Skip to main content

Home/ Global Economy/ Group items tagged case

Rss Feed Group items tagged

Gene Ellis

Analysis: Euro zone fragmenting faster than EU can act - 0 views

  • Deposit flight from Spanish banks has been gaining pace and it is not clear a euro zone agreement to lend Madrid up to 100 billion euros in rescue funds will reverse the flows if investors fear Spain may face a full sovereign bailout.
  • Many banks are reorganising, or being forced to reorganise, along national lines, accentuating a deepening north-south divide within the currency bloc.
  • Since government credit ratings and bond yields effectively set a floor for the borrowing costs of banks and businesses in their jurisdiction, the best-managed Spanish or Italian banks or companies have to pay far more for loans, if they can get them, than their worst-managed German or Dutch peers.
  • ...10 more annotations...
  • European Central Bank President Mario Draghi acknowledged as he cut interest rates last week that the north-south disconnect was making it more difficult to run a single monetary policy.
  • Two huge injections of cheap three-year loans into the euro zone banking system this year, amounting to 1 trillion euros, bought only a few months' respite.
  • Conservative German economists led by Hans-Werner Sinn, head of the Ifo institute, are warning of dire consequences for Germany from ballooning claims via the ECB's system for settling payments among national central banks, known as TARGET2.
  • If a southern country were to default or leave the euro, they contend, Germany would be left with an astronomical bill, far beyond its theoretical limit of 211 billion euros liability for euro zone bailout funds.
  • As long as European monetary union is permanent and irreversible, such cross-border claims and capital flows within the currency area should not matter any more than money moving between Texas and California does.But even the faintest prospect of a Day of Reckoning changes that calculus radically.In that case, money would flood into German assets considered "safe" and out of securities and deposits in countries seen as at risk of leaving the monetary union. Some pessimists reckon we are already witnessing the early signs of such a process.
  • Either member governments would always be willing to let their national central banks give unlimited credit to each other, in which case a collapse would be impossible, or they might be unwilling to provide boundless credit, "and this will set the parameters for the dynamics of collapse", Garber warned.
  • "The problem is that at the time of a sovereign debt crisis, large portions of a national balance sheet may suddenly flee to the ECB's books, possibly overwhelming the capacity of a bailout fund to absorb the entire hit," he wrote in 2010,
  • national regulators in some EU countries are moving quietly to try to reduce their home banks' exposure to such an eventuality. The ECB itself last week set a limit on the amount of state-backed bank bonds that banks could use as collateral in its lending operations.
  • In one high-profile case, Germany's financial regulator Bafin ordered HypoVereinsbank (HVB), the German subsidiary of UniCredit, to curb transfers to its parent bank in Italy last year, people familiar with the case said.
  • In any case, common supervision without joint deposit insurance may be insufficient to reverse capital flight.
Gene Ellis

U.S. Embassy Criticizes Pardons in Nigeria Corruption Cases - NYTimes.com - 0 views

  • Mr. Ribadu once estimated that between independence and the end of military rule in 1999, Nigeria had lost more than $380 billion to corruption and mismanagement. In recent years, tens of billions of dollars have been siphoned from a federal oil revenues account, with virtually no accounting for it.
Gene Ellis

Five lessons from the Spanish cajas debacle for a new euro-wide supervisor | vox - 0 views

