Skip to main content

Home/ Nyefrank/ Group items tagged VICTIM

Rss Feed Group items tagged

Filter: All | Bookmarks | Topics Simple Middle
Nye Frank

538 F2d 10 Torres v. Sachs S Velez | Open Jurist - 0 views

74.125.155.132/search

rico act case nye

shared by Nye Frank on 27 Jul 09 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 27 Jul 09
     
    Section 402 allows a court, in its discretion, to award attorneys' fees to a prevailing party in suits to enforce the voting guarantees of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendments, and statutes enacted under those amendments. This section is similar to provisions in Titles II and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibit discrimination in public accommodations and employment, and to Section 403 of this act (the coverage of which is described below). Such a provision is appropriate in voting rights cases because there, as in employment and public accommodations cases, and other civil rights cases, Congress depends heavily upon private citizens to enforce the fundamental rights involved. Fee awards are a necessary means of enabling private citizens to vindicate these Federal rights. It is intended that the standards for awarding fees under sections 402 and 403 be generally the same as under the fee provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. A party seeking to enforce the rights protected by the Constitutional clause or statute under which fees are authorized by these sections, if successful, "should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust." Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402, 88 S.Ct. 964, 19 L.Ed.2d 1263 (1968). . . . In several hearings held over a period of years, the Committee has found that fee awards are essential if the Constitutional requirements and Federal statutes to which sections 402 and 403 apply are to be fully enforced. We find that the effects of such fee awards are ancilliary (sic) and incident to securing compliance with these laws, and that fee awards are an integral part of the remedies necessary to obtain such compliance. Fee awards are therefore provided in cases covered by sections 402 and 403 in accordance with Congress' powers under, inter alia, the Fourteenth Amendment, Section 5. As with cases brought under 20 U.S.C. § 1617, the Emergency School Ai
  • Nye Frank on 27 Jul 09
     
    Section 402 allows a court, in its discretion, to award attorneys' fees to a prevailing party in suits to enforce the voting guarantees of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendments, and statutes enacted under those amendments. This section is similar to provisions in Titles II and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibit discrimination in public accommodations and employment, and to Section 403 of this act (the coverage of which is described below). Such a provision is appropriate in voting rights cases because there, as in employment and public accommodations cases, and other civil rights cases, Congress depends heavily upon private citizens to enforce the fundamental rights involved. Fee awards are a necessary means of enabling private citizens to vindicate these Federal rights. It is intended that the standards for awarding fees under sections 402 and 403 be generally the same as under the fee provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. A party seeking to enforce the rights protected by the Constitutional clause or statute under which fees are authorized by these sections, if successful, "should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust." Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402, 88 S.Ct. 964, 19 L.Ed.2d 1263 (1968). . . . In several hearings held over a period of years, the Committee has found that fee awards are essential if the Constitutional requirements and Federal statutes to which sections 402 and 403 apply are to be fully enforced. We find that the effects of such fee awards are ancilliary (sic) and incident to securing compliance with these laws, and that fee awards are an integral part of the remedies necessary to obtain such compliance. Fee awards are therefore provided in cases covered by sections 402 and 403 in accordance with Congress' powers under, inter alia, the Fourteenth Amendment, Section 5. As with cases brought under 20 U.S.C. § 1617, the Emergency School Ai
Nye Frank

