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Proposals for a central database of all mobile phone and internet traffic have been condemned as "Orwellian".

But the Lib Dems slammed the idea as "incompatible with a free country", while the Tories called on the government to justify its plans.

"Ministers claim the database will only be used in terrorist cases, but there is now a long list of cases, from the arrest of Walter Wolfgang for heckling at a Labour conference to the freezing of Icelandic assets, where anti-terrorism law has been used for purposes for which it was not intended."

像华为/中兴这样的大公司，没有资助几个有名的开源项目已经说不过去了，他们还禁止员工与自由软件开发者交流，即使在向开源社区求助时，还要带上： This email and its attachments contain confidential information from XXXX, which is intended only for the person or entity whose address is listed above. Any use of the information contained here in any way (including, but not limited to, total or partial disclosure, reproduction, or dissemination) by persons other than the intended recipient(s) is prohibited. If you receive this email in error, please notify the sender by phone or email immediately and delete it! 结果当然是被国外的黑客们骂得狗血淋头，唉，洋相出大了。

Why does a society that, like America, impresses most people who spend time here project such a poor image and scare people as much as it attracts them? Why do China’s leaders, who survive partly by listening to their own people, develop such tin ears when dealing with the outside world?

Of course, most official voices of China now have the opposite effect. Their minor, provable lies—the sky is blue, no one wants to protest—inevitably build mistrust of larger claims that are closer to being true. And those are the claims the government most wants the world to listen to: that the country is moving forward and is less repressive and more open than official actions and explanations (or lack of them) make China seem. Many Chinese who have seen the world are very canny about it, and have just the skills government spokesmen lack—for instance, understanding the root of foreign concerns and addressing them not with special pleading (“This is China…”) but on their own terms. Worldly Chinese demonstrate this every day in the businesses, universities, and nongovernmental organizations where they generally work. But the closer Chinese officials are to centers of political power, the less they know what they don’t know about the world.

虽然WordCamp没机会参加，但是可以参加下周末在广州的中文网志年会。如果说08年的WordCamp还是一个小众和IT人的blogger聚会的话，相信中文网志年会一定是被各类普通的blogger、非ITblogger充斥。也许WordCamp上可以讨论用户体验等等，前三届还是IT族们唱大戏的时候，那么这第四届网志年会注定会更泛化，预计这场大会将会成为也泛主题甚至无主题的一场纯粹聚会罢。我看Blogcn、Blogbus上都有不少独立网志，也期望看到纯粹的blog精神。

So apparently the controversies in international media this summer over China and the Olympics came as a bit of a shock to the Chinese people. While the government's retained tight control over its own media, it's been less able to harmonize those pesky news outlets abroad. Not one to take perceived insults to its national image lying down, Beijing is now throwing RMB 45 billion into targeting global audiences.

Twitter Fast Growing Beyond its Messaging Roots

The most interesting thesis is the idea that China could use international law as a weapon, or “lawfare” for short. The authors argue that citizens of democracies increasingly demand that their countries uphold international rules, particularly ones that govern human rights and the conduct of war. Governments are, therefore, constrained by regional or worldwide organizations, such as the European Union, ASEAN, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the WTO and the United Nations. The authors argue that China should copy the European model of using international law to pin down the USA: “there are far-sighted big powers which have clearly already begun to borrow the power of supra-national, multinational, and non-state players to redouble and expand their own influence.” They think that China could turn the United Nations and regional organizations into an amplifier of the Chinese worldview – discouraging the USA from using its might in campaigns like the Iraq War.

Beijing has been willing to allow the Organization of Islamic States to take the lead in weakening the new Human Rights Council. This subtle diplomacy has been devastatingly effective – contributing to a massive fall in US influence: in 1995 the USA won 50.6 percent of the votes in the United Nations general assembly; by 2006, the figure had fallen to just 23.6 percent. On human rights, the results are even more dramatic: China’s win-rate has rocketed from 43 percent to 82 percent, while the USA’s has tumbled from 57 per cent to 22 percent. The New York Times’ UN correspondent James Traub has detected a paradigm shift in the United Nations’ operations: “it’s a truism that the Security Council can function only insofar as the United States lets it. The adage may soon be applied to China as well.” Traub may be right. China’s capacity to influence the United Nations is increasing, and soon we may be complaining about Chinese behavior on big policy issues

It is inevItable and right that Clinton will bring up Tibet, human rights and other contentious issues. But all evidence suggests that she would like to do so in the context of a re-formatted US-China relationship that places collaboration at Its heart.

