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Gene Ellis

Foreign Banks in U.S. Face Greater Restrictions - NYTimes.com - 0 views

  • As for equity levels, in many cases a foreign bank might simply have to convert loans it had made to the American operation into equity investments. Suddenly the American operation would appear to be better capitalized.
  • European regulators who trusted Iceland to regulate its own banks wound up paying off depositors even though there is little hope Iceland will ever reimburse those payments.
  • It turns out that in the financial crisis, big banks with high leverage ratios — that is, more capital relative to assets — were significantly more likely to survive without needing bailouts.
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  • “The current rules can be very easily gamed,”
  • thinks that regulators would be better off to seek simplicity through measures like leverage ratios, rather than allow banks to make calculations that depend on thousands of estimates to determine how much capital they need.
Gene Ellis

Europe's Irrelevant Austerity Debate by Daniel Gros - Project Syndicate - 0 views

  • But the debate about austerity and the cost of high public-debt levels misses a key point: Public debt owed to foreigners is different from debt owed to residents.
  • If foreign debt matters more than public debt, the key variable requiring adjustment is the external deficit, not the fiscal deficit. A country that has a balanced current account does not need any additional foreign capital. That is why risk premiums are continuing to fall in the eurozone, despite high political uncertainty in Italy and continuing large fiscal deficits elsewhere. The peripheral countries’ external deficits are falling rapidly, thus diminishing the need for foreign financing.
  • And the evidence confirms that the euro crisis is not really about sovereign debt, but about foreign debt.
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  • By contrast, in the case of debt owed to foreigners, higher interest rates lead to a welfare loss for the country as a whole, because the government must transfer resources abroad, which usually requires a combination of exchange-rate depreciation and a reduction in domestic expenditure.
  • But austerity can never be self-defeating for the external adjustment. On the contrary, the larger the fall in domestic demand in response to a cut in government expenditure, the more imports will fall and the stronger the improvement in the current account – and thus ultimately the reduction in the risk premium – will be.
  • Second, if foreign debt is the real problem, the escalating debate about the Reinhart/Rogoff results is irrelevant for the euro crisis. Countries that have their own currency, like the United Kingdom – and especially the United States, which can borrow from foreigners in dollars – do not face a direct financing constraint.
  • But the eurozone’s peripheral countries simply did not have a choice: they had to reduce their deficits, because the foreign capital on which their economies were so dependent was no longer available.
Gene Ellis

Tomato Imports Deal Reached by U.S. and Mexico - NYTimes.com - 0 views

  • The agreement, reached late Saturday, raises the minimum sales price for Mexican tomatoes in the United States, aims to strengthen compliance and enforcement, and increases the types of tomatoes governed by the bilateral pact to four from one.
  • “The draft agreement raises reference prices substantially, in some cases more than double the current reference price for certain products,
  • Florida growers contended it set the minimum price of Mexican tomatoes so low that the Florida growers could not compete.
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  • “Even though no dumping or injury to the U.S. industry was demonstrated by our competitors,
  • The new agreement covers all fresh and chilled tomatoes, excluding those intended for use in processing like canning and dehydrating, and in juices, sauces and purées.
  • It raises the basic floor price for winter tomatoes to 31 cents a pound from 21.69 cents — higher than the price the Mexicans were proposing in October — and establishes even higher prices for specialty tomatoes and tomatoes grown in controlled environments. The Mexicans have invested billions in greenhouses to grow tomatoes, while Florida tomatoes are largely picked green and treated with a gas to change their color.
  • The dispute unfolded in the heated politics surrounding the presidential election, with Mexican growers charging that the Commerce Department was courting voters in the important swing state of Florida. Instead, the timing of the negotiations ensured that the government could win those votes and bring the controversy to a conclusion satisfactory to the Mexicans after the election was over.
  • The Mexicans enlisted roughly 370 American businesses, including Wal-Mart Stores and meat and vegetable producers, to argue their cause.
Gene Ellis

Bureaucracy's Salaries Defended in Europe - NYTimes.com - 0 views

  • the monthly base salary of the most senior bloc officials is 18,370 euros, or $24,830.
  • the highest-paid European Union officials paid taxes equivalent to about 25 percent of their gross salary.
  • European Union officials generally pay low taxes,
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  • Ms. Merkel’s monthly base salary is 21,000 euros,
  • Unlike European Union officials, the 27 members of the European Commission are political appointees. Their salaries are much closer to those of national leaders like Ms. Merkel, and in some cases may exceed them.
  • José Manuel Barroso, president of the commission, is paid a monthly salary of 25,351 euros, a residence allowance equal to 15 percent of that salary, and allowances for expenses like running a household and schooling for children. The seven vice presidents of the commission earn basic monthly salaries of 22,963 euros.
Gene Ellis