FindLaw | Cases and Codes - 0 views

caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/...getcase.pl

1983 indifference minimum in standard case

shared by Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09 - Cached
  • To sustain a S 1983 civil rights action, a plaintiff must show "(1) that the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) that [such] conduct deprived the plaintiff of a federal constitutional or statutory right." 2 Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 938 (1990). Here, it is undisputed that defendants were acting under color of state law. At issue here is whether Officer Smith, the Sacramento County Sheriff's Department, or Sacramento County engaged in conduct that deprived Lewis of a federally protected righ
  • F.2d 272 (6th Cir. 1990) (noting that the Supreme Court's reasoning in Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), likely "preserve[d] Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process analysis for those instances in which a free citizen is denied his or her constitutional right to life through means other than a law enforcement official's arrest, investigatory stop or other seizure"), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 851 (1990).
  • But when a law enforcement officer arbitrarily acts to deprive a person of life and personal security in the course of pursuing his official duties, constitutional due process rights may be implicated. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331 ("The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government."). Section 1983 "contains no state-of-mind requirement independent of that necessary to state a violation of the underlying constitutional right." Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330 . See Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330 . The underlying constitutional rights at issue here are substantive due process rights to life and liberty or personal security. In Daniels, the Supreme Court held that where an official's or government entity's conduct constitutes mere negligence, no substantive due process violation occurs. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 328 . Daniels expressly left open the question whether something less than intentional conduct such as recklessness or gross negligence would suffice "to trigger the protections of the Due Process Clause." Id. at 334 n.3. But in City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989), the Court held that nonintentional government conduct can violate the Due Process Clause and thus lead to S 1983 liability. City of Canton held that a municipality may be liable for a failure to train its employees when such failure demonstrates "deliberate indifference to rights of persons with whom police come into contact." Id. at 388.
  • ...9 more annotations...
  • Five circuits have addressed S 1983 liability in the context of high-speed pursuits. These circuits have applied various labels to the standard of conduct that may lead to liability. See, e.g., Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296 (3rd Cir. 1994) (en banc) (overruling previous reckless indifference standard and adopting shocks the conscience standard); Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1496 (10th Cir. 1992) (reckless disregard); Temkin v. Frederick County Comm'rs, 945 F.2d 716, 723 (4th Cir. 1991) (shocks the conscience), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1095 (1992); Roach v. City of Fredericktown, 882 F.2d 294, 297 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding gross negligence insufficient but not stating what standard should be applied); Jones v. Sherrill, 827 F.2d 1102, 1106 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding gross negligence or outrageous conduct sufficient in some circumstances). 4
  • In one such due process case, we held that either "gross negligence, recklessness, or `deliberate indifference'" was sufficient to state a substantive due process violation. Wood v. Ostrander, 851 F.2d 1212, 1214 (9th Cir. 1988) ("Wood
  • I"), reh'g granted and opinion modified by, 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989) ("Wood II"), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 938 (1990). Relying on the standard set out in Wood I, we later held that "grossly negligent or reckless official conduct that infringes upon an interest protected by the Due Process Clause is actionable under S 1983." Fargo v. City of San Juan Bautista, 857 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1988). But Fargo's grossly negligent standard was explicitly based on Wood I, which was modified on rehearing and superseded by Wood II. In Wood II, we stepped back from the grossly negligent standard. We noted that an intervening Supreme Court decision, City of Canton, 489 U.S. 378 , had called into question this standard as set forth in Wood I and Fargo. Wood II, 879 F.2d at 588.
  • In Fargo, we defined gross negligence as "`more than ordinary inadvertence or inattention, but less perhaps than conscious indifference to the consequences.'" Fargo, 857 F.2d at 641 (quoting W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts S 34, at 212 (5th ed. 1984)). We also noted that an officer's state of mind is not an issue in a claim based on gross negligence, "although the contrary may be true where the claim involves recklessness." Id. at 642. Although we declined to decide whether an innocent state of mind would negate recklessness or "whether recklessness may be presumed conclusively from conduct," we did note that recklessness and deliberate indifference are equivalent in the sense that they both generally refer to conduct involving "a `conscious disregard' of public safety." Id. at 642 n.7. We also said that, "where state officials have notice of the possibility of harm, `negligence can rise to the level of deliberate indifference to or reckless disregard for' the victim." Id. (quoting Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 357 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)). Because we concluded that a triable issue of fact remained as to whether the police officer's conduct might have been grossly negligent, we found it unnecessary to determine whether the officer's conduct might have risen to the more culpable standard of recklessness. Id. at 643
  • In Wood II, we redefined the standard forS 1983 substantive due process violations by police officers. As explained above, we recognized that the Supreme Court's decision in City of Canton, 489 U.S. 378 , had called into question our decisions in Wood I and Fargo that gross negligence was sufficient. Wood II, 879 F.2d at 588. Analyzing the facts in Wood under City of Canton's deliberate indifference standard, we concluded that there remained a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the police officer in Wood had been deliberately indifferent to the plaintiff's interest in her personal security. Id. at 588.
  • Wood II makes clear that, in this circuit, an officer can be held liable for a S 1983 claim if that officer's conduct is delib erately indifferent to or in reckless disregard of a person's right to life and personal security.
  • Here, plaintiffs have alleged that Officer Smith violated the Sacramento County Sheriff's Department General Order regarding pursuits ("General Order")6 by instituting and then continuing the pursuit even when a reasonable officer would have known that to do so was in reckless disregard of Lewis's and Willard's safety. A violation of police procedures is relevant to determine whether a substantive due process violation has occurred. Fargo, 857 F.2d at 642. Police procedures are designed, in part, to guide officers when they engage in conduct that poses a serious risk of harm to either a suspect or to the general public. See id.
  • The General Order requires an officer to communicate his intention to pursue a vehicle to the sheriff's department dispatch center. But defendants concede that Smith did not contact the dispatch center. The General Order requires an officer to consider whether the seriousness of the offense warrants a chase at speeds in excess of the posted limit. But here, the only apparent "offense" was the boys' refusal to stop when another officer told them to do so. The General Order requires an officer to consider whether the need for apprehension justifies the pursuit under existing conditions. Yet Smith apparently only "needed" to apprehend the boys because they refused to stop. The General Order requires an officer to consider whether the pursuit presents unreasonable hazards to life and property. But taking the facts here in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, there existed an unreasonable hazard to Lewis's and Willard's lives. The General Order also directs an officer to discontinue a pursuit when the hazards of continuing outweigh the benefits of immediate apprehension. But here, there was no apparent danger involved in permitting the boys to escape. There certainly was risk of harm to others in continuing the pursuit.
  • In City of Canton the Supreme Court held that deliberate indifference was the minimum standard of culpability necessary to maintain a S 1983 due process action against a municipality for a policy or custom of inadequate training of police officers. City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388 . The Court reasoned that a municipality's inadequate training of its employees can only constitute a "policy or custom" when such inadequate training "evidences a `deliberate indifference' to the rights of its inhabitants." Id. at 389. But the Court also specified that the deliberate indifference standard "does not turn upon the degree of fault (if any) that a plaintiff must show to make out an underlying claim of a constitutional violation." Id. at 388 n.8. City of Canton thus did not explicitly overrule our decisions in either Wood I or Fargo because they involved claims of substantive due process violations against individual police officers.
  • Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09
     
