administration Youth Rehabilitation Services Zoning Commission Issues in DC Politics Budget issues DC Flag DC General, PBC Gun issues Health issues Housing initiatives Mayor's mansion Public Benefit Corporation Regional Mobility Reservation 13 Tax Rev Comm Term limits repeal Voting rights, statehood Williams's Fundraising Scandals Links Organizations Appleseed Center Cardozo Shaw Neigh.Assoc. Committee of 100 Fed of Citizens Assocs League of Women Voters Parents United Shaw Coalition Photos Search What Is DCWatch? themail archives Materials from the Metropolitan Police Department: Citizen Complaint Report Form, PD-99 Materials on the Metropolitan Police Department. Neighborhood Safety Zone Initiative Mayor Adrian Fenty, MPD Chief Cathy
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    Department of Justice guidelines state that "A law enforcement agency clears a crime by exceptional means when elements beyond its control prevent the placing of formal charges against the offender
Nye Frank

1 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH CENTRAL DIVISION PETER JOSE SMITH... - 0 views

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    III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDSummary judgment is proper if the moving party can demonstrate that there is no genuineissue of material fact and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In considering whether5genuine issues of material fact exist, the Court determines whether a reasonable jury could returna verdict for the nonmoving party in the face of all the evidence presented. The Court is required6to construe all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Nye Frank

Position Outline for Elder Abuse Policy (Rough Draft) - 0 views

  • 29 NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, (2 nd ed. 1991), Standard 26.7, p. 94. 30 NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, (2 nd ed. 1991), Standard 26.3, p. 93. 31 See NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, (2 nd ed. 1991), Standard 26.7, p.92
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    Page 1 Page 2 NATIONAL DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION POLICY POSITIONS ON THE PROSECUTION OF ELDER ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND FINANCIAL EXPLOITATION Adopted: March 22, 2003 by the Board of Directors in New Orleans, Louisiana National District Attorneys Association 99 Canal Center Plaza, Suite 510 Alexandria, Virginia 22314 Telephone: 703-549-9222 Facsimile: 703-836-3195 Page 3 i INDEX TOPIC PAGE NO. Magnitude of Elder Abuse …………………………………………….. 1-2 Current Elder Population ……………………………………… 2-3 Projected Increase in the Elder Population …………………… 3 Number of Individuals in Nursing Homes ……………………. 3 Elder Abuse in Domestic Settings ……………………………… 3-4 Elder Abuse in Institutional Settings ………………………...... 4-5 Elder Abuse and the Prosecutor's Office Office Organization ……………………………………………... 5-6 Training Training to Understand Crimes against Elders ……………….. 7-9 Training to Understand the Elder Victim ……………………… 9 Victim's Services ………………………………………………………… 10-13 Funding …………………………………………………………………… 13-14 Multidisciplinary Approach …………………………………………….. 14-15 Public Awareness ………………………………………………………… 15-17 State Legislation State Criminal Laws ………………………………………………. 17 State Mandatory Reporting Laws ………………………………… 18 Special Trial Procedures and Evidentiary Rules ………………… 18-19 Page 4 1 NATIONAL DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION POLICY POSITIONS ON THE PROSECUTION OF ELDER ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND FINANCIAL EXPLOITATION Introduction: Since May of 1986, the National District Attorneys Association has become increasingly concerned about the growing problem of eld
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    Page 1 Page 2 NATIONAL DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION POLICY POSITIONS ON THE PROSECUTION OF ELDER ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND FINANCIAL EXPLOITATION Adopted: March 22, 2003 by the Board of Directors in New Orleans, Louisiana National District Attorneys Association 99 Canal Center Plaza, Suite 510 Alexandria, Virginia 22314 Telephone: 703-549-9222 Facsimile: 703-836-3195 Page 3 i INDEX TOPIC PAGE NO. Magnitude of Elder Abuse …………………………………………….. 1-2 Current Elder Population ……………………………………… 2-3 Projected Increase in the Elder Population …………………… 3 Number of Individuals in Nursing Homes ……………………. 3 Elder Abuse in Domestic Settings ……………………………… 3-4 Elder Abuse in Institutional Settings ………………………...... 4-5 Elder Abuse and the Prosecutor's Office Office Organization ……………………………………………... 5-6 Training Training to Understand Crimes against Elders ……………….. 7-9 Training to Understand the Elder Victim ……………………… 9 Victim's Services ………………………………………………………… 10-13 Funding …………………………………………………………………… 13-14 Multidisciplinary Approach …………………………………………….. 14-15 Public Awareness ………………………………………………………… 15-17 State Legislation State Criminal Laws ………………………………………………. 17 State Mandatory Reporting Laws ………………………………… 18 Special Trial Procedures and Evidentiary Rules ………………… 18-19 Page 4 1 NATIONAL DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION POLICY POSITIONS ON THE PROSECUTION OF ELDER ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND FINANCIAL EXPLOITATION Introduction: Since May of 1986, the National District Attorneys Association has become increasingly concerned about the growing problem of eld
Nye Frank

