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Richard Koo (2003) coined the term “balance sheet recession” to characterise the endless travail of Japan following the collapse of its real estate and stock market bubbles in 1990. The Japanese government did not act to repair the balance sheets of the private sector following the crash. Instead, it chose a policy of keeping bank rate near zero so as to reduce deposit rates and let the banks earn their way back into solvency. At the same time it supported the real sector by repeated large doses of Keynesian deficit spending. It took a decade and a half for these policies to bring the Japanese economy back to reasonable health.

At the time, a majority of forecasts predicted that the economy would slip back into depression once defence expenditures were terminated and the armed forces demobilised. The forecasts were wrong. This famous postwar “forecasting debacle” demonstrated how simple income-expenditure reasoning, ignoring the state of balance sheets, can lead one completely astray.

But the reforms often fail to work. The Spanish law is intended to promote restructuring of viable firms but in practice most insolvencies end in liquidation after lengthy court proceedings.

High household debt helps explain why the Netherlands, along with Italy and Spain, remained in recession in the second quarter of 2013 even as the euro area in general embarked on recovery. Dutch GDP this year will be 2% lower than in 2011 and more than 3% below its previous peak, in 2008.

it illustrates the malign effect of high debt when house prices fall

The reason is not hard to fathom. Hobbled by severe damage to private and public-sector balance sheets, and with policy interest rates at or near zero, post-bubble economies have been mired in a classic “liquidity trap.” They are more focused on paying down massive debt overhangs built up before the crisis than on assuming new debt and boosting aggregate demand.

The sad case of the American consumer is a classic example of how this plays out. In the years leading up to the crisis, two bubbles – property and credit – fueled a record-high personal-consumption binge. When the bubbles burst, households understandably became fixated on balance-sheet repair – namely, paying down debt and rebuilding personal savings, rather than resuming excessive spending habits.CommentsView/Create comment on this paragraph

US consumers have pulled back as never before.

Expansion was, for lack of other options, financed largely through short-term loans.

since the onset of the global financial crisis, eurozone-based banks’ subsidiaries in emerging Europe have been reducing their exposure to the region. In 2009-2010, the European Bank Coordination Initiative – known informally as the “Vienna Initiative” – helped to avert a systemic crisis in developing Europe by stopping foreign-owned parent banks from staging a catastrophic stampede to the exits.CommentsView/Create comment on this paragraphBut, in the second half of 2011, the eurozone-based parent banks that dominate emerging Europe’s banking sector came under renewed pressure to deleverage. Many are now radically changing their business models to reduce risk.

No region of the world has benefited more from cross-border banking, yet these achievements are now at risk

The threat to cross-border banks comes not only from their deteriorating balance sheets in the face of lower sovereign-debt quality and weaker growth prospects, but also from the policy response itself.

a European solution must take account of the network of foreign subsidiaries across Europe.

Simple? Yet, not a single person on the face of this earth knows how to make me.

Not much meets the eye—there's some wood, lacquer, the printed labeling, graphite lead, a bit of metal, and an eraser.

a cedar of straight grain that grows in Northern California and Oregon

Its full name is more than a mouthful. Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross Settlement System is better known as TARGET2 for short. It is the behind-the-scene payments system that conveniently enables citizens across the euro area to settle electronic transactions in euro. And at just over €500 billion, its TARGET2 claim on the Eurosystem is also the largest and fastest growing item on the Bundesbank’s balance sheet, as well as a source of much misunderstanding and debate.

The allocation of TARGET2 balances among the seventeen national central banks, which together with the ECB make up the Eurosystem, reflects where the market allocates the money created by the ECB. The fact that the Bundesbank has a large TARGET2 claim (asset) on the Eurosystem, while national central banks in southern Europe and Ireland together have an equally large TARGET2 liability, simply reflects that a lot of the ECB’s newly created money has ended up in Germany. Why? Because of capital flight.

