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The Internationalist » The BRICS India Summit: Beyond Bricolage? - 0 views

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    BRICS
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The Morning Ledger: Europe Prepares for Nightmare Scenario - The CFO Report - WSJ - 0 views

  • But euro-zone members would probably have to take a big hit on loans to the country and banks could face heavy losses on their exposure to the Greek economy.
  • Contingency planning is ramping up on the corporate side, too. One European supermarket group has been looking closely at its suppliers’ financing requirements. “The key thing for them is how their working capital cycle is funded and whether they can get access to the banks that they normally would use, which may themselves be in a liquidity squeeze,” a treasury official at the company tells CFO European Briefing. “Our job is to ensure the channels of liquidity are open. If we can keep that going, a lot of the disruption can be minimized relatively quickly.”
  • Meanwhile, some portfolio managers are dumping debt of southern European countries, while others are piling into U.S. and German issues,
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Ways to accelerate private-sector deleveraging | Martin Wolf's Exchange - 0 views

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    The difficulties in financial de-leveraging.  Excellent piece.
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Eurocrisis: on towards total catastrophe - Mail Online - M E Synon's blog - 0 views

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    "catastrophe This is an edited version of my column in Monday's Irish Daily Mail -- "
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The delicate balance of fixing the eurozone | Martin Wolf's Exchange - 0 views

  • The euro itself was a leading cause of this crisis by ushering in a remarkably swift convergence in interest rates, which had the effect of directing too much capital into countries that formerly had had to pay high interest rates. This undermined the competitiveness of these countries through inflation and gave rise to huge deficits in their current accounts.
  • The euro is not suffering from a mere confidence crisis that can be resolved by assuaging the markets; it is experiencing a profound balance‐of‐payment crisis that is being prolonged by the expansion of public financial aid.
  • Since autumn 2007, long before the official bail‐out initiatives began, some of the crisis‐hit countries have replaced dwindling private capital imports and capital flight with their money‐printing presses (Target credits).
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  • 5. Export surpluses create no real value if they translate into claims vis‐à‐vis countries which ultimately cannot pay their debts,
  • 6. The ECB Council overstepped its mandate when it transferred to Eurozone national central banks, primarily the Bundesbank, the task of financing the public and private deficits of other countries.
  • 7. Germany’s liability for the bail‐out initiatives does not total 211 billion euros, as often cited, but is actually now close to 600 billion euros if the far larger bailout initiatives of the ECB are included in this figure.
  • 8. The Target credits and the purchase of government bonds by the ECB system transfer the investment risk of private investors and banks to the taxpayers of economically sound countries, posing a threat to the euro because they offer debtor countries incentives to advocate inflationary policies at the ECB Council which would help them defer their obligation to repay their foreign debts.
  • 9. Eurobonds would undermine debt discipline, lead to much higher interest burdens for the German state, and anew induce capital flows in Europe that would exacerbate the external imbalances.
  • ) Target debts are to be settled on an annual basis with interest‐bearing, marketable assets as in the US.
  • g) Countries that are not competitive enough to repay their foreign debts should, in their own interest, leave the Monetary Union.”
  • I also appreciate the fact that the declaration envisages a credit boom in Germany that would ultimately rebalance the eurozone economy. Nevertheless, this rebalancing is likely to prove painfully slow and certainly requires a prolonged period of relatively high inflation in Germany, to offset relatively low inflation in the vulnerable countries. It is far from clear that German public opinion is prepared for such an outcome.
  • More important, I do not believe a currency union that takes for granted the possibility of sovereign defaults and even exit would prove workable. It is a recipe for extreme financial instability, with huge runs on credit to banks, private non-banks and governments built in.
  • mechanisms of financing and adjustment. Permanent transfers from some countries to others, merely to offset a lack of
  • competitiveness (rather than accelerate income convergence), are indeed undesirable. Nevertheless, financing needs to be sufficiently large and generous to give vulnerable countries some chance of managing the adjustment to shocks, without sovereign default, mass private bankruptcies and implosion of financial systems.
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    The second major article on Professor Hans-Werner Sinn's attack on the premises of the eurozone. TARGET 2 analysis, plus...
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"Which Eurobonds?" by Jeffrey Frankel | Project Syndicate - 0 views