    The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a particular amendment `provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, `that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
  • ...1 more comment...
  • Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09
     
    The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a particular amendment `provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, `that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
  • Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09
     
    The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a particular amendment `provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, `that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
  • Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09
     
    The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a particular amendment `provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, `that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
Nye Frank

Scribd - 0 views

www.scribd.com/search

shared by Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09 - Cached
Nye Frank

http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/files/RIC/Publications/promoting%20effective%20homicide%20inv... - 0 views

www.cops.usdoj.gov/...0homicide%20investigations.txt

homicide exceptional close case clearance 20homicide 20effective

shared by Nye Frank on 02 Aug 09 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 02 Aug 09
     
    6 - Chapter 1. Introduction Chapter 2. Homicides and Clearance Rates - 7 ACCORDING TO THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION'S (FBI) Annual Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) for 2005, the number of homicides in the United States increased by 4.8 percent compared to 2004-the largest single-year increase for homicides in 14 years. And, for June 2006 the trend continued, with preliminary UCR data showing that homicide increased by 0.3 percent, with a much larger increase of 6.7 percent in cities with populations of 1 million or more. While the number of homicides in the U.S. has fluctuated since the 1960s, the number of homicides being solved has decreased in that time. Homicide clearance rates have decreased by approximately 30 percent since the 1960s.Despite this overall national decrease, however, some jurisdictions have maintained their ability to solve homicides at a high rate. This chapter provides an overview of homicide rates and clearance rates in the United States. It discusses the effect of unsolved homicides on the department and the community. This chapter also highlights trends affecting homicide investigations and investigative factors associated with cleared homicide cases. Strategies for improving homicide clearance rates are examined, as well. OVERVIEW OF HOMICIDE RATES AND CLEARANCE RATES Since 1930, the FBI has annually collected data on the number of crimes reported from more than 17,000 law enforcement agencies in the United 2 Homicides and Clearance Rates States and the number of crimes that are cleared by an arrest. The FBI releases this information to the public through its UCRs. For the purposes of the UCR, a crime is considered cleared if at least one person has been 1. arrested, 2. charged with the crime, and 3. handed over to the courts for prosecution.1 The UCR also considers some cases cleared when certain "exceptional means" are met. For a case to be cleared by "exceptional means," the law enforcement agency must have identifi
  • Nye Frank on 02 Aug 09
     