  • just the three most problematic Spanish cajas (Bankia, CatalunyaCaixa and Novagalicia) have had capital deficits (to be covered partly or fully by the taxpayer) of €54 billion – over 5% of Spanish GDP, a larger amount than what Spain will have to request from the European rescue funds.
  • Already the first entity that was intervened (CCM) as far back as March 2009, showed that the real NPL levels post intervention (17.6%) were more than twice as large as the reported ones. This should have been the point for the Banco de España to get ahead of the curve by ordering an audit of the whole sector
  • There is no intimation by anyone of outright corruption in the Banco de España supervisory role, and given the professionalism of the institution it is unlikely that there was any.
  • ...13 more annotations...
  • not surprisingly, Banco de España supervisors had little interest in discovering that Spain’s vaunted regulator had in fact missed the largest financial crisis in the history of the country
  • Unfortunately, often supervisors in charge of the failing entity in the years of the debt run up were the ones charged with uncovering the problems.
  • Spain was the leader in the introduction of a dynamic provision – a provisioning tool that forces banks to increase provisions without reference to any specific loan. The intention of this tool was twofold: to mitigate the bad times, and to cool the booms in the good times (Holmstrom and Tirole 1997). Dynamic provisions were endorsed as part of the Basel III standards in December 2010, in part on the strength of Spain’s experience. And indeed the existing evidence (Jiménez et al. 2012) shows that the tool worked as intended, dampening the credit boom and softening somewhat the credit crunch. However, it is clear by now that their level was not nearly enough, as their size – 3% of GDP at their highest point (2004) – was simply not of a magnitude commensurate with the credit losses.
  • Without the provisions, the reality of the cajas' accounts would have become much faster a concern, and would have imposed itself on the regulator
  • Had the Banco de España ordered an audit of the system after uncovering numerous irregularities in CCM, it would have not been able to deal with the capital shortfalls uncovered as there was no appropriate resolution regime in Spain at the time
  • governance played a critical role in the development of the Spanish crisis. In the Spanish case, the supervisor, confronted with powerful and well connected ex-politicians decided to look the other way in the face of obvious building trouble.
  • More systematic evidence of the role played by these governance issues is provided in a 2009 paper (Cuñat and Garicano 2009b) where we showed that cajas with chief executives who had no previous banking experience (!), no graduate education, and were politically connected did substantially worse in the run up to the crisis (granting more real estate developer loan, up to half of the entire loan book in some instances) and during the crisis (with higher NPLs).
  • Even more important was the role of these political connections in diluting the role of the supervisor after the crisis started, in what was meant to be the crisis resolution stage but which was in fact a crisis cover up stage.
  • What are the takeaways
  • I would suggest five.
  • Second, career concerns of supervisors are crucial.
  • Third, dynamic provisioning is a good idea, but the supervisor must be mindful it may delay decision making in problem cases
  • Fifth, supervision and an appropriately tough resolution regime must go hand in hand.
Gene Ellis

Eurozone fragmenting too rapidly - The China Post - 0 views

  • Any event that makes a euro exit by Greece — the most heavily indebted member state, which is off track on its second bailout program and in the fifth year of a recession — seems bound to accelerate those flows, despite repeated statements by EU leaders that Greece is a unique case. “If it does occur, a crisis will propagate itself through the TARGET payments system of the European System of Central Banks,” U.S. economist Peter Garber, now a global strategist with Deutsche Bank, wrote in a prophetic 1999 research paper. Either member governments would always be willing to let their national central banks give unlimited credit to each other, in which case a collapse would be impossible, or they might be unwilling to provide boundless credit, “and this will set the parameters for the dynamics of collapse,” Garber warned.
Gene Ellis

Ireland's Debt to Foreign Banks Is Still Unknown - NYTimes.com - 0 views

  • Mr. Weber, who is also a member of the European Central Bank’s governing council, said that the statistics reflected Ireland’s status as a financial center: much of what is recorded as claims on Ireland is in fact money funneled through Irish subsidiaries of German banks, and ultimately bound for elsewhere, Mr. Weber said. He said total German exposure was closer to $30 billion.
  • In both cases more than half of the exposure was to Ireland’s private sector, rather than lending to the government or Ireland’s beleaguered banks.
  • In Germany, Hypo Real Estate, a property and public sector lender owned by the government after a bailout, owed its near collapse largely to problems at Depfa, its subsidiary in Dublin. Last month Hypo transferred most of its troubled assets to a so-called bad bank that will slowly wind down the investments.
  • ...3 more annotations...
  • Taxpayers will bear the cost, but they may never find out how much. The bad bank, known as FMS Wertmanagement, has no plans to release financial statements, according to Soffin, the German government organization that oversees bank rescues.
  • The latest figures from the Bank for International Settlements put total European bank exposure to Portugal and Spain at $853 billion, with Germany, France and Britain the biggest creditors.
  • That worst-case forecast highlights another potential hidden risk. Credit-default swaps are typically sold over the counter by investment banks, with little information available publicly about the financial strength of the sellers. “Only then will we know for sure if the institutions that wrote the credit-default swaps have the liquidity and the financial strength to perform as contracted,” Mr. Weinberg wrote in a note last week.
Gene Ellis

