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if lost generation were made up for entirely by coal-fired plants, carbon emissions would increase annually by as much as 33 million tons. This would represent an overall 4% annual increase in carbon emissions for the country and an 8% increase in carbon emissions for the power sector alone.

The moratorium could cause a spike in CO2 emissions as Germany turns to its other, more carbon-intensive sources to supply its energy demand. Already, the country has been engaged in a "dash for coal", building dozens of new coal plants in response to the perverse incentives and intense lobbying from the coal industries made possible by the European Emissions Trading Scheme. (As previously reported by Breakthrough Europe).

Alternatively, should the country try to replace lost generation entirely with power from renewables, it would need to more than double generation of renewable energy, from where it currently stands at 97 billion kWh to about 237 billion kWh. As part of the country's low-carbon strategy, Germany has planned to deploy at least 20% renewable energy sources by 2020. If the nation now chooses to meet this goal by displacing nuclear plants, 2020 emissions levels would be higher than had the country otherwise phased out its carbon-intensive coal or natural gas plants.

*Carbon emissions factors used are those estimated by the World Bank in 2009 for new coal-fired power plants (0.795 t C02/MWh) and new gas-fired power plants (0.398 t C02/MWh) **Data from Carbon Monitoring For Action, European Nuclear Society Data, and US Energy Information Administration

Some European leaders, including Angela Merkel, may be backtracking fast on their commitment to nuclear power, but despite yesterday's escalation of the ongoing crisis in Fukushima, Japan, there appear to be no signs that India, China and other emerging economies will succumb to a similar backlash. For the emerging economies, overcoming poverty and insecurity of supply remain the overriding priorities of energy policy.

in complex systems, "no matter how effective conventional safety devices are, there is a form of accident that is inevitable" - hence the term "normal accidents".

system accidents occur with many technologies: Take the example of a highway blow-out leading to a pile-up. This may have disastrous consequences for those involved but cannot be described as a disaster. The latter only happens when the technologies involved have the potential to affect many innocent bystanders. This "dread factor" is why the nuclear aspect of Japan's ordeal has come to dominate headlines, even though the tsunami has had much greater immediate impact on lives.

It is simply too early to say what precisely went wrong at Fukushima, and it has been surprising to see commentators speak with such speed and certainty. Most people accept that they will only ever have a rough understanding of the facts. But they instinctively ask if they can trust those in charge and wonder why governments support particular technologies so strongly.

Industry and governments need to be more straightforward with the public. The pretence of knowledge is deeply unscientific; a more humble approach where officials are frank about the unknowns would paradoxically engender greater trust.

Likewise, nuclear's opponents need to adopt a measured approach. We need a fuller democratic debate about the choices we are making. Catastrophic potential needs to be a central criterion in decisions about technology. Advice from experts is useful but the most significant questions are ethical in character.

If technologies can potentially have disastrous effects on large numbers of innocent bystanders, someone needs to represent their interests. We might expect this to be the role of governments, yet they have generally become advocates of nuclear power because it is a relatively low-carbon technology that reduces reliance on fossil fuels. Unfortunately, this commitment seems to have reduced their ability to be seen to act as honest brokers, something acutely felt at times like these, especially since there have been repeated scandals in Japan over the covering-up of information relating to accidents at reactors.

Post Fukushima, governments in Germany, Switzerland and Austria already appear to be shifting their policies. Rational voices, such as the Britain's chief scientific adviser John Beddington, are saying quite logically that we should not compare the events in Japan with the situation in Britain, which does not have the same earthquake risk. Unfortunately, such arguments are unlikely to prevail in the politics of risky technologies.

firms and investors involved in nuclear power have often failed to take regulatory and political risk into account; history shows that nuclear accidents can lead to tighter regulations, which in turn can increase nuclear costs. Further ahead, the proponents of hazardous technologies need to bear the full costs of their products, including insurance liabilities and the cost of independent monitoring of environmental and health effects. As it currently stands, taxpayers would pay for any future nuclear incident.