PORTFOLIO.HU | Blanchard: Eurozone integration needs to go forward or go back, but it c... - 0 views

  • And, while lower investment since the beginning of the crisis has led to a smaller capital stock, again the effect appears quantitatively small. It is also difficult to see why the crisis would have led to a large decrease in total factor productivity. This being said, I would have expected a large output gap to lead to more downward pressure on inflation than we have seen. I see the fact that inflation is roughly stable is a puzzle. We are doing more research on this issue at the IMF.
  • O.B.:There is no question internal devaluations are tougher to achieve than when you can adjust the nominal exchange rate. That’s well understood. A number of European countries have a competitiveness problem, which shows up in a large current account deficit.
  • olve it. And there is no alternative for them than to become more competitive, to decrease the real exchange rate. Is it happening? I think it’s starting to happen, but it’s happening slowly, and it’s going to take a long time.
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  • They have to
  • Many countries have a tough adjustment to achieve. In doing so, they indeed have to be careful about their social implications. When adjustment requires a decrease in the real wage (or at least a decrease relative to productivity), it is essential that the decrease be fairly shared. You have to make sure that there is a safety net in place. If the pension system has to be made less generous, which is the case in a number of countries, you have to make sure the lowest pensions are protected.
  • It is clear that adjustment in the Euro zone requires a decrease in the relative price of periphery countries and an increase in the relative price of core countries. If the ECB wants to maintain two percent inflation for the Euro zone as a whole, this implies, arithmetically, that core countries have to have inflation higher than two percent, periphery countries have to have inflation lower than two percent, until the adjustment has taken place.
Gene Ellis

Why We Lie - WSJ.com - 0 views

  • "I was amazed at how quickly and easily this guy was able to open the door," Peter said. The locksmith told him that locks are on doors only to keep honest people honest. One percent of people will always be honest and never steal. Another 1% will always be dishonest and always try to pick your lock and steal your television; locks won't do much to protect you from the hardened thieves, who can get into your house if they really want to. The purpose of locks, the locksmith said, is to protect you from the 98% of mostly honest people who might be tempted to try your door if it had no lock.
  • What we have found, in a nutshell: Everybody has the capacity to be dishonest, and almost everybody cheats—just by a little. Except for a few outliers at the top and bottom, the behavior of almost everyone is driven by two opposing motivations. On the one hand, we want to benefit from cheating and get as much money and glory as possible; on the other hand, we want to view ourselves as honest, honorable people. Sadly, it is this kind of small-scale mass cheating, not the high-profile cases, that is most corrosive to society.
  • It has shown rather conclusively that cheating does not correspond to the traditional, rational model of human behavior—that is, the idea that people simply weigh the benefits (say, money) against the costs (the possibility of getting caught and punished) and act accordingly.
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  • All of this means that, although it is obviously important to pay attention to flagrant misbehaviors, it is probably even more important to discourage the small and more ubiquitous forms of dishonesty—the misbehavior that affects all of us, as both perpetrators and victims.
Gene Ellis

"A Banking Union Baby Step" by Daniel Gros | Project Syndicate - 0 views

  • The recently created European Banking Authority has only limited powers over national supervisors, whose daily work is guided mainly by national considerations.
  • Moreover, the ECB already bears de facto responsibility for the stability of the eurozone’s banking system. But, until now, it had to lend massive amounts to banks without being able to judge their soundness, because all of that information was in the hands of national authorities who guarded it jealously and typically denied problems until it was too late.
  • Consider the case of a bank headquartered in Italy, but with an important subsidiary in Germany. The German operations naturally generate a surplus of funds (given that savings in Germany far exceed investment on average). The parent bank would like to use these funds to reinforce the group’s liquidity. But the German supervisory authorities consider Italy at risk and thus oppose any transfer of funds there.CommentsView/Create comment on this paragraphThe supervisor of the home country (Italy) has the opposite interest. It would like to see the “internal capital market” operate as much as possible. Here, too, it makes sense to have the ECB in charge as a neutral arbiter with respect to these opposing interests.
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  • Economic (and political) logic requires that the eurozone will soon also need a common bank rescue fund. Officially, this has not yet been acknowledged. But that is often the way that European integration proceeds: an incomplete step in one area later requires further steps in related areas.
Gene Ellis

