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The U.S. government's director for cybersecurity resigned on Friday, criticizing the excessive role of the National Security Agency in countering threats to the country's computer systems. "He has tendered his resignation," Amy Kudwa, a Department of Homeland Security spokeswoman told Reuters. Former Silicon Valley entrepreneur Rod Beckstrom said in a resignation letter published by the Wall Street Journal it was a "bad strategy" to have the National Security Agency, which is part of the Department of Defense, play a major role in cybersecurity. Beckstrom headed the National Cybersecurity Center, which was created last March to coordinate all government cybersecurity efforts and answers to the Department of Homeland Security. Homeland Security said in a statement that it has a strong relationship with the NSA and continues to work closely with all of its partners to protect the country's cyber networks. Beckstrom wrote to Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano on Thursday in his resignation letter that the NSA currently dominates most national cyber efforts. "While acknowledging the critical importance of NSA to our intelligence efforts, I believe this is a bad strategy on multiple grounds," he wrote in the letter posted by the Wall Street Journal on its website. National Security Agency officials could not immediately be reached for comment. Beckstrom said in his letter that the cybersecurity group did not receive adequate support to accomplish its role during the previous administration of President George W. Bush, which only provided the center with five weeks of funding in the last year. His resignation will be effective March 13, the letter said. The newspaper said the Obama administration was conducting a 60-day review of the cybersecurity program started by Bush last year to protect government networks.

A group of federal agencies and private organizations, including the National Security Agency and the Department of Homeland Security, has released a set of guidelines defining the top 20 things organizations should do to prevent cyberattacks. The Consensus Audit Guidelines (CAG) describe the 20 key actions, referred to as security controls, that organizations should take to defend their computer systems. The controls are expected to become baseline best practices for computer security, following further public- and private-sector review. CAG is being led by John Gilligan, formerly the CIO for both the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Department of Energy, and a member of the Obama transition team dealing with IT in the Department of Defense and various intelligence agencies. "We are in a war, a cyberwar," Gilligan said on a media conference call. "And the federal government is one of many large organizations that are being targeted. Our ability at present to detect and defend against these attacks is really quite weak in many cases." Borrowing an analogy he attributed to an unnamed federal CIO, Gilligan said, "We're bleeding badly and we really need triage and we need to focus on things that will keep this patient alive." The CAG initiative represents part of a larger effort, backed by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C., to implement recommendations from the CSIS Commission report on Cybersecurity for the 44th Presidency.

Washington insiders say that the Obama administration will be more aggressive with actions to protect consumers online. Two consumer advocacy groups, the Center for Digital Democracy and the U.S. Public Interest Research Group, have asked the Federal Trade Commission to investigate behavioral targeting practices aimed at mobile phone users. The day the FTC received the request and one week before the Obama administration took office, four marketing and advertising associations announced their intent to create an enhanced set of self-regulatory principles for online behavioral advertising. The American Association of Advertising Agencies, Association of National Advertisers, Direct Marketing Association and Interactive Advertising Bureau are said to be reviewing the areas for self-regulation set forth in the FTC's proposed self-regulatory principles issued in December 2007. As marketers, our boundaries for targeting campaigns continue to widen as technology improves. We collect more information than ever before. This, along with the fear of federal regulation, may create a trend for more marketers to take on a dual role as a privacy professional. The International Association for Privacy Professionals (IAPP, https://www.privacyassociation.org/) provides privacy education and certification for privacy professionals.

The departments of Defense, State, and Health and Human Services have not met legal requirements meant to protect Americans' civil liberties, and a board that's supposed to enforce the mandates has been dormant since 2007, according to federal records. All three departments have failed to comply with a 2007 law directing them to appoint civil liberties protection officers and report regularly to Congress on the safeguards they use to make sure their programs don't undermine the public's rights and privacy, a USA TODAY review of congressional filings shows. An independent Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board set up to monitor the departments hasn't met publicly since 2006; it no longer has members. Government missteps such as putting innocent people on terrorist watch lists and misusing administrative warrants, known as national security letters, "might have been dealt with much sooner if we had … cops on the beat to make sure there are standards that are being upheld," says Caroline Fredrickson, legislative director at the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). The lack of civil liberties officers at State and Health and Human Services is troubling because the departments hold passport and medical records, says James Dempsey, vice president of the Center for Democracy and Technology. "Security of that information is very important," he says, and these officers should monitor how it's used and shared. The Pentagon also has sparked concerns. Its Counterintelligence Field Activity office was criticized by the ACLU for wrongly tracking anti-war groups - a charge confirmed by the Pentagon in 2006. A 2007 law requires eight departments and agencies to have civil liberties officers and file reports. Justice, Homeland Security, Treasury, the CIA and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence have done so. Sens. Joe Lieberman, I-Conn., and Susan Collins, R-Maine, leaders of the Homeland Security committee, says departments not in compliance will b