Dereliction and Collusion - City of Seattle Contra Cabal 711-08-10 - 0 views

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    This is the html version of the file http://contracabal.org/NewFiles/711-08-10-06-0317.pdf. Google automatically generates html versions of documents as we crawl the web. Page 1 © Copyright 2006 by Paul Trummel. Contra Cabal #711-08-10/06-0317-2011. Page 1 of 5 Dereliction and Collusion - City of Seattle Contra Cabal 711-08-10 Alleged Dereliction and Unlawful Collusion among Thomas A. Carr, Seattle City Attorney, his assistants Michael J. Finkle and Robert W. Hood, in a consort with Stephen A. M-tch-ll, a Council House administrator, his directors, and their lawyers. Seattle Jewish Mafia (SJM), a faith-based initiative similar to Al Quaeda, has destroyed Contra Cabal web site three times. It attempted to silence the author and to cover up elder abuse by Council House directors using unlawful means to prevent constitutionally protected speech. [Seattle Jewish Mafia] [Kill the Messenger - WIP] With similar intent, Seattle City Attorney Thomas A. Carr, has issued six criminal indictments against the author. He has attempted to intimidate, silence, and return the author to jail on trumped-up charges - charges similar to those used by Judge James A. Doerty to jail and place him in solitary confinement (2002). Doerty's decision now awaits review by Washington Supreme Court. [Supreme Court Review] Carr's behavior, as an elected official, ranks as truly kafkaesque. In an attempt to preempt the Supreme Court decision, he has evidently tried to pervert the course of justice. Fabricating or interfering with evidence and threatening or intimidating witnesses both classify as criminal offenses punishable by a jail sentence. SJM has shown a pattern of racketeering (defined by the Civil Rights Act and RICO statute). A RICO pattern means two or more organized criminal acts which indicate ensuant activity. Those acts include conspiracy to commit crimes of coercion by wrongful use of force or fear. Instead of challenging the perpetrators, Carr and his team of lawyers have collud
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    This is the html version of the file http://contracabal.org/NewFiles/711-08-10-06-0317.pdf. Google automatically generates html versions of documents as we crawl the web. Page 1 © Copyright 2006 by Paul Trummel. Contra Cabal #711-08-10/06-0317-2011. Page 1 of 5 Dereliction and Collusion - City of Seattle Contra Cabal 711-08-10 Alleged Dereliction and Unlawful Collusion among Thomas A. Carr, Seattle City Attorney, his assistants Michael J. Finkle and Robert W. Hood, in a consort with Stephen A. M-tch-ll, a Council House administrator, his directors, and their lawyers. Seattle Jewish Mafia (SJM), a faith-based initiative similar to Al Quaeda, has destroyed Contra Cabal web site three times. It attempted to silence the author and to cover up elder abuse by Council House directors using unlawful means to prevent constitutionally protected speech. [Seattle Jewish Mafia] [Kill the Messenger - WIP] With similar intent, Seattle City Attorney Thomas A. Carr, has issued six criminal indictments against the author. He has attempted to intimidate, silence, and return the author to jail on trumped-up charges - charges similar to those used by Judge James A. Doerty to jail and place him in solitary confinement (2002). Doerty's decision now awaits review by Washington Supreme Court. [Supreme Court Review] Carr's behavior, as an elected official, ranks as truly kafkaesque. In an attempt to preempt the Supreme Court decision, he has evidently tried to pervert the course of justice. Fabricating or interfering with evidence and threatening or intimidating witnesses both classify as criminal offenses punishable by a jail sentence. SJM has shown a pattern of racketeering (defined by the Civil Rights Act and RICO statute). A RICO pattern means two or more organized criminal acts which indicate ensuant activity. Those acts include conspiracy to commit crimes of coercion by wrongful use of force or fear. Instead of challenging the perpetrators, Carr and his team of lawyers have collud
Nye Frank

