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To remedy these defects, the Federal Reserve System, established in 1913, was to act as a lender of last resort, bringing all systemically important institutions – national banks , large state banks and trust companies – under the federal supervision of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency or the Federal Reserve banks.

Consequently, when onerous rules, such as the prohibition on branch banking prevented banks from financing the emerging giant corporations, markets, assisted by more lightly regulated trust and insurance companies, stepped in.

But, they have not converged, especially with regard to state banks that often pressure state regulators.

Surveillance of a bank is not dependent on the geographic scope of its operations, as in the US, but on its systemic significance measured in several dimensions and whether it receives financial assistance from the European Stability Mechanism.

the time will come when the ECB will set a policy that is too tight for the outliers, leading to substantially higher unemployment than if they were free to set their own monetary policies. Even without discretionary monetary policies, the interest rates in countries with weak demand would naturally decline, and the external values of their currencies would fall, both acting as offsetting stabilizers of the countries weak demand. But this will not be possible within the EMU, where a single interest rate and a single exchange rate prevail. Result: higher average cyclical unemployment.

In the U.S., a fall in regional demand leads to lower wages, which help to maintain employment; to movements of labor to regions where demand is stronger; and to a net fiscal transfer from Washington (because lower regional income means lower federal tax liability). None of this happens in Europe, where wages are inflexible, mobility is severely limited by language and custom, and there are no significant fiscal transfers.

Politicians can now blame the ECB for high unemployment and complain that it is a powerful force beyond national control. Instead of seeking to make labor markets more flexible, European governments are talking more about "social wages," about mandatory 35-hour workweeks, and about rolling back even the small reductions in social benefits Germany achieved under Helmut Kohls government. Worse yet, there are attempts to eliminate differences in labor practices and even differences in wages among the EMU countries.

Moreover, these policies reduce the international competitiveness of many European industries and encourage the adoption of protectionist policies to keep out non-European products.

Forcing a single monetary policy on all of Europe will cause the countries that suffer what they regard as unnecessarily high unemployment to resent the actions of others. Attempts to force a Europewide tax system, especially if taxes are used to redistribute incomes among European countries, will compound the potential for conflict.

Now, if Spain were an American state rather than a European country, things wouldn’t be so bad. For one thing, costs and prices wouldn’t have gotten so far out of line: Florida, which among other things was freely able to attract workers from other states and keep labor costs down, never experienced anything like Spain’s relative inflation. For another, Spain would be receiving a lot of automatic support in the crisis: Florida’s housing boom has gone bust, but Washington keeps sending the Social Security and Medicare checks. But Spain isn’t an American state, and as a result it’s in deep trouble.

None of this should come as a big surprise. Long before the euro came into being, economists warned that Europe wasn’t ready for a single currency.

What we’ll probably see over the next few years is a painful process of muddling through: bailouts accompanied by demands for savage austerity, all against a background of very high unemployment, perpetuated by the grinding deflation I already mentioned.

Yes, some governments were irresponsible; but the fundamental problem was hubris, the arrogant belief that Europe could make a single currency work despite strong reasons to believe that it wasn’t ready. More Articles in Opinion »

Second, conditions will be attached to such a rescue. These recommendations could be clever if they require “Swedish-style” bank restructuring whereby shareholders and other major stakeholders are made to absorb first the losses, and if a new clearly untainted management replaces the previous one. Such interventions limit the costs to taxpayers; they can even turn a profit. Of course, the conditions could also be silly, raising the costs to taxpayers to huge levels.

But this is not what the official text says, which makes one suspect that policymakers have not agreed to something simple and clean. Most likely, they will keep negotiating and come with the usual 17-headed monster that exhausted diplomats are wont to invent.

There was no knock-out winner in this summit, but on points I’d have to say that the winner is the crisis.

Charles Wyplosz

"Supertankers" are the largest tankers, including very large crude carriers (VLCC) and ULCCs with capacities over 250,000 DWT. These ships can transport 2,000,000 barrels (320,000 m3) of oil/318 000 metric tons.[46] By way of comparison, the United Kingdom consumed about 1.6 million barrels (250,000 m3) of oil per day in 2009.[47] ULCCs, commissioned in the 1970s, were the largest vessels ever built, but the longest ones have already been scrapped; only a few ULCCs remain in service, none of which are more than 400m long.[48] Because of their great size, supertankers often can not enter port fully loaded.[28] These ships can take on their cargo at off-shore platforms and single-point moorings.[28] On the other end of the journey, they often pump their cargo off to smaller tankers at designated lightering points off-coast.[28] A supertanker's routes are generally long, requiring it to stay at sea for extended periods, up to and beyond seventy days at a time.[28]