Green growth is a worthwhile goal - FT.com - 0 views

  • Green growth is a worthwhile goal
  • A particularly important aspect of that uncertainty is tipping points
  • It is irrational to play in the climate casino without seeking to eliminate worst-case outcomes
  • ...5 more annotations...
  • Externalities do not fix themselves. In the absence of effective individual property rights they require government action, in this case the action of close to 200 governments.
  • Why should they do this? The answer is: because a low-carbon atmosphere is a global public good.
  • It is by now impossible to be optimistic that anything like this will happen. This is partly because the needed agreement must be long-term and global. That, in turn, raises difficult questions of intragenerational and intergenerational equity.
  • Suppose that, despite all the logic, it proves impossible to achieve a relevant global agreement. Does it make sense for any country or group of countries to take determined action on their own? If the aim is to deal with climate change, the answer is: absolutely not, unless the countries are China or the US.
  • But it might be possible for a country to demonstrate proof of concept:
Gene Ellis

Laura Tyson , Eric Drabkin and Ken Serwin make the case for territorial taxation of US ... - 0 views

  • Which Corporate Taxation for America?
  • The current system, all agree, is deeply flawed: the corporate tax rate is too high by global standards, and the corporate tax base is too narrow, owing to numerous credits, deductions, and special provisions that distort economic decisions.
Gene Ellis

An interview with Athanasios Orphanides: What happened in Cyprus | The Economist - 0 views

  • Cyprus had developed its financial center over three decades ago by having double taxation treaties with a number of countries, the Soviet Union for example. That means if profits are booked and earned and taxed in Cyprus, they are not taxed again in the other country. Russian deposits are there because Cyprus has a low corporate tax rate, much like Malta and Luxembourg, which annoys some people in Europe.
  • In addition, Cyprus has a legal system based on English law and follows English accounting rules
  • This government took a country with excellent fiscal finances, a surplus in fiscal accounts, and a banking system that was in excellent health. They started overspending, not only for unproductive government expenditures but also they raised implicit liabilities by raising pension promises, and so forth.
  • ...11 more annotations...
  • The size of the banking sector and exposure to Greece were known risks but at that time there was no banking problem in Cyprus
  • The containers were part of a shipment going from Iran to Syria that was intercepted in Cypriot waters after a tip from the U.S. The president took the decision to keep the ammunition. [NOTE: An independent prosecutor found that Christofias has ignored repeated warnings and pleas to destroy or safeguard the ammunition, apparently in hopes of one day returning it to Syria or Iran.]
  • Instead, they started lobbying the Russian government to give them a loan that would help them finance the country for a couple more years, and Russia came through, unfortunately,
  • I say unfortunately because as a result the government could keep operating and accumulating deficits without taking corrective action.
  • The next important date was the October 26-27, 2011 meeting of the EU council in Brussels where European leaders decided to wipe out what ended up being about 80% of the value of Greek debt that the private sector held. Every bank operating in Greece, regardless of where it was headquartered, had a lot of Greek debt.
  • For Cyprus, the writedown of Greek debt was between 4.5 and 5 billion euro, a substantial chunk of capital.
  • The second element of the decision taken by heads of states was to instruct the EBA to do a so- called capital exercise that marked to market sovereign debt and effectively raised abruptly capital requirements. The exercise required banks to have a core tier-1 ratio of 9%, and on top of that a buffer to make up for differences in market and book value of government debt. That famous capital exercise created the capital crunch in the euro area which is the cause of the recession we've had in the euro area for the last 2 years.
  • The Basle II framework that governments adopted internationally, and that the EU supervisory framework during this period also incorporated, specifies that holdings of government debt in a states' own currency are a zero-risk-weight asset, that is they are assigned a weight of zero in calculating capital requirements.
  • the governments should have agreed to make the EFSF/ESM available for direct recapitalization of banks instead of asking each government to be responsible for the capitalization.
  • Following a downgrading in late June 2012, all three major rating agencies rated the sovereign paper Cyprus below investment grade. According to ECB rules, that made the government debt not eligible as collateral for borrowing from the eurosystem, unless the ECB suspended the rules, as it had done for the cases of Greece, Portugal and Ireland. In the case of Cyprus, the ECB decided not to suspend the eligibility rule.
  • The governments have created risk in what before last week were considered perfectly safe deposits. This is going to have a chilling effect on deposits in any bank in a country perceived to be weak. This will mean the cost of funding will increase in the periphery of Europe and as a result, the cost of financing for businesses and households will increase. That will add to the divergences we already have and make the recession in the periphery of Europe deeper than it already is. This is really a disaster for European economic management as a whole. 
Gene Ellis