related:/interstitial?url=http://www.foruminfotech.net/legalaid/your_invitation.html - ... - 0 views

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    1 Web Images Maps News Video Gmail more ▼ Shopping Groups Books Scholar Finance Blogs YouTube Calendar Photos Documents Reader Sites even more » crystalfinancial@gmail.com | Web History | My Account | Sign out Google Advanced Search Preferences Web Results 1 - 10 of about 4,940 for legal clinic helps self represented litigants for elders . ( 0.31 seconds) Search Results Self-Representation Resource Guide Jan 13, 2009 ... "Self Represented Litigants and Court and Legal Services Responses to their Needs: What We ... Provides links to various legal hotlines for the elderly. ... Starting a Court-Based Self Help Center: 12 Core Resources. ... www.ncsconline.org/wc/CourTopics/ResourceGuide.asp?topic=ProSe - 61k - Cached - Similar pages - [PDF] ACTION PLAN TO ASSIST SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS File Format: PDF/Adobe Acrobat - View as HTML San Francisco's Action Plan will serve self-represented litigants in San ... collection, traffic, guardianship issues, and court services for elders ... (a) We are currently providing most self-help services at the Civic Center ... Cooperative Restraining Order Clinic, Volunteer Legal Services Program and Eviction ... www.courtinfo.ca.gov/programs/equalaccess/documents/san_francisco.pdf - Similar pages - [PDF] Notes from the Mini White House Conference on Aging Session File Format: PDF/Adobe Acrobat - View as HTML The private bar is more involved in legal services for elders ... of legal assistance to self-represented litigants, including exploration of the role of ... www.whcoa.gov/about/des_events_reports/ Legal %20Services%20Min
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Law School Outline - Constitutional Law - NYU School of Law - Pildus - 0 views

