Corporate control of public sphere

Residents who do not have a personal connection to the network but depend on collective access cannot, as we have seen, benefit from the ‘social’ tariff because the overall consumption at their connection puts them in the higher bracket.

Today, by contrast with the situation that prevailed in 1996, 90 per cent of people in Dakar and 85 per cent of those in other cities officially have access to drinking water (79 per cent and 63 per cent respectively have an individual connection to the network; the others rely on a collective connection close to their residence). More than 1.64 million additional people are said to have gained access to the water network, particularly through 150,000 so-called ‘social’ connections, offered at a very low rate for the poor. Cuts in the water supply, frequent before, have become increasingly rare. The quality of the water supply has also improved.

In contrast, however, to what is suggested (including towards the Senegalese themselves) by the promoters of public–private partnerships, most of the progress in extending infrastructure and network connections has not been accomplished by the private company responsible for commercial exploitation, the SDE, but by the public company responsible for infrastructure, SONES.

The fact that there has been no additional price increase since 2003 can be partially explained by state policy (as the price of water is set by the state), and the will to provide a positive response to pressure from consumer organisations and trade unions.

It is a usual strategy of proponents of public–private partnerships in the water sector to start with ‘soft’ forms of privatisation such as lease contracts in order to ensure a better acceptance by the often reluctant local population, at a later stage, of more extensive forms of privatisation such as concessions. It is therefore all the more necessary to have a closer look, beyond the promotional announcements disseminated by international financial institutions, at the reality of the progress achieved since 1996.

Ultimately, the lease contract has reinforced previously existing dichotomies in the provision of water services, creating a two-tier system distinguishing between creditworthy consumers and others, at the expense of a perspective of universal right to water for all citizens of Senegal. This two-tier system is likely, once again, to be compounded by a total concession of the service.

nly two ways they can secure reasonable profits – which is the only raison d’être for a private company. These are either by drastically increasing the price of water, with the risk of being confronted with the resistance of the population and soaring unpaid bills, or by failing to implement but a small portion of the necessary investments – a trend already common among private contractors because their contracts do not run for more than 25 years, while the lifetime of networks and equipment is closer to 50 years. In both cases, the population, and primarily the poor, will bear the costs.

But above all, without denying the past and present problems of the water public service in Senegal, only a solution based on public management seems likely to extend the progress already achieved and to address the structural problems identified above.

two conditions. The first is a genuine democratic reform of the water service, with real transparency, accountability and genuine participation of citizens and civil society. Various public services from the global South, in Brazil and India in particular, have carried out such reforms to great success.

is the ability to access financial, technical and organisational support. If international financial institutions and major donors continue to focus on public–private partnerships as the only solution to all the problems of the water sector and as a condition to access their loans, there is an emerging trend in favour of public solutions.

Moussa Diop

The phenomenon of the commodification of life is also affecting land.

In Mali, a public-private partnership system and a framework of long-term leases have been used to lease several tens of thousands of hectares of land at very low cost to foreign governments or private investors (both foreign and nationals).

This new plague of land grabbing, over and above being characterised by huge areas, is just the tip of the iceberg of commercial farming, one that uses vast quantities of water. Agronomically speaking, it has been proven that the quantity of water required to grow 1 kg of rice could grow 3 kg of sorghum. When this land is being used to grow agro-fuel, it will work even more against food security. For those communities that are affected, land grabbing also involves water grabbing. This is a factor in many conflicts.