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Gene Ellis

One more summit: The crisis rolls on | vox - 0 views

www.voxeu.org/...one-more-summit-crisis-rolls

summit crisis rolls vox

shared by Gene Ellis on 18 Jul 12 - No Cached
  • Reading the official documents from the June 28 summit requires linguistic and divination skills.
  • The clearest result is that EFSF/ESM funds can be used directly to support banks.
  • The summit attendees seem to have successfully drawn the conclusion that this was necessary from the disastrous impact of their mid-June decision on new lending to Spanish authorities to shore up their banks. Within hours, the main conclusion drawn by the markets was that the Spanish public debt had grown by €100 billion, bringing Spain closer to the fate of Ireland (bad bank debt dragging down a government with an otherwise healthy fiscal position).
  • ...10 more annotations...
  • The new agreement suggests that in the future, banks will be bailed out by the collective effort of Eurozone countries.
  • First, this arrangement is to be finalised by the end of the year. This means that, in the end, the Spanish debt will rise by €100 billion (the market participants who enthusiastically celebrated the decision by raising the price of Spanish bonds will eventually understand that). Ditto in the not unlikely case that some Italian or French banks wobble before December.
  • Second, conditions will be attached to such a rescue. These recommendations could be clever if they require “Swedish-style” bank restructuring whereby shareholders and other major stakeholders are made to absorb first the losses, and if a new clearly untainted management replaces the previous one. Such interventions limit the costs to taxpayers; they can even turn a profit. Of course, the conditions could also be silly, raising the costs to taxpayers to huge levels.
  • Third, the arrangement is linked to the establishment of a “single supervisory mechanism involving the ECB”. This could be a single Eurozone supervisor built inside the ECB, which would go a long way to plugging one the worst mistakes in the Maastricht Treaty (lack of a joint regulation and resolution regime for banks).
  • But this is not what the official text says, which makes one suspect that policymakers have not agreed to something simple and clean. Most likely, they will keep negotiating and come with the usual 17-headed monster that exhausted diplomats are wont to invent.
  • This is important because a contagious banking crisis that hits several large banks would require much more money than is available in the EFSF-EMS facilities.
  • Light conditionality, as they requested, is bound to collapse at the foot of the Bundestag, which must approve every single loan.
  • There was no knock-out winner in this summit, but on points I’d have to say that the winner is the crisis.
  • There was nothing on collapsing Greece, nothing on unsustainable public debts in several countries, and no end in sight to recession in an increasing number of countries.
  • Charles Wyplosz
Gene Ellis

Op-Ed Columnist - The Euro Trap - NYTimes.com - 0 views

www.nytimes.com/...30krugman.html

krugman euro trap nytimes

shared by Gene Ellis on 24 Apr 13 - Cached
  • The fact is that three years ago none of the countries now in or near crisis seemed to be in deep fiscal trouble.
  • And all of the countries were attracting large inflows of foreign capital, largely because markets believed that membership in the euro zone made Greek, Portuguese and Spanish bonds safe investments.
  • Then came the global financial crisis. Those inflows of capital dried up; revenues plunged and deficits soared; and membership in the euro, which had encouraged markets to love the crisis countries not wisely but too well, turned into a trap.
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  • During the years of easy money, wages and prices in the crisis countries rose much faster than in the rest of Europe. Now that the money is no longer rolling in, those countries need to get costs back in line.
  • Now that Greece and Germany share the same currency, however, the only way to reduce Greek relative costs is through some combination of German inflation and Greek deflation. And since Germany won’t accept inflation, deflation it is.
  • The problem is that deflation — falling wages and prices — is always and everywhere a deeply painful process. It invariably involves a prolonged slump with high unemployment. And it also aggravates debt problems, both public and private, because incomes fall while the debt burden doesn’t.
  • Earlier this week, when it downgraded Greek debt, Standard & Poor’s suggested that the euro value of Greek G.D.P. may not return to its 2008 level until 2017, meaning that Greece has no hope of growing out of its troubles.
  • Until recently, most analysts, myself included, considered a euro breakup basically impossible, since any government that even hinted that it was considering leaving the euro would be inviting a catastrophic run on its banks. But if the crisis countries are forced into default, they’ll probably face severe bank runs anyway, forcing them into emergency measures like temporary restrictions on bank withdrawals. This would open the door to euro exit.
Gene Ellis

