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The Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money published a paper that examines the interconnectedness CBDC development and adoption levels, digital asset returns and financial stability. (CBDC development and adoption was measured with a news media coverage based "CBDC Uncertainty Index" developed by Wang et al (2022).) The paper finds a significant level of connectedness between CBDCs, digital assets and financial stability, but only a weak positive connectedness between CBDCs and returns on digital assets. Furthermore, the study finds bidirectional connectedness between CBDCs and other financial stability measures, suggesting that changes in CBDC performance can influence the overall stability of the financial system, and vice versa.

"In this paper, we study the mechanisms that govern price stability of MakerDAO's DAI token, the first decentralized stablecoin. DAI works through a set of autonomous smart contracts, in which users deposit cryptocurrency collateral, typically Ethereum, and borrow a fraction of their positions as DAI tokens. Using data on the universe of collateralized debt positions, we show that DAI price covaries negatively with returns to risky collateral. The peg-price volatility is related to collateral risk, while the stability rate has little ability to stabilize the coin. The introduction of safe collateral types has led to an increase in peg stability."

The Financial Stability Board (FSB) published a report on the potential financial stability implications of distributed ledger technology (DLT) based financial asset tokenization. The report opines that many of the purported benefits of tokenization have yet to be fully proven, may not be uniquely achievable through tokenisation, and may involve trade-offs that might negate the benefits. And several vulnerabilities are identified relating to liquidity and maturity mismatch; leverage; asset price and quality; interconnectedness; and operational fragilities. Tokenization could have implications for financial stability if the tokenised part of the financial system scales up significantly, if increased complexity and opacity of tokenisation projects lead to unpredictable outcomes in times of stress, and if identified vulnerabilities are not adequately addressed through oversight, regulation, supervision, and enforcement.

The Financial Stability Board published two reports that consider the financial stability implications from an increasing offering of financial services by BigTech firms, and the adoption of cloud computing and data services across a range of functions at financial institutions.

The Bank of Canada [BoC] published a paper on the risks stablecoins could pose to the financial system. It argues that the stabilization mechanisms of stablecoins give rise to the risk of confidence runs, which can propagate to broader crypto-asset markets and the traditional financial sector. It also argues that stablecoins can contribute to financial stability risks by facilitating the buildup of leverage and liquidity mismatch in decentralized finance (DeFi). Such risks cannot be addressed by ensuring the price stability of stablecoins alone. Finally, it explores the potential implications of stablecoins for the current system of bank-intermediated credit and for monetary policy.

The European Central Bank (ECB) published a paper that shows the existence of a central bank trilemma. When a central bank is involved in financial intermediation, either directly through a central bank digital currency (CBDC) or indirectly through other policy instruments, it can only achieve at most two of three objectives: a socially efficient allocation, financial stability (i.e., absence of runs), and price stability. In particular, a commitment to price stability can cause a run on the central bank. Implementation of the socially optimal allocation requires a commitment to inflation.

The Financial Stability Board (FSB) published a report that explores potential factors driving the higher level of activities related to foreign currency-pegged stablecoins in emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs), the associated financial stability risks and regulatory challenges, and provides considerations to address them. EMDEs may be exposed to macro-financial risks arising from the use of foreign currency pegged global stablecoins, which can increase financial stability risks by destabilizing financial flows and straining fiscal resources.

Using a rich dataset of signed trades and order books on multiple exchanges, we examine how peg-sustaining arbitrage stabilizes the price of the largest stable coin, Tether. We find that stable-coin issuance, the closest analogue to central-bank intervention, plays only a limited role in stabilization, pointing instead to stabilizing forces on the demand side. Following Tether's introduction to the Ethereum blockchain in 2019, we find increased investor access to arbitrage trades, and a decline in arbitrage spreads from 70 to 30 basis points. We also pin down which fundamentals drive the two-sided distribution of peg price deviations: Premiums are due to stable coins' role as a safe haven, exhibiting, for example, premiums greater than 100 basis points during the COVID-19 panic of March 2020; discounts derive from liquidity effects and collateral concerns.

This ECB article focuses on the global stablecoin asset management functions, assessing their regulatory and financial stability implications. It argues that regulatory gaps may exist with certain design features, and concludes that the malfunctioning of that function could pose risks to financial stability given its potential size and interlinkages with the financial system. Also, a robust regulatory framework needs to be put in place in order to address these risks before such arrangements are allowed to operate.

"A global stablecoin network, if poorly designed and unregulated, could pose risks to financial stability. The failure of a stablecoin to operate as expected could disrupt other parts of the financial system. For example, the inability to convert stablecoins into domestic currency on demand or to settle payments on time could create credit and liquidity dislocations in the economy. If a stablecoin's credit, liquidity, market, and operational risks are managed ineffectively, it could face a loss of confidence. This loss of confidence could lead to a run, where many holders attempt to liquidate their stablecoins at the same time. In an extreme scenario, holders may be unable to do so, with potentially severe consequences for domestic or international economic activity, asset prices, or financial stability."