As demand grew moderately in the United States and Western Europe, expanding economies such as China fueled exponential growth in demand.[60]

The average one-year time charter rate for a 5-year-old tanker of 280,000 metric tons of deadweight varied from $56,500 per day in December 2005 to $53,000 per day in September 2007 with a high of $64,500 per day in September 2006.[59]

More importantly and less known to German taxpayers, Greece will also default on 155 billion euros directly owed to the euro system (comprised of the ECB and the 17 national central banks in the euro area). This includes 110 billion euros provided automatically to Greece through the Target2 payments system—which handles settlements between central banks for countries using the euro. As depositors and lenders flee Greek banks, someone needs to finance that capital flight, otherwise Greek banks would fail. This role is taken on by other euro area central banks, which have quietly lent large funds, with the balances reported in the Target2 account. The vast bulk of this lending is, in practice, done by the Bundesbank since capital flight mostly goes to Germany, although all members of the euro system share the losses if there are defaults.

No responsible bank would claim these sums are minor risks to its capital or to taxpayers. These claims also amount to 43 percent of German Gross Domestic Product,

An ingredient crucial to malaria drugs, artemisinin, is already being produced from a yeast altered through synthetic biology. Specific brands have not been disclosed.

Ecover buys the ingredient, algal oil from Solazyme, which used to describe itself as a synthetic biology company but has taken the term off its website.

The groups acknowledge that the Solazyme oil itself — in the Ecover detergent — does not contain genetically engineered ingredients in the conventional meaning of the term. Rather, the organism producing the oil has been genetically altered.

Some of the same companies are now busily churning out vanillin, resveratrol and citrus flavorings from yeast and other microorganisms that are a product of synthetic biology for use in foods.

but countries like Germany, which were over-saving and running external surpluses, have not been forced to adjust by increasing domestic demand, so their trade surpluses have remained large.

Of course, Germany fails to recognize that successful monetary unions like the United States have a full banking union with significant risk-sharing elements, and a fiscal union whereby idiosyncratic shocks to specific states’ output are absorbed by the federal budget. The US is also a large transfer union, in which richer states permanently subsidize the poorer ones.

But the fundamental crisis of the eurozone has not been resolved, and another year of muddling through could revive these risks in a more virulent form in 2014 and beyond. Unfortunately, the eurozone crisis is likely to remain with us for years to come, sustaining the likelihood of coercive debt restructurings and eurozone exits.

The picture is one in which there are many fewer euros floating around the euro area than markets expected a half decade ago, and the distribution of those euros is moving northward.

It seems reasonable to argue that the distributional shift needed to occur, given the actual productivity performance.  The overall slowdown in euro spending growth, however, looks like an unnecessary and painful complication to adjustment.

This has all been the result of the commitment to keep just one euro. But that commitment is painful, and the alternative—more than one euro—is looking more attractive.

Since 2010, Spanish home prices have dropped over 20%, while German home prices are up a smidge.

Where prices were more flexible, as in asset markets, price adjustment was quick. Over the past two years, Spanish equities have fallen 24%, while German equities are up 8%.

The northward euro shift had two nasty effects, then: it shrank asset values while also (via wage rigidity) creating substantial unemployment.

This threatened to accelerate into a full-scale run and collapse until the ECB intervened.

as markets observed the periphery's reduced ability to pay off its debts, they moved their euros northward even faster

For the periphery to raise its external surplus (necessary in order to service its large and growing debts) it must rely much more on import compression than on export growth.

farm spending remained the largest single portion of the budget, accounting for about 38 percent of the total — although that was down from about 42 percent in the previous seven-year budget period.

Europe, of course, has no significant centralized tax authority, so this key automatic stabilizer is essentially absent.

Many Germans today rightly feel that any system of fiscal transfers will morph into a permanent feeding tube, much the way that northern Italy has been propping up southern Italy for the last century. Indeed, more than 20 years on, Western Germans still see no end in sight for the bills from German unification.

A logical corollary of the criteria set forth by Kenen and Obstfeld, and even of Mundell’s labor-mobility criterion, is that currency unions cannot survive without political legitimacy,

European policymakers today often complain that, were it not for the US financial crisis, the eurozone would be doing just fine. Perhaps they are right. But any financial system must be able to withstand shocks, including big ones.