China's Hurdle to Fast Action on Climate Change - NYTimes.com - 0 views

  • China’s Hurdle to Fast Action on Climate Change
  • Any hopes that American commitments to cut carbon emissions will have a decisive impact on climate change rely on the assumption that China will reciprocate and deliver aggressive emission cuts of its own.
  • Fast economic growth in China and India is projected to fuel a substantial increase in carbon pollution over coming decades, despite big improvements in energy efficiency and the decarbonization of their energy supply
  • ...6 more annotations...
  • The country accounts for over a quarter of global greenhouse gas emissions.
  • Over the next 20 years, China’s CO2 emissions will grow by an amount roughly equal to the United States’ total emissions today,
  • Even assuming that China’s population does not grow at all over the next 30 years, that the energy efficiency of its economy increases at a faster pace than most developed and developing countries and that it manages to decarbonize its energy sources faster than pretty much anybody else, China would still be emitting a lot more carbon in 2040 than it does today, according to E.I.A. calculations.
  • Can the United States or anybody else do anything to speed China down a low-carbon path?
  • The latest report from the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, issued in April, suggested several ways to allot responsibilities. If one starts counting in the 18th century and counts only emissions from industry and energy generation, the United States is responsible for more than a quarter of all greenhouse gases that humanity has put into the air. China, by contrast, is responsible for 10 percent.But if one starts counting in 1990, when the world first became aware that CO2 was a problem, and includes greenhouse gases emitted from changes in land use, the United States is responsible for only 18 percent, and China’s share rises to 15 percent. Rich and poor countries, unsurprisingly, disagree on the proper measure. Photo
  • Not everybody will meet their Copenhagen pledges. Japan, which unplugged its nuclear energy after the disaster at the Fukushima nuclear power plant, will fall behind. So will Canada and Australia, whose new conservative governments have lost interest in the pledges of their predecessors.
Gene Ellis

Shinzo Abe's Monetary-Policy Delusions by Stephen S. Roach - Project Syndicate - 0 views

  • The reason is not hard to fathom. Hobbled by severe damage to private and public-sector balance sheets, and with policy interest rates at or near zero, post-bubble economies have been mired in a classic “liquidity trap.” They are more focused on paying down massive debt overhangs built up before the crisis than on assuming new debt and boosting aggregate demand.
  • The sad case of the American consumer is a classic example of how this plays out. In the years leading up to the crisis, two bubbles – property and credit – fueled a record-high personal-consumption binge. When the bubbles burst, households understandably became fixated on balance-sheet repair – namely, paying down debt and rebuilding personal savings, rather than resuming excessive spending habits.CommentsView/Create comment on this paragraph
  • US consumers have pulled back as never before.
  • ...5 more annotations...
  • Central banks that buy sovereign debt issued by fiscal authorities offset market-imposed discipline on borrowing costs, effectively subsidizing public-sector profligacy.
  • Zombie-like companies were kept on artificial life-support in the false hope that time alone would revive them. It was not until late in the decade, when the banking sector was reorganized and corporate restructuring was encouraged,
  • Like Japan, America’s post-bubble healing has been limited – even in the face of the Fed’s outsize liquidity injections. Household debt stood at 112% of income in the third quarter of 2012 – down from record highs in 2006, but still nearly 40 percentage points above the 75% norm of the last three decades of the twentieth century. Similarly, the personal-saving rate, at just 3.5% in the four months ending in November 2012, was less than half the 7.9% average of 1970-99.
  • Crisis-torn peripheral European economies still suffer from unsustainable debt loads and serious productivity and competitiveness problems. And a fragmented European banking system remains one of the weakest links in the regional daisy chain.
  • That leaves a huge sum of excess liquidity sloshing around in global asset markets. Where it goes, the next crisis is inevitably doomed to follow.
Gene Ellis

Some thoughts on German politics and the saver's tax in Cyprus | Credit Writedowns - 0 views

