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"Motivated by the regional bank crisis of 2023, we model the impact of interest rates on the liquidity risk of banks. Prior work shows that banks hedge the interest rate risk of their assets with their deposit franchise: when interest rates rise, the value of the assets falls but the value of the deposit franchise rises. Yet the deposit franchise is only valuable if depositors remain in the bank. This creates run incentives for uninsured depositors. We show that a run equilibrium is absent at low interest rates but appears when rates rise because the deposit franchise comes to dominate the value of the bank. The liquidity risk of the bank thus increases with interest rates. We provide a formula for the bank's optimal risk management policy. The bank should act as if its deposit rate is more sensitive to market rates than it really is, i.e., as if its "deposit beta" is higher. This leads the bank to shrink the duration of its assets. Shortening duration has a downside, however: it exposes the bank to insolvency if interest rates fall. The bank thus faces a dilemma: it cannot simultaneously hedge its interest rate risk and liquidity risk exposures. The dilemma disappears only if uninsured deposits do not contribute to the deposit franchise (if they have a deposit beta of one). The recent growth of low-beta uninsured checking and savings accounts thus poses stability risks to banks. The risks increase with interest rates and are amplified by other exposures such as credit risk. We show how they can be addressed with an optimal capital requirement that rises with interest rates."

The BIS published a paper that that explores the implications of central bank digital currency (CBDC) remuneration and convenience, focusing on the US monetary system with its large excess reserves, with the rate of interest on reserves (IOR) as the main monetary policy tool. The paper finds that at low IOR rates, large banks are non-responsive to IOR rate changes, leading to weak pass-through of IOR rate changes to deposit rates. Here an interest-bearing CBDC could provide competitive pressure to drive up deposit rates and improve monetary policy transmission. However, increasing remuneration past a point where it becomes a binding floor, increases deposit rates but leads to greater inequality of market shares in both deposit and lending markets, and reducing deposit rate responsiveness to IOR changes... The paper also finds that payment convenience is a crucial aspect of CBDC design that may be more desirable than remunerating CBDC. Payment convenience could be driven by a host of features that enhance the performance of CBDC as a medium of exchange. Examples include the quality of the user interface, processing speed, privacy and access to markets. A highly convenient CBDC produces sufficient competitive pressure in deposit markets to raise deposit rates for any given level of IOR and increases the responsiveness of deposit rates to IOR rate changes. Increasing payment convenience also has favorable effects on market composition by levelling the playing field

Issuers of stablecoins have thrived while nominal interest rates have been near zero. With high positive interest rates, the opportunity cost of holding zero-interest stablecoins increases and the issuers lose business. With significantly negative rates, the value of safe reserves declines but the tokens are still redeemable at par. Issuers face insolvency and must invest in riskier reserves for a chance to survive. If stablecoins are no longer fully backed by safe and liquid assets and are widely used, this creates financial stability risks. Suppose the issuers could pass on their interest earnings (or costs if rates are negative) on reserves to the token holders on a one-on-one basis. If interest rates are high, stablecoins are a competitive liquid store of value. If they are significantly negative, the issuers' liabilities shrink along with their reserve; the issuer remains solvent. Stablecoins could be sustainable in all interest rate environments. There is a problem though, at least for the EU with the Regulation on Markets in Crypto-assets (MiCA) that is expected to come into force in 2024. This proscribes the paying of interest on money tokens. That would force issuers to adopt a business model that is only sustainable with near-zero interest rates.

"Why are interest rates on dollar-pegged stablecoins so much higher than interest rates on actual dollars? You'd think that a stablecoin worth a dollar would command the same interest rate as a dollar, namely zero. But a quick search of lending rates on stablecoins reveals rates of anything from 9% to 13%, or even more."

Decentralized finance (DeFi) is expanding into the world of interest rate swaps (IRS), a derivative instrument for exchanging fixed and variable interest rates, which account for more than $1 quadrillion in exchanged value per annum in traditional finance. DeFi firm Voltz Labs has launched a non-custodial automated market making (AMM) IRS trading platform based on the Aave and Compound DeFi USDT, USDC, DAI and ETH lending markets. However, IRS AMMs are challenged by DeFi markets' lack of fixed-rate products off which to price swaps. (Traditional markets offer both variable- and fixed-rate products.)

The Bitcoin network hash rate has just taken a steep plummet and is now down almost 45% from its 2020 peak. The hash rate measures the number of calculations that the network can perform each second. A higher hash rate means greater competition among miners to validate new blocks; it also increases the number of resources needed for performing a 51% attack, making the network more secure.

Circle published a breakdown of the assets backing its USDC stablecoin in its latest attestation report. According to the report, on May 28 bout 61% of its tokens were backed by cash and money market funds. Yankee certificates of deposit (i.e., issued by non-US banks) comprise a further 13%, short-term U.S. Treasury securities account for 12%, unsecured commercial paper accounts for 9%, and the remaining tokens are backed by unsecured short-term municipal and corporate bonds. By "short-term" is meant a maximum term to maturity of three years, and the overall portfolio weighted average maturity is limited to 1.5 years. There are also credit rating limits based on S&P scales. The overall portfolio must main an average credit rating must of A or better, commercial paper holdings must be rated A1 on the short-term scale, and for bonds issued by corporations and financial institutions must be rated BBB+ or higher on the long-term scale.

MakerDAO (MKR) set interest rates on most assets, with the notable exclusion of Ether (ETH), back above 0%. Lowering interest rates is generally seen as a way of stimulating DAI creation, which is supposed to lower its price to its intended $1 peg, but DAI is trading at $1.03, significantly above its intended price. Maker has yet to find a satisfactory mechanism to entice arbitrageurs to bring the price down to $1. Several proposals based on strong-handed market interventions are being discussed, while external observers often bring up the idea of setting negative interest rates. The Maker community appears to be unwilling to cross that line for now, however.