"The Euro's Latest Reprieve" by Joseph E. Stiglitz | Project Syndicate - 0 views

  • Like an inmate on death row, the euro has received another last-minute stay of execution. It will survive a little longer. The markets are celebrating, as they have after each of the four previous “euro crisis” summits – until they come to understand that the fundamental problems have yet to be addressed.
  • Europe’s leaders did not recognize this rising danger, which could easily be averted by a common guarantee, which would simultaneously correct the market distortion arising from the differential implicit subsidy.
  • Likewise, they now recognize that bailout loans that give the new lender seniority over other creditors worsen the position of private investors, who will simply demand even higher interest rates.CommentsView/Create comment on this paragraph
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  • It is deeply troubling that it took Europe’s leaders so long to see something so obvious
  • What is now proposed is recapitalization of the European Investment Bank, part of a growth package of some $150 billion. But politicians are good at repackaging, and, by some accounts, the new money is a small fraction of that amount, and even that will not get into the system immediately. In short: the remedies – far too little and too late – are based on a misdiagnosis of the problem and flawed economics.
  • Eurobonds and a solidarity fund could promote growth and stabilize the interest rates faced by governments in crisis. Lower interest rates, for example, would free up money so that even countries with tight budget constraints could spend more on growth-enhancing investments.
  • Even well-managed banking systems would face problems in an economic downturn of Greek and Spanish magnitude; with the collapse of Spain’s real-estate bubble, its banks are even more at risk.
  • Europe’s leaders have finally understood that the bootstrap operation by which Europe lends money to the banks to save the sovereigns, and to the sovereigns to save the banks, will not work.
  • The euro was flawed from the outset, but it was clear that the consequences would become apparent only in a crisis.
  • Workers may leave Ireland or Greece not because their productivity there is lower, but because, by leaving, they can escape the debt burden incurred by their parents.
  • Germany worries that, without strict supervision of banks and budgets, it will be left holding the bag for its more profligate neighbors. But that misses the key point: Spain, Ireland, and many other distressed countries ran budget surpluses before the crisis. The down
  • turn caused the deficits, not the other way around.CommentsView/Create comment on this paragraph
  • If these countries made a mistake, it was only that, like Germany today, they were overly credulous of markets, so they (like the United States and so many others) allowed an asset bubble to grow unchecked.
  • Moreover, Germany is on the hook in either case: if the euro or the economies on the periphery collapse, the costs to Germany will be high.
  • While structural problems have weakened competitiveness and GDP growth in particular countries, they did not bring about the crisis, and addressing them will not resolve it.CommentsView/Create comment on this paragraph
Gene Ellis