A complaint filed with the Federal Trade Commission by consumer groups seeking greater privacy protection for mobile Internet users could become a crucial test for the Obama administration's commitment to Internet privacy, a researcher has said. A policy statement published on then-President-elect Barack Obama's transitional Web site said he plans to "strengthen privacy protections for the digital age." Need to review your privacy policy or guide your clients in preparing a privacy framework? Download a copy of the Generally Accepted Privacy Principles.

A recurring problem in modern litigation is the inadvertent disclosure of materials subject to the attorney-client privilege or the attorney work product protection. New Federal Rule of Evidence 502 changes the rules concerning waiver of privilege in all Federal and many State court cases, thereby reducing the risk that inadvertent disclosures will constitute a wavier of attorney client privilege or work product protection. But the new rule requires careful application. Important risks remain. Inadvertent disclosure of privileged or protected information too easily occurs when massive numbers of documents or files make it impractical or prohibitively expensive to review every item individually. The proverbial privileged document needle gets lost in the e-discovery haystack and is overlooked. Later, when opposing counsel recognizes that she has a potentially privileged document and brings this to the attention of disclosing counsel, there may be a fight as to whether the document will be returned, or whether the disclosure constitutes a wavier of any privilege related to the information. Under existing State and Federal law, release of privileged or protected information to an adversary, even if inadvertent, may constitute a waiver of the privilege or protection with regard to the information or document disclosed or, worse, to all documents and other information related to the same topic. Invoking the "claw" Amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b), adopted in December 2006, were aimed at reducing the risks of waiver from inadvertent disclosures. Rule 26(b) provides that if privileged information is produced, the party making the claim of privilege may notify any party that received the information of the privilege claim and the basis for it. After being notified, a party must promptly return, sequester, or destroy the specified information and any copies it has, must not use or disclose the information until the privilege claim is resolved; must t

The Heartland data breach is an opportunity for the US government to standardise data breach notification laws. Bill Conner, chairman, president and CEO of Entrust, claimed that following the revelation that more than 100 million credit cards could have been compromised, the government needs to continue to move quickly to standardise data breach notification laws and call for technology, such as encryption and stronger authentication, that truly protects consumer information. Conner said: "Cybercrime continues to grow and is increasingly affecting more and more of this country's citizens. To slow the upward trend of cybercrime in this country, all organisations - enterprise, consumer and even governments - need to carefully review current security approaches and identify key gaps within their infrastructures." He further called for Congress to pass a data breach notification law that better protects consumer identities through stronger data security standards with strong encryption. "This is an opportunity to do something about a security issue that impacts all Americans", said Conner.

The federal government has a key role to play in researching and organizing a national response to the problem of medical identity theft, authors of a government-funded study have concluded. Patients, providers, payers and other members of the healthcare community also must join in the effort to combat a problem that is serious, although as yet its scope is not fully known, the report stated. Contractor Booz Allen Hamilton released the report last week. It represents the final phase of the $450,000 study funded last year by the Office of the National Coordinator at HHS. The study consisted of three parts, the first being to review existing knowledge about medical identity theft as well as policies and practices to prevent it. Those findings were included in a research paper on the subject released last October. The second phase involved a public meeting Oct. 15, 2008, the same day the paper was released, to "open a dialogue about medical identity theft within the healthcare industry. The final phase, the 26-page report, includes 31 "potential actions," which are recommendations that could form a national policy on medical identity theft. While medical identity theft "may be categorized as healthcare fraud," according to the report, "there are unique and important distinctions of medical identity theft that need to become more commonly understood to address this issue effectively." One difference, the report authors noted, is that the primary motive behind healthcare fraud "is most often monetary gain, such as when fraudulent providers bill for more expensive services than those rendered. However, medical identity theft tends to be focused on the use of someone else's information to gain goods, services and healthcare." IT could hurt, help Therefore, undetected medical identity theft poses medical risks to its victims, since their medical records may contain inaccurate and potentially harmful information that may cause them not to be con

