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The Obama administration said the move reiterated its previously-stated commitment to end the use of torture by its officers, and would protect those who acted within the limits set out by a previous legal opinion.

Mr Obama gave an assurance that "those who carried out their duties relying in good faith upon legal advice from the Department of Justice... will not be subject to prosecution".

One of the documents contained legal authorisation for a list of specific harsh interrogation techniques, including pushing detainees against a wall, facial slaps, cramped confinement, stress positions and sleep deprivation. The memo also authorises the use of "waterboarding", or simulated drowning, and the placing of a detainee into a confined space with an insect.

The release of the memos stems from a request by civil rights group the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU).

Mr Parker said the decision to allow the use of insects in interrogation was reminiscent of the Room 101 nightmare described by George Orwell in his seminal novel, 1984.

The approved tactic - to place al-Qaeda suspect Abu Zubaydah, who is afraid of insects, inside a box filled with caterpillars but to tell him they were stinging insects - was never used.

During his first week in office, President Obama issued an executive order officially outlawing the use of harsh interrogation techniques by the CIA, and forcing the agency to adhere to standards laid out in the US Army Field Manual.

"Bottom line here is you've had crimes committed," Amnesty International analyst Tom Parker told the BBC.

the former head of the CIA under former President George W Bush, Gen Michael Hayden, said the White House move would undermine intelligence work and dissuade foreign agencies from sharing information with the CIA. "If you want an intelligence service to work for you, they always work on the edge. That's just where they work," he told the Associated Press.

The policy of trying to isolate Cuba also works—perversely enough—to bolster the Cuban regime. The U.S. embargo provides Cuba's leaders a convenient excuse—the country's economic travails are due to U.S. sanctions, they can claim, not their own failed policies. The lack of American visitors and investment also helps the government maintain political control.

There is one more reason to doubt the wisdom of continuing to isolate Cuba. However slowly, the country is changing. The question is whether the United States will be in a position to influence the direction and pace of this change. We do not want to see a Cuba that fails, in which the existing regime gives way to a repressive regime of a different stripe or to disorder marked by drugs, criminality, terror or a humanitarian crisis that prompts hundreds of thousands of Cubans to flee their country for the United States.

According to the intelligence minister, the US and some western countries were aiming to achieve unrest in Iran's elections atmosphere. When asked by a reporter about the arrest of foreign spies working under the guise of reporters, Mohseni-Ejei said, "Anybody who embarks on espionage activity in the country will be arrested. A foreign reporter has so far been nabbed and another one has been questioned and his things were confiscated." The Iranian government has arrested a reporter working for the Newsweek and another one working for the Washington Times.

While President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad continues to make belligerent noises about Israel and the West, others in Tehran have hinted that they're ready for a change. In a Mar. 21 speech, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei trotted out standard anti-American rhetoric but also indicated a willingness to talk. And Ahmadinejad's probable opponent in the June presidential election, former Prime Minister Mir Hossein Moussavi, favors negotiations with the US. "Obama has prompted Iranians to have an open debate about the relationship they want to have with the US," says Gary Sick, an Iran specialist at Columbia University in New York. "This is something that hasn't been seen in 30 years."

Most Iranian executives seem to be rooting for Moussavi. Although he is an old-guard leftist, businesspeople hope he would lead a reform-minded administration that could ease Iran's isolation. "Ahmadinejad has done serious damage to Iran's reputation and the reputation of Iranian business," says Mohammad Reza Behzadian, a former head of the Tehran Chamber of Commerce who runs Tondar Middle East, a trading company in Tehran.

Facing pressure from Washington, major European banks have stopped doing business in the country. So Iranians must pay exorbitant rates for trade financing from second- and third-tier banks in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. Some Iranians work around the restrictions by setting up subsidiaries in the United Arab Emirates and playing cat-and-mouse with American inspectors. But such solutions are expensive, adding billions of dollars to Iran's soaring import bill-$57 billion for the year that ended in March. "It's a challenge finding banks that we can trust," says Parviz Aghili, CEO of Karafarin Bank in Tehran.

Sanctions also restrict the development of Iran's vital energy reserves. Tehran wants to boost oil production capacity by 25 percent, to 5 million barrels a day, but with little foreign help and aging fields in rapid decline, it's tough even to maintain current output. That's one reason Iranian oil officials are quick to say they want American help. "We don't have any problems with US investment," says M.A. Khatibi Tabatabaei, Iran's representative on OPEC's board of governors.