PrudentBear - 0 views

  • German exporters were major beneficiaries of this growth. German banks and financial institutions helped finance the growth.
  • Exports have provided the majority of Germany’s growth in recent years. Germany is heavily reliant on a narrowly based industrial sector, focused on investment goods—automobiles, industrial machinery, chemicals, electronics and medical devices. These sectors make up a quarter of its GDP and the bulk of exports.
  • Germany’s service sector is weak with lower productivity than comparable countries. While it argues that Greece should deregulate professions, many professions in Germany remain highly regulated. Trades and professions are regulated by complex technical rules and standards rooted in the medieval guild systems. Foreign entrants frequently find these rules difficult and expensive to navigate.
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  • Despite the international standing of Deutsche Bank, Germany’s banking system is fragile. Several German banks required government support during the financial crisis. Highly fragmented (in part due to heavy government involvement) and with low profitability, German banks, especially the German Länder (state) owned Landsbanks, face problems. They have large exposures to European sovereign debt, real estate and structured securities.
  • Prior to 2005, the Landesbanken were able to borrow cheaply, relying on the guarantee of the state governments. The EU ruled these guarantees amounted to subsidies. Before the abolition of the guarantees, the Landesbanks issued large amounts of state-guaranteed loans which mature by December 2015.
  • While it insists on other countries reducing public debt, German debt levels are high—around 81% of GDP. The Bundesbank, Germany’s central bank, has stated that public debt levels will remain above 60% (the level stipulated by European treaties) for many years.
  • Germany’s greatest vulnerability is its financial exposures from the current crisis. German exposure to Europe, especially the troubled peripheral economies, is large.
  • German banks had exposures of around US$500 billion to the debt issues of peripheral nations. While the levels have been reduced, it remains substantial, especially when direct exposures to banks in these countries and indirect exposures via the global financial system are considered. The reduction in risk held by private banks has been offset by the increase in exposure of the German state, which assumed some of this exposure.
  • For example, the exposure of the ECB to Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain and Italy is euro 918 billion as of April 2012. This exposure is also rising rapidly, especially driven by capital flight out of these countries.
  • Germany is now caught in a trap. Irrespective of the resolution of the debt crisis, Germany will suffer significant losses on its exposure – it will be the biggest loser.
  • Once the artificial boom ends, voters will discover they were betrayed by Germany’s pro-European political elite. There will be an electoral revolt and, as in the rest of Europe, a strong challenge from radical political forces with unpredictable consequences.
  • In late May 2012, French President Francois Hollande provided a curious argument in support of eurozone bonds: “Is it acceptable that some sovereigns can borrow at 6% and others at zero in the same monetary union?”
  • Political will for integration
  • In the peripheral economies, continued withdrawal of deposits from national banks (a rational choice given currency and confiscation risk) may necessitate either a Europe wide deposit guarantee system or further funding of banks.
  • A credible deposit insurance scheme would have to cover household deposits (say up to euro 100,000), which is around 72% of all deposits, in the peripheral countries. This would entail an insurance scheme for around euro 1.3 trillion of deposits.
  • Given that the Spanish Economy Ministry reports that euro 184 billion in loans to developers are “problematic,” the additional recapitalization needs of Spain’s banks may be as high as euro 200-300 billion in additional funds (20-30% of GDP)
  • A Greek default would result in losses to Germany of up to around euro 90 billion. Germany’s potential losses increase rapidly as more countries default or leave the eurozone.
  • Austerity or default will force many European economies into recession for a prolonged period. German exports will be affected given Europe is around 60% of its market, including around 40% within the eurozone. In case of a break-up of the euro, estimates of German growth range from -1% to below -10%. It is worth remembering that the German economy fell in size by around 5% in 2008, the worst result since the Second World War, mainly on the back of declining exports.
  • For example, Greece owes about euro 400 billion to private bondholders but increasingly to public bodies, such as the IMF and ECB, mainly due to the bailouts. If Greece walks away as some political parties have threatened, then the fallout for the lenders, such as Germany, are potentially calamitous.
  • But the largest single direct German exposure is the Bundesbank’s over euro 700 billion current exposure under the TARGET2 (Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross Settlement Express Transfer System) to other central banks in the Eurozone.
  • by Satyajit Das
Gene Ellis

No ordinary recession: There is much to fear beyond fear itself | vox - 0 views

  • Richard Koo (2003) coined the term “balance sheet recession” to characterise the endless travail of Japan following the collapse of its real estate and stock market bubbles in 1990. The Japanese government did not act to repair the balance sheets of the private sector following the crash. Instead, it chose a policy of keeping bank rate near zero so as to reduce deposit rates and let the banks earn their way back into solvency. At the same time it supported the real sector by repeated large doses of Keynesian deficit spending. It took a decade and a half for these policies to bring the Japanese economy back to reasonable health.
  • At the time, a majority of forecasts predicted that the economy would slip back into depression once defence expenditures were terminated and the armed forces demobilised. The forecasts were wrong. This famous postwar “forecasting debacle” demonstrated how simple income-expenditure reasoning, ignoring the state of balance sheets, can lead one completely astray.
  • The lesson to be drawn from these two cases is that deficit spending will be absorbed into the financial sinkholes in private sector balance sheets and will not become effective until those holes have been filled.
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  • The present administration, like the last, would like to recapitalise the banks at least partly by attracting private capital. That can hardly be accomplished as long as the value of large chunks of the banks’ assets remains anybody’s guess.
  • When the entire private sector is bent on shortening its balance sheet and paying down debt, the public sector’s balance sheet must move in the opposite, offsetting direction. When the entire private sector is striving to save, the government must dis-save. The political obstacles to doing these things on a sufficient scale are formidable.
  • The Swedish policy following the 1992 crisis has been often referred to in recent months. Sweden acted quickly and decisively to close insolvent banks, and to quarantine their bad assets into a special fund.2 Eventually, all the assets, good and bad, ended up in the private banking sector again. The stockholders in the failed banks lost all their equity while the loss to taxpayers of the bad assets was minimal in the end. The operation was necessary to the recovery but what actually got the economy out of a very sharp and deep recession was the 25-30% devaluation of the krona which produced a long period of strong export-led growth.
  • So the private sector as a whole is bent on reducing debt.
  • Businesses will use depreciation charges and sell off inventories to do so. Households are trying once more to save. Less investment and more saving spell declining incomes.
  • now that they know how dangerous their leverage of yesteryear was.
  • Fiscal stimulus will not have much effect as long as the financial system is deleveraging.
  • er self-imposed constitutional balanced budget requirements and are consequently acting as powerful amplifiers of recession with respect to both income and employment.
  • Almost all American states now suffer und
Gene Ellis