Since the euro eliminated exchange rate risk among its member states, Germany has invested a substantial portion of its savings in Europe’s current account deficit countries. Some of those savings are now returning home. That’s the capital flight.

Deposit flight from Spanish banks has been gaining pace and it is not clear a euro zone agreement to lend Madrid up to 100 billion euros in rescue funds will reverse the flows if investors fear Spain may face a full sovereign bailout.

Many banks are reorganising, or being forced to reorganise, along national lines, accentuating a deepening north-south divide within the currency bloc.

Since government credit ratings and bond yields effectively set a floor for the borrowing costs of banks and businesses in their jurisdiction, the best-managed Spanish or Italian banks or companies have to pay far more for loans, if they can get them, than their worst-managed German or Dutch peers.

It took financial markets more than a year to realize the implications of Chancellor Merkel’s declaration, demonstrating that they operate with far-from-perfect knowledge

the financial markets began to realize that government bonds, which had been considered riskless, carried significant risks and could actually default. When they finally discovered it, risk premiums in the form of higher yields that governments had to offer so as to sell their bonds rose dramatically. This rendered commercial banks whose balance sheets were loaded with those bonds potentially insolvent.

In New York and London, banks have set up dedicated crisis teams, and rehearsed elaborate responses.

Citigroup has $84 billion in loans, bonds and other types of exposure to troubled European countries, plus France. The bank’s filings indicate that all but $8 billion of that exposure is offset with collateral it has collected and hedges on the portfolio.

Some banks are testing their systems to deal with the possibility of new currencies and preparing guidance for clients on how to operate in such an environment.

Steel Industry Feeling Stress as Automakers Turn to Aluminum

These are headed for Mexico, to Navistar’s stamping plant there.Continue reading the main story

Now, they are trying to respond, making lighter, stronger steel in a bid to retain one of their most important customers, the automakers.

This coincided with the bubble years in peripheral Eurozone countries (2003-07). The effect of this is that Germany accumulated large net claims on Eurozone countries, which at the end of 2011 amounted to €634 billion.

These current account surpluses did not lead to TARGET2 claims during the bubble years because the counterpart of these surpluses were increasing claims held by (mainly) German banks against the other Eurozone countries.

the German banking system was lending the money to other Eurozone countries to allow them to buy surplus German products – a highly risky affair.

Comparing the first half of 2007 and the first half of 2013, real GDP contracted by an accumulated 1.3 per cent in the eurozone, 5.3 per cent in Spain and 8.4 per cent in Italy.

In the same period investment was down by an accumulated 19 per cent in the eurozone – and 38 per cent in Spain and 27 per cent in Italy. Between the first quarter of 2007 and the first quarter of 2013, employment fell 17 per cent in Spain and 2 per cent in Italy.

Italy is stuck with a combination of an unsustainable high level of public debt and no productivity growth. It has essentially two options to adjust – become like Germany, or leave the eurozone. The country is unable to do the first, and unwilling to do the latter

Europe has to do whatever it takes By Martin Wolf

Astonishingly, yields on Italian and Spanish 10-year debt have fallen from 6.3 per cent and 7.0 per cent, respectively, at the beginning of August 2012, to a mere 2.3 and 2.1 per cent early this month. That is below the yield on UK gilts.

Fiscal policy also continues to tighten, even though interest rates are at the zero bound: the OECD has forecast that the cyclically adjusted fiscal deficit of the eurozone would shrink from a mere 1.4 per cent in 2013 to an even more austere 0.9 per cent in 2014.

Four rescue measures for stagnant eurozone

The EBA has a long record of stress tests that grotesquely underestimate the capital holes in EU banks.

Profits Vanish in Venezuela After Currency Devaluation

The country’s high inflation — currently around 60 percent a year — has also meant that the prices in bolívares that companies charge for many goods and services have risen sharply.

Now companies are feeling the pain from a series of currency devaluations over the last year and a half. Photo