  • Now, the large 82.8% German government debt to GDP ratio is a source of shame for many because Germany was a driving force in enshrining the 60% government debt to GDP hurdle into the Maastricht Treaty that set out terms for the euro zone.
  • Moreover, the interest rate policy of the ECB, geared as it was to the slow growth core, produced negative real interest rates and credit bubbles in Spain and Ireland during the last decade. German banks piled in to those countries as prospects domestically stagnated.
  • “The average German worker feels like a cash cow being sucked dry by a quick succession of reforms and bailouts that take money out of her pocket. First it was for reunification, then for European integration, then to right the economy, then to bail out German banks, and finally to bail out the European periphery. Fatigue has set in.”
  • ...10 more annotations...
  • The bottom line is that none of the major political parties in Germany are going to vote for bailouts for other euro zone countries unless massive strings are attached, since these bailouts are political losers.
  • The anti-bailout part of the FDP platform is the one part of their rhetoric which could successfully take them over the 5% hurdle. The FDP’s complicity in using German taxpayer money to bail out the so-called profligate periphery is a one-way ticket out of Parliament.
  • “First, the Greek reports come via statements made by Michael Fuchs, CDU deputy Bundestag head and a senior member of German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s party. Fuchs warned earlier today that Germany would veto further aid to Greece if the country has not met the conditions of its previous bailouts.
  • “Second, all along Germany has indicated that it is resistant to increasing funding of the ESM and EFSF bailout facilities. This presents a problem in the case of Spain and Italy because of the size of those economies.
  • Willem Buiter, Chief Economist at Citigroup, has been most vocal in predicting that these facilities will be inadequate when Spain and Italy hit the wall and that more extreme measures will have to be taken.
  • The basic dilemma here is that almost all of the eurozone governments including Germany carry high debt burdens in excess of the Maastricht Treaty. For example, Germany has been in breach of Maastricht Treaty in 8 of 10 years since 2002, has been over the Maastricht 60% hurdle in each of those ten years, and now carries a debt to GDP burden above 80%.
  • The long and short of it was that the Germans had reached the end of their ability to support bailouts.
  • All evidence is that this levy has created panic in Cyprus. After all, what is the use of having a deposit guarantee if government can arbitrarily circumvent it to impose losses on your deposits anyway?
  • One can't just blame Cyprus for this fiasco. The ECB, EC and European Union finance ministers signed off on the insured deposit grab too]
  • My view? It was inevitable that we would be in crisis again. The austerity world view of crisis resolution is completely at odds with the capacity of the euro zone’s institutional architecture to handle a crisis.
Gene Ellis

Hot Money Blues - NYTimes.com - 0 views

  • for the time being, and probably for years to come, the island nation will have to maintain fairly draconian controls on the movement of capital in and out of the country.
  • It will mark the end of an era for Cyprus, which has in effect spent the past decade advertising itself as a place where wealthy individuals who want to avoid taxes and scrutiny can safely park their money, no questions asked.
  • To some extent this reflected the fact that capital controls have potential costs: they impose extra burdens of paperwork, they make business operations more difficult, and conventional economic analysis says that they should have a negative impact on growth (although this effect is hard to find in the numbers). But it also reflected the rise of free-market ideology,
  • ...2 more annotations...
  • It’s hard to imagine now, but for more than three decades after World War II financial crises of the kind we’ve lately become so familiar with hardly ever happened.
  • But the best predictor of crisis is large inflows of foreign money: in all but a couple of the cases I just mentioned, the foundation for crisis was laid by a rush of foreign investors into a country, followed by a sudden rush out.
Gene Ellis

Eurozone: Looking for growth | vox - 0 views

  • Empirical evidence suggests deleveraging episodes accompanied by a housing crisis will take on average five and a half years across high-income OECD countries (or seven years when accompanied by a banking crisis (Aspachs-Bracon et al. 2011, IMF 2012).
  • Little resolution of banking-sector difficulties in the Eurozone suggests that deleveraging and credit will probably remain slow and impaired for much longer than previously thought. Recoveries that happen without credit are, on average, a third longer than recovery episodes with credit (Darvas 2013).
  • Damages to trend growth are notoriously difficult to assess,
  • ...10 more annotations...
  • In addition, observed GDP growth tends to be revised until several years after the first estimate
  • Our work is based on a simple Solow growth-accounting methodology.
  • A common feature of all economies is a collapse in productivity, which is typical of a big recession. In addition, Spain and Italy also underwent a very sharp labour contraction.
  • The additional effect of ageing.
  • A downside risk is that investment growth does not recover fully (for example, because banks fail to provide the necessary funding). In this case, we assume investment growth is only half what it was before the onset of economic turmoil.
  • We also estimate productivity through a convergence equation, which would slightly lift productivity in peripheral countries in the future.
  • This exercise suggests that in the absence of policy reforms, trend growth will have been damaged significantly, by at least one percentage point, post-crisis, compared with pre-crisis levels,
  • In the event that investment fails to recover quickly
  •  or unemployment levels take longer to fall than in previous recovery episodes, then trend growth would be significantly lower for longer. Trend growth might well remain negative in Spain and Italy, and may fail to increase for Germany or France.
  • this exercise shows the damage will indeed be long lasting, permanently impairing growth in a context of an ageing population that needs higher growth capacity than ever before.
Gene Ellis