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    1 C ONSTITUTIONAL L AW O UTLINE I. The Building Blocks Marbury v. Madison (1803) Marshall - political struggle between John Adams and Federalists and successor Thomas Jefferson and the Republicans - Commissions for justices signed by Adams but not yet delivered when he left office; Jefferson administration refused to honor appointments for which commissions had not actually been delivered - Marbury : would-be justice of the peace; brought suit directly in S.Ct. sought writ of mandamus compelling Madison to deliver their commissions - Madison : Secretary of State for Jefferson - Which branch shall have final say interpreting the Constitution? Q1: Does Marbury have a RIGHT to commission? Q2: Does he have a REMEDY? Q3: Is remedy a MANDAMUS? Q4: Can a mandamus be issued from THIS COURT? Marshall's Decision: a. Right to Commission: Yes, on facts and law he has a legal right b. Remedy: Yes, judicial remedy will not interfere improperly with executive's constitutional discretion (Marshall acknowledged that there are some Qs which legislature is better equipped to deal with but this is not one of them) c. Mandamus not allowed i. § 13 of Judiciary Act of 1789 allows Court to issue mandamus ii. Article III § 2(2) gives Court original jurisdiction in a few cases and appellate jurisdiction in the rest. Writ of mandamus not among the cases as to which original jurisdiction is conferred on S.Ct. Congressional statute at odds with Constitution d. Supremacy of Constitution: If S.Ct. identifies a conflict between const. provision and congressional statute, the Court has the authority (and the duty) to declare the statute unconstitutional and to refuse to enforce it. i. Constitution is paramount: The very purpose of written constitution is to establish fundamental and paramount law. An act which is repugnant to C cannot become law of the land. ii. Who interprets: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicia
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    1 C ONSTITUTIONAL L AW O UTLINE I. The Building Blocks Marbury v. Madison (1803) Marshall - political struggle between John Adams and Federalists and successor Thomas Jefferson and the Republicans - Commissions for justices signed by Adams but not yet delivered when he left office; Jefferson administration refused to honor appointments for which commissions had not actually been delivered - Marbury : would-be justice of the peace; brought suit directly in S.Ct. sought writ of mandamus compelling Madison to deliver their commissions - Madison : Secretary of State for Jefferson - Which branch shall have final say interpreting the Constitution? Q1: Does Marbury have a RIGHT to commission? Q2: Does he have a REMEDY? Q3: Is remedy a MANDAMUS? Q4: Can a mandamus be issued from THIS COURT? Marshall's Decision: a. Right to Commission: Yes, on facts and law he has a legal right b. Remedy: Yes, judicial remedy will not interfere improperly with executive's constitutional discretion (Marshall acknowledged that there are some Qs which legislature is better equipped to deal with but this is not one of them) c. Mandamus not allowed i. § 13 of Judiciary Act of 1789 allows Court to issue mandamus ii. Article III § 2(2) gives Court original jurisdiction in a few cases and appellate jurisdiction in the rest. Writ of mandamus not among the cases as to which original jurisdiction is conferred on S.Ct. Congressional statute at odds with Constitution d. Supremacy of Constitution: If S.Ct. identifies a conflict between const. provision and congressional statute, the Court has the authority (and the duty) to declare the statute unconstitutional and to refuse to enforce it. i. Constitution is paramount: The very purpose of written constitution is to establish fundamental and paramount law. An act which is repugnant to C cannot become law of the land. ii. Who interprets: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
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    1 C ONSTITUTIONAL L AW O UTLINE I. The Building Blocks Marbury v. Madison (1803) Marshall - political struggle between John Adams and Federalists and successor Thomas Jefferson and the Republicans - Commissions for justices signed by Adams but not yet delivered when he left office; Jefferson administration refused to honor appointments for which commissions had not actually been delivered - Marbury : would-be justice of the peace; brought suit directly in S.Ct. sought writ of mandamus compelling Madison to deliver their commissions - Madison : Secretary of State for Jefferson - Which branch shall have final say interpreting the Constitution? Q1: Does Marbury have a RIGHT to commission? Q2: Does he have a REMEDY? Q3: Is remedy a MANDAMUS? Q4: Can a mandamus be issued from THIS COURT? Marshall's Decision: a. Right to Commission: Yes, on facts and law he has a legal right b. Remedy: Yes, judicial remedy will not interfere improperly with executive's constitutional discretion (Marshall acknowledged that there are some Qs which legislature is better equipped to deal with but this is not one of them) c. Mandamus not allowed i. § 13 of Judiciary Act of 1789 allows Court to issue mandamus ii. Article III § 2(2) gives Court original jurisdiction in a few cases and appellate jurisdiction in the rest. Writ of mandamus not among the cases as to which original jurisdiction is conferred on S.Ct. Congressional statute at odds with Constitution d. Supremacy of Constitution: If S.Ct. identifies a conflict between const. provision and congressional statute, the Court has the authority (and the duty) to declare the statute unconstitutional and to refuse to enforce it. i. Constitution is paramount: The very purpose of written constitution is to establish fundamental and paramount law. An act which is repugnant to C cannot become law of the land. ii. Who interprets: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
Nye Frank

Defense attorney claims he has proof of misconduct by Santa Clara County prosecutors - ... - 0 views