  • Any solution to the eurozone crisis must meet a short-run objective and a long-run goal. Unfortunately, the two tend to conflict.Illustration by Paul LachineCommentsView/Create comment on this paragraphThe short-run objective is to return Greece, Portugal, and other troubled countries to a sustainable debt path (that is, a declining debt/GDP ratio). Austerity has raised debt/GDP ratios, but a debt write-down or bigger bailouts would undermine the long-term goal of minimizing the risk of similar debt crises in the future.CommentsView/Create comment on this paragraph
  • it is hard to commit today to practice fiscal rectitude tomorrow. Official debt caps, such as the Maastricht fiscal criteria and the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), failed because they were unenforceable.
  • The introduction of Eurobonds – joint, aggregate eurozone liabilities – could be part of the solution, if designed properly. There is certainly demand for them in China and other major emerging countries, which are desperate for an alternative to low-yielding US government securities.
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  • But Germany remains opposed on moral-hazard grounds: a joint guarantee of Eurozone members’ liabilities would strengthen individual national governments’ incentive to spend beyond their means.
  • The German Council of Economic Experts has proposed a European Redemption Fund (ERF). The plan would convert into de facto 25-year Eurobonds the existing sovereign debt of member countries in excess of 60% of GDP, the threshold specified by the Maastricht criteria and the SGP.
  • But this seems upside down.
  • it offers absolution precisely on the 60%-of-GDP margin where countries will have the most trouble resisting temptation.
  • the main explanation for the absence of US moral hazard is that the right precedent was set in 1841, when the federal government let eight states and the Territory of Florida default.
  • Ever since 1841, the market requires that US states running up questionable levels of debt pay an interest-rate premium to compensate for the default risk.
  • Had the ECB operated from the outset under a rule prohibiting it from accepting SGP-noncompliant countries’ debt as collateral, the entire eurozone sovereign-debt problem might have been avoided.
  • the expansion in the US took place at the federal level, where spending today amounts to 24% of GDP, compared to just 1.2% of GDP for the European Union budget.
  • The version of Eurobonds that might work as the missing long-term enforcement mechanism is almost the reverse of the Germans’ ERF proposal: the “blue bonds” proposed two years ago by Jacques Delpla and Jakob von Weizsäcker. Under this plan, only debt issued by national authorities below the 60%-of-GDP threshold could receive eurozone backing and seniority. When a country issued debt above the threshold, the resulting “red bonds” would lose this status.
  • The point is that the enforcement mechanism would be truly automatic: market interest rates would provide the discipline that bureaucrats in Brussels cannot.
  • Of course, the eurozone cannot establish a blue-bond regime without first solving the problems of debt overhang and troubled banks. Otherwise, the plan itself would be destabilizing, because almost all countries would immediately be in the red.
  • But one thing seems clear. German taxpayers, whose longstanding suspicion of profligate Mediterranean euro members has been vindicated, will not be happy when asked to pay still more for the cause of European integration. At a minimum, they will need some credible reason to believe that 20 years of false assurances have come to an end – that this is the last bailout.
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Investors Seek Yields in Europe, but Analysts Warn of Risk - NYTimes.com - 0 views

  • Investors Seek Yields in Europe, but Analysts Warn of Risk
  • Once again, foreign investors are piling into the government bonds of Ireland, Spain and Portugal — countries that got into such debt trouble that they required bailouts. Now these countries are able to sell their bonds at lower interest rates than they have seen in years, renewing hope that Europe has turned a corner.
  • Claus Vistesen, the head of research at Variant Perception, a London-based economic research group, sees the ratio of debt to economic output as a continuing threat to a euro zone recovery.“People think growth is coming back,” Mr. Vistesen said, “but at the end of the day, debt is still going up.”
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  • Despite the suddenly easier terms under which Ireland and other recovering euro zone countries can borrow, the fact remains: These countries are still mired in stagnation.
    • Gene Ellis
       
      Do the maths here:  1600 a week jobs being lost equals, what, just over 80,000 jobs a year?  1200 jobs a week now being created, that's what, a little over 60,000 a year?  We've had 5-6 years of recession, so how many years to get back to where we were?  And, of course, the population was growing...
  • “Sixteen hundred jobs a week were being lost before we took office; we’re now in a position where 1,200 jobs a week are being created, and our consumer confidence numbers have been steadily growing.”
  • For the euro zone at large, though, a step back often follows each step forward. France and Italy, the bloc’s second- and third-largest economies, are increasingly seen as the latest sick men of the Continent. Even Germany, the bloc’s powerhouse, grew only feebly last year, by 0.4 percent.
  • In Ireland, more than 80 percent of the investment came from abroad, with banks and pension funds making up 37 percent of the offering and fund managers about half.
  • Mr. Kirkegaard cited “the hunt for yield.”
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Davos view: Don't get too confident about Eurozone prospects | The World - 0 views

  • Davos view: Don’t get too confident about Eurozone prospects
  • One was the danger that European elections could show a growing mood of political protest – and volatility. Secondly, the ECB’s stress tests could spark new market alarm about the banks – which would impact sovereigns too.
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