The Dallas Fed published a working paper that analyzes the impact of introducing a central bank digital currency (CBDC) on financial inclusion, and its potential adverse effect on bank funding. We highlight the role of two design parameters: the fixed cost of CBDC usage and the interest rate it pays, and derive principles for maximum inclusion and for mitigating the inclusion-intermediation trade-off. Agents' choice of money instrument is endogenously driven by income heterogeneity. Pre-CBDC, wealthier agents adopt deposits, while poorer agents adopt cash and remain unbanked. CBDCs with low fixed costs (and low interest rates) are adopted by cash holders and directly increase inclusion. CBDCs with high fixed costs (and high interest rates) are adopted by deposit holders and increase inclusion by raising deposit rates. The former allows for more favorable inclusion-intermediation trade-offs.

"We consider a continuous-time financial market with no arbitrage and no transactions costs. In this setting, we introduce two types of perpetual contracts, one in which the payoff to the long side is a fixed function of the underlyers and the long side pays a funding rate to the short side, the other in which the payoff to the long side is a fixed function of the underlyers times a discount factor that changes over time but no funding payments are required. Assuming asset prices are continuous and strictly positive, we derive model-free expressions for the funding rate and discount rate of these perpetual contracts as well as replication strategies for the short side. When asset prices can jump, we derive expressions for the funding and discount rates, which are semi-robust in the sense that they do not depend on the dynamics of the volatility process of the underlying risky assets, but do depend on the intensity of jumps under the market's pricing measure. When asset prices can jump and the volatility process is independent of the underlying risky assets, we derive an explicit replication strategy for the short side of a perpetual contract. Throughout the paper, we illustrate through examples how specific perpetual contracts relate to traditional financial instruments such as variance swaps and leveraged exchange traded funds."

"We use a microeconomic banking model to investigate the effects of introducing an economy-wide, account-type CBDC on a bank's loan supply and its failure risk. Given that a CBDC is expected to lower the cost of liquidity circulation and become a strong substitute for demand deposits, both the loan supply and the bank failure risk increase. These increases are countered by subsequent increases in the rates of return on term deposits and loans, which, in turn, reduce the loan supply and thus bank failure risk. These offsetting forces lead to no significant change in banking, as long as the rate of return on loans is below a certain threshold. However, once the rate is above the threshold, bank failure risk increases, thereby undermining banking stability. The problem is more pronounced when the degree of pass-through of funding costs to the loan rate is high and the profitability of a successful project is low. Our results imply that central banks wishing to introduce an economy-wide, account-type CBDC should first monitor yields on bank loans and consider policy measures that induce banks to maintain adequate liquidity reserve levels."

S&P Global unveiled ratings for eight stablecoins. On a grading scale of one (very strong) to five (very weak) USDC, Pax Dollar (USDP) and Gemini Dollar (GUSD) scored all scored two strong), while Tether's USDT scored a four (constrained). USDT was penalized for its lack of transparency and for holding some higher risk assets. The ratings are based on an assessment of asset quality risks, including credit, market value, and custody risks, the degree of any risk mitigants like overcollateralization requirements and liquidation mechanisms, governance, legal and regulatory framework, redeemability and liquidity, technology and third-party dependencies, and track record.

"Even though the rate to borrow Tether is higher than the rate to borrow USD Coin, it may be worthwhile for me to go with the a Tether loan if I think that the odds of Tether failing justify the higher financing cost. We can even go a bit further and say that the 0.9% premium on a Tether loan is the market's best estimate of the odds of Tether losing its peg relative to USD Coin losing its peg. So for all those would-be stablecoin analysts out there, keep your eye on Aave's USD Coin-Tether spread. It's a good indicator of stablecoin risk."

For a definitive answer on whether the hash rate follows the price or vice-versa, we will likely need to wait another ten years to have a large enough data set to accurately analyze the correlation.

Libra type systems face different kinds of difficulties in low and high interest rate environments. In high rate environments, the opportunity cost of holding the currency is high, which leads to lower quantity demanded. In low rate environments, the revenue stream may be insufficient to cover the costs incurred by the intermediaries. This creates an incentive for asset substitution, i.e., to allow backing the currency with higher risk assets (with higher yields) thereby increasing insolvency and run risks.

The Bitcoin network hash rate, which was reaching all-time highs a few weeks ago, has recently dropped around 40% yesterday. According to information from Coin.dance, the hash rate plummeted from 98 million to 57,7 million TH/s.

Crypto exchanges, including Coinbase and Kraken, have developed a system to rate which crypto-assets are likely to be securities. Crypto-assets are rated on a scale of 1 to 5, with the highest value signifying that a token is a security.

Negative interest rates can potentially pose a challenge to the ability of USD-backed stablecoins to operate as-is," Garrick Hileman, head of research at Blockchain.com, told The Block. "Specifically, the types of backing assets held by a stablecoin operator may need to be adjusted in a negative rates environment, and such changes may introduce additional risk to maintaining the 1:1 redemption peg.

Some of the world's biggest bitcoin mining pools that cater to Chinese miner clients have seen a sharp hash rate drop over the past 24 hours. Data from BTC.com shows that major China-based bitcoin mining pools, in particular AntPool, F2Pool, Poolin, BTC.com, have seen hash rate drops between 11% to 30% in the last 24 hours. Bitcoin mining pools run by Huobi and Binance have also seen a 24-hour decline of over 10%.

At the heart of the Raisin model is a platform that allows savers to move their deposits to banks that offer a higher interest rate than their local providers. "The average interest rate on deposits at the large US banks is 0.01 percent. But there are around 6,000 U.S. banks. Some of them offer rates of more than 2 percent.