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Reports on Tuesday of a New Zealand man who purchased a secondhand MP3 player containing the personal information of U.S. soldiers highlighted the federal government's continuing inability to protect private information on unauthorized, third-party storage devices. New Zealander Chris Ogle bought a used MP3 player in Oklahoma about a year ago, according to New Zealand's public television station, ONE News. A few weeks ago, when he plugged the player into his computer to download a song, Ogle found 60 military files stored on the device, which included names, addresses, and phone and Social Security numbers of U.S. soldiers. The files also contained what appears to be a mission briefing and lists of equipment deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan. Most of the files are dated 2005. ONE News reported that some of the phone numbers on the player are still active. "The more I look at it, the more I see and the less I think I should be," Ogle told ONE News. Ogle offered to return the MP3 player to U.S. officials if requested. Privacy experts say the breach is just the latest example of the federal government's inability to manage the security risk posed by removable storage devices. In November the Defense Department banned the use of removable storage devices after reports that hardware that can be inserted into a USB drive could infect the computer with viruses and worms. A Pentagon spokesman said the military is aware of the latest report form New Zealand, but does not know of any action the department has taken. Michael Maloof, chief technology officer for the information security firm TriGeo Network Security in Post Falls, Idaho, said individuals do not view devices like MP3 players as computers that can store large amounts of private data. "Myself and security experts have been saying for some time that phones and MP3 players are really mass storage devices," he said. The military should "ban all mass storage devices. It may make some people unhappy, but you see the

At last, my summer reading list is complete!

In what it described as an historic document, the National Institute for Standards and Technology issued a special report entitled Recommended Security Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations. Special Publication 800-53, Revision 3, is historic in nature. For the first time, and as part of a continuing initiative to develop a unified information security framework for the federal government and its contractors, NIST has included security controls in its catalog for national security and non-national security systems in its latest revision, No. 3, of Special Publication 800-53. "The important changes described (in the publication) are part of a larger strategic initiative to focus on enterprise-wide, near real-time risk management; that is, managing risks from information systems in dynamic environments of operation that can adversely affect organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the nation," Ron Ross, NIST's Federal Information Security Management Act implementation project leader, said in a message incorporated into the 220-page report. According to the document, the updated security control catalogue incorporates best practices in information security from the Department of Defense, intelligence community and civilian agencies to produce the most broad-based and comprehensive set of safeguards and countermeasures ever developed for information systems.

Cyber espionage, attacks, breaches, viruses - they are all among the concerns President Barack Obama cited Friday when he announced he will create a new White House office of cyber security, with that cyber czar reporting to the National Security Council as well as to the National Economic Council. The nation's vulnerability to cyber attacks has long been a concern. The Center for Strategic and International Studies said in a December report that the U.S. Defense Department alone has said its computers are probed hundreds of thousands of times each day. These publicly known cases of hacks, thefts and viruses at government, military, utilities and educational sites are just some examples

Heartland Payment Systems Inc. said it was experiencing losses this quarter as a direct result of a massive data breach it disclosed in January when investigators discovered a malicious program sniffing credit card data passing through its systems. The company said it took a $2.5 million loss for the quarter as a result of spending more than $12.6 million in legal bills, fines from MasterCard and Visa and administrative costs. The announcement was made during the company's financial earnings call, where Carr said the costs associated with the breach could continue to climb. "Our defense of the claims regarding the processing system intrusion remains ongoing," he said. "Much of the legal work remains to be done and it is difficult to anticipate when these matters will come to a conclusion." Carr also admitted for the first time that since the Princeton, N.J.-based processing giant announced a breach of its systems, some of the payment processor's clients have switched to competitors as a result of the breach. He said some competing processors resorted to scare tactics. "We have had many competitors that have been very supportive and professional, and we certainly don't want to tar all of our competitors with the same brush," Carr said. "We have had some competitors telling merchants falsely that they would be fined $10,000 a day if they stay with Heartland. We think we're through the worst of that." Car said less than $1 million of the breach costs were fines levied by MasterCard and Visa against the company's sponsored banks. The fines are being contested, he said. More than $500,000 relates to a fine assessed by MasterCard against the sponsored banks in which the card company said Heartland failed to take appropriate action upon learning that a breach was suspected. Carr said the fine is in direct violation of both the MasterCard rules and law.

A surprise legal maneuver by the defense in the Sarah Palin hacking case could undermine key charges carrying the stiffest potential penalties. A lawyer for the Tennessee college student charged with hacking into the Alaska governor's Yahoo e-mail account last year says his client couldn't have violated Palin's privacy because a judge had already declared her e-mails a matter of public record. "He's not suggesting that e-mail can't be private," says Mark Rasch, a former Justice Department cybercrime prosecutor. "He's saying this particular e-mail was not private or personal because of who she is and because it wasn't intimate communication. " Additionally, photos that 20-year-old David Kernell allegedly obtained of Palin and her family were not private since the Palins are "the subjects of untold numbers of photo-ops," the lawyer argued last week, in one of a slew of motions and memorandums attacking the government's four-count federal indictment against Kernell.

Creative lawyer. The kid is still stupid. To me, It says more that Palin didn't get in trouble for using a public web mail account for State business. The kid who reads her email is on trial? What a country.