After Bangladesh, Seeking New Sources - NYTimes.com - 0 views

  • Bennett Model helped pioneer the exporting of garments from China in 1975, the year before Mao Zedong died,
  • Buying from Bangladesh, said Mr. Model, “has been politically incorrect ever since problems started there, so a lot of major players had already been looking for alternatives.”
  • Western executives are checking on potential new suppliers in southern Vietnam, central Cambodia and the hinterlands of Java in Indonesia.
  • ...4 more annotations...
  • “Right now, the name of Bangladesh just gives a bad rep to a company,”
  • Bangladesh, which is the world’s second-largest garment manufacturer after China
  • Garment manufacturing makes up a fifth of the economy in Bangladesh and four-fifths of its exports,
  • “People are on the one hand looking at contingency plans in case the unrest gets worse,” said Bruce Rockowitz, the group president and chief executive of Hong Kong-based Li & Fung, one of the world’s largest sourcing companies.
Gene Ellis

Europe's Two-Speed Future by Jean-Claude Piris - Project Syndicate - 0 views

  • relatively small size,
  • aging populations,
  • excessive indebtedness
  • ...5 more annotations...
  • insufficient investment in research and development
  • lack of energy resources
  • But the eurozone’s architecture – in which monetary policy is centralized, but budgetary and economic policies are left up to individual governments – is not viable in the long term
  • establishing a “two-speed Europe” – in which a core group of countries pursues deeper integration more quickly than the rest – is the EU’s best option for reaching the level of cooperation needed to escape the crisis intact.
  • Pursuing this option would require that the decision-making process be legitimate. In the Council, as in all cases of “enhanced cooperation,” only participating members have the right to vote. In the European Parliament, by contrast, all 27 EU members participate in the decision-making process, even concerning measures that will affect only the 23 “eurozone plus” countries (the 17 eurozone members and the six that have agreed to the Euro Plus Pact) – a method that could pose a political problem.
Gene Ellis

Mastering business management studies online - 0 views

  • The free online mini MBA is a condensed version of a full fledged MBA & is aimed at providing a solid foundation in current business theory and practices.
  • Online video lectures and case studies by top management faculty will cover subjects like Fundamentals of Accounting, Principles of Marketing, Managing Human Resource, Essentials of Business Communication and Business Strategy.
  • “The pedagogy involves pre-recorded video learning modules with fully interactive and collaborative features like the discussion forums, online chats, quizzes and live virtual classrooms. The entire course content will be made available on an anytime, anywhere learning mode using the “portable classroom” model.
Gene Ellis