In a chapter in the April 2022 Global Financial Stability Report and an accompanying blog post, International Monetary Fund staff argue that, while Fintech can increase efficiency and competition and broaden access to financial services, the fast growth of fintech firms into risky business segments-and their inadequate regulation and interconnectedness with the traditional financial system-can have financial stability implications. The chapter explores three key types of fintech to illustrate these risks: digital banks ("neobanks"), long-established fintech firms in the US mortgage market, and decentralized finance ("DeFi"). The chapter argues that policies targeting fintech and traditional financial firms proportionally are needed. In the case of DeFi, regulations should focus on the elements of the crypto ecosystem that enable it, such as stablecoin issuers and centralized exchanges.

A paper by Yiming Ma, Yao Zeng, and Anthony Lee Zhang analyzes the run risk of USD-backed stablecoins and uncover a dilemma between stablecoins' price stability and financial stability. They show that panic runs exist even though general investors only trade stablecoins in secondary markets with flexible prices. Run incentives are reinstated by stablecoin issuers' liquidity transformation and the fixed $1 at which arbitrageurs redeem stablecoins for cash in the primary market. The authors discover that more efficient arbitrage amplifies run risk. This explains why stablecoin issuers only authorize a small set of arbitragers even though it comes at the expense of maintaining a stable secondary price. In other words, the centralization of arbitrage embeds an inherent tradeoff between run risk and price stability. The paper's findings are based on a model and a novel dataset on stablecoin redemptions, trading, and reserve assets. Calibrating the model, the authors find a higher run risk for USDT, the largest stablecoin, compared to USDC, the second-largest stablecoin. However, even USDC bears significant run risk due to its less concentrated arbitrage and more concentrated deposit holdings.

The  European Commission (EC) published an assessment of digital euro issuance on financial stability and commercial bank balance sheets. It concludes that a digital euro would not pose any significant risks to financial stability as long as take-up does not exceed EUR 3,000, although small banks that normally rely mostly on deposits as a source of funding, could face a potential decrease in profitability. A digital euro produces only small changes in the response of the economy to macroeconomic shocks, especially with a cap on holdings.

The US Fed published a paper that explores whether the digital financial system creates new potential challenges to financial stability. It describes emerging vulnerabilities that could present risks to financial stability in the future if the digital asset ecosystem becomes more systemic, including: run risks among large stablecoins, valuation pressures in crypto-assets, fragilities of decentralized finance (DeFi) platforms, growing interconnectedness, and a general lack of regulation.

"The Financial Stability Board (FSB) published today a toolkit for financial authorities and financial institutions for their third-party risk management and oversight. The toolkit was developed in response to concerns over the extent and nature of financial institutions' interactions with a broad and diverse ecosystem of third-party service providers, which could have implications for financial stability. The primary emphasis of the toolkit is on critical third-party services, given the potential impact of their disruption on financial institutions' critical operations and financial stability. It also looks holistically at financial institutions' third-party risk management in light of changing industry practices and recent regulatory and supervisory approaches to operational resilience."

The IMF published a paper that traces the development of fintech (excluding cryptocurrencies) and empirically assess its impact on financial stability in a panel of 198 countries over the period 2012-2020. The impact magnitude and statistical significance of fintech depend on the type of instrument (digital lending vs. digital capital raising). However, the overall effect turns out to be negative, albeit statistically insignificant, because of the overwhelming share of digital lending in the total. While digital capital raising is estimated to have a positive effect on financial stability in advanced economies, its effect is negative in developing countries.

The Financial Stability Board (FSB) published an examination of developments and associated vulnerabilities relating to unbacked crypto-assets, stablecoins; and decentralised finance (DeFi) and other platforms on which crypto-assets trade. The report notes that although the extent and nature of use of crypto-assets varies across jurisdictions, financial stability risks could rapidly escalate, underscoring the need for timely and pre-emptive evaluation of possible policy responses.

The US Federal Reserve Board (FRB) published a note that describes the general lifecycle of a stablecoin from its issuance to its redemption. It then categorizes various stabilization mechanisms and discuss how they work in practice. A key observation is that, although several stablecoins may peg their value to the same real-world asset, stabilization mechanisms can vary greatly in terms of maintaining stability with the reference asset, and so may have varying susceptibilities to the risk of runs from the stablecoin to the reference asset.

The U.S. Federal Reserve published a paper that examines the financial stability risks in times of stress associated with central bank digital currency (CBDC) under different design options. The analysis is based on lessons derived from historical case studies of bank runs as well as on an analytical framework that allows for the characterization of the mechanisms through which a CBDC can affect financial stability. It then discusses an extensive array of policy tools that can be employed to mitigate these risks.

The IMF published a paper that analyzes the financial stability implications of retail central bank digital currency (CBDC). It starts with a systematic analysis of balance sheet changes that arise from the new liability for the central bank and the banking system, and examine how they depend on preconditions, central bank choices, and banking system responses. Based on this, it discusses the range of implications for financial stability that may arise in steady state, in the context of adoption, and in crisis times. Threats to financial intermediation in steady state arise mainly in situations where the central bank balance sheet expands, and triggers adjustment mechanisms that lead to more costly or less stable funding of the banking system, while in crisis times run risk may increase. The analysis of policy choices to control these effects considers macroprudential policy, and an expansion of central bank lending to commercial banks, but finds that a main contribution needs to come from a design of the CBDC that encourages its use as a means of payment rather than a store of value.