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In retrospect, the report said, the "program served as a holding operation" that allowed "private creditors to reduce exposures…leaving taxpayers and the official sector on the hook."

now confront the prospect of a third bailout in which they would also forgive some of Greece's debt.

Draghi

a break from the era of missed targets and loose implementation towards a new paradigm of steadfast reform momentum,

Greece, where the euro zone’s debt crisis erupted in late 2009, is the currency area’s most heavily indebted country, despite a big “haircut” this year on privately held bonds.

The key question remains whether Greek debt can become sustainable without euro-zone governments having to write off some of the loans they have made to Athens.

Ford Motor Co. (F) (F) said at the end of last year it will increase capacity near Valencia as it shuts plants in the U.K. and Belgium.

In Ireland, U.S. companies such as EBay Inc (EBAY) (EBAY)., Google Inc. (GOOG) (GOOG) and Facebook Inc (FB). all have expanded in the past two years, taking advantage of a corporate-tax rate of just 12.5 percent compared to Spain’s 30 percent.

aising the retirement age, making it easier to fire workers in downturns and preventing unions from clinging to boom-time wage deals.

reducing social- security payments

It’s the mirror image of the euro’s first decade, when historically low interest rates in the periphery fueled inflationary spending booms, reflected in credit bubbles and deteriorating current accounts and government budgets.

The smaller trade imbalances really reflect a collapse in demand for imports as consumers and companies hunker down,

“At this stage it is still demand destruction which has helped current-account deficit countries balance their accounts,” said Mayer. “It’s not a healthy situation.”

They also say countries will need to run even healthier current accounts than now if they are to stabilize the debts they owe abroad.

However, as of last week, the country's four biggest banks had committed to sell just 67% of their total portfolio, hoping to hold on to the balance. This amount now is believed to have increased to almost 100% as they receive bonds issued by the European Financial Stability Fund—the euro-zone's temporary rescue fund—in exchange for Greek debt. "Greek banks were under pressure from the European Central Bank to take part in the buyback," said a senior official at one of the Greek banks. "Now the bonds they will use to borrow money from the ECB will be EFSF bonds, which means that the central bank is reducing its exposure to Greece."

The second element of the debt-relief package would be more innovative: If Greece’s economy performs well, the generous extension of maturities can be clawed back or the interest rate raised. A formula for this could be linked to the debt/GDP ratio

Why bother? Because the very premise of the current deal and the expectations it sets out are wrong. First, the notion that there is a smooth transition path for the debt/GDP ratio from 200% to 124% is fanciful. Second, even if, by some miracle, Greece did reach the 124% mark by 2020, the claim that its debt will then be “sustainable” is absurd.

Make no mistake: policymakers’ track record on forecasting Greek economic performance during the crisis has been an embarrassment. In May 2010, the International Monetary Fund projected – presumably in concurrence with its European partners – that Greece’s annual GDP growth would exceed 1% in 2012. Instead, the Greek economy will shrink by 6%. The unemployment rate, expected to peak this year at 15%, is now above 25% – and is still rising. The debt/GDP ratio was expected to top out at 150%; absent the substantial write-down of privately held debt, which was deemed unnecessary, the ratio would have been close to 250%.CommentsView/Create comment on this paragraphIn September 2010, four months after the official Greek bailout was put in place, the IMF issued a pamphlet asserting that “default in today’s advanced economies is unnecessary, undesirable, and unlikely.” The conclusion was that official financing would carry Greece past its short-term liquidity problems. Calls for immediate debt restructuring went unheeded. Six months later, after substantial official funds had been used to pay private creditors, the outstanding private debt was substantially restructured.CommentsView/Create comment on this paragraphSuch were the errors committed over short time horizons.

And, again, even if Greece somehow did achieve the 124% milestone, its debt would still not be sustainable.

Staying the course, as Summers warns, will lead only to “needless suffering” before that course inevitably collapses, bringing Greece – and much else –­ crashing down.

Greece is one of the world's top 20 tourist destinations, traditionally drawing about half of its visitors from other European Union countries—especially from Germany and the U.K.

Prices are down some 15% from last year, according to SETE, following a 10% cut in rates charged by hotel and tour operators in 2011.

Leading German tour operator TUI AG says its Greek vacation bookings were down 30% up to March. European travel agency Thomas Cook TCG.LN +0.23% said German bookings for Greece so far are also down by 30% compared with 2011, despite discounts of as much as 20%.

Likewise, when it comes to assistance, I think we have a clear legal framework, according to which neither any member state nor the entire Union can be held liable for the debt of another member state.

But such a pact would be circumscribed to helping countries help themselves.

But government debt is still growing considerably. Doesn't this also increase the risk of inflation? Starbatty: That's what I assume. Inflation would be an elegant means of reducing debt, and many academics are discussing this scenario. But it becomes truly problematic when government bonds eventually lose their status as a safe haven. If China or Japan arrive at this conclusion and sell their bonds, a bubble could burst that is far more dangerous than any other bubble. If that happens, markets will plunge, and interest rates will shoot up.

The answer might prove surprising. The German public might suddenly realize that the euro area confers on Germany not one but two “exorbitant privileges”: low interest rates as the haven for European capital and a competitive exchange rate by being hitched to weaker partners. In that case, Germany would have to offer its partners a much more attractive deal to keep them in the euro area.

If Europe has allowed these debts to move from the private sector to the public sector – a well-established pattern over the past half-century – it is Europe, not Greece, that should bear the consequences.

What makes Greece’s problems more difficult to address is the structure of the eurozone: monetary union implies that member states cannot devalue their way out of trouble, yet the modicum of European solidarity that must accompany this loss of policy flexibility simply is not there.

The International Monetary Fund will not disburse Greece's next bailout tranche until the country completes a voluntary buy back of its debt, an IMF spokesman said

Who will actually sell the debt at a 70% discount?

Two thirds of the private holders of Greek debt are Greek banks (22 billion euro). These are certainly not going to sell because doing so forces them to realize losses on the debt,

There is a simple and obvious solution, which will then force itself. The official creditors should take really substantial losses on Greek debt.

The only real alternative is Greece leaving the euro

This situation is basically a slow asphyxiation.