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Nye Frank

FindLaw | Cases and Codes - 0 views

  • To sustain a S 1983 civil rights action, a plaintiff must show "(1) that the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) that [such] conduct deprived the plaintiff of a federal constitutional or statutory right." 2 Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 938 (1990). Here, it is undisputed that defendants were acting under color of state law. At issue here is whether Officer Smith, the Sacramento County Sheriff's Department, or Sacramento County engaged in conduct that deprived Lewis of a federally protected righ
  • F.2d 272 (6th Cir. 1990) (noting that the Supreme Court's reasoning in Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), likely "preserve[d] Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process analysis for those instances in which a free citizen is denied his or her constitutional right to life through means other than a law enforcement official's arrest, investigatory stop or other seizure"), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 851 (1990).
  • But when a law enforcement officer arbitrarily acts to deprive a person of life and personal security in the course of pursuing his official duties, constitutional due process rights may be implicated. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331 ("The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government."). Section 1983 "contains no state-of-mind requirement independent of that necessary to state a violation of the underlying constitutional right." Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330 . See Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330 . The underlying constitutional rights at issue here are substantive due process rights to life and liberty or personal security. In Daniels, the Supreme Court held that where an official's or government entity's conduct constitutes mere negligence, no substantive due process violation occurs. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 328 . Daniels expressly left open the question whether something less than intentional conduct such as recklessness or gross negligence would suffice "to trigger the protections of the Due Process Clause." Id. at 334 n.3. But in City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989), the Court held that nonintentional government conduct can violate the Due Process Clause and thus lead to S 1983 liability. City of Canton held that a municipality may be liable for a failure to train its employees when such failure demonstrates "deliberate indifference to rights of persons with whom police come into contact." Id. at 388.
  • ...9 more annotations...
  • Five circuits have addressed S 1983 liability in the context of high-speed pursuits. These circuits have applied various labels to the standard of conduct that may lead to liability. See, e.g., Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296 (3rd Cir. 1994) (en banc) (overruling previous reckless indifference standard and adopting shocks the conscience standard); Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1496 (10th Cir. 1992) (reckless disregard); Temkin v. Frederick County Comm'rs, 945 F.2d 716, 723 (4th Cir. 1991) (shocks the conscience), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1095 (1992); Roach v. City of Fredericktown, 882 F.2d 294, 297 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding gross negligence insufficient but not stating what standard should be applied); Jones v. Sherrill, 827 F.2d 1102, 1106 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding gross negligence or outrageous conduct sufficient in some circumstances). 4
  • In one such due process case, we held that either "gross negligence, recklessness, or `deliberate indifference'" was sufficient to state a substantive due process violation. Wood v. Ostrander, 851 F.2d 1212, 1214 (9th Cir. 1988) ("Wood
  • I"), reh'g granted and opinion modified by, 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989) ("Wood II"), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 938 (1990). Relying on the standard set out in Wood I, we later held that "grossly negligent or reckless official conduct that infringes upon an interest protected by the Due Process Clause is actionable under S 1983." Fargo v. City of San Juan Bautista, 857 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1988). But Fargo's grossly negligent standard was explicitly based on Wood I, which was modified on rehearing and superseded by Wood II. In Wood II, we stepped back from the grossly negligent standard. We noted that an intervening Supreme Court decision, City of Canton, 489 U.S. 378 , had called into question this standard as set forth in Wood I and Fargo. Wood II, 879 F.2d at 588.
