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在30天时间内，志愿者将记录垃圾邮件数量和自己的经历。 其中一位志愿者、家庭主妇Tracy Mooney说，“都是欺骗人的，当点击电子邮件后你会看到最肮脏的东西。”Mooney介绍了接收到的Spam，一封邮件告诉她收到7500美元信用 卡，她点击了许多虚假的钓鱼银行网站，尼日利亚政府还送给她一份遗产，一些邮件试图想获取她的PayPal帐号。试验后，McAfee提供的电脑都变得迟 钝了，里面有很多间谍程序。

中国已经成为世界垃圾信息的发源地，全球多家反垃圾信息机构甚至将一整个网段的 IP 地址全部列入黑名单，译者曾就正常邮件服务器被反垃圾邮件机构列入黑名单一事同这些机构长期接触，首先，很多机构对中国抱有成见，他们将整个网段全部列入黑名单而伤及无辜的做法显然是错误的，然而值得我们反思的是，不少反垃圾邮件机构在给译者的回信中称，他们曾同负责这个 IP 地址段的中国网络运营商长期联系，却从未得到任何回复，中国一方面实行了非常严格的网络管理，一方面又十分草率，导致目前的局面。究其原因，运营商及注册商只顾商人利益而罔顾自己的社会责任是最根本的原因。"

At 4AM this morning I received an email inviting me to an IRC chatroom where someone would explain to me exactly how the Time.com 100 Poll was precision hacked. Naturally, I was a bit suspicious. Anyone could claim to be responsible for the hack - but I ventured onto the IRC channel (feeling a bit like a Woodward or Bernstein meeting Deep Throat in a parking garage). After talking to ‘Zombocom’ (not his real nick) for a few minutes, it was clear that Zombocom was a key player in the hack. He explained how it all works. The Beginning Zombocom told me that it all started out when the folks that hang out on the random board of 4chan (sometimes known as /b/) became aware that Time.com had enlisted moot (the founder of 4chan) as one of the candidates in the Time.com 100 poll. A little investigation showed that a poll vote could be submitted just by doing an HTTP get on the URL:        http://www.timepolls.com/contentpolls/Vote.do ?pollName=time100_2009&id=1883924&rating=1 where ID is a number associated with the person being voted for (in this case 1883924 is Rain’s ID). Soon afterward, several people crafted ‘autovoters’ that would use the simple voting URL protocol to vote for moot. These simple autovoters could be triggered by an easily embeddable ’spam URL’. The autovoters were very flexible allowing the rating to be set for any poll candidate. For example, the URL           http://fun.qinip.com/gen.php?id=1883924 &rating=1&amount=160 could be used to push 160 ratings of 1 (the worst rating) for the artist Rain to the Time.com poll.

“Needless to say, we were enraged” says Zombocom. /b/ responded by getting organized - they created an IRC channel (#time_vote) devoted to the hack, and started to recruit. Shortly afterward, one of the members discovered that the ’salt’, the key to authenticating requests, was poorly hidden in Time.com’s voting flash application and could be extracted. With the salt in hand - the autovoters were back online, rocking the vote.