Ahmadinejad's erratic policies make things worse. The populist President has spent freely on everything from loans to small businesses of questionable viability to imported food and cash handouts for the poor. And he has pressured banks to shovel out easy credit, leading to a real estate boom. But worried that oil earnings will start to peter out, the central bank has tightened up, starving factories of capital and prompting a sharp fall in property prices.

Last year, when oil prices surged, the Iranian economy could shrug off its problems. With oil's steep decline and the global financial crunch, though, some fear social unrest. Many factories are months behind on salaries, says Ali Reza Mahjoub, a member of Parliament and head of Workers' House, a labor group. He estimates that unemployment, officially 12.5 oercent, is really closer to 17 oercent. As financing dries up, building is grinding to a halt, says developer Amir-Mohamad Mazaheri. "This is a very dangerous situation," he says, puffing on a cigarette in a new tower in North Tehran. "There will be 3-4 million construction workers looking to any activity to support themselves."

Even with sanctions in place, savvy foreigners have managed to make a mark in Iran-though it takes persistence. Renault, for instance, has a $200 million joint venture to build the Logan compact. But late payments from the Iranians and difficulties training enough suppliers to meet a requirement of 60 percent local content have slowed progress, Renault says. The venture, Renault Pars, has cut its output target for the Logan by 25 percent, to 150,000 cars per year. "You need a lot of time and energy," says Renault Pars chief Jean-Michel Kerebel. "What takes five hours in Europe could take five days here."

Peace Now's Hagit Ofran said the work in East Talpiot in south-east Jerusalem aims to build "housing units for Orthodox religious Jewish families right next to the Palestinian neighbourhood of Arab al-Sawahra". The housing complex is made up of three blocks of flats containing about 60 homes, Peace Now says.

In a speech in Ramallah, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas said he would not give in to Israeli or international pressure to resume negotiations if settlement construction continues. "All I know is that there is the state of Israel, in the borders of 1967, not one centimetre more, not one centimetre less. Anything else, I don't accept," Mr Abbas said.

About 200,000 Israeli Jews live in homes in East Jerusalem, with a further 250,000 settlers living in other parts of the West Bank, on land Palestinian negotiators have sought as part of a future Palestinian state.

Last week, the Economist called for the United States to reduce its aid to Israel if the Netanyahu government continues to reject a two-state solution.  The Boston Globe offered a similar view earlier this week, advising Obama to tell Netanyahu "to take the steps necessary for peace or risk compromising Israel's special relationship with America." A few days ago, Ha’aretz reported that the Obama Administration was preparing Congressional leaders for a possible confrontation with the Netanyahu government.

We already know what it means for the United States to put pressure on the Palestinians, because Washington has done that repeatedly -- and sometimes effectively -- over the past several decades.  During the 1970s, for example, the United States supported King Hussein’s violent crackdown on the PLO cadres who were threatening his rule in Jordan. During the 1980s, the United States refused to recognize the PLO until it accepted Israel’s right to exist.  After the outbreak of the Second Intifada, the Bush administration refused to deal with Yasser Arafat and pushed hard for his replacement. After Arafat's death, we insisted on democratic elections for a new Palestinian assembly and then rejected the results when Hamas won. The United States has also gone after charitable organizations with ties to Hamas and backed Israel’s recent campaign in Gaza.

In short, the United States has rarely hesitated to use its leverage to try to shape Palestinian behavior, even if some of these efforts -- such as the inept attempt to foment a Fatah coup against Hamas in 2007 -- have backfired.

The United States has only rarely put (mild) pressure on Israel in recent decades (and never for very long), even when the Israeli government was engaged in actions (such as building settlements) that the U.S. government opposed.  The question is: if the Netanyahu/Lieberman government remains intransigent, what should Obama do?

4. Downgrade existing arrangements for “strategic cooperation.”  There are now a number of institutionalized arrangements for security cooperation between the Pentagon and the Israel Defense Forces and between U.S. and Israeli intelligence. The Obama administration could postpone or suspend some of these meetings, or start sending lower-grade representatives to them.

