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Nye Frank

Search Results - THOMAS (Library of Congress) - 0 views

  • 27. H.R.448 : To protect seniors in the United States from elder abuse by establishing specialized elder abuse prosecution and research programs and activities to aid victims of elder abuse, to provide training to prosecutors and other law enforcement related to elder abuse prevention and protection, to establish programs that provide for emergency crisis response teams to combat elder abuse, and for other purposes.
    Sponsor: Rep Sestak, Joe [PA-7] (introduced 1/9/2009)      Cosponsors (5)
    Committees: House Judiciary; Senate Judiciary
    Latest Major Action: 2/12/2009 Referred to Senate committee. Status: Received in the Senate and Read twice and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.
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    Limited To:
    DATES FROM 01/01/2007-01/01/2010
    31 Bills from the 111th Congress ranked by relevance on
    "probation
    "
    .




    31
    bills
    containing your phrase (or variants of its words)
    in the same order
    .




    Listing of
    31
    bills containing your phrase (or variants of its words)
    in the same order
    .

    1 .
    CAN DO Act of 2009 (Introduced in House)
    [H.R.1303.IH]

    2 .
    Ex-Offenders Voting Rights Act of 2009 (Introduced in House)
    [H.R.59.IH]

    3 .
    MEGA (Introduced in House)
    [H.R.330.IH]

    4 .
    Whereas there are approximately three million Americans employed within the
    justice system; (Engrossed as Agreed to or Passed by House)
    [H.RES.45.EH]

    5 .
    SERV Act (Introduced in Senate)
    [S.902.IS]

    6 .
    SERV Act (Introduced in House)
    [H.R.2138.IH]

    7 .
    Whereas there are approximately three million Americans employed within the
    justice system; (Introduced in House)
    [H.RES.45.IH]

    8 .
    Safeguarding America's Seniors and Veterans Act of 2009 (Introduced in
    House)
    [H.R.746.IH]

    9 .
    Managing Arson Through Criminal History (MATCH) Act of 2009 (Introduced in
    House)
    [H.R.1727.IH]

    10 .
    Calling on the Government of Vietnam to release from prison, end the
    detention without trial, and cease the harassment and house arrest of the people
    who signed the Manifesto on Freedom... (Introduced in House)
    [H.RES.334.IH]

    11
    .
    Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that the President of
    the United States should not issue pardons to senior members of his
    administration during the final 90 days... (Introduced in House)
    [H.RES.9.IH]

    12 .
    National Criminal Justice Commission Act of 2009 (Introduced in Senate
Nye Frank

FindLaw | Cases and Codes - 0 views

  • To sustain a S 1983 civil rights action, a plaintiff must show "(1) that the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) that [such] conduct deprived the plaintiff of a federal constitutional or statutory right." 2 Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 938 (1990). Here, it is undisputed that defendants were acting under color of state law. At issue here is whether Officer Smith, the Sacramento County Sheriff's Department, or Sacramento County engaged in conduct that deprived Lewis of a federally protected righ
  • F.2d 272 (6th Cir. 1990) (noting that the Supreme Court's reasoning in Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), likely "preserve[d] Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process analysis for those instances in which a free citizen is denied his or her constitutional right to life through means other than a law enforcement official's arrest, investigatory stop or other seizure"), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 851 (1990).
  • But when a law enforcement officer arbitrarily acts to deprive a person of life and personal security in the course of pursuing his official duties, constitutional due process rights may be implicated. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331 ("The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government.").

    Section 1983 "contains no state-of-mind requirement independent of that necessary to state a violation of the underlying constitutional right." Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330 . See Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330 . The underlying constitutional rights at issue here are substantive due process rights to life and liberty or personal security.

    In Daniels, the Supreme Court held that where an official's or government entity's conduct constitutes mere negligence, no substantive due process violation occurs. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 328 . Daniels expressly left open the question whether something less than intentional conduct such as recklessness or gross negligence would suffice "to trigger the protections of the Due Process Clause." Id. at 334 n.3. But in City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989), the Court held that nonintentional government conduct can violate the Due Process Clause and thus lead to S 1983 liability. City of Canton held that a municipality may be liable for a failure to train its employees when such failure demonstrates "deliberate indifference to rights of persons with whom police come into contact." Id. at 388.