  • In Fargo, we defined gross negligence as "`more than ordinary inadvertence or inattention, but less perhaps than conscious indifference to the consequences.'" Fargo, 857 F.2d at 641 (quoting W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts S 34, at 212 (5th ed. 1984)). We also noted that an officer's state of mind is not an issue in a claim based on gross negligence, "although the contrary may be true where the claim involves recklessness." Id. at 642. Although we declined to decide whether an innocent state of mind would negate recklessness or "whether recklessness may be presumed conclusively from conduct," we did note that recklessness and deliberate indifference are equivalent in the sense that they both generally refer to conduct involving "a `conscious disregard' of public safety." Id. at 642 n.7. We also said that, "where state officials have notice of the possibility of harm, `negligence can rise to the level of deliberate indifference to or reckless disregard for' the victim." Id. (quoting Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 357 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)). Because we concluded that a triable issue of fact remained as to whether the police officer's conduct might have been grossly negligent, we found it unnecessary to determine whether the officer's conduct might have risen to the more culpable standard of recklessness. Id. at 643
  • In Wood II, we redefined the standard forS 1983 substantive due process violations by police officers. As explained above, we recognized that the Supreme Court's decision in City of Canton, 489 U.S. 378 , had called into question our decisions in Wood I and Fargo that gross negligence was sufficient. Wood II, 879 F.2d at 588. Analyzing the facts in Wood under City of Canton's deliberate indifference standard, we concluded that there remained a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the police officer in Wood had been deliberately indifferent to the plaintiff's interest in her personal security. Id. at 588.
  • Wood II makes clear that, in this circuit, an officer can be held liable for a S 1983 claim if that officer's conduct is delib erately indifferent to or in reckless disregard of a person's right to life and personal security.
  • Here, plaintiffs have alleged that Officer Smith violated the Sacramento County Sheriff's Department General Order regarding pursuits ("General Order")6 by instituting and then continuing the pursuit even when a reasonable officer would have known that to do so was in reckless disregard of Lewis's and Willard's safety. A violation of police procedures is relevant to determine whether a substantive due process violation has occurred. Fargo, 857 F.2d at 642. Police procedures are designed, in part, to guide officers when they engage in conduct that poses a serious risk of harm to either a suspect or to the general public. See id.
  • The General Order requires an officer to communicate his intention to pursue a vehicle to the sheriff's department dispatch center. But defendants concede that Smith did not contact the dispatch center. The General Order requires an officer to consider whether the seriousness of the offense warrants a chase at speeds in excess of the posted limit. But here, the only apparent "offense" was the boys' refusal to stop when another officer told them to do so. The General Order requires an officer to consider whether the need for apprehension justifies the pursuit under existing conditions. Yet Smith apparently only "needed" to apprehend the boys because they refused to stop. The General Order requires an officer to consider whether the pursuit presents unreasonable hazards to life and property. But taking the facts here in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, there existed an unreasonable hazard to Lewis's and Willard's lives. The General Order also directs an officer to discontinue a pursuit when the hazards of continuing outweigh the benefits of immediate apprehension. But here, there was no apparent danger involved in permitting the boys to escape. There certainly was risk of harm to others in continuing the pursuit.
  • In City of Canton the Supreme Court held that deliberate indifference was the minimum standard of culpability necessary to maintain a S 1983 due process action against a municipality for a policy or custom of inadequate training of police officers. City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388 . The Court reasoned that a municipality's inadequate training of its employees can only constitute a "policy or custom" when such inadequate training "evidences a `deliberate indifference' to the rights of its inhabitants." Id. at 389. But the Court also specified that the deliberate indifference standard "does not turn upon the degree of fault (if any) that a plaintiff must show to make out an underlying claim of a constitutional violation." Id. at 388 n.8. City of Canton thus did not explicitly overrule our decisions in either Wood I or Fargo because they involved claims of substantive due process violations against individual police officers.
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    The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a particular amendment `provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, `that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
  • ...1 more comment...
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    The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a particular amendment `provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, `that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
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    The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a particular amendment `provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, `that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
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    The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a particular amendment `provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, `that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
Nye Frank

