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Nye Frank

prosecutor, brady material, violations, duty - 0 views

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prosecutor brady material violations duty

shared by Nye Frank on 22 Apr 09 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 22 Apr 09
     
    Results 1 - 10 for prosecution's Brady obligation with Safesearch on. (0.14 seconds) Ads by Google Buy Brady Product Shop Labels, Ribbons, Tapes & More. Great Deals on Bulk Qty. Order Now! www.MSCDirect.com Brady Distributor The entire Brady catalog available to purchase online. All New Site. www.HansenSupply.com #1 Brady Dealer in the US The Best Selection and Lowest Price 31 drums in stock-Ships fast & free ForksDrumCloset.com/Brady_Drums Obligations en Bourse Achetez, Vendez, Comparez en Ligne Faites vos Opérations Boursières ! Obligations.fr.Ask.com Custom Search Second Circuit Blog: Prosecutor Cannot Avoid Brady Obligation by ...Aug 22, 2006 ... Prosecutor Cannot Avoid Brady Obligation by Claiming that He Did Not ... the prosecutor's failure to abide by his obligations under Brady. ... circuit2.blogspot.com/2006/08/prosecutor-cannot-avoid-brady.html [PDF] The Prosecution's Obligations to Disclose Witness ProffersFile Format: PDF/Adobe Acrobat - View as HTML tion's obligations under Brady and Jencks to dis- close proffer materials have significant ramifica- tions. For the prosecution, the boundaries of its ... www.birdmarella.com/articles/Prosecution%20Obligations.pdf Possible Brady Material In The Possession Of Law Enforcement ...The prosecution has no obligation to communicate preliminary, challenged or .... triggers his or her Brady obligation, the trial deputy shall review this ... da.co.la.ca.us/sd02-08.htm Legal Defense Fund - News ArticlesBecause the prosecution is obligated to turn over information that is under its control, the prosecution increases it Brady obligations each time it ... www.porac.org/ldf/articles/october%201%202002.html Federal Criminal Law Newsletter (Visitor's Edition) - September 24 ...Sep 24, 2001 ... Fair Trials and the Prompt Release of Brady/Giglio Materials to the .... principle that a prosecutor's Brady obligation is independent of a ... www.fedcrimlaw
Nye Frank

specific intent, obstuction of justice - 0 views

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obstruction of justice specific intent case

shared by Nye Frank on 22 Apr 09 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 22 Apr 09
     
    Criminal Resource Manual 1723 Protection of Government Processes ... The weight of authority, however, requires the government prove that the defendant had a specific intent to obstruct or impede a pending judicial proceeding ... www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/crm01723.htm 5th Circuit: INTENT OF THREAT WILL DETERMINE SENTENCE | Article ... Therefore, sentencing enhancement would clearly...defendant had the specific intent to obstruct justice...threats he had the specific intent to ... www.highbeam.com/doc/1P3-697020701.html 239 F.3d 159 Woodard argues on appeal that the district court failed to make a requisite finding that he had the "specific intent to obstruct justice," and erroneously ... bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F3/239/239.F3d.159.00-1323.823--.2000.html 5th Circuit: INTENT OF THREAT WILL DETERMINE SENTENCE | Organized ... A second issue before the court is whether the defendant had the specific intent to obstruct justice when he made his threats. ... findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa4441/is_200408/ai_n16058940/ 557 F.2d 233 ... to establish White's specific intent to obstruct justice and whether the ... Having determined that White possessed the requisite specific intent the court ... with the requirement that White be shown to have had the specific intent ... bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F2/557/557.F2d.233.77-1015.html Behavior of the Defendant in a Competency-to-Stand-Trial ... The court concluded that Mr. Binion's substantial rights had not been affected. ... evidence to prove that he had specific intent to obstruct justice. ... www.jaapl.org/cgi/content/full/34/1/126 by S Darani - 2006 - Cited by 1 - Related articles - All 2 versions 86 F.3d 263 ... that the defendant must have a specific intent to obstruct justice, "i.e., ... We need not decide in this case whether this specific intent requirement should be ... we think that he had the requisite specific intent to obstruct the ... bulk
Nye Frank