It's unclear whether a report being prepared for President Barack Obama on federal information security preparedness will support recent calls for the creation of a new cybersecurity office within the White House, two lawmakers said last week. Instead, the report may recommend a more collaborative and cooperative strategy among federal agencies on the issue of cybersecurity without a single agency or department in charge, they said. Members of the U.S. House Cybersecurity Caucus met with Melissa Hathaway, acting senior director for cyberspace for the National Security Council and Homeland Security Council. Hathaway, who is conducting a 60-day review of federal cybersecurity preparedness on behalf of the president, Thursday presented a status report to members of the caucus. Speaking with reporters after the briefing, Rep. James Langevin (D-R.I.), co-chair of the caucus, and Rep. Yvette Clarke (D-N.Y.), chairwoman of a subcommittee within the Committee on Homeland Security, said it was unclear yet what Hathaway might recommend. Rather than "include another structure" within the White House, there may be a call for an increase in staffing within the White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in a bid to improve its current role of overseeing government cyberaffairs, said Langevin. Chances are "there will not be one king," he said. Langevin co-chaired a commission at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a bipartisan think tank, that has called for the creation of a centralized cybersecurity office in the White House to be named the National Office for Cyberspace. The new office could combine the National Cyber Security Center (NCSC) and the Joint Interagency Cyber Task Force, two existing agencies that are handing cybersecurity today. The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) has also called for a new office dedicated to cybersecurity within the White House. Calls have been prompted by what is perceived as the inability of the U.S. De

During the past decade, rapid developments in information and communications technology have transformed key social, commercial, and political realities. Within that same time period, working at something less than Internet speed, much of the academic and policy debate arising from these new and emerging technologies has been fragmented. There have been few examples of interdisciplinary dialogue about the importance and impact of anonymity and privacy in a networked society. Lessons from the Identity Trail: Anonymity, Privacy and Identity in a Networked Society fills that gap, and examines key questions about anonymity, privacy, and identity in an environment that increasingly automates the collection of personal information and relies upon surveillance to promote private and public sector goals. This book has been informed by the results of a multi-million dollar research project that has brought together a distinguished array of philosophers, ethicists, feminists, cognitive scientists, lawyers, cryptographers, engineers, policy analysts, government policy makers, and privacy experts. Working collaboratively over a four-year period and participating in an iterative process designed to maximize the potential for interdisciplinary discussion and feedback through a series of workshops and peer review, the authors have integrated crucial public policy themes with the most recent research outcomes. The book is available for download under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 Canada License by chapter below. Hard copies are available for purchase at Amazon & at Oxford University Press.

Those who are superstitious may believe that bad things happen on Friday the 13th, but we will leave it to each individual and entity to formulate conclusions regarding the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act (the HITECH Act), which Congress passed late on Friday, February 13, 2009, and President Obama officially signed into effect on February 17, 2009. The HITECH Act addresses various aspects relating to the use of health information technology (H.I.T.), including providing for federal funding by way of grants and incentive payments in order to promote H.I.T. implementation. This Alert focuses, however, on Subtitle D of the HITECH Act, which includes important, new and far-reaching provisions concerning the privacy and security of health information that will materially and directly affect more entities, businesses and individuals in more diverse ways than ever before. These changes are further elaborated upon below, but this Alert can only highlight certain prominent issues under the HITECH Act and is by no means a comprehensive review of this lengthy and complex Act. For questions and additional guidance on the HITECH Act, contact your Fox Rothschild attorney or the authors of this Alert. New Privacy and Security Requirements * Security Breach Notification Requirements: Security breach notification requirements under the HITECH Act go into effect 30 days after the date that interim final regulations are promulgated, which will be no later than 180 days after the date of enactment of the HITECH Act (August 16, 2009). Covered entities, business associates and vendors who handle personal health records are required to abide by breach notification requirements. Violations of this requirement by vendors would be treated as an unfair and deceptive act or practice in violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act. If a breach affects more than 500 individuals of a particular state, notice also must be provided to prominent media outl

Physician groups press FTC for exemption from Red Flag Rules With a May 1 deadline for compliance looming, the American Medical Association (AMA) has asked the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to suspend the application of the Red Flag Rules to physicians and publish a new rule so that physicians have an opportunity to provide comments. In a March 9 letter to the FTC, AMA Executive Vice President Michael D. Maves wrote that the AMA "strongly believes that the FTC did not provide physicians with an opportunity to review and comment on this Rule." Controversy. Under the Red Flag Rules, which were finalized in October 2007 under the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA), financial institutions and creditors must develop and implement written identity theft prevention programs. FACTA provides a broad definition of "creditor" as "any entity that regularly extends, renews or continues credit." The FTC has interpreted this definition to include health care providers and physicians. The AMA and several other medical trade associations have taken the position that physicians were not intended to be subject to the Red Flag Rules, but the FTC has held firm in its interpretation, in spite of the objections. In a Feb. 4 letter to the AMA, the FTC reiterated its position that "the plain language and purpose of the Rule dictate that health care professionals are covered by the Rule when they regularly defer payment for goods or services." The FTC also has taken the position that application of the Red Flag Rules to physicians will reduce the incidence of medical identity theft and will not impose a heavy burden on health care professionals. Rulemaking process. In addition to its claim that health care providers should not be classified as creditors, the AMA also has argued that the physician community was not informed that it would be subject to the Red Flag Rules.