  • ...9 more annotations...
  • Five circuits have addressed S 1983 liability in the context of high-speed pursuits. These circuits have applied various labels to the standard of conduct that may lead to liability. See, e.g., Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296 (3rd Cir. 1994) (en banc) (overruling previous reckless indifference standard and adopting shocks the conscience standard); Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1496 (10th Cir. 1992) (reckless disregard); Temkin v. Frederick County Comm'rs, 945 F.2d 716, 723 (4th Cir. 1991) (shocks the conscience), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1095 (1992); Roach v. City of Fredericktown, 882 F.2d 294, 297 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding gross negligence insufficient but not stating what standard should be applied); Jones v. Sherrill, 827 F.2d 1102, 1106 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding gross negligence or outrageous conduct sufficient in some circumstances). 4
  • In one such due process case, we held that either "gross negligence, recklessness, or `deliberate indifference'" was sufficient to state a substantive due process violation. Wood v. Ostrander, 851 F.2d 1212, 1214 (9th Cir. 1988) ("Wood
  • I"), reh'g granted and opinion modified by, 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989) ("Wood II"), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 938 (1990). Relying on the standard set out in Wood I, we later held that "grossly negligent or reckless official conduct that infringes upon an interest protected by the Due Process Clause is actionable under S 1983." Fargo v. City of San Juan Bautista, 857 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1988). But Fargo's grossly negligent standard was explicitly based on Wood I, which was modified on rehearing and superseded by Wood II. In Wood II, we stepped back from the grossly negligent standard. We noted that an intervening Supreme Court decision, City of Canton, 489 U.S. 378 , had called into question this standard as set forth in Wood I and Fargo. Wood II, 879 F.2d at 588.
  • In Fargo, we defined gross negligence as "`more than ordinary inadvertence or inattention, but less perhaps than conscious indifference to the consequences.'" Fargo, 857 F.2d at 641 (quoting W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts S 34, at 212 (5th ed. 1984)). We also noted that an officer's state of mind is not an issue in a claim based on gross negligence, "although the contrary may be true where the claim involves recklessness." Id. at 642. Although we declined to decide whether an innocent state of mind would negate recklessness or "whether recklessness may be presumed conclusively from conduct," we did note that recklessness and deliberate indifference are equivalent in the sense that they both generally refer to conduct involving "a `conscious disregard' of public safety." Id. at 642 n.7. We also said that, "where state officials have notice of the possibility of harm, `negligence can rise to the level of deliberate indifference to or reckless disregard for' the victim." Id. (quoting Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 357 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)). Because we concluded that a triable issue of fact remained as to whether the police officer's conduct might have been grossly negligent, we found it unnecessary to determine whether the officer's conduct might have risen to the more culpable standard of recklessness. Id. at 643
  • In Wood II, we redefined the standard forS 1983 substantive due process violations by police officers. As explained above, we recognized that the Supreme Court's decision in City of Canton, 489 U.S. 378 , had called into question our decisions in Wood I and Fargo that gross negligence was sufficient. Wood II, 879 F.2d at 588. Analyzing the facts in Wood under City of Canton's deliberate indifference standard, we concluded that there remained a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the police officer in Wood had been deliberately indifferent to the plaintiff's interest in her personal security. Id. at 588.
  • Wood II makes clear that, in this circuit, an officer can be held liable for a S 1983 claim if that officer's conduct is delib erately indifferent to or in reckless disregard of a person's right to life and personal security.
  • Here, plaintiffs have alleged that Officer Smith violated the Sacramento County Sheriff's Department General Order regarding pursuits ("General Order")6 by instituting and then continuing the pursuit even when a reasonable officer would have known that to do so was in reckless disregard of Lewis's and Willard's safety. A violation of police procedures is relevant to determine whether a substantive due process violation has occurred. Fargo, 857 F.2d at 642. Police procedures are designed, in part, to guide officers when they engage in conduct that poses a serious risk of harm to either a suspect or to the general public. See id.
  • The General Order requires an officer to communicate his intention to pursue a vehicle to the sheriff's department dispatch center. But defendants concede that Smith did not contact the dispatch center. The General Order requires an officer to consider whether the seriousness of the offense warrants a chase at speeds in excess of the posted limit. But here, the only apparent "offense" was the boys' refusal to stop when another officer told them to do so. The General Order requires an officer to consider whether the need for apprehension justifies the pursuit under existing conditions. Yet Smith apparently only "needed" to apprehend the boys because they refused to stop. The General Order requires an officer to consider whether the pursuit presents unreasonable hazards to life and property. But taking the facts here in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, there existed an unreasonable hazard to Lewis's and Willard's lives. The General Order also directs an officer to discontinue a pursuit when the hazards of continuing outweigh the benefits of immediate apprehension. But here, there was no apparent danger involved in permitting the boys to escape. There certainly was risk of harm to others in continuing the pursuit.
  • In City of Canton the Supreme Court held that deliberate indifference was the minimum standard of culpability necessary to maintain a S 1983 due process action against a municipality for a policy or custom of inadequate training of police officers. City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388 . The Court reasoned that a municipality's inadequate training of its employees can only constitute a "policy or custom" when such inadequate training "evidences a `deliberate indifference' to the rights of its inhabitants." Id. at 389. But the Court also specified that the deliberate indifference standard "does not turn upon the degree of fault (if any) that a plaintiff must show to make out an underlying claim of a constitutional violation." Id. at 388 n.8. City of Canton thus did not explicitly overrule our decisions in either Wood I or Fargo because they involved claims of substantive due process violations against individual police officers.
  •  
    The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a particular amendment `provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, `that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
  • ...1 more comment...
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    The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a particular amendment `provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, `that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
  •  
    The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a particular amendment `provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, `that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
  •  
    The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a particular amendment `provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, `that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
Nye Frank