Critics of technology are often dubbed in policy circles as anti-science. Yet critical thinking is central to any rational decision-making process - it is less scientific to support a technology uncritically. Accidents happen with all technologies, and are regrettable but not disastrous so long as the technology does not have catastrophic potential; this raises significant questions about whether we want to adopt technologies that do have such potential.

Much of this flow of cash was the product of the Three Power Source Development Laws, a sophisticated system of government subsidies created in 1974 by Kakuei Tanaka, the powerful prime minister who shaped Japan’s nuclear power landscape and used big public works projects to build postwar Japan’s most formidable political machine. The law required all Japanese power consumers to pay, as part of their utility bills, a tax that was funneled to communities with nuclear plants. Officials at the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, which regulates the nuclear industry, and oversees the subsidies, refused to specify how much communities have come to rely on those subsidies. “This is money to promote the locality’s acceptance of a nuclear plant,” said Tatsumi Nakano of the ministry’s Agency for Natural Resources and Energy.

UPDATE: I AM INFORMED THAT THE MATERIAL REPORTED BY EURACTIV AND REPRODUCED BELOW IS COMPREHENSIVELY WRONG.  APPARENTLY MR. SAWYER IS NOT A CONTRIBUTOR TO THE IPCC AND THE REPORT DOES NOT DISCUSS NUCLEAR POWER.  I HAVE UPDATED THIS POST ACCORDINGLY. THE EURACTIV NEWS STORY POSTED UP YESTERDAY REMAINS IN ERROR.

Within Japan, it’s the NSC (Nuclear Safety Commission) that has responsibility for classifying its incidents. When they say Fukushima is a 7, it doesn’t necessarily mean the same thing as what the USSR considered to be a 7 in 1986. Why not? Because there are many different aspects to a nuclear incident. There are health effects, potential health effects, environmental effects, measurements of radiation released, and so on.

The scale boils all these factors down to a single number, which to me, is a misguided effort: 0 – No safety significance 1 – Anomaly 2 – Incident 3 – Serious incident 4 – Accident with local consequences 5 – Accident with wider consequences 6 – Serious accident 7 – Major accident I certainly agree that Fukushima is a 7, a major accident, considering its type of reactor. Chernobyl was a Generation 0 atomic pile, not really what you’d call a nuclear reactor, and I’m surprised it didn’t blow up half the continent.  For a proper nuclear reactor, I think Fukushima is about as bad as things can get.

But notice, it does not fulfill some of the qualifications of a 7, or even of a 4. For example, people start dying from radiation as early as 4 on the scale. Nobody has died from radiation at Fukushima (three were killed by the tsunami), and nobody was hurt at all at Three Mile Island which was a 5. The grimmest rational estimates of Chernobyl put its eventual death toll from cancer at 4,000. But it does fulfill the other qualifications of a 7; notably: Major release of radioactive material with widespread health and environmental effects requiring implementation of planned and extended countermeasures.

there is a tendency to conclude that govts with the best expert advice have made this decision because there is a real danger of something sinister happening. But remember govts are also under pressure to act because they are made up of politicians - also they may be making precautionary moves because they have little to lose and have to be seen as being pro-active. How real is the danger of harmful radiation reaching Tokyo and should you leave if you're in Tokyo? There were many people doing a "wait and see" before Wednesday but once the US & UK govt called for a pull-out, the fear factor rose several notches and if you're a Japanese in Tokyo watching all the foreigners "abandoning" your city, you start to feel some anxiety and later panic. One EU official used the word "apocalypse"[Link] to describe the situation in Japan and the fear index hit the roof....then a whole herd of experts came out to paint more dire scenarios saying the Japanese have lost all control of the nuclear plants. All this lead the public to think that calamity is the most likely outcome of the unfolding saga and if make a decision from all this, you will just run for the exits if you're in Tokyo. All this is happening while the Japanese govt is trying to calm the people and prevent a pandemonium after the triple disaster hit the country. In China, people have emptied the supermarket shelves of iodized salt because of media reports that the consumption of iodine can block radioactive iodine from being absorbed by thyroid glands causing thyroid cancer. There are also reports of people getting ill after ingesting iodine pills out of fear of radiation.