Op-ed: Greece's Exit May Become the Euro's Envy - 0 views

  • The immediate consequences of Greece leaving or being forced out of the euro area would certainly be devastating. Capital flight would intensify, fuelling depreciation and inflation. All existing contracts would need to be redenominated and renegotiated, creating financial chaos. Perhaps most politically devastating, fiscal austerity might actually need to intensify, since Greece still runs a primary deficit, which it would have to correct if EU and International Monetary Fund financing vanished.
  • But this process would also produce a substantially depreciated exchange rate (50 drachmas to the euro, anyone?) And that would set in motion a process of adjustment that would soon reorient the economy and put it on a path of sustainable growth. In fact, Greek growth would probably surge, possibly for a prolonged period, if it adopted sensible policies to rapidly restore and sustain macroeconomic stability.
  • Just look at what happened to the countries that defaulted and devalued during the financial crises of the 1990s. They all initially suffered severe contractions. But the recessions lasted only one or two years. Then came the rebound. South Korea posted nine years of growth averaging nearly 6 percent. Indonesia, which experienced a wave of defaults that toppled nearly every bank in the entire system, registered growth above 5 percent for a similar period; Argentina close to 8 percent; and Russia above 7 percent. The historical record shows clearly that there is life after financial crises.
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  • Today, Germany grudgingly does the minimum needed to keep the euro area intact. If exit to emulate Greece becomes an attractive proposition, Germany will be put on the spot—and the magnanimity it shows in place of its current miserliness will be the ultimate test of how much it values the euro area.
  • The answer might prove surprising. The German public might suddenly realize that the euro area confers on Germany not one but two “exorbitant privileges”: low interest rates as the haven for European capital and a competitive exchange rate by being hitched to weaker partners. In that case, Germany would have to offer its partners a much more attractive deal to keep them in the euro area.
Gene Ellis

One more summit: The crisis rolls on | vox - 0 views

  • Reading the official documents from the June 28 summit requires linguistic and divination skills.
  • The clearest result is that EFSF/ESM funds can be used directly to support banks.
  • The summit attendees seem to have successfully drawn the conclusion that this was necessary from the disastrous impact of their mid-June decision on new lending to Spanish authorities to shore up their banks. Within hours, the main conclusion drawn by the markets was that the Spanish public debt had grown by €100 billion, bringing Spain closer to the fate of Ireland (bad bank debt dragging down a government with an otherwise healthy fiscal position).
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  • The new agreement suggests that in the future, banks will be bailed out by the collective effort of Eurozone countries.
  • First, this arrangement is to be finalised by the end of the year. This means that, in the end, the Spanish debt will rise by €100 billion (the market participants who enthusiastically celebrated the decision by raising the price of Spanish bonds will eventually understand that). Ditto in the not unlikely case that some Italian or French banks wobble before December.
  • Second, conditions will be attached to such a rescue. These recommendations could be clever if they require “Swedish-style” bank restructuring whereby shareholders and other major stakeholders are made to absorb first the losses, and if a new clearly untainted management replaces the previous one. Such interventions limit the costs to taxpayers; they can even turn a profit. Of course, the conditions could also be silly, raising the costs to taxpayers to huge levels.
  • Third, the arrangement is linked to the establishment of a “single supervisory mechanism involving the ECB”. This could be a single Eurozone supervisor built inside the ECB, which would go a long way to plugging one the worst mistakes in the Maastricht Treaty (lack of a joint regulation and resolution regime for banks).
  • But this is not what the official text says, which makes one suspect that policymakers have not agreed to something simple and clean. Most likely, they will keep negotiating and come with the usual 17-headed monster that exhausted diplomats are wont to invent.
  • This is important because a contagious banking crisis that hits several large banks would require much more money than is available in the EFSF-EMS facilities.
  • Light conditionality, as they requested, is bound to collapse at the foot of the Bundestag, which must approve every single loan.
  • There was no knock-out winner in this summit, but on points I’d have to say that the winner is the crisis.
  • There was nothing on collapsing Greece, nothing on unsustainable public debts in several countries, and no end in sight to recession in an increasing number of countries.
  • Charles Wyplosz
Gene Ellis