LADA Victim-Witness Assistance Program - 0 views

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    Law, Tort, Administrative, Hate Crimes, Corruption, Sheriff,
  •  
    Victim Rights in California
    [
    TOP
    ]

    Victims of crime and the families of homicide victims have the right to:


    Know the current status of your court case.
    Be assisted if called as a witness.
    Attend all sentencing proceedings.
    Speak in person; address the court in writing; or be represented by an
    attorney at the time of felony sentencing to express your views concerning the
    defendant, the crime, and its effects on you and your family.
    Have the court order restitution from the convicted person.
    Request the Board of Prison Terms to provide notice of any hearing to review
    or consider parole eligibility or parole-setting for prisoner(s) in your case.
    You must keep the Board of Prison Terms informed of your current address if you
    wish to be notified.
    Speak personally; submit a letter, tape recording or video tape; or send an
    attorney to the parole hearing to express your views about the crime and the
    person responsible.



    Program Services Available
    [

    TOP

    ]

    The following mandatory and optional services, mandated by the Office of
    Emergency Services, are provided:

    Mandatory Services


    Crisis Intervention
    Emergency Assistance
    Resource and Referral Assistance
    Follow-up Assistance
    Property Return Assistance
    Orientation to the Criminal Justice System
    Victim Impact Statement Assistance
    Court Escort/Court Support
    Case Status/Case Disposition Information
    Notification of Family/Friends
    Employer Notification
    Victim of Crime Claims Assistance
    Restitution Assistance

    Optional Services


    Creditor Intervention
    Child Care Assistance
    Witness Notification
    Funeral Arrangement Assistance
    Crime Prevention Information
    Witness Protection Assistance
    Temporary Restraining Order Information
    Transportation Assistance
    Court Waiting Area
    Employer Intervention

    Language Capabilities: Confidential language service available to translate
    all languages.



    State Victim of Crime Compens
nyefrankracing frank

Riverside County Tactics to Elder in Court False Statement of Fact - 1 views

    • Nye Frank
       
      The Autopsy and Sheriff report were not given to the family when the case was closed. Dawn the daughter had to call a national victims org to get them. The autopsy was given to the Press Enterprise before family. Even thogh there is zero indications that Nye ever hit the article 5 months after Nye's death, front page says fist fight, and says heart attack while the autopsy says no heart attack. Perhaps the Press Enterprise is puppet ofs the DA office, to cover up the truth and creat bias. It is alledged that the news reporter is dating the room mate of Prosecutor Daima Calhoun. Daima Calhoun told Dawn if her mom and her continued to investigate this case she would arrest 73 year old Lee Frank. Her boss Mike Rushton told Lee he had a heart attack, even though the autopsy says he did not and Mike attended a meeting a month before closing the case as a homicide in a administrative meeting. Killer let out in 3 days to stalk Nye Franks wife. The sheriff and DA, and protective services said they cannot do anything about it.
    • Nye Frank
       
      Ty was actually out within 24 hours even though the DA and sheriff knew his parents were already stalking us
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    68 year old Nye Frank strangled and beat in front of his 73 year old wife Lee Frank. 27 year old Ty Reddish was professionally trained in wrestling. Nye had 0 history of fighting ever. The Sheriff said that the prosecutor said not charging the guy because he said Prosecutor Daima Calhoun of Riverside County
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