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The new agreement suggests that in the future, banks will be bailed out by the collective effort of Eurozone countries.

First, this arrangement is to be finalised by the end of the year. This means that, in the end, the Spanish debt will rise by €100 billion (the market participants who enthusiastically celebrated the decision by raising the price of Spanish bonds will eventually understand that). Ditto in the not unlikely case that some Italian or French banks wobble before December.

Third, the arrangement is linked to the establishment of a “single supervisory mechanism involving the ECB”. This could be a single Eurozone supervisor built inside the ECB, which would go a long way to plugging one the worst mistakes in the Maastricht Treaty (lack of a joint regulation and resolution regime for banks).

This is important because a contagious banking crisis that hits several large banks would require much more money than is available in the EFSF-EMS facilities.

Light conditionality, as they requested, is bound to collapse at the foot of the Bundestag, which must approve every single loan.

There was nothing on collapsing Greece, nothing on unsustainable public debts in several countries, and no end in sight to recession in an increasing number of countries.

The banking union that is required is the one Germany will not accept: central regulation and supervision, a common restructuring fund and common deposit insurance. It would take years to create.

With interest rates on 10-year government bonds over 6 per cent, neither Italy nor Spain can sustain their membership in the eurozone. This is what Mario Monti and Mariano Rajoy should have made clear to Angela Merkel at the summit.

The message I took away from the summit is that the eurozone will not resolve the crisis. In that sense, it was indeed a “historic” meeting.

The question the German government now faces is whether to preserve the monetary union or have a stable currency.

Eurobonds and a solidarity fund could promote growth and stabilize the interest rates faced by governments in crisis. Lower interest rates, for example, would free up money so that even countries with tight budget constraints could spend more on growth-enhancing investments.

Even well-managed banking systems would face problems in an economic downturn of Greek and Spanish magnitude; with the collapse of Spain’s real-estate bubble, its banks are even more at risk.

If these countries made a mistake, it was only that, like Germany today, they were overly credulous of markets, so they (like the United States and so many others) allowed an asset bubble to grow unchecked.

Moreover, Germany is on the hook in either case: if the euro or the economies on the periphery collapse, the costs to Germany will be high.

While structural problems have weakened competitiveness and GDP growth in particular countries, they did not bring about the crisis, and addressing them will not resolve it.CommentsView/Create comment on this paragraph

The eurozone could face a major crisis at short notice if either country experiences serious trouble selling government paper, which both must do in large volume and on a continuing basis.

The avoidance of default on the core sovereign debt, the debt undertaken without duress by the Irish State, is a legitimate objective of national policy.

It had become clear, early in 2010, that the blanket bank guarantee would bankrupt the Irish State, and the Government finally began to acknowledge that haircuts for senior, but unsecured, bank bondholders had become unavoidable.

Some countries in Central Europe — such as Austria and the Czech Republic — and the Balkans would run out of gas they import through Ukraine.

that Russia cuts supplies of gas through Ukraine but continues pumping it through its other two pipelines to the West — one through the Baltic and the other through Poland.

In such a scenario,

The European Union also responded to the 2009 shutdown by building “interconnectors” between different countries. As a result, it is easier to shunt gas and electricity from countries that have excess energy to those that face a shortage — though these connections are still patchy and need to be built up.

n the short run, European Union countries can use more coal and less gas in their electricity generation.

The European Union can also increase imports of liquefied natural gas, mainly from Qatar. But there are problems. First, most of the Union’s L.N.G. terminals are in Western Europe, whereas it is the eastern part of the Union that is most vulnerable to a cutoff of Russian gas. So more terminals need to be built, which takes time. What’s more, L.N.G. is expensive — partly because Japan is buying lots of it after closing its nuclear plants in the wake of the Fukushima disaster.

Longer term, European Union nations should embrace shale gas. It is cheap and local. Britain and Poland have the most potential.

Meanwhile, countries such as Germany should abandon their knee-jerk aversion to nuclear energy.

The problem is not the carbon goal, said Raoul Ruparel of Open Europe, a research institute. Rather it is the renewable target, which results in uneconomic wind and solar power being built across the Union.

To do so, CO2 emissions from industry and energy use would have to fall to at most 1.6 tons a year for every person on the planet by midcentury.

That is less than a tenth of annual American emissions per person today and less than a third of the world average

Lacking any understanding of the feasibility of the exercise, governments postured and jockeyed over which country should be responsible for what

This is not achievable by going after low-hanging fruit, such as replacing coal with natural gas in power plants.

The decarbonization paths rely on aggressive assumptions about our ability to deploy new technologies on a commercial scale economically.

Russia, for instance, hit the target. But Oleg Lugovoy of the Environmental Defense Fund, who worked on the Russian plan, observed that “if we don’t have carbon capture and storage we would have to reconsider.”