Banks' Fire Drill for Greece Election - NYTimes.com - 0 views

  • In New York and London, banks have set up dedicated crisis teams, and rehearsed elaborate responses.
  • Citigroup has $84 billion in loans, bonds and other types of exposure to troubled European countries, plus France. The bank’s filings indicate that all but $8 billion of that exposure is offset with collateral it has collected and hedges on the portfolio.
  • Some banks are testing their systems to deal with the possibility of new currencies and preparing guidance for clients on how to operate in such an environment.
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  • Banks like Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley are also looking into the severe legal challenges that would arise if a country exited the euro. Contracts that govern loans, bonds and derivatives in Europe rarely take into account such a situation.
  • Consider an Italian corporation that owed a foreign bank 5 million euros, with a loan agreement struck under Italian law. If Italy left the euro, the bank might have less chance of getting euros back after the exit. In that case, the financial firm might be exposed to a new, less valuable currency.
  • Recognizing that threat, some banks are trying to move contracts into new jurisdictions like the United States or Britain. By transferring such loan agreements to English law, the banks may increase the chances of getting repaid in euros after an exit, according to legal experts.
  • The banks are also trying to protect their balance sheets if they do get stuck with large amounts of assets denominated in a new, weaker currency.
  • By doing so, they can better match their assets (the loans) within a specific country with their liabilities (the deposits). Then if a country left the euro zone, the value of the loan might fall in euros, but the banks wouldn’t owe as much to depositors in euros.
  • Mr. Lim notes, however, that some large banks, including Deutsche Bank, still have a lot more loans than deposits in countries like Italy and Spain.
Gene Ellis

Foxconn Audit Reveals Workweek Still Too Long - NYTimes.com - 0 views

  • Foxconn, part of the Taiwan-based company Hon Hai Precision Industry, employs about 178,000 workers at the three factories inspected. It has about 1.2 million workers at plants making products for Apple, Hewlett-Packard, Dell, Microsoft and other technology companies.
  • He noted that Foxconn has also overhauled many processes, including using robots instead of people to polish the aluminum backs of iPad cases and water to capture and dispose of the resulting dust.
Gene Ellis

Buiter: Most European banks are zombies | Credit Writedowns - 0 views

  • The second big takeaway comes from the article’s title. Buiter thinks most European banks are zombies that need to be recapitalized or resolved. In most cases this can be done by haircutting senior and subordinated bondholders only.
Gene Ellis

Tracing Germs Through the Aisles - NYTimes.com - 0 views

  • More than 70 percent of all the antibiotics used in the United States are given to animals.
  • Agribusiness groups disagree and say the main problem is overuse of antibiotic treatments for people. Bugs rarely migrate from animals to people, and even when they do, the risk they pose to human health is negligible, the industry contends.
  • He is comparing the genetic sequences of E. coli germs resistant to multiple antibiotics found in the meat samples to the ones that have caused urinary tract infections in people (mostly women).
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  • Urinary infections were chosen because they are so common. American women get more than eight million of them a year. In rare cases the infections enter the bloodstream and are fatal.
  • A new strain of the antibiotic-resistant bug MRSA, for example, was first detected in people in Holland in 2003, and now represents 40 percent of the MRSA infections in humans in that country, according to Jan Kluytmans, a Dutch researcher. That same strain was common in pigs on farms before it was found in people, scientists say.
  • He thinks the Food and Drug Administration’s efforts to limit antibiotic use on farms have been weak. In 1977, the F.D.A. said it would begin to ban some agricultural uses of antibiotics. But the House and Senate appropriations committees — dominated by agricultural interests — passed resolutions against the ban, and the agency retreated. More recently, the agency has limited the use of two important classes of antibiotics in animals. But advocates say it needs to go further and ban use of all antibiotics for growth promotion. Sweden and Denmark have already done so.
  • Ms. Slaughter said aggressive lobbying by agribusiness interests has played a major role in blocking passage of legislation.
  • But the economics of food presents perhaps the biggest obstacle. On large industrial farms, animals are raised in close contact with one another and with big concentrations of bacteria-laden feces and urine. Antibiotics keep infections at bay but also create drug resistance.
Gene Ellis

