Group items tagged

The result was rapid growth combined with significant inflation: between 2000 and 2008, the prices of goods and services produced in Spain rose by 35 percent, compared with a rise of only 10 percent in Germany. Thanks to rising costs, Spanish exports became increasingly uncompetitive, but job growth stayed strong thanks to the housing boom.

Then the bubble burst.

But the flood of red ink

was a result, not a cause, of Spain’s problems.

The nation’s core economic problem is that costs and prices have gotten out of line with those in the rest of Europe. If Spain still had its old currency, the peseta, it could remedy that problem quickly through devaluation — by, say, reducing the value of a peseta by 20 percent against other European currencies. But Spain no longer has its own money, which means that it can regain competitiveness only through a slow, grinding process of deflation.

Unlike most other Spanish industries, car manufacturing has no sectorwide collective bargaining agreement with unions. As a result, each carmaker has been able to adjust working hours with its own employees, in response to changing demand.

In return, the companies have promised workers that they will not be subjected to the huge layoffs made in other parts of the economy,

I don’t want to give lessons to anybody. But at such a delicate moment for Spain, showing that we believe in flexibility and consensus has certainly been highly valued by the carmakers.”

The ECB’s Outright Monetary Transactions programme was instrumental in reducing Spanish government bond yields. This alleviated the Spanish fiscal position, but did not make it sustainable. The continuing unsustainability of the Spanish government debt has to do with two factors: First while r (the interest rate) declined, g (nominal growth) remained much lower in Spain than in the UK. The latter was due to the deflationary forces in the Eurozone – themselves a result of excessive austerity and the absence of currency depreciation (which was made possible in the UK thanks to the expansionary monetary policies of the Bank of England).

 Second, it is the responsibility of the leading centrist parties to recognize the options explicitly. If they do not, extremist parties either of the right or the left will take control of the debate, and convert what is a conflict between different economic sectors into a nationalist conflict or a class conflict. If the former win, it will spell the end of the grand European experiment.

First, as long as Spain suffers from its current debt burden, it does not matter how intelligently and forcefully it implements economic reforms. It will not be able to grow out of its debt burden and must choose between two paths

Most currency and sovereign debt crises in modern history ultimately represent a conflict over how the costs are to be assigned among two different groups

ransfers from a Luxembourg company to the US would have typically been subject to a withholding tax. Last year, after attracting the attention of Spanish tax authorities, Exxon quietly closed down the operation.

“Normally you would have to pay a 10 per cent withholding tax at source to send profits to the US,

Spain introduced the ETVE in the mid-1990s to encourage foreign investment, and better compete with Luxembourg and Holland for international companies seeking tax-efficient European holding structures. It also allowed for foreign companies to take advantage of Spain’s strong network of bilateral tax treaties with countries in Latin America, such as Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, which can offer more favourable tax rates than other countries. Once the ETVE has been established all overseas dividends that are paid into it are exempt from tax in Spain, and can be easily moved on to a final destination, providing a small number of conditions have been met. Most importantly, corporation tax must have been paid in the country of origin on the dividends being transferred, and companies using ETVEs to house shareholdings in foreign subsidiaries must not be resident in any country identified by Spain as a tax haven.

In fact, Linthal is an ETVE used by Ambev, a subsidiary of Anheuser-Busch InBev, the Belgian-based brewer, to distribute dividends from several Latin American beer brands, such as Argentina’s Quilmes and Cervecería Boliviana Nacional, to its holding company in Brazil.

Willem Buiter, Chief Economist at Citigroup, has been most vocal in predicting that these facilities will be inadequate when Spain and Italy hit the wall and that more extreme measures will have to be taken.

The basic dilemma here is that almost all of the eurozone governments including Germany carry high debt burdens in excess of the Maastricht Treaty. For example, Germany has been in breach of Maastricht Treaty in 8 of 10 years since 2002, has been over the Maastricht 60% hurdle in each of those ten years, and now carries a debt to GDP burden above 80%.

Unfortunately, often supervisors in charge of the failing entity in the years of the debt run up were the ones charged with uncovering the problems.

Spain was the leader in the introduction of a dynamic provision – a provisioning tool that forces banks to increase provisions without reference to any specific loan. The intention of this tool was twofold: to mitigate the bad times, and to cool the booms in the good times (Holmstrom and Tirole 1997). Dynamic provisions were endorsed as part of the Basel III standards in December 2010, in part on the strength of Spain’s experience. And indeed the existing evidence (Jiménez et al. 2012) shows that the tool worked as intended, dampening the credit boom and softening somewhat the credit crunch. However, it is clear by now that their level was not nearly enough, as their size – 3% of GDP at their highest point (2004) – was simply not of a magnitude commensurate with the credit losses.

Without the provisions, the reality of the cajas' accounts would have become much faster a concern, and would have imposed itself on the regulator

Had the Banco de España ordered an audit of the system after uncovering numerous irregularities in CCM, it would have not been able to deal with the capital shortfalls uncovered as there was no appropriate resolution regime in Spain at the time

More systematic evidence of the role played by these governance issues is provided in a 2009 paper (Cuñat and Garicano 2009b) where we showed that cajas with chief executives who had no previous banking experience (!), no graduate education, and were politically connected did substantially worse in the run up to the crisis (granting more real estate developer loan, up to half of the entire loan book in some instances) and during the crisis (with higher NPLs).

Bank of France Governor Christian Noyer told journalists in Paris last week that “whatever happens in Greece” won’t place any French financial institution in difficulty.