FindLaw | Cases and Codes - 0 views

caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/...getcase.pl

1983 indifference minimum in standard case

shared by Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09 - Cached
  • To sustain a S 1983 civil rights action, a plaintiff must show "(1) that the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) that [such] conduct deprived the plaintiff of a federal constitutional or statutory right." 2 Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 938 (1990). Here, it is undisputed that defendants were acting under color of state law. At issue here is whether Officer Smith, the Sacramento County Sheriff's Department, or Sacramento County engaged in conduct that deprived Lewis of a federally protected righ
  • F.2d 272 (6th Cir. 1990) (noting that the Supreme Court's reasoning in Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), likely "preserve[d] Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process analysis for those instances in which a free citizen is denied his or her constitutional right to life through means other than a law enforcement official's arrest, investigatory stop or other seizure"), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 851 (1990).
  • But when a law enforcement officer arbitrarily acts to deprive a person of life and personal security in the course of pursuing his official duties, constitutional due process rights may be implicated. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331 ("The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government."). Section 1983 "contains no state-of-mind requirement independent of that necessary to state a violation of the underlying constitutional right." Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330 . See Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330 . The underlying constitutional rights at issue here are substantive due process rights to life and liberty or personal security. In Daniels, the Supreme Court held that where an official's or government entity's conduct constitutes mere negligence, no substantive due process violation occurs. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 328 . Daniels expressly left open the question whether something less than intentional conduct such as recklessness or gross negligence would suffice "to trigger the protections of the Due Process Clause." Id. at 334 n.3. But in City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989), the Court held that nonintentional government conduct can violate the Due Process Clause and thus lead to S 1983 liability. City of Canton held that a municipality may be liable for a failure to train its employees when such failure demonstrates "deliberate indifference to rights of persons with whom police come into contact." Id. at 388.
  • ...9 more annotations...
  • Five circuits have addressed S 1983 liability in the context of high-speed pursuits. These circuits have applied various labels to the standard of conduct that may lead to liability. See, e.g., Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296 (3rd Cir. 1994) (en banc) (overruling previous reckless indifference standard and adopting shocks the conscience standard); Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1496 (10th Cir. 1992) (reckless disregard); Temkin v. Frederick County Comm'rs, 945 F.2d 716, 723 (4th Cir. 1991) (shocks the conscience), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1095 (1992); Roach v. City of Fredericktown, 882 F.2d 294, 297 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding gross negligence insufficient but not stating what standard should be applied); Jones v. Sherrill, 827 F.2d 1102, 1106 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding gross negligence or outrageous conduct sufficient in some circumstances). 4
  • In one such due process case, we held that either "gross negligence, recklessness, or `deliberate indifference'" was sufficient to state a substantive due process violation. Wood v. Ostrander, 851 F.2d 1212, 1214 (9th Cir. 1988) ("Wood
  • I"), reh'g granted and opinion modified by, 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989) ("Wood II"), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 938 (1990). Relying on the standard set out in Wood I, we later held that "grossly negligent or reckless official conduct that infringes upon an interest protected by the Due Process Clause is actionable under S 1983." Fargo v. City of San Juan Bautista, 857 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1988). But Fargo's grossly negligent standard was explicitly based on Wood I, which was modified on rehearing and superseded by Wood II. In Wood II, we stepped back from the grossly negligent standard. We noted that an intervening Supreme Court decision, City of Canton, 489 U.S. 378 , had called into question this standard as set forth in Wood I and Fargo. Wood II, 879 F.2d at 588.
  • In Fargo, we defined gross negligence as "`more than ordinary inadvertence or inattention, but less perhaps than conscious indifference to the consequences.'" Fargo, 857 F.2d at 641 (quoting W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts S 34, at 212 (5th ed. 1984)). We also noted that an officer's state of mind is not an issue in a claim based on gross negligence, "although the contrary may be true where the claim involves recklessness." Id. at 642. Although we declined to decide whether an innocent state of mind would negate recklessness or "whether recklessness may be presumed conclusively from conduct," we did note that recklessness and deliberate indifference are equivalent in the sense that they both generally refer to conduct involving "a `conscious disregard' of public safety." Id. at 642 n.7. We also said that, "where state officials have notice of the possibility of harm, `negligence can rise to the level of deliberate indifference to or reckless disregard for' the victim." Id. (quoting Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 357 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)). Because we concluded that a triable issue of fact remained as to whether the police officer's conduct might have been grossly negligent, we found it unnecessary to determine whether the officer's conduct might have risen to the more culpable standard of recklessness. Id. at 643
  • In Wood II, we redefined the standard forS 1983 substantive due process violations by police officers. As explained above, we recognized that the Supreme Court's decision in City of Canton, 489 U.S. 378 , had called into question our decisions in Wood I and Fargo that gross negligence was sufficient. Wood II, 879 F.2d at 588. Analyzing the facts in Wood under City of Canton's deliberate indifference standard, we concluded that there remained a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the police officer in Wood had been deliberately indifferent to the plaintiff's interest in her personal security. Id. at 588.
  • Wood II makes clear that, in this circuit, an officer can be held liable for a S 1983 claim if that officer's conduct is delib erately indifferent to or in reckless disregard of a person's right to life and personal security.
  • Here, plaintiffs have alleged that Officer Smith violated the Sacramento County Sheriff's Department General Order regarding pursuits ("General Order")6 by instituting and then continuing the pursuit even when a reasonable officer would have known that to do so was in reckless disregard of Lewis's and Willard's safety. A violation of police procedures is relevant to determine whether a substantive due process violation has occurred. Fargo, 857 F.2d at 642. Police procedures are designed, in part, to guide officers when they engage in conduct that poses a serious risk of harm to either a suspect or to the general public. See id.
  • The General Order requires an officer to communicate his intention to pursue a vehicle to the sheriff's department dispatch center. But defendants concede that Smith did not contact the dispatch center. The General Order requires an officer to consider whether the seriousness of the offense warrants a chase at speeds in excess of the posted limit. But here, the only apparent "offense" was the boys' refusal to stop when another officer told them to do so. The General Order requires an officer to consider whether the need for apprehension justifies the pursuit under existing conditions. Yet Smith apparently only "needed" to apprehend the boys because they refused to stop. The General Order requires an officer to consider whether the pursuit presents unreasonable hazards to life and property. But taking the facts here in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, there existed an unreasonable hazard to Lewis's and Willard's lives. The General Order also directs an officer to discontinue a pursuit when the hazards of continuing outweigh the benefits of immediate apprehension. But here, there was no apparent danger involved in permitting the boys to escape. There certainly was risk of harm to others in continuing the pursuit.
  • In City of Canton the Supreme Court held that deliberate indifference was the minimum standard of culpability necessary to maintain a S 1983 due process action against a municipality for a policy or custom of inadequate training of police officers. City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388 . The Court reasoned that a municipality's inadequate training of its employees can only constitute a "policy or custom" when such inadequate training "evidences a `deliberate indifference' to the rights of its inhabitants." Id. at 389. But the Court also specified that the deliberate indifference standard "does not turn upon the degree of fault (if any) that a plaintiff must show to make out an underlying claim of a constitutional violation." Id. at 388 n.8. City of Canton thus did not explicitly overrule our decisions in either Wood I or Fargo because they involved claims of substantive due process violations against individual police officers.
  • Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09
     