Op-Ed Columnist - The Making of a Euromess - NYTimes.com - 0 views

  • No, the real story behind the euromess lies not in the profligacy of politicians but in the arrogance of elites — specifically, the policy elites who pushed Europe into adopting a single currency well before the continent was ready for such an experiment.
  • Consider the case of Spain, which on the eve of the crisis appeared to be a model fiscal citizen.
  • But with its warm weather and beaches, Spain was also the Florida of Europe — and like Florida, it experienced a huge housing boom. The financing for this boom came largely from outside the country: there were giant inflows of capital from the rest of Europe, Germany in particular.
  • ...9 more annotations...
  • The result was rapid growth combined with significant inflation: between 2000 and 2008, the prices of goods and services produced in Spain rose by 35 percent, compared with a rise of only 10 percent in Germany. Thanks to rising costs, Spanish exports became increasingly uncompetitive, but job growth stayed strong thanks to the housing boom.
  • Then the bubble burst.
  • But the flood of red ink
  • was a result, not a cause, of Spain’s problems.
  • The nation’s core economic problem is that costs and prices have gotten out of line with those in the rest of Europe. If Spain still had its old currency, the peseta, it could remedy that problem quickly through devaluation — by, say, reducing the value of a peseta by 20 percent against other European currencies. But Spain no longer has its own money, which means that it can regain competitiveness only through a slow, grinding process of deflation.
  • Now, if Spain were an American state rather than a European country, things wouldn’t be so bad. For one thing, costs and prices wouldn’t have gotten so far out of line: Florida, which among other things was freely able to attract workers from other states and keep labor costs down, never experienced anything like Spain’s relative inflation. For another, Spain would be receiving a lot of automatic support in the crisis: Florida’s housing boom has gone bust, but Washington keeps sending the Social Security and Medicare checks. But Spain isn’t an American state, and as a result it’s in deep trouble.
  • None of this should come as a big surprise. Long before the euro came into being, economists warned that Europe wasn’t ready for a single currency.
  • What we’ll probably see over the next few years is a painful process of muddling through: bailouts accompanied by demands for savage austerity, all against a background of very high unemployment, perpetuated by the grinding deflation I already mentioned.
  • Yes, some governments were irresponsible; but the fundamental problem was hubris, the arrogant belief that Europe could make a single currency work despite strong reasons to believe that it wasn’t ready. More Articles in Opinion »
Gene Ellis

Big Banks' Tall Tales by Simon Johnson - Project Syndicate - 0 views

  • In the second narrative, the world’s largest banks remain too big to manage and have strong incentives to engage in precisely the kind of excessive risk-taking that can bring down economies. Last year’s “London Whale” trading losses at JPMorgan Chase are a case in point. And, according to this narrative’s advocates, almost all big banks display symptoms of chronic mismanagement.
  • But a great myth lurks at the heart of the financial industry’s argument that all is well. The FDIC’s resolution powers will not work for large, complex cross-border financial enterprises.  The reason is simple: US law can create a resolution authority that works only within national boundaries. Addressing potential failure at a firm like Citigroup would require a cross-border agreement between governments and all responsible agencies.
  • I had the opportunity to talk with senior officials and their advisers from various countries, including from Europe. I asked all of them the same question: When will we have a binding framework for cross-border resolution?CommentsView/Create comment on this paragraphThe answers typically ranged from “not in our lifetimes” to “never.” Again, the reason is simple: countries do not want to compromise their sovereignty or tie their hands in any way.
  • ...2 more annotations...
  • This form of government support amounts to a large implicit subsidy for big banks.
  • What other part of the corporate world has the ability to drive the global economy into recession, as banks did in the fall of 2008?
Gene Ellis

David Ignatius: Mervyn King's hard lessons in Keynesian economics - The Washington Post - 0 views

  • As King struggled with the crisis, he concluded that the biggest vulnerability was the solvency of the banking system itself. The crash wasn’t just a liquidity squeeze caused by toxic assets; the problem was that big banks around the world were undercapitalized and, in many cases, insolvent.
  • King pushed the banks to recapitalize and, later, to accept more regulation. This upset a financial elite that, as King says, was the only sector of the British economy that had escaped the market revolution of the Margaret Thatcher years.
  • For King, the past decade reinforced the lessons Keynes drew from the 1930s: One is the psychological quirkiness of investors, which Keynes described as “animal spirits” on the upside and “extreme liquidity preference” on the down.
  • ...4 more annotations...
  • Then and now, monetary policy could not persuade frightened people to spend and invest.
  • The second Keynesian lesson was the need for some international structure to balance surplus and deficit nations.
  • Those global institutions are weak, but the real crisis has been within the euro zone, which has no effective internal balancing mechanism: It lacks a federal structure to transfer money from surplus Germany to deficit Greece, and it lacks flexible internal exchange rates that could allow a Greece or Spain to devalue its currency and find its own equilibrium.
  • Europe has responded to the crisis with the very British approach of muddling through, but King predicts it won’t work. Creating a true federal union, while an admirable goal, will be the work of a hundred years; the only quick way for countries to adjust is the breakup of the euro zone. King thinks the euro zone must confront the basic choice between accepting a transfer union or changing the membership of the monetary union. “Muddling through” isn’t a serious option.
1 - 20 of 51 Next › Last »
Showing 20 items per page