Since Obama's landmark speech on cybersecurity in May, his administration hasn't revealed much about its long-percolating plans to shore up the government's defenses against hackers and cyberspies. But privacy advocates monitoring the initiative are already raising concerns about what they know and what they don't: the details that have trickled out--including the involvement of the National Security Agency--and the veil of classified information that still covers much of the multibillion-dollar project. "It feels like the Bush administration all over again," says Pam Dixon, executive director of the World Privacy Forum. "Not enough people know the details about these programs to have a good public discussion. We all want good security of government systems, but you have to balance the cloak and dagger elements with civil liberties."

Joshua Corman would seem an unlikely critic of IT security vendors. After all, he works for one. Yet Corman, principal security strategist for IBM's Internet Security Systems division, is speaking out about what he sees as eight trends undermining the ability of IT security practitioners to mount an effective defense against online outlaws. Having worked for the vendor side, Corman says he is uniquely positioned to grasp its weaknesses up close. And so, with a PowerPoint presentation on the "8 Dirty Secrets" of the market in hand, he has traveled to seminars and worked the phones, hoping to motivate a change for the better. Here is the breakdown of those 8 dirty secrets and what Corman sees as practical ways to keep the vendors honest. [Related podcast: The Dark Side of the Security Market] Click here to find out more! Dirty Secret 1: Vendors don't need to be ahead of the threat, just the buyer This is the problem that leads to the seven "dirty secrets" that follow. In essence, Corman said, the goal of the security market is to make money, not to ensure the customer's security. Tom Vredenburg, regional IM manager for Houston-based Wartsila Corp., said Corman's take is consistent with what he has experienced in the trenches. "Not only has security become a phantom deliverable, but the vendors themselves have become equally tough to pin down and evaluate. Are they software sellers or risk managers? Are they service providers or network designers? Am I buying partnerships or licenses? Most of them don't know themselves what they are -- only that they need to sell something that most people don't really want to buy in the first place -- insurance."

Yet another breach of sensitive, unencrypted data is making news in the United Kingdom. This time the breach puts Royal Air Force staff at serious risk of being targeted for blackmail by foreign intelligence services or others. The breach involves audio recordings with high-ranking air force officers who were being interviewed in-depth for a security clearance. In the interviews, the officers disclosed information about extra-marital affairs, drug abuse, visits to prostitutes, medical conditions, criminal convictions and debt histories - information the military needed to determine their security risk. The recordings were stored on three unencrypted hard drives that disappeared last year. The interviews were conducted to ensure that the officers "can be trusted with sensitive government information and property," the Ministry of Defense said. But the interviews have now become a huge security risk for the officers and the Ministry of Defence, which has proven itself to be untrustworthy when it comes to guarding sensitive information and property.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation is expanding beyond its traditional fingerprint-focused collection practices to develop a new biometrics system that will include DNA records, 3-D facial imaging, palm prints and voice scans, blended to create what's known as "multi-modal biometrics." Slideshow: The changing face of biometrics How the Defense Department might institutionalize war-time biometrics "The FBI today is announcing a rapid DNA initiative," said Louis Grever, executive assistant director of the FBI's science and technology branch, during his keynote presentation at the Biometric Consortium Conference in Tampa. The FBI plans to begin migrating from its IAFIS database, established in the mid-1990s to hold its vast fingerprint data, to a next-generation system that's expected to be in prototype early next year. This multi-modal NGI biometrics database system will hold DNA records and more.

Visa Inc.'s top risk management executive today dismissed what she described as "recent rumblings" about the possible demise of the PCI data security rules as "premature" and "dangerous" to long-term efforts to ensure that credit and debit card data is secure. Speaking at Visa's Global Security Summit in Washington, Ellen Richey, the credit card company's chief enterprise risk officer, insisted that despite recent data breaches at two payment processors, the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) "remains an effective security tool when implemented properly." Richey added that breaches such as the ones at Heartland Payment Systems Inc. and RBS WorldPay Inc. were shaping public opinion and obscuring what otherwise has been "substantial progress" on the security front over the past year. "I'm sure that everyone in this room has read the headlines questioning how an event of this magnitude could still happen today," Richey said, referring to the Heartland breach. "The fact is, it never should have" - and indeed wouldn't have if Heartland had been vigilant about maintaining its PCI compliance, according to Richey. "As we've said before," she continued, "no compromised entity has yet been found to be in compliance with PCI DSS at the time of a breach." Pointing to Visa's decision last week to remove both of the breached payment processors from its list of PCI-compliant service providers, Richey said that Heartland would face fines and probationary terms that were proportionate to the still-undisclosed magnitude of the breach. "While this situation is unfortunate, it does not make me question the tools we have at our disposal," she said of the PCI rules.

The ranking member of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee told the chief executive of Heartland Payment Systems that she was "astonished" a breach the company's information system lasted for nearly 1½ years without being detected. At a panel hearing Monday on protecting industry against growing cyber threats, Sen. Susan Collins, R.-Maine, asked Heartland CEO Robert Carr to explain how this delay happened. Carr responded that a breach is usually detected when the processing payer is notified of fraudulent use of cards, and that didn't occur until the end of 2008. "Isn't there software in the systems to detect such a breach?" Collins asked.