"The heavy presence of Chinese (People's) Liberation Army officers throughout the proceedings left many wondering exactly what image the hosts were intending to project to the international community...," the newspaper said. "At a time when Tibet, Darfur and China's broader human rights record are proving delicate issues for Beijing organizers, the move to present thousands of drilled, sobersided army officers ... was surprising for its brazenness; a none too subtle projection of strength," it said. Asked about the military theme, Zhang Jigang, chief of the People's Liberation Army dance troupe, told reporters there were "excellent performers and directors" in the military. "I think this is a Chinese characteristic," he said. "All of the military arms have ... have wonderful acrobats and opera troupes. We should make use of such resources."

15] 标题： 发表评论人：[游客]Roger [2008-10-10 22:30:02]   Prof. Dr. Chemist Hongfei Wang, My Chinese name is 钱永健. It is right wrItten in your blog (although my chinese is not so good). However, the right way wrIting of my name (as showed by 曹聪) is Roger Tsien. You even do not know my name. It seems true you do not know what I am doing at all. I am not a Chemist. but you are. Best regards.

此消息意味着，长期在幕后监控和封锁互联网的黑手：G-F-W，第一次浮出水面，赤裸裸的暴露在全世界观众面前，大快人心啊！做个不是很恰当的比喻，就是在IT界查出了“IT三聚氰胺”，某科技公司TOM也可以说成是“三鹿集团”了...

Google's top copyright man, he wrote his blog in a purely private capacity as one of the leading copyright scholars in the world.

copyright has become less and less responsive to the balance of incentives and exceptions

Copyright law has abandoned its reason for being: to encourage learning and the creation of new works

The result was a challenge to the prevalent thinking that the Internet in China is all about entertainment, and that Chinese users will stay complacent under Internet control and management, since greater freedom of expression was allowed right after the quake. But now it remains to be seen whether these changes will have a lasting impact on Internet use in China. With the state returning to its tight pre-quake controls over the Internet, users may resist giving up their recent freedoms.

The State Administration for Radio, Film and Television has already issued five licences for mobile television services to a privileged group of state-owned broadcasters, including China Central Television (CCTV), the Shanghai Media Group and the Southern Media Group. These will sell content to the mobile operators, ensuring political censorship over the free flow of multimedia content. Whatever the format, the Communist party has given no sign it intends to relax its vigilance over what Chinese viewers can watch.

while most karaoke evenings might be innocent affairs, the risk of finding yourself in a compromising situation was not worth it. He advised me to make a polite excuse to avoid them.

By contrast it is precisely when you ignore your own culture and principles that you risk losing face or risk your Chinese partners thinking you are so weak you can easily be taken advantage of.

In all these cases, it is tempting to conclude that the regime is worried about its own survival, and, in order to rally nationalist passions, feels compelled to portray the country as a global victim.

The strongest evidence to support the theory of insecurity at the highest levels of Chinese society is the practice of the “princelings” (wealthy children of the ruling elites) to buy homes in places such as the United States, Canada and Australia. These are not luxury homes of the sort favored by wealthy businessman and officials from the oil-rich countries of the Middle East. Rather they are typically “normal” homes of the sort a potential émigré might want to have in reserve in case things went bad back home.

Under the category "Cisco Opportunities," the document provides bullet point suggestions for how it might service China's censorship system called the "Golden Shield", and better known in the West as the Great Firewall of China. China's "Golden Shield" project was one of several government-run commercial opportunities for Cisco in 2002. Credit: Cisco The document is the first evidence that the networking giant has marketed its routers to China specifically as a tool of repression.

Much of the volunteer effort has involved individuals or small groups. China is still wary of large NGOs and has none that is truly independent of the government specialising in disaster relief. But in recent years the party has begun to acknowledge more openly that there may a role for them. Official press coverage of the earthquake, although careful to highlight the party's contributions, has also paid rare tribute to the unofficial volunteers. The government has been encouraging firms to give more generously to worthy causes. From this year it has increased tax incentives for corporate donations to charities. But this applies to only a small number of government-approved organisations. For the sake of earthquake relief the authorities are letting down their guard. But the government gives little encouragement to new NGOs and often treats the small existing ones as potential germs of political opposition. The response to this disaster might ease its fears.