Skip to main content

Home/ European Union/ Group items tagged enlargement_theory

Rss Feed Group items tagged

Prof. Dr  Wolfgang Schumann

European Union External Governance - Journal of European Public Policy, Volume 16 Issue... - 0 views

  • EU rules beyond EU borders: theorizing external governance in European politics Sandra Lavenex; Frank Schimmelfennig Pages 791 – 812 Abstract | References | Full Text PDF | Full Text HTML | Request Permissions Related Articles  buy now Modes of external governance: a cross-national and cross-sectoral comparison Sandra Lavenex;  Dirk Lehmkuhl; Nicole Wichmann Pages 813 – 833 Abstract | References | Full Text PDF | Full Text HTML | Request Permissions Related Articles  buy now Which rules shape EU external governance? Patterns of rule selection in foreign and security policies Esther Barbé;  Oriol Costa;  Anna Herranz Surrallés; Michal Natorski Pages 834 – 852 Abstract | References | Full Text PDF | Full Text HTML | Request Permissions Related Articles  buy now ./content%7Edb=all%7Econtent=a
  • EU rules beyond EU borders: theorizing external governance in European politics Sandra Lavenex; Frank Schimmelfennig Pages 791 – 812 Abstract | References | Full Text PDF | Full Text HTML | Request Permissions Related Articles  buy now Modes of external governance: a cross-national and cross-sectoral comparison Sandra Lavenex;  Dirk Lehmkuhl; Nicole Wichmann Pages 813 – 833 Abstract | References | Full Text PDF | Full Text HTML | Request Permissions Related Articles  buy now Which rules shape EU external governance? Patterns of rule selection in foreign and security policies Esther Barbé;  Oriol Costa;  Anna Herranz Surrallés; Michal Natorski Pages 834 – 852 Abstract | References | Full Text PDF | Full Text HTML | Request Permissions Related Articles  buy now bo
  •  
    Articles - EU rules beyond EU borders: theorizing external governance in European politics - Modes of external governance: a cross-national and cross-sectoral comparison - Which rules shape EU external governance? Patterns of rule selection in foreign and security policies - Constraining external governance: interdependence with Russia and the CIS as limits to the EU's rule transfer in the Ukraine - Hierarchy, networks, or markets: how does the EU shape environmental policy adoptions within and beyond its borders? - Democracy promotion as external governance? - EU promotion of democratic governance in the neighbourhood
Prof. Dr  Wolfgang Schumann

Schneider (2008): Conflict, Negotiation and European Union Enlargement - 0 views

  • Each wave of expansion of the European Union has led to political tensions and conflict. Existing members fear their membership privileges will diminish and candidates are loath to concede the expected benefits of membership. Despite these conflicts, enlargement has always succeeded - so why does the EU continue to admit new states even though current members might lose from their accession? Combining political economy logic with statistical and case study analyses, Christina J. Schneider argues that the dominant theories of EU enlargement ignore how EU members and applicant states negotiate the distribution of enlargement benefits and costs. She explains that EU enlargement happens despite distributional conflicts if the overall gains of enlargement are redistributed from the relative winners among existing members and applicants to the relative losers. If the overall gains from enlargement are sufficiently great, a redistribution of these gains will compensate losers, making enlargement attractive for all states.• Offers an in-depth overview of existing literature on EU integration and enlargement • Features past enlargements, the formal enlargement process, and other information relevant for EU enlargement • Includes a combination of different methods: game-theory, quantitative analysis and case studiesContents1. Introduction; 2. EU enlargements and transitional periods; 3. A rationalist puzzle of EU enlargement?; 4. A theory of discriminatory membership; 5. EU enlargement, distributional conflicts, and the demand for compensation; 6. The discriminatory of membership; 7. Discriminatory membership and intra-union redistribution; 8. Conclusion.
1 - 2 of 2
Showing 20 items per page