What’s changed is that banks in the so-called core EU countries of Germany, France and the U.K. used funds from the ECB in December and February to insulate their southern European units against losses should one or more country exit the euro. “If you’re a U.K. lender and you’ve lent 10 billion euros to your Spanish subsidiary and Spain exits, you’re suddenly only going to get paid back in 50 percent devalued pesetas and you’re on the hook for 5 billion euros,” said Philippe Bodereau, London-based head of European credit research at Pacific Investment Management Co., the world’s largest bond investor.

One way multinational banking groups are mitigating that risk is by replacing their own funding lines to subsidiaries in the region with ECB loans. Deutsche Bank, Europe’s biggest bank by assets, tapped “a small amount” of ECB cash to help fund corporate and retail business in continental Europe, where it has sizeable operations in Italy and Spain. BNP Paribas, Europe’s third-biggest bank, used the programs to help fund its Italian unit as it reduces intergroup backing.

European banks also have cut their sovereign-debt holdings and exposures to Ireland, Italy, Spain and Portugal.

ermany, France and the U.K. reduced exposure to Greece by more than half in the two years through the end of 2011 to $68.2 billion, BIS data show.

One aim of the exercise is to identify the bad debts that are fouling up euro-zone banks and preventing the flow of new credit. This is important because parts of the single-currency area are crippled not just by public borrowing but by private debt, most of which is sitting on banking books.

High private debt is more detrimental to growth than high public debt, according to recent research by the IMF.

Other balance-sheet indicators also suggest that Italian business is in a bad way. For example, 30% of corporate debt is owed by firms whose pre-tax earnings are less than the interest payments they have to make. That share of frail companies is even higher in Spain and Portugal (40% and nearly 50% respectively).

Little progress has been made to lighten the private-debt burden since the crisis began. Though it eased in Spain from 227% of GDP in 2009 to 215% in 2012, it rose over the same period in Cyprus, Ireland and Portugal. In Britain, by contrast, private debt fell from 207% of GDP in 2009 to 190% in 2012 thanks to improvements by both households and firms.

Firms that have overborrowed are reluctant to embark on new ventures, and banks are in any case reluctant to lend because their balance-sheets are peppered with bad debts. This unhappy state of affairs prevails throughout southern Europe though its precise causes vary.

Italy faces no immediate threat for as long interest rates remain low. The country will be able to muddle through for a while until some political or economic shock will force a decision one way or the other.

Meanwhile, the single largest constraint on the resumption of eurozone growth is not fiscal policy – which is broadly neutral at present across the single currency area – but the continued failure to clean up the banks. The growth rate of loans to the non-financial sector turned negative in 2009, showed some intermittent improvements, only to then deteriorate again last year.

The monetary and banking data are telling us that the economy will teeter on the brink of zero or low growth for the foreseeable future because the financial sector is not supplying the economy with sufficient funds to expand.

Banking union could help, but only if it were to break the relationship between banks and sovereigns and clean up the balance sheets.

While a slide in imports accounts for some of the correction, Greece boosted its exports outside the EU by about 30 percent in the fourth quarter of 2012 from the previous year, while Italy’s rose 13 percent in January from a year ago, he said.

The metamorphosis is known as internal devaluation

Prevented by membership of the euro from driving down currencies, governments and companies are squeezing labor costs to spur productivity.

On average, the periphery is about halfway to eliminating large structural current-account deficits, which allow for declines related to recession-driven weaker import demand, estimates Goldman Sachs (GS).

The OECD today published an index showing that relative labor costs in Spain and Portugal have now dropped below Germany’s for the first time since 2005.

“It’s potentially good for the economy but only if it results in faster investment,”

“If not then there’s a downward spiral risk.”

if intra-eurozone mobility were anything like Mundell’s ideal, today we would not be seeing 25% unemployment in Spain while Germany’s unemployment rate is below 7%.CommentsView/Create comment on this paragraph

Peter Kenen argued in the late 1960’s that without exchange-rate movements as a shock absorber, a currency union requires fiscal transfers as a way to share risk.

Later, Maurice Obstfeld pointed out that, in addition to fiscal transfers, a currency union needs clearly defined rules for the lender of last resort. Otherwise, bank runs and debt panics will be rampant. Obstfeld had in mind a bailout mechanism for banks, but it is now abundantly clear that one also needs a lender of last resort and a bankruptcy mechanism for states and municipalities.

Such disparities of demand conditions will undoubtedly persist in the future because European countries differ substantially in industrial composition and in a variety of economic policies.

EMU is meant to be a marriage made in heaven with no possibility of divorce.

At the end of this week, WestLB, once Germany's third-largest landesbank, will provide a rare example of an ailing bank that is being broken up. Under pressure from EU competition authorities, the bank's toxic assets have been moved into a so-called bad bank, another part of the business has been sold and the remainder will continue to operate under the brand name Portigon.

Eastern Valencia said it was asking for central government help as it could not refinance loans that must be paid off this year.

Valencia, which has long been run by Rajoy's PP, is emblematic of Spain's current crisis. A property crash has hit both regional government income and the region's banks, with its three main banks having to be rescued. Local politicians, meanwhile, have a growing reputation for corruption and frivolous spending.

Valencia mopped up a quarter of the €17bn (£13.2bn) of extra money made available by central government in April to pay a backlog of regional government bills.

Last year the regions not only failed to meet government-set deficit reduction targets, but actually increased their joint deficit.

Analysts believe most regions will miss this year's 1.5 percent deficit target. The government last week asked at least eight of them to revise their 2012 budgets, threatening to take over the finances of some of them.