    The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a particular amendment `provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, `that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
  • ...1 more comment...
  • Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09
     
    The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a particular amendment `provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, `that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
  • Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09
     
    The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a particular amendment `provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, `that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
  • Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09
     
    The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a particular amendment `provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, `that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
Nye Frank

Department of Justice, State of Oregon - Links - 0 views

www.doj.state.or.us/links.shtml

legal links courts leg senate org law

shared by Nye Frank on 22 Apr 09 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 22 Apr 09
     
    Legal | Consumer | Child Support (DCS) | Other Government Legal Oregon Courts Oregon Revised Statutes Links Oregon Constitution Links Oregon Administrative Rules Oregon State Bar Association United States Courts Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals United States Supreme Court Consumer American Association of Retired Persons Better Business Bureau Construction Contractors Board Federal Communication Commission Federal Trade Commission Food & Drug Administration Securities and Exchange Commission Division of Child Support DCS Links Other Government United States Department of Justice United States Senate United States House of Representatives Oregon Legislature Oregon Governor State of Oregon |Back to Top
  • Nye Frank on 22 Apr 09
     
    Legal | Consumer | Child Support (DCS) | Other Government Legal Oregon Courts Oregon Revised Statutes Links Oregon Constitution Links Oregon Administrative Rules Oregon State Bar Association United States Courts Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals United States Supreme Court Consumer American Association of Retired Persons Better Business Bureau Construction Contractors Board Federal Communication Commission Federal Trade Commission Food & Drug Administration Securities and Exchange Commission Division of Child Support DCS Links Other Government United States Department of Justice United States Senate United States House of Representatives Oregon Legislature Oregon Governor State of Oregon |Back to Top
Nye Frank

Diigo & Google - 0 views

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1983

shared by Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09 - Cached
Nye Frank

Victim Rights Manual - 0 views

209.85.173.132/search

crime victims rights disclosure foia manual

shared by Nye Frank on 23 Apr 09 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 23 Apr 09
     
    A defendant may be released on bail for all offenses except capital crimes. Public safety is the primary consideration in setting the bail amount. The court must conduct a hearing before deviating from the scheduled bail for a violent felony or for threatening a witness in a rape, domestic violence or criminal threat case. The court must state its reasons for deviating from the bail schedule. (Cal.Const Art. 1 Sect. 28, PC 1270.1, and PC 1275.)In violent felony cases, the district attorneys office, Division of Victim Services and the probation department are responsible for notifying victims and witnesses that they can request notification regarding the defendant's release. The Division of Victim Services will provide the forms to those victims and witnesses. (PC 679.03(a).)Inmates convicted of murder, voluntary manslaughter, life cases, stalking or a case where the defendant inflicted great bodily injury, cannot be released on parole within 35 miles of a victim or witness. However, the victim or witness must file the appropriate form with CDCR, and CDCR must find there is a need to protect the safety and well being of the victim or witness. (PC 3003.)Upon request, when a defendant is sent to state prison, the victim or next of kin will be notified of the defendant's release to work furlough or a reentry program at least 60 days prior to placement. If the inmate escapes, the victim must be given immediate notification. The victim should keep his or her request and current address on file using a form that can be obtained through the Division of Victim Services. (PC 679.02(a)(6), PC 11155.)The Right to be Protected13 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 17 An employer with more than 25 employees may not discriminate against an employee who has been a victim of a sex crime or domestic violence when that employee seeks medical attention or counseling. (LC 230.1.)Employers must allow crime victims or family members t
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