Why China will not buy the world - FT.com - 0 views

  • At the heart of the new global economy are what Prof Nolan calls “systems integrator” companies – businesses with dominant brands and superior technologies, which are at the apex of value chains that serve the global middle classes. These global businesses, in turn, exert enormous pressure on their supply chains, creating ever-rising consolidation there, as well.
  • Using data from 2006-09, Prof Nolan concludes that the number of globally dominant businesses in the manufacture of large commercial aircraft and carbonated drinks was two; of mobile telecommunications infrastructure and smart phones, just three; of beer, elevators, heavy-duty trucks and personal computers, four; of digital cameras, six; and of motor vehicles and pharmaceuticals, 10. In these cases, dominant businesses supplied between half and all of the world market. Similar degrees of concentration have emerged, after consolidation, in many industries
  • Much the same concentration can be seen among component suppliers.
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  • Such a business “typically possesses some combination of a number of key attributes, among them the capability to raise finance for large new projects and the resources necessary to fund a high level of research and development spending to sustain technological leadership, to develop a global brand, to invest in state-of-the-art information technology and to attract the best human resources”.
  • Moreover, “one hundred giant firms, all from the high-income countries, account for over three-fifths of the total R&D expenditure among the world’s top 1,400 companies. They are the foundation of the world’s technical progress in the era of capitalist globalisation”.
  • This creates growing tension, as governments find “their” companies ever harder to tax or regulate.
Gene Ellis

What If We Never Run Out of Oil? - Charles C. Mann - The Atlantic - 0 views

  • In most cases, mining tar sands involves drilling two horizontal wells, one above the other, into the bitumen layer; injecting massive gouts of high-pressure steam and solvents into the top well, liquefying the bitumen; sucking up the melted bitumen as it drips into the sand around the lower well; and then refining the bitumen into “synthetic crude oil.”
  • Economists sometimes describe a fuel in terms of its energy return on energy invested (EROEI), a measure of how much energy must be used up to acquire, process, and deliver the fuel in a useful form. OPEC oil, for example, is typically estimated to have an EROEI of 12 to 18, which means that 12 to 18 barrels of oil are produced at the wellhead for every barrel of oil consumed during their production. In this calculation, tar sands look awful: they have an EROEI of 4 to 7. (Steaming out the bitumen also requires a lot of water. Environmentalists ask, with some justification, where it all is going to come from.)
  • To obtain shale gas, companies first dig wells that reach down thousands of feet. Then, with the absurd agility of anime characters, the drills wriggle sideways to bore thousands of feet more through methane-bearing shale. Once in place, the well injects high-pressure water into the stone, creating hairline cracks. The water is mixed with chemicals and “proppant,” particles of sand or ceramic that help keep the cracks open once they have formed. Gas trapped between layers of shale seeps past the proppant and rises through the well to be collected.
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  • Water-assisted fracturing has been in use since the late 1940s, but it became “fracking” only recently, when it was married with horizontal drilling and the advanced sensing techniques that let it be used deep underground. Energy costs are surprisingly small; a Swiss-American research team calculated in 2011 that the average EROEI for fracked gas in a representative Pennsylvania county was about 87—about six times better than for Persian Gulf oil and 16 times better than for tar sands. (Fracking uses a lot of water, though, and activists charge that the chemicals contaminate underground water supplies.)
  • Today, a fifth of U.S. energy consumption is fueled by coal, mainly from Appalachia and the West, a long-term energy source that has provided jobs for millions, a century-old way of life
  • and pollution that kills more than 10,000 Americans a year (that estimate is from a 2010 National Research Council study).
  • Roughly speaking, burning coal produces twice as much carbon dioxide as burning the equivalent amount of natural gas. Almost all domestic coal is used to generate electricity—it produces 38 percent of the U.S. power supply. Fracking is swiftly changing this: in 2011, utilities reported plans to shut down 57 of the nation’s 1,287 coal-fired generators the following year. Largely in consequence, U.S. energy-related carbon-dioxide emissions have dropped to figures last seen in 1995. Since 2006, they have fallen more than those from any other nation in the world.
  • In the sort of development that irresistibly attracts descriptors like ironic, Germany, often touted as an environmental model for its commitment to solar and wind power, has expanded its use of coal, and as a result is steadily increasing its carbon-dioxide output. Unlike Americans, Europeans can’t readily switch to natural gas; Continental nations, which import most of their natural gas, agreed to long-term contracts that tie its price to the price of oil, now quite high.
  • Several researchers told me that the current towel-snapping between Beijing and Tokyo over islands in the East China Sea is due less to nationalistic posturing than to nearby petroleum deposits.)
  • In mid-March, Japan’s Chikyu test ended a week early, after sand got in the well mechanism. But by then the researchers had already retrieved about 4 million cubic feet of natural gas from methane hydrate, at double the expected rate.
  • What is known, says Timothy Collett, the energy-research director for the USGS program, is that some of the gulf’s more than 3,500 oil and gas wells are in gas-hydrate areas.
  • In Dutch-disease scenarios, oil weakens all the pillars but one—the petroleum industry, which bloats steroidally.
  • Because the national petroleum company, with its gush of oil revenues, is the center of national economic power, “the ruler typically puts a loyalist in charge,” says Michael Ross, a UCLA political scientist and the author of The Oil Curse (2012). “The possibilities for corruption are endless.” Governments dip into the oil kitty to reward friends and buy off enemies. Sometimes the money goes to simple bribes; in the early 1990s, hundreds of millions of euros from France’s state oil company, Elf Aquitaine, lined the pockets of businessmen and politicians at home and abroad.
  • How much of Venezuela’s oil wealth Hugo Chávez hijacked for his own political purposes is unknown, because his government stopped publishing the relevant income and expenditure figures. Similarly, Ross points out, Saddam Hussein allocated more than half the government’s funds to the Iraq National Oil Company; nobody has any idea what happened to the stash, though, because INOC never released a budget. (Saddam personally directed the nationalization of Iraqi oil in 1972, then leveraged his control of petroleum revenues to seize power from his rivals.)
  • “How will the royal family contain both the mullahs and the unemployed youth without a slush fund?”
  • It seems fair to say that if autocrats in these places were toppled, most Americans would not mourn. But it seems equally fair to say that they would not necessarily be enthusiastic about their replacements.
Gene Ellis

