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The size of the banking sector and exposure to Greece were known risks but at that time there was no banking problem in Cyprus

The containers were part of a shipment going from Iran to Syria that was intercepted in Cypriot waters after a tip from the U.S. The president took the decision to keep the ammunition. [NOTE: An independent prosecutor found that Christofias has ignored repeated warnings and pleas to destroy or safeguard the ammunition, apparently in hopes of one day returning it to Syria or Iran.]

Instead, they started lobbying the Russian government to give them a loan that would help them finance the country for a couple more years, and Russia came through, unfortunately,

I say unfortunately because as a result the government could keep operating and accumulating deficits without taking corrective action.

The next important date was the October 26-27, 2011 meeting of the EU council in Brussels where European leaders decided to wipe out what ended up being about 80% of the value of Greek debt that the private sector held. Every bank operating in Greece, regardless of where it was headquartered, had a lot of Greek debt.

For Cyprus, the writedown of Greek debt was between 4.5 and 5 billion euro, a substantial chunk of capital.

The Basle II framework that governments adopted internationally, and that the EU supervisory framework during this period also incorporated, specifies that holdings of government debt in a states' own currency are a zero-risk-weight asset, that is they are assigned a weight of zero in calculating capital requirements.

the governments should have agreed to make the EFSF/ESM available for direct recapitalization of banks instead of asking each government to be responsible for the capitalization.

Following a downgrading in late June 2012, all three major rating agencies rated the sovereign paper Cyprus below investment grade. According to ECB rules, that made the government debt not eligible as collateral for borrowing from the eurosystem, unless the ECB suspended the rules, as it had done for the cases of Greece, Portugal and Ireland. In the case of Cyprus, the ECB decided not to suspend the eligibility rule.

The governments have created risk in what before last week were considered perfectly safe deposits. This is going to have a chilling effect on deposits in any bank in a country perceived to be weak. This will mean the cost of funding will increase in the periphery of Europe and as a result, the cost of financing for businesses and households will increase. That will add to the divergences we already have and make the recession in the periphery of Europe deeper than it already is. This is really a disaster for European economic management as a whole. 

Debt auctions in Italy at the end of last week came off better than some observers had expected and, although borrowing costs remain high, the successful debt sale has increased the prospect that the euro zone can avert another crisis during the summer break.

Mr. de Guindos said that debt purchases between countries within the 17-nation single currency area had virtually ground to a halt.

The ministers are expected to hold talks on Friday to agree to extend 30 billion euros for the rescue by the end of the month. By agreement of European Union leaders last month, the debt will go direct to banks, rather than being added to the Spanish government’s finances, once plans for a new regulatory structure for Europe’s banks is put in place.

"The Greek bailout was not a program for Greece, but for the euro zone itself,"

"In May 2010, we knew that Greece needed a bailout but not that it would require debt restructuring," IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde said in a June interview. "We had no clue that the overall economic situation was going to deteriorate as quickly as it did."

Ms. Lagarde was French finance minister at the time and keen to avoid losses by her country's banks, which had lent heavily to Greece.

"An upfront debt restructuring would have been better for Greece although this was not acceptable to the euro partners," it said.

Much of the debt was held by already fragile French and German banks, so European nations wouldn't consider it. And the U.S. feared its own trillion-dollar exposure to European banks.

Several IMF directors had warned of just that outcome three years earlier. The program "may be seen not as a rescue of Greece, which will have to undergo a wrenching adjustment, but as a bailout of Greece's private debtholders, mainly European financial institutions," Brazil's executive director, Paulo Nogueira Batista, said at the May 2010 meeting.