FindLaw | Cases and Codes - 0 views

  • Plaintiffs Teri and Thomas Lewis, Philip Lewis's parents, filed suit in Sacramento County Superior Court against Sacramento County, the Sacramento County Sheriff's Department, and Officer Smith. The Lewises allege a deprivation of their son's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. S 1983 and wrongful death under California state law. Defendants removed the case to federal court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction and moved for summary judgment on various grounds
  • The district court granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants on the S 1983 claims. The court also granted summary judgment in favor of Smith as to the state causes of action. The court denied summary judgment as to the pendent state law causes of action against the County and the Sheriff's department, dismissing those claims without prejudice. The district court's decisions are summarized below.
  • We review de novo the district court's grant of summary judgment. We must determine, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court correctly applied the relevant substantive law. We do not weigh the evidence or determine the truth of the matter but only determine whether there is a genuine issue of fact for trial. Jesinger, 24 F.3d at 1130
  • ...3 more annotations...
  • First, the district court assumed, without deciding, that Officer Smith had violated Lewis's constitutional rights. The court then addressed Smith's claim to qualified immunity. The court stated that plaintiffs had not presented, and it could not find, any "state or federal opinion published before May, 1990, when the alleged misconduct took place, that supports plaintiffs' view that they have a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right in the context of high speed police pursuits." The court therefore found that the law regarding Lewis's Fourteenth Amendment right to life and personal security was not clearly established and granted summary judgment in favor of Officer Smith on qualified immunity grounds.
  • Because the court dismissed all federal claims, it declined to decide whether the county and the sheriff's department were also immune under California law. The court then dismissed without prejudice the state claims against the county and sheriff's department to allow plaintiffs to file those claims in state court.
  • To sustain a S 1983 civil rights action, a plaintiff must show "(1) that the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) that [such] conduct deprived the plaintiff of a federal constitutional or statutory right." 2 Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 938 (1990). Here, it is undisputed that defendants were acting under color of state law. At issue here is whether Officer Smith, the Sacramento County Sheriff's Department, or Sacramento County engaged in conduct that deprived Lewis of a federally protected right. The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a particular amendment `provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, `that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989))
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    LakinChapman, LLC Nationwide www.lakinlaw.com/PracticeAreas/Nursing-Home-Neglect.asp Pioneers in nursing home abuse law 866-839-2021 Statutory Protection of Older Persons Today, all states have laws concerning the abuse, neglect or exploitation of older people, but these states may follow different approaches. In most states, there is a system of adult protective services for investigating and remedying reported abuses. Moreover, some states have laws giving victims of abuse, neglect or exploitation a civil cause of action. Finally, in most states, the abuse or neglect of older people is also a crime. Adult Protective Services Typically, before any civil or criminal action is commenced against a nursing home, a report will have been made to your state's adult protective services agency, or other system in place for the reporting and investigation of allegations of the abuse, neglect or exploitation of the elderly. All states have a system for reporting allegations of abuse, neglect and exploitation of the elderly, for investigating the allegations and, if the allegations are founded, for providing services to the older person to remedy the problems and prevent their recurrence. In fact, most states have mandatory reporting requirements with respect to such allegations. If an agency concludes that an allegation is founded, it will respond by offering the older person appropriate services, such as medical assistance, counseling, special transportation, assistance with money management, or placement in a different residential setting. Civil Actions Based on Statutes Some state legislatures have created causes of action involving the abuse, neglect, or exploitation of older people, which allow victims to bring civil actions against the perpetrators and/or their employees. These causes of action may authorize damages awards to victims, but may also authorize the issuance of injunctions and restraining or protective orders, for immediate relief from ongoing abuse
Nye Frank

OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY - 0 views

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    Page 1 Final Report CJ - 1 OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY AN IN-DEPTH INVESTIGATION Prepared by 2001-2002 Orange CountyGrand Jury June, 2002 Page 2 CJ - 2 2001-2002 Orange County Grand Jury COMMENDATIONS There are many men and women: managers, deputy district attorneys, and investigators in the Office of the District Attorney who have demonstrated great professionalism and integrity. They have worked in their offices, entered the courts, and gone into the streets to insure that the criminal justice system in Orange County is held to the highest standards. The 2001-2002 Orange County Grand Jury extends its highest commendation to these dedicated public servants and asks that the electorate of the county join us in this commendation. Page 3 Final Report CJ - 3 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page COMMENDATIONS......................................................................................................... 2 TABLE OF CONTENTS.................................................................................................... 3 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................................ 5 INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 7 Major Accomplishments of the District Attorney's Office under the Current Administration............................................................................................................ 7 INITIATION OF THE INVESTIGATION & METHOD OF STUDY ............................. 9 ORGANIZATIONAL RESTRUCTURE - Attorney Positions ....................................... 11 Factual Background - Post 1998 Campaign............................................................. 11 Findings..................................................................................................................... 15 Recommendations ......................................................................................
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    Page 1 Final Report CJ - 1 OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY AN IN-DEPTH INVESTIGATION Prepared by 2001-2002 Orange CountyGrand Jury June, 2002 Page 2 CJ - 2 2001-2002 Orange County Grand Jury COMMENDATIONS There are many men and women: managers, deputy district attorneys, and investigators in the Office of the District Attorney who have demonstrated great professionalism and integrity. They have worked in their offices, entered the courts, and gone into the streets to insure that the criminal justice system in Orange County is held to the highest standards. The 2001-2002 Orange County Grand Jury extends its highest commendation to these dedicated public servants and asks that the electorate of the county join us in this commendation. Page 3 Final Report CJ - 3 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page COMMENDATIONS......................................................................................................... 2 TABLE OF CONTENTS.................................................................................................... 3 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................................ 5 INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 7 Major Accomplishments of the District Attorney's Office under the Current Administration............................................................................................................ 7 INITIATION OF THE INVESTIGATION & METHOD OF STUDY ............................. 9 ORGANIZATIONAL RESTRUCTURE - Attorney Positions ....................................... 11 Factual Background - Post 1998 Campaign............................................................. 11 Findings..................................................................................................................... 15 Recommendations ......................................................................................
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NPR and PBS Radio Archives/Frontline Videos - 0 views

