Foreign Policy: Ending North Korea's Endless Nuclear Drama - 0 views
-
the United States and its allies have had serious disagreements over North Korea. Japan is prepared to obstruct negotiations until Pyongyang comes clean on the handful of Japanese kidnapped by the North some 30 years ago. The Chinese have wanted to moderate and ultimately change North Korea through reform and sizable economic support, but have little to show for it. Many of the cognoscenti see China as the ultimate arbiter compelling North Korean cooperation. That, of course, has not happened. China has its own interest -- keeping North Korea afloat -- and that's not likely to change. The U.S. and Chinese economies are now so enmeshed that U.S. leverage on China is very limited. South Korea's "sunshine policy," which provided large-scale aid in hopes of ultimately seducing North Korea, was despised by the Bush administration. (Ironically, a new South Korean government abandoned the policy just as the United States was softening its approach to the North.)
-
The U.S. administration seems content to resume six-party talks where they left off: completing the "phase two" agreement, exchanging fuel oil for disablement of the North's plutonium facilities, and an agreement on verification, the sticking point precipitating the breakdown of negotiations. Preventing North Korea from producing more fissile material makes sense. From there, the going gets increasingly tough.
-
The weight of evidence suggests that North Korea will be unwilling to give up its nuclear weapons for a long time, if ever. The apparent North Korean interest in trading the dismantling of its plutonium facilities for light water reactors will not likely go down well in Washington. It is not much of a deal.
- ...3 more annotations...
-
Nuclear weapons are Kim Jong Il's trump card. They get international attention. If U.S. President Barack Obama wants to make real progress on denuclearization, he must take a more comprehensive approach with North Korea under the umbrella of the six-party talks. In addition to pursuing denuclearization, he should opt for a radical change in relations: a peace treaty for the peninsula, the normalization of all political and economic relations, and a big economic package for the North, including increasing integration into the global economy. Only a major improvement in its overall situation might lead North Korea to consider some change in course and give up its nuclear weapons.
-
There are, of course, difficulties and downsides. Heavy opposition in Washington might not be worth the cost of a highly uncertain, radically different approach. It could also be unacceptable to both South Korea and Japan, which are not eager to offer goodies to Pyongyang that might not be reciprocated. North Korea's opaqueness raises verification problems, which may be impossible to work out. And Kim Jong Il might simply not be interested in such a big-bang deal.
-
But without an approach like this, you can bank on endless, fruitless negotiations. Going down today's six-party route will also require the United States to shore up its deterrence in the area, particularly for Japan, and strengthen the antiproliferation initiative to guard against North Korean nuclear and missile exports. Enlarging the framework of negotiations looks like the only serious way of achieving a negotiated end to North Korea's nuclear weapons programs. Doing so will require lots of patience, intensive alliance management, and internal political risk with no certain result. But it's worth a shot. At a minimum, having such a package out there may be of some help should the Dear Leader depart the scene.