ENG 1103

Carly Amos

Agreeing to disagree. Annals of Statisitics 4, 1236-1239] derives his famous we cannot agree to disagree result under the assumption that people are expected utility () decision makers. Motivated by empirical evidence against EU theory, we study the possibility of agreeing to disagree within the framework of Choquet expected utility () theory which generalizes EU theory by allowing for ambiguous beliefs. As our first main contribution, we show that people may well agree to disagree if their Bayesian updating of ambiguous beliefs is psychologically biased in our sense. Remarkably, this finding holds regardless of whether people with identical priors apply the same psychologically biased Bayesian update rule or not. As our second main contribution, we develop a formal model of Bayesian learning under ambiguity. As a key feature of our approach the posterior subjective beliefs do, in general, not converge to "true" probabilities which is in line with psychological evidence against converging learning behavior. This finding thus formally establishes that CEU decision makers may even agree to disagree in the long-run despite the fact that they always received the same information.

Reactions are stimulated by external stimuli which cause our brain to fire immediately. Often we see things that make us cringe and fill us full of anger.

Abstract Background and objectives: Recombinant human growth hormone (rhGH) has been on the list of forbidden substances since availability of its recombinant form improved in the early 1990s. Although its effectiveness in enhancing physical performance is still unproved, the compound is likely used for its potential anabolic effect on the muscle growth, and also in combination with other products (androgens, erythropoietin, etc.). The degree of similarity between the endogenous and the recombinant forms, the pulsatile secretion and marked interindividual variability makes detection of doping difficult. Two approaches proposed to overcome this problem are: the indirect method, which measures a combination of several factors in the biological cascade affected by administration of GH; and the direct method, which measures the difference between the circulating and the recombinant (represented by the unique 22 kD molecule) forms of GH. This article gives an overview of what is presently known about hGH in relation to sport. The available methods of detection are also evaluated. Methods: Review of the literature on GH in relation to exercise, and its adverse effects and methods of detection when used for doping. Results and conclusion: The main effects of exercise on hGH production and the use and effects of rhGH in athletes are discussed. Difficulties encountered by laboratories to prove misuse of this substance by both indirect and direct analyses are emphasised. The direct method currently seems to have the best reliability, even though the time window of detection is too short. hGH doping is a major challenge in the fight against doping. The effect of exercise on hGH and its short half-life are still presenting difficulties during doping analysis. To date the most promising method appears to be the direct approach utilising immunoassays.

Why do People Disagree? The author of this blog explains the causes of disagreement through psychological studies. He says that people disagree due to different desires, mentalities, and backgrounds. People who were raised differently might have conflicting morals with another individual who was brought up in a different setting with different guidelines to live by, therefore affecting their assumptions leading to difference in opinion, or a disagreement. People who care more about a certain issue may value their issue over another individual's issue; for example, let's say that Brayden thinks that pens are the best writing utensils while I argue that pencils are better. If Brayden's personal belief that pens are better than pencils is one that he feels very strongly about, it is going to be difficult to get him to side with me and say that pencils are better. It is all about being open to new suggestions in order to either learn new facts about certain issues, or agree to disagree respectively.

Aumann [Aumann R., 1976. Agreeing to disagree. Annals of Statisitics 4, 1236-1239] derives his famous we cannot agree to disagree result under the assumption that people are expected utility (=EU) decision makers. Motivated by empirical evidence against EU theory, we study the possibility of agreeing to disagree within the framework of Choquet expected utility (=CEU) theory which generalizes EU theory by allowing for ambiguous beliefs. As our first main contribution, we show that people may well agree to disagree if their Bayesian updating of ambiguous beliefs is psychologically biased in our sense. Remarkably, this finding holds regardless of whether people with identical priors apply the same psychologically biased Bayesian update rule or not. As our second main contribution, we develop a formal model of Bayesian learning under ambiguity. As a key feature of our approach the posterior subjective beliefs do, in general, not converge to "true" probabilities which is in line with psychological evidence against converging learning behavior. This finding thus formally establishes that CEU decision makers may even agree to disagree in the long-run despite the fact that they always received the same information.

This article states why it is that some people will always disagree with others no matter what the subject is. This article lists some personal reasons why people disagree with others. Emotion and education are key factors.

Abstract The current study examines developing changes in children's intuitions about why disagreements about decisions might occur, focusing on what children understand about partiality and how it may vary depending on the context. Eighty children ages 6 to 13 years old and 20 adults were presented with stories in which there was a disagreement with the judge about who the winner of a contest should be. Participants were asked to generate their own explanations for why the disagreement may have occurred and to evaluate the plausibility of different explanations provided by the experimenter. Even 6-year-olds generated and endorsed partiality as a possible explanation for disagreement, although they did so at a lower rate than older children. A richer understanding of how context influences both the reasons for disagreement and the likelihood of partiality seems to develop over childhood.

The four main reasons people disagree are: Objective, Method, Communication, and Emotion

The four main reasons people disagree include: Objective -What one person wants to accomplish is different than what the other person wants. Method- They may agree on the objective, but they have differing opinions on the best way to achieve the objective. Communication- They may agree on both the objective and the method, but they don't realize it. They keep arguing, and because of miscommunication they each get the impression that the other person disagrees. Emotion- They may agree on the objective and the method, and they may even understand that they agree on these things. But they choose to disagree anyway (or at least one of them does). There are a lot of possible emotional reasons: everything from distrust, dislike and hate, to embarrassment, fear, peer pressure, face-saving or just a steadfast commitment to a prior position.

This article talks about the statistics on abortion. It gives numbers on how many girls and women get abortions each year, who is getting them, who performs the abortions, and how the abortion is done.

Why Do People Disagree? Explaining and Endorsing the Possibility of Partiality in Judgments The current study examines developing changes in children's intuitions about why disagreements about decisions might occur, focusing on what children understand about partiality and how it may vary depending on the context. Eighty children ages 6 to 13 years old and 20 adults were presented with stories in which there was a disagreement with the judge about who the winner of a contest should be. Participants were asked to generate their own explanations for why the disagreement may have occurred and to evaluate the plausibility of different explanations provided by the experimenter. Even 6-year-olds generated and endorsed partiality as a possible explanation for disagreement, although they did so at a lower rate than older children. A richer understanding of how context influences both the reasons for disagreement and the likelihood of partiality seems to develop over childhood.

The current study examines developing changes in children's intuitions about why disagreements about decisions might occur, focusing on what children understand about partiality and how it may vary depending on the context. Eighty children ages 6 to 13 years old and 20 adults were presented with stories in which there was a disagreement with the judge about who the winner of a contest should be. Participants were asked to generate their own explanations for why the disagreement may have occurred and to evaluate the plausibility of different explanations provided by the experimenter. Even 6-year-olds generated and endorsed partiality as a possible explanation for disagreement, although they did so at a lower rate than older children. A richer understanding of how context influences both the reasons for disagreement and the likelihood of partiality seems to develop over childhood

Psychologists are led to believe that children under 6-years old are unable to recognize the difference between objective and subjective examination. This lack of awareness leads to the idea that "People are always telling the truth without bias.

People tend to be dogmatic towards a single mindset and that their opinions are indeed fact. Because there are times when truth is not known, people will disagree on what truth is involved in such situations.