  • hapter 11: Political Crime Frontline Online Video: The Enemy Within http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/enemywithin/view/ Frontline Online Video: Al Qaeda's New Front http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/front/view/ Habeas Schmabeas Podcast 3/10/06 Episode 310 (59:58) http://www.thislife.org The New Role of Neighborhood Watch http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=3844320 (41:32) These programs examine the key elements of terrorism and America's response to its threat. Questions: How do these programs about terrorism fit with the material presented in this chapter? Explain the changes in policy discussed in these programs. Do they seem to be effective? Note: Other Frontline shows of related interest that can be ordered include Frontline: Campaign Against Terror http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/campaign/ Frontline: Inside the Terror Network http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/network/ Frontline: Trail of a Terrorist http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/trail/
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Victim Rights Manual - 0 views

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    A defendant may be released on bail for all offenses except capital crimes. Public safety is the primary consideration in setting the bail amount. The court must conduct a hearing before deviating from the scheduled bail for a violent felony or for threatening a witness in a rape, domestic violence or criminal threat case. The court must state its reasons for deviating from the bail schedule. (Cal.Const Art. 1 Sect. 28, PC 1270.1, and PC 1275.)In violent felony cases, the district attorneys office, Division of Victim Services and the probation department are responsible for notifying victims and witnesses that they can request notification regarding the defendant's release. The Division of Victim Services will provide the forms to those victims and witnesses. (PC 679.03(a).)Inmates convicted of murder, voluntary manslaughter, life cases, stalking or a case where the defendant inflicted great bodily injury, cannot be released on parole within 35 miles of a victim or witness. However, the victim or witness must file the appropriate form with CDCR, and CDCR must find there is a need to protect the safety and well being of the victim or witness. (PC 3003.)Upon request, when a defendant is sent to state prison, the victim or next of kin will be notified of the defendant's release to work furlough or a reentry program at least 60 days prior to placement. If the inmate escapes, the victim must be given immediate notification. The victim should keep his or her request and current address on file using a form that can be obtained through the Division of Victim Services. (PC 679.02(a)(6), PC 11155.)The Right to be Protected13 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 17 An employer with more than 25 employees may not discriminate against an employee who has been a victim of a sex crime or domestic violence when that employee seeks medical attention or counseling. (LC 230.1.)Employers must allow crime victims or family members t
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Motion (legal) - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia - 0 views

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    Rule 56, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, is the rule which explains the mechanics of a summary judgment motion. As explained in the notes to this rule, summary judgment procedure is a method for promptly disposing of actions in which there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. Prior to its introduction in the US in 1934, it was used in England for more than 50 years. In England motions for summary judgments were used only in cases of liquidated claims, there followed a steady enlargement of the scope of the remedy until it was used in actions to recover land or chattels and in all other actions at law, for liquidated or unliquidated claims, except for a few designated torts and breach of promise of marriage. English Rules Under the Judicature Act (The Annual Practice, 1937) O. 3, r. 6; Orders 14, 14A, and 15; see also O. 32, r. 6, authorizing an application for judgment at any time upon admissions. New York was a leader in the adoption of this rule in the US and the success of the method helps account for its current importance as an almost indispensable tool in administrative actions (especially before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission which adjudicates employment discrimination claims and the Merit Systems Protection Board which adjudicates federal employment matters).[2]
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