The euro crisis: Debtors' prison | The Economist - 0 views

  • But the reforms often fail to work. The Spanish law is intended to promote restructuring of viable firms but in practice most insolvencies end in liquidation after lengthy court proceedings.
  • High household debt helps explain why the Netherlands, along with Italy and Spain, remained in recession in the second quarter of 2013 even as the euro area in general embarked on recovery. Dutch GDP this year will be 2% lower than in 2011 and more than 3% below its previous peak, in 2008.
  • it illustrates the malign effect of high debt when house prices fall
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  • One aim of the exercise is to identify the bad debts that are fouling up euro-zone banks and preventing the flow of new credit. This is important because parts of the single-currency area are crippled not just by public borrowing but by private debt, most of which is sitting on banking books.
  • High private debt is more detrimental to growth than high public debt, according to recent research by the IMF.
  • The malign effect of high private debt becomes apparent in the busts that follow credit-driven booms. Households that have borrowed too much in relation to their income trim their spending, the main component of GDP. Overleveraged firms avoid investing and concentrate on shrinking their balance-sheets by paying off loans. As bad debts erode their capital, banks become more reluctant to lend. These adverse trends reinforce each other, increasing the overall drag on growth.
  • Other balance-sheet indicators also suggest that Italian business is in a bad way. For example, 30% of corporate debt is owed by firms whose pre-tax earnings are less than the interest payments they have to make. That share of frail companies is even higher in Spain and Portugal (40% and nearly 50% respectively).
  • Little progress has been made to lighten the private-debt burden since the crisis began. Though it eased in Spain from 227% of GDP in 2009 to 215% in 2012, it rose over the same period in Cyprus, Ireland and Portugal. In Britain, by contrast, private debt fell from 207% of GDP in 2009 to 190% in 2012 thanks to improvements by both households and firms.
  • There is an inherent contradiction between the need for debtor countries in the euro zone to regain competitiveness through lower prices and at the same time to ease excessive debt with a dose of inflation.
  • Firms that have overborrowed are reluctant to embark on new ventures, and banks are in any case reluctant to lend because their balance-sheets are peppered with bad debts. This unhappy state of affairs prevails throughout southern Europe though its precise causes vary.
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