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"A plan to temporarily store two trainloads of Savannah River Site's depleted uranium in Texas after it was rejected by Utah's governor might be unnecessary and could waste taxpayers' money, according to the U.S. Energy Department's Inspector General. * Comment (1) * E-mail * Bookmark and Share Advertisement "The only apparent driver in this case was a Recovery Act-related goal established by the Department to accelerate the general disposition of the SRS material," said the report, released Tuesday as a "management alert" based on information received from a "reliable and credible" department source."

"Unseen beyond the grazing Holsteins and rolling pastures of eastern Belgium, the 12-foot-long tapered metal cylinders sit in their underground vaults, waiting for the doomsday call that never came. Each packs the power of many Hiroshimas. America's oldest nuclear weapons, unwanted, outdated, a legacy of the 20th century, are now the focus of a political struggle that could shake the NATO alliance in the 21st. The questions hanging over the B-61 bombs, an estimated 200 of them on six air bases across Europe, relate not just to why they're still here, but to how safe and secure they are. For one thing, al-Qaida terrorists have already targeted this Belgian air base 84 kilometers (52 miles) northeast of Brussels. For another, U.S. Air Force inspectors found inadequate security at most of the six sites. And three months ago a "bombspotter" team, anti-nuclear activists, penetrated nearly one kilometer (a half-mile) inside Kleine Brogel, reaching its innermost bunkers."

"The Nuclear Regulatory Commission yesterday released internal records that show one of its senior employees filed a pair of complaints questioning the agency's own diligence in obtaining Davis-Besse documents from FirstEnergy Corp. in 2005 and 2007. Those records also show the employee, Jim Gavula, was later told by NRC brass that the agency - highly critical of FirstEnergy in the past - believes it did everything within its power to get more cooperation. Mr. Gavula, an NRC employee for 24 years who now helps the agency review technical documents, filed the complaints as a senior reactor inspector in 2006 and 2008. Such records, often kept secret, were authorized by Mr. Gavula to be made public."

"Prairie Island Nuclear plant operators knew of the potential for flooding in the plant's Unit 1 and Unit 2 turbine buildings, but failed to understand the implications on important safety-related equipment, according to a preliminary finding submitted to the plant Thursday by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The failure to identify and correct the potential safety issues in a timely manner is a significant human performance issue and cause for further review by the agency, according to NRC inspectors. Plant officials have 10 days to respond to the findings before the NRC decides whether to take enforcement action. "We're waiting now for their response," said NRC spokesperson Viktoria Mitlyng."

Companies that operate U.S. nuclear power plants are not telling the government about some equipment defects that could create safety risks, according to a report released Thursday. An audit by the inspector general of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission also raised questions about the agency's oversight, saying reporting guidelines for the nuclear industry are "contradictory and unclear." Reflecting that confusion, the report said the NRC has not levied any civil penalties or significant enforcement actions against nuclear plant operators for lapses in reporting equipment defects in at least eight years. The study comes as questions are raised about the safety of U.S. nuclear facilities in the wake of the nuclear crisis in Japan. The NRC voted Wednesday to conduct two safety reviews of the 104 nuclear reactors operating in the U.S. Unless the NRC takes steps to improve its reporting guidelines, "the margin of safety for operating reactors could be reduced," the IG report said.

"This article from back in March describes some of the past safety problems at Japan's nuclear facilities. It briefly mentions issues the IAEA had as far back as the 1990′s with Japan's failing nuclear safety. The arrangements for accidents, emergency planning and safety training by Japanese power companies were condemned as inadequate by IAEA inspectors after they visited four reactors in the 1990s. Altogether they found 90 deficiencies in safety procedures. The IAEA's findings should have been a wake up call, the more concerning part is that they were completely unable to do anything about it. It did cause a major scandal in Japan as cover ups by the power companies hit the media. A considerable portion of the IAEA findings involved cracks in equipment, a serious danger. As of 2002 the IAEA did not know if anything had been done to solve the problems. They had not been invited back by Japan to visit the reactors for new inspections. This problem with the IAEA and their lack of ability to enforce anything has been criticized by many since the Fukushima disasters."

Utility officials and regulators next week will review an analysis of what caused a crack in the concrete wall of the Crystal River nuclear plant's containment building. Progress Energy also will present repair plans for the crack discovered Oct. 2 as the utility was cutting a hole in the containment building wall to replace two generators. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission will also share its findings of what caused the concrete in the 42-inch-thick wall that surrounds the nuclear reactor to crack. The NRC sent its own team of inspectors to survey the plant.

"As Japan struggles to regain control of its Fukushima Daiichi power plant, there's lots of talk about which technical safeguards the plant lacked and which should be required in future nuclear facilities. But a new report points to another kind of safeguard that failed: public institutions. Nuclear power plants are designed for what the industry calls defense in depth: the inclusion of backup safeguards in case the primary safeguards fail. No single layer of protection should be trusted entirely. The same is true of people. No power plant operator should be trusted to maintain the safety of its reactors. We need multiple layers of scrutiny-inspectors, regulators, independent nuclear experts-to double- and triple-check the operator's work."

Lawrence Hochreiter, Gov. James Douglas' appointee to a panel overseeing an inspection of the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Plant, died Wednesday after collapsing while teaching at Pennsylvania State University. "A professor at Penn State, Dr. Hochreiter provided invaluable expertise in nuclear engineering and energy over his distinguished career," Department of Public Service spokesman Steve Wark said in a statement. "Our deepest sympathies are extended to Dr. Hochreiter's family during this time of tremendous loss and sadness."