Europe Can't Handle the Euro - 0 views

www.nber.org/...wj020800.html

shared by Gene Ellis on 31 May 12 - No Cached
  • When leaders of the 11 nations that agreed to combine their currencies gathered in January 1999, they predicted great things: the single currency would shift global portfolios to euro assets, depressing the value of the dollar relative to the euro, and the new eurozone would be a strong player in the global economy, reflecting the size of an integrated European market. Instead the euro plummeted, Europes economy remains weak, and unemployment is more than twice the U.S. level.
  • The ECB will eventually be judged not by its words but by whether it achieves low inflation and does so without increasing cyclical unemployment. I am not optimistic about either part of this goal.
  • The ECB must make monetary policy for "Europe as a whole," which in practice means doing what is appropriate for Germany, France and Italy, the eurozones three largest countries. Last year demand conditions in those countries were relatively weak, while demand conditions in Spain and Ireland were very strong. That meant a monetary policy that was too expansionary for Spain and Ireland, causing a substantial acceleration of their inflation and threatening their competitiveness.
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  • Such disparities of demand conditions will undoubtedly persist in the future because European countries differ substantially in industrial composition and in a variety of economic policies.
  • the time will come when the ECB will set a policy that is too tight for the outliers, leading to substantially higher unemployment than if they were free to set their own monetary policies. Even without discretionary monetary policies, the interest rates in countries with weak demand would naturally decline, and the external values of their currencies would fall, both acting as offsetting stabilizers of the countries weak demand. But this will not be possible within the EMU, where a single interest rate and a single exchange rate prevail. Result: higher average cyclical unemployment.
  • In the U.S., a fall in regional demand leads to lower wages, which help to maintain employment; to movements of labor to regions where demand is stronger; and to a net fiscal transfer from Washington (because lower regional income means lower federal tax liability). None of this happens in Europe, where wages are inflexible, mobility is severely limited by language and custom, and there are no significant fiscal transfers.
  • Politicians can now blame the ECB for high unemployment and complain that it is a powerful force beyond national control. Instead of seeking to make labor markets more flexible, European governments are talking more about "social wages," about mandatory 35-hour workweeks, and about rolling back even the small reductions in social benefits Germany achieved under Helmut Kohls government. Worse yet, there are attempts to eliminate differences in labor practices and even differences in wages among the EMU countries.
  • Moreover, these policies reduce the international competitiveness of many European industries and encourage the adoption of protectionist policies to keep out non-European products.
  • Forcing a single monetary policy on all of Europe will cause the countries that suffer what they regard as unnecessarily high unemployment to resent the actions of others. Attempts to force a Europewide tax system, especially if taxes are used to redistribute incomes among European countries, will compound the potential for conflict.
  • EMU is meant to be a marriage made in heaven with no possibility of divorce.
Gene Ellis

The iEconomy - Nissan's Move to U.S. Offers Lessons for Tech Industry - NYTimes.com - 0 views

www.nytimes.com/...lessons-for-tech-industry.html

shared by Gene Ellis on 29 Oct 13 - No Cached
  • Since its first pickup truck rolled off the line here on June 16, 1983, Nissan has produced more than seven million vehicles in the United States. It now employs 15,000 people in this country. It makes more than a half-million cars, trucks and S.U.V.’s a year, with the plant in Smyrna building six models, including the soon-to-be-produced, all-electric Nissan Leaf.
  • Could the Japanese car companies achieve the same quality using American workers?
  • including currency fluctuations that made exporting more expensive. The final push came from American anger as imports grabbed one-fourth of the United States market.
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  • “The pressure put on the Japanese was absolutely critical for them to agree to export restraints,”
Gene Ellis