Increasing nuclear power in the EIA reference scenario from a 17% to 43% share of electricity implies, in round numbers, about 300 new nuclear power plants by 2035.***  If you do not like nuclear you can substitute wind turbines or solar thermal plants (or even reductions in electricity consumption) according to the data provided in The Climate Fix, Table 4.4.  The magnitude of the task is the same size, just expressed differently.

One nuclear plant worth of carbon-free energy every 30 days between now and 2035.  This does not even consider electrification of some fraction of the vehicle fleet -- another of President Obama's goals -- which presumably would add a not-insignificant amount to electricity demand. Thus, I'd suggest that the President's clean energy goal is much more of the aspirational variety than a actual policy target expected to be hit precisely.

Despite the cowboy outlaw connotations, black-hat services are not illegal, but trafficking in them risks the wrath of Google. The company draws a pretty thick line between techniques it considers deceptive and “white hat” approaches, which are offered by hundreds of consulting firms and are legitimate ways to increase a site’s visibility. Penney’s results were derived from methods on the wrong side of that line, says Mr. Pierce. He described the optimization as the most ambitious attempt to game Google’s search results that he has ever seen.

TO understand the strategy that kept J. C. Penney in the pole position for so many searches, you need to know how Web sites rise to the top of Google’s results. We’re talking, to be clear, about the “organic” results — in other words, the ones that are not paid advertisements. In deriving organic results, Google’s algorithm takes into account dozens of criteria, many of which the company will not discuss.

But it has described one crucial factor in detail: links from one site to another. If you own a Web site, for instance, about Chinese cooking, your site’s Google ranking will improve as other sites link to it. The more links to your site, especially those from other Chinese cooking-related sites, the higher your ranking. In a way, what Google is measuring is your site’s popularity by polling the best-informed online fans of Chinese cooking and counting their links to your site as votes of approval.

But even links that have nothing to do with Chinese cooking can bolster your profile if your site is barnacled with enough of them. And here’s where the strategy that aided Penney comes in. Someone paid to have thousands of links placed on hundreds of sites scattered around the Web, all of which lead directly to JCPenney.com.

Who is that someone? A spokeswoman for J. C. Penney, Darcie Brossart, says it was not Penney.

“J. C. Penney did not authorize, and we were not involved with or aware of, the posting of the links that you sent to us, as it is against our natural search policies,” Ms. Brossart wrote in an e-mail. She added, “We are working to have the links taken down.”

Using an online tool called Open Site Explorer, Mr. Pierce found 2,015 pages with phrases like “casual dresses,” “evening dresses,” “little black dress” or “cocktail dress.” Click on any of these phrases on any of these 2,015 pages, and you are bounced directly to the main page for dresses on JCPenney.com.

Some of the 2,015 pages are on sites related, at least nominally, to clothing. But most are not. The phrase “black dresses” and a Penney link were tacked to the bottom of a site called nuclear.engineeringaddict.com. “Evening dresses” appeared on a site called casino-focus.com. “Cocktail dresses” showed up on bulgariapropertyportal.com. ”Casual dresses” was on a site called elistofbanks.com. “Semi-formal dresses” was pasted, rather incongruously, on usclettermen.org.

Students are supposed to be engaging with the big ideas in society. It might be how to make a nuclear bomb in physics, or it might be the rationale for using the nuclear bomb against Japan in history. If university is not about these difficult and challenging ideas, then it really is nothing more than a finishing school to equip us with the correct skills for the workplace. If free education, an issue close to the heart of many students, is about anything, it should be about the freedom to explore ideas. The truth is that the greatest impediment to getting a free education is not the fees but the NUS’s policies which effectively keep students wrapped in cotton wool.

probabilistic intuition. We’ll learn to judge what’s likely and unlikely—and what’s impossible to know. We’ll learn about distorting habits of mind like selection bias—and how to guard against them. We’ll gamble. We’ll read The Art of Probability for Scientists and Engineers by Richard Hamming, Expert Political Judgment by Philip Tetlock, and How to Cheat Your Friends at Poker by Penn Jillette and Mickey Lynn.