    6 - Chapter 1. Introduction Chapter 2. Homicides and Clearance Rates - 7 ACCORDING TO THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION'S (FBI) Annual Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) for 2005, the number of homicides in the United States increased by 4.8 percent compared to 2004-the largest single-year increase for homicides in 14 years. And, for June 2006 the trend continued, with preliminary UCR data showing that homicide increased by 0.3 percent, with a much larger increase of 6.7 percent in cities with populations of 1 million or more. While the number of homicides in the U.S. has fluctuated since the 1960s, the number of homicides being solved has decreased in that time. Homicide clearance rates have decreased by approximately 30 percent since the 1960s.Despite this overall national decrease, however, some jurisdictions have maintained their ability to solve homicides at a high rate. This chapter provides an overview of homicide rates and clearance rates in the United States. It discusses the effect of unsolved homicides on the department and the community. This chapter also highlights trends affecting homicide investigations and investigative factors associated with cleared homicide cases. Strategies for improving homicide clearance rates are examined, as well. OVERVIEW OF HOMICIDE RATES AND CLEARANCE RATES Since 1930, the FBI has annually collected data on the number of crimes reported from more than 17,000 law enforcement agencies in the United 2 Homicides and Clearance Rates States and the number of crimes that are cleared by an arrest. The FBI releases this information to the public through its UCRs. For the purposes of the UCR, a crime is considered cleared if at least one person has been 1. arrested, 2. charged with the crime, and 3. handed over to the courts for prosecution.1 The UCR also considers some cases cleared when certain "exceptional means" are met. For a case to be cleared by "exceptional means," the law enforcement agency must have identifi
nyefrankracing frank

Inland Empire - 0 views

www.diigo.com/...inland-empire

inland Empire Politics Ethics Elders Victims Civil Rights Nye Frank Corruption District Attorney CRA

shared by nyefrankracing frank on 29 Aug 09 - Cached
  • nyefrankracing frank on 29 Aug 09
     
    Ol Boys Style Politics
Nye Frank

Important, Please Read!!! Nye Frank!!!! - OFN Forums - 0 views

www.offroadfabnet.com/...showthread.php

inland things to do weekend 243 Twin pines victims nye frank ofn forums crime Riverside County

shared by Nye Frank on 13 Apr 09 - Cached
Nye Frank

Search Results - THOMAS (Library of Congress) - 0 views

thomas.loc.gov/thomas

probation legislative elder law in hearings legislation research congress

shared by Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09 - Cached
  • 27. H.R.448 : To protect seniors in the United States from elder abuse by establishing specialized elder abuse prosecution and research programs and activities to aid victims of elder abuse, to provide training to prosecutors and other law enforcement related to elder abuse prevention and protection, to establish programs that provide for emergency crisis response teams to combat elder abuse, and for other purposes.Sponsor: Rep Sestak, Joe [PA-7] (introduced 1/9/2009)      Cosponsors (5) Committees: House Judiciary; Senate Judiciary Latest Major Action: 2/12/2009 Referred to Senate committee. Status: Received in the Senate and Read twice and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.
  • Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09
     