The Greek package: Eurozone rescue or seeds of an unravelled monetary union? | vox - 0 views

www.voxeu.org/...eeds-unravelled-monetary-union

shared by Gene Ellis on 29 Oct 13 - No Cached
  • The plan will not work.
  • The IMF has the option of suspending its disbursements and forcing a default, as it did with Argentina.
  • Once the markets realise this, they will further raise the interest that they request to roll over the maturing debt or simply refuse to refinance the debt.
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  • At least, this will clarify the situation: the plan is about bailing out a Eurozone government, in direct violation of Art. 125 of the European Treaty, the so-called no-bail-out clause.
  • The next headache should be contagion.
  • What has been offered to Greece cannot be refused to other Eurozone governments
  • So, one more time, a (dwindling) group of deficit-stricken countries will have to provide money to increasingly large debtors. In fact, this process means that ultimately there is no national debt anymore, at least for the next few years.
  • An alternative to spreading mutual underwriting is debt monetisation.
  • The ECB does not buy assets outright, so the loss would be borne by the banks that used the Greek bonds as collateral for repo operations with the ECB. But banks are the ECB’s counterparties; if they default, the loss is the ECB’s.
  • Was there no other way? It would have been very easy to let Greece go straight to the IMF months ago and reschedule its debt with IMF’s assistance. This would have been a partial default, and the haircut could have been quite small. Most banks that are exposed to the Greek debt should have been able to withstand such losses. With a grace period of, say, three years, Greece would have had the breathing space that the latest plan tries so hard to organise
Gene Ellis

Russia pressures Moldova and Ukraine ahead of signing of E.U. Association Agreement - T... - 0 views

www.washingtonpost.com/...b-90f6-3073c03746b1_story.html

shared by Gene Ellis on 05 Feb 15 - No Cached
  • Russia pressures Moldova and Ukraine ahead of signing of E.U. Association Agreement
  • And in September, Russia declared that Moldovan wines did not meet Russian food-safety standards, removing access to a major export market for a key Moldovan industry. (Wines from pro-Russian autonomous regions of Moldova have been deemed safe for Russian palates, however.) Many Moldovans are convinced that the apples and grapes that grow on their nation’s gently rolling hills are the next targets. Russia is their main export market, and E.U. regulations will keep most of the fruits out of Europe even after the agreement is signed
  • Overall, 26 percent of Moldova’s exports go to Russia and 47 percent to the E.U.
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  • As of mid-April, Moldovans can travel visa-free to the E.U. Transnistria residents who have Moldovan passports also will benefit.
Gene Ellis

Work Like a German - NYTimes.com - 0 views

www.nytimes.com/...work-like-a-german.html

shared by Gene Ellis on 25 Apr 14 - No Cached
  • Work Like a German
  • In the German job-share model (known as “Kurzarbeit”), if an employer cuts an employee’s hours so that income is reduced by more than 10 percent, the government compensates workers for a large portion of wages lost. This enables companies to cut costs during downturns without having to lay workers off.
  • For the long-term unemployed who take significantly lower-paying jobs (typically, at minimum-wage levels), the unemployment benefits could offer stop-loss insurance to put a floor under their losses.
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  • The new program should also subsidize employers to provide paid sick days, family leave and child care support — measures that are especially important for disadvantaged women in the work force.
  • Taking another page from the German system — this time, its apprenticeship program — training should include both internships and postgraduate job placements.
  • Once workers go on the Disability Insurance rolls, it has proved very hard to get them off; all the while, their skills and contacts in the workplace atrophy. In the fiscal year 2013, the program is estimated to have cost a record $144 billion.
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