Post-State Diplomacy Why take this course? As the world becomes evermore atomized, understanding the new leaders and constituencies becomes increasingly important.

tribal insurgents to multinational corporations, private charities to pirate gangs, religious movements to armies for hire, a range of organizations now compete with (and sometimes eclipse) the nation-states in which they reside. Without capitals or traditional constituencies, they can’t be persuaded or deterred by traditional tactics.

that doesn’t mean diplomacy is dead; quite the opposite. Negotiating with these parties requires the same skills as dealing with belligerent nations—understanding the shareholders and alliances they must answer to, the cultures that inform how they behave, and the religious, economic, and political interests they must address.

Power has always depended on who can provide justice, commerce, and stability.

Remix Culture Why take this course? Modern artists don’t start with a blank page or empty canvas. They start with preexisting works. What you’ll learn: How to analyze—and create—artworks made out of other artworks

philosophical roots of remix culture and study seminal works like Robert Rauschenberg’s Monogram and Jorge Luis Borges’ Pierre Menard, Author of Don Quixote. And we’ll examine modern-day exemplars from DJ Shadow’s Endtroducing to Auto-Tune the News.

Applied Cognition Why take this course? You have to know the brain to train the brain. What you’ll learn: How the mind works and how you can make it work for you.

Writing for New Forms Why take this course? You can write a cogent essay, but can you write it in 140 characters or less? What you’ll learn: How to adapt your message to multiple formats and audiences—human and machine.

The natural scientific doubt was this: scientists could not say with absolute certainty that smoking caused cancer, because there wasn’t an invariable effect. “Smoking does not kill everyone who smokes, it only kills about half of them.” All scientists could say was that there was an extremely strong association between smoking and serious health risks

the “Tobacco Strategy” was created, and had two tactics: To “use normal scientific doubt to undermine the status of actual scientific knowledge” and To exploit the media’s adherence to the fairness doctrine, which would give equal weight to each side of a debate, regardless of any disparity in the supporting scientific evidence

Fred Seitz was a scientist who learned the Tobacco Strategy first-hand. He had an impressive resume. An actual rocket scientist, he helped build the atomic bomb in the 1940s, worked for NATO in the 1950s, was president of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences in the 1960s, and of Rockefeller University in the 1970s.

After his retirement in 1979, Seitz took on a job for the tobacco industry. Over the next 6 years, he doled out $45 million of R.J. Reynolds’ money to fund biomedical research to create “an extensive body of scientifically well-grounded data useful in defending the industry against attacks” by such means as focussing on alternative “causes or development mechanisms of chronic degenerative diseases imputed to cigarettes.” He was joined by, most notably, two other physicists: William Nierenberg, who also worked on the atom bomb in the 1940s, submarine warfare, NATO, and was appointed director or the Scripps Institution of Oceanography in 1965; and Robert Jastrow, who founded NASA’s Goddard Institute for Space Studies, which he directed until he retired in 1981 to teach at Dartmouth College.

In 1984, these three founded the think tank, the George C. Marshall Institute

None of these men were experts in environmental and health issues, but they all “used their scientific credentials to present themselves as authorities, and they used their authority to discredit any science they didn’t like.” They turned out to be wrong, in terms of the science, on every issue they weighed in on. But they turned out to be highly successful in preventing or limiting regulation that the scientific evidence would warrant.

The bulk of the book details at how these men and others applied the Tobacco Strategy to create doubt on the following issues: the unfeasibility of the Strategic Defense Initiative (Ronald Reagan’s “Star Wars”), and the resultant threat of nuclear winter that Carl Sagan, among others, pointed out acid rain depletion of the ozone layer second-hand smoke, and most recently, and significantly, global warming.

Having pointed out the dangers the doubt-mongers pose, Oreskes and Conway propose a remedy: an emphasis on scientific literacy, not in the sense of memorizing scientific facts, but in being able to assess which scientists to trust.