Paperwork containing the personal medical information of at least 66 patients at Massachusetts General Hospital was lost this month when an employee apparently left it on an MBTA train. The hospital sent out letters last week to patients whose identities were included in the lost paperwork, telling them the information listed their names and dates of birth, and private medical information, including their diagnoses and the name of the provider with whom they met. The material constituted billing records for patients who attended the hospital's Infectious Disease Associates outpatient practice on Fruit Street on March 4. Deborah A. Adair, the hospital's privacy officer and director of health information services, said in a statement released yesterday that while the incident was regrettable, the hospital followed privacy laws by immediately alerting affected patients and authorities, including the state attorney general's office and the Department of Consumer Affairs and Business Regulation. "[Hospital] police and security are thoroughly investigating this matter not only with an eye toward recovering the missing information but also toward making sure that this will not happen again," Adair said. "Our information privacy and security policies and procedures are among the strongest in the healthcare industry, but incidents such as this remind us that we must continue to review and revise them, as well as continue to educate our staff on best practices to avoid incidents such as this." According to hospital security reports, a manager in the infectious disease center's billing unit told supervisors that she left the paperwork on a Red Line train the morning of March 9. The manager said she had brought the paperwork home with her to work over the weekend and left the material sometime between 7:30 and 9 a.m. The Transit Police were notified, but the paperwork was not found.

The theft in 2006 of an employee laptop that contained personal information on millions of veterans taught the Veterans Affairs Department some hard lessons. VA became "the poster child of data breaches," said Kathryn Maginnis, the department's associate deputy assistant secretary for risk management and incident response. As a result of that incident and several breaches that followed, the department developed a comprehensive incident response program and incident resolution team that evaluates all serious exposures of sensitive data. "We have a culture of report, report, report," Maginnis said at the recent FOSE conference in Washington. The incident response program received a perfect score last year in the VA inspector general's Federal Information Security Management Act audit, and Maginnis said she expects to get another perfect score this year. The department developed two in-house online tools to help track and evaluate incidents, said Amanda Graves Scott, director of the incident resolution team. The Formal Event Review and Evaluation Tool uses a 56-question questionnaire to determine the risk category of a data breach, and the VA Incident Response Tracking System automates a manual tracking process for information technology incident response.

Be careful what information you give to recruiters!

Insurance company Aetna has contacted 65,000 current and former employees whose Social Security numbers (SSNs) may have been compromised in a Web site data breach. The job application Web site also held names, phone numbers, e-mail and mailing addresses for up to 450,000 applicants, Aetna spokeswoman Cynthia Michener said. SSNs for those people were not stored on the site, which was maintained by an external vendor. The company found out about the breach earlier this month when people began receiving spam messages that appeared to come from Aetna and complained to the company, Michener said. The spam purported to be a response to a job inquiry and requested more personal information. The spam campaign showed the intruders successfully harvested e-mail addresses from the Web site, although Michener said it's not clear if SSNs were also obtained. Nonetheless, Aetna sent letters last week notifying the 65,000 people whose SSNs were on the site of the breach. The company is offering them one year of free credit monitoring, as SSNs are often used by identity thieves. "We wanted to err on the side of caution," Michener said. Aetna hired an IT forensics company to investigate how the Web site had been compromised. "At this point despite a thorough review, they've not been able to pinpoint the precise breach," Michener said. Aetna posted alerts on the job site, its main Web site and its internal intranet about the spam campaign, Michener said.