    The Library of Congress > THOMAS Home > Bills, Resolutions > Search Results THIS SEARCH THIS DOCUMENT GO TO Next Hit Forward New Bills Search Prev Hit Back HomePage Hit List Best Sections Help Contents Display Limited To: DATES FROM 01/01/2007-01/01/2010 31 Bills from the 111th Congress ranked by relevance on "probation " . 31 bills containing your phrase (or variants of its words) in the same order . Listing of 31 bills containing your phrase (or variants of its words) in the same order . 1 . CAN DO Act of 2009 (Introduced in House) [H.R.1303.IH] 2 . Ex-Offenders Voting Rights Act of 2009 (Introduced in House) [H.R.59.IH] 3 . MEGA (Introduced in House) [H.R.330.IH] 4 . Whereas there are approximately three million Americans employed within the justice system; (Engrossed as Agreed to or Passed by House) [H.RES.45.EH] 5 . SERV Act (Introduced in Senate) [S.902.IS] 6 . SERV Act (Introduced in House) [H.R.2138.IH] 7 . Whereas there are approximately three million Americans employed within the justice system; (Introduced in House) [H.RES.45.IH] 8 . Safeguarding America's Seniors and Veterans Act of 2009 (Introduced in House) [H.R.746.IH] 9 . Managing Arson Through Criminal History (MATCH) Act of 2009 (Introduced in House) [H.R.1727.IH] 10 . Calling on the Government of Vietnam to release from prison, end the detention without trial, and cease the harassment and house arrest of the people who signed the Manifesto on Freedom... (Introduced in House) [H.RES.334.IH] 11 . Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that the President of the United States should not issue pardons to senior members of his administration during the final 90 days... (Introduced in House) [H.RES.9.IH] 12 . National Criminal Justice Commission Act of 2009 (Introduced in Senate
Nye Frank

U.S. Code - 0 views

law2.house.gov/...fastweb.exe

shared by Nye Frank on 21 Apr 09 - Cached
  • Grant amounts under this section may not be used to bring a cause of action for damages. (c) False Claims Act
    • Nye Frank
      Nye Frank on 21 Apr 09
       
      victim funds
Nye Frank

questions documents statement of fact for summary judgement. - 0 views

wyomcases.courts.state.wy.us/...deliverdocument.asp

victim statement of fact for summary judgement

shared by Nye Frank on 21 Apr 09 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 21 Apr 09
     
    Estate of Coleman v. Casper Concrete Co. 1997 WY 64 939 P.2d 233 Case Number: 96-30 Decided: 05/19/1997 Supreme Court of Wyoming -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Cite as: 1997 WY 64, 939 P.2d 233 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The ESTATE OF KEITH D. COLEMAN, Deceased, By and Through its Personal Representative, Janice Coleman, Appellant(Plaintiff), v. CASPER CONCRETE COMPANY, a Wyoming Corporation; and Skorcz Electric, Inc., a Wyoming Corporation, Appellees(Defendants). Appeal from the District Court, Natrona County, The Honorable Dan Spangler, Judge Representing Appellant: Dallas J. Laird, Casper; and Richard R. Jamieson, Casper. Representing Appellee: Richard R. Wilking, Casper; and Earl J. Hanson of Hanson, Roybal, Lee & Todd, P.C., Billings, for Appellee Casper Concrete Company. Rebecca A. Lewis of Lewis & Associates, P.C., Laramie, for Appellee Skorcz Electric, Inc. Before TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN,* and LEHMAN, JJ. * Chief Justice at time of oral argument. TAYLOR, Chief Justice. [¶1] In 1989, the State of Wyoming contracted with appellees to build a highway intersection and install traffic lights. In June of 1993, during a malfunction of those lights, a young man was killed in a collision with a drunk driver at the intersection. Although the State successfully sought shelter in immunity and the drunk driver eventually settled with the decedent's estate, suit survived against appellees on disparate theories of negligence, strict liability and res ipsa loquitur. From an adverse summary judgment, the decedent's estate prosecutes this appeal. We affirm. I. ISSUES [¶2] The decedent's mother, Janice Coleman, as personal representative of her son's estate (appellant), states the following issues: I. Whether the district court properly granted summary judgmen
« First ‹ Previous 101 - 120 of 132 Next ›
Showing 20▼ items per page