Why Google isn't ready to be an Enterprise vendor

At the Google (NSDQ: GOOG) I/O developer conference this week, Google Inc. will host more than 80 technical sessions on all of the Google apps and platforms we've come to know -- Android, Chrome, App Engine, Web Toolkit, AJAX and others. When reviewing the Google I/O Schedule this morning, I was disappointed by what could not be easily found. The conference will run this week, May 28 to 29, in San Francisco, and Google is expecting more than 2,000 attendees. Unfortunately, a long perusal of the schedule shows plenty of tracks with Search, Scale, and Performance in the title -- but only one track with Security. What about Privacy? Well, there's no tracks highlighting data privacy, either. There is a session that covers federated identity management, Practical Standards-based Security and Identity in the Enterprise. And it looks promising, but federated authentication and authorization is more about making sure applications and people can interact securely, not that an application, itself, is inherently secure.

We've all heard the argument before: "Why should you worry about the government looking into your personal records if you have nothing to hide?" Daniel J. Solove, an associate professor of law at The George Washington University Law School, analyzes that argument in a recently published paper titled "I've Got Nothing to Hide and Other Misunderstandings of Privacy." Solove argues that "the question assumes faulty assumptions about privacy and its value." Those who make the "nothing to hide" argument fail to understand the chilling effect that surveillance has on public discourse, the fact that small bits of private data (which an individual may not object to being uncovered) when put together form a larger and more intimate profile (which an individual may object to), and the mistake of having one's profile mistakenly associated with a group that is labeled as threatening. Here's an excerpt from the paper, which was published in the latest issue of the San Diego Law Review: [T]he problem with the "nothing to hide" argument is that it focuses on just one or two particular kinds of privacy problems - the disclosure of personal information or surveillance - and not others. It assumes a particular view about what privacy entails, and it sets the terms for debate in a manner that is often unproductive. It is important to distinguish here between two ways of justifying a program such as the NSA surveillance and data mining program. First is to not recognize a problem. This is how the "nothing to hide" argument works. It denies even the existence of a problem. The second manner of justifying such a program is to acknowledge the problems but contend that the benefits of the NSA program outweigh the privacy harms. The first justification influences the second, for the low value given to privacy is based upon a narrow view of the problem. The key misunderstanding is that the "nothing to hide" argument views privacy in a particular way - as a

The federal GLBA, HIPAA, FACTA and its Red Flags and Disposal Rules, state data Breach Notification Laws and many other federal and state laws and industry regulations like PCI-DSS are intended to protect the privacy and security of consumer's personally identifiable and financial information entrusted to businesses and other organizations. Many suchidentity theft, id theft, government security, government privacy regulations aim to prevent identity theft and privacy violations. While some businesses have been negligent in securing information, other businesses have been victimized by black hat hackers or "crackers" who operate ahead of the cybersecurity technology curve. Cybersecurity is an ongoing challenge for businesses and for government as discussed in the President's Cyberspace Policy Review. In the four-year period ending in 2008, 23% of all data breaches reported were attributed to hackers. For those data breaches involving more than one million profiles, hacking was identified as the cause in 66% of the breaches according to a recent research report on data breach risk factors.

DESPITE SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENTS since the U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 became effective, the continuing cost of compliance with the act's Section 404 requirements remains a concern for board members and management. A periodic operational audit of the Section 404 program can provide valuable information to executive management and the audit committee, and potentially identify areas where significant costsavings can be realized. Whether the Section 404 program is managed by the finance department, internal auditing, or another organization, it's an excellent candidate for this type of review, particularly if the focus remains on program efficiency. Several questions, based on The IIA's publication Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404: A Guide for Management by Internal Control Practitioners, can be used as the basis for the audit. The questions cover issues ranging from ensuring that operating management takes ownership of its processes, to achieving fewer and more effective key controls, to determining whether the external auditor's reliance on management testing has been optimized.

To assist small businesses and other entities, the Federal Trade Commission staff will redouble its efforts to educate them about compliance with the "Red Flags" Rule and ease compliance by providing additional resources and guidance to clarify whether businesses are covered by the Rule and what they must do to comply. To give creditors and financial institutions more time to review this guidance and develop and implement written Identity Theft Prevention Programs, the FTC will further delay enforcement of the Rule until November 1, 2009. The Red Flags Rule is an anti-fraud regulation, requiring "creditors" and "financial institutions" with covered accounts to implement programs to identify, detect, and respond to the warning signs, or "red flags," that could indicate identity theft. The financial regulatory agencies, including the FTC, developed the Rule, which was mandated by the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 (FACTA). FACTA's definition of "creditor" includes any entity that regularly extends or renews credit - or arranges for others to do so - and includes all entities that regularly permit deferred payments for goods or services. Accepting credit cards as a form of payment does not, by itself, make an entity a creditor. "Financial institutions" include entities that offer accounts that enable consumers to write checks or make payments to third parties through other means, such as other negotiable instruments or telephone transfers.