2. Change the Rhetoric. The Obama administration could begin by using different language to describe certain Israeli policies.  While reaffirming America’s commitment to Israel’s existence as a Jewish-majority state, it could stop referring to settlement construction as “unhelpful,” a word that makes U.S. diplomats sound timid and mealy-mouthed.  Instead, we could start describing the settlements as “illegal” or as “violations of international law.”

U.S. officials could even describe Israel’s occupation as “contrary to democracy,” “unwise,” “cruel,” or “unjust.”  Altering the rhetoric would send a clear signal to the Israeli government and its citizens that their government’s opposition to a two-state solution was jeopardizing the special relationship.

3. Support a U.N. Resolution Condemning the Occupation.  Since 1972, the United States has vetoed forty-three U.N. Security Council resolutions that were critical of Israel (a number greater than the sum of all vetoes cast by the other permanent members)

If the Obama administration wanted to send a clear signal that it was unhappy with Israel’s actions, it could sponsor a resolution condemning the occupation and calling for a two-state solution.

1. Cut the aid package? If you add it all up, Israel gets over $3 billion in U.S. economic and military aid each year, which works out to about $500 per Israeli citizen. There’s a lot of potential leverage here, but it’s probably not the best stick to use, at least not at first. Trying to trim or cut the aid package will trigger an open and undoubtedly ugly confrontation in Congress (where the influence of AIPAC and other hard-line groups in the Israel lobby is greatest). So that’s not where I’d start.

There is in fact a precedent for this step: after negotiating the original agreements for a “strategic partnership,” the Reagan administration suspended them following Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Today, such a step would surely get the attention of Israel’s security establishment.

5. Reduce U.S. purchases of Israeli military equipment. In addition to providing Israel with military assistance (some of which is then used to purchase U.S. arms), the Pentagon also buys millions of dollars of weaponry and other services from Israel’s own defense industry. Obama could instruct Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to slow or decrease these purchases, which would send an unmistakable signal that it was no longer "business-as-usual." Given the battering Israel’s economy has taken in the current global recession, this step would get noticed too.

6. Get tough with private organizations that support settlement activity. As David Ignatius recently noted in the Washington Post, many private donations to charitable organizations operating in Israel are tax-deductible in the United States, including private donations that support settlement activity. This makes no sense: it means the American taxpayer is indirectly subsidizing activities that are contrary to stated U.S. policy and that actually threaten Israel’s long-term future.  Just as the United States has gone after charitable contributions flowing to terrorist organizations, the U.S. Treasury could crack down on charitable organizations (including those of some prominent Christian Zionists) that are supporting these illegal activities. 

7. Place more limits on U.S. loan guarantees. The United States has provided billions of dollars of loan guarantees to Israel on several occasions, which enabled Israel to borrow money from commercial banks at lower interest rates.  Back in 1992, the first Bush administration held up nearly $10 billion in guarantees until Israel agreed to halt settlement construction and attend the Madrid peace conference, and the dispute helped undermine the hard-line Likud government of Yitzhak Shamir and bring Yitzhak Rabin to power, which in turn made the historic Oslo Agreement possible.

8. Encourage other U.S. allies to use their influence too. In the past, the United States has often pressed other states to upgrade their own ties with Israel.  If pressure is needed, however, the United States could try a different tack.  For example, we could quietly encourage the EU not to upgrade its relations with Israel until it had agreed to end the occupation.

most of these measures could be implemented by the Executive Branch alone, thereby outflanking die-hard defenders of the special relationship in Congress.  Indeed, even hinting that it was thinking about some of these measures would probably get Netanyahu to start reconsidering his position.

Most importantly, Obama and his aides will need to reach out to Israel’s supporters in the United States, and make it clear to them that pressing Israel to end the occupation is essential for Israel’s long-term survival.

He will have to work with the more far-sighted elements in the pro-Israel community -- including groups like J Street, the Israel Policy Forum, Brit Tzedek v'Shalom,  and others

In effect, the United States would be giving Israel a choice: it can end its self-defeating occupation of Palestinian lands, actively work for a two-state solution, and thereby remain a cherished American ally.  Or it can continue to expand the occupation and face a progressive loss of American support as well as the costly and corrupting burden of ruling millions of Palestinians by force.

Indeed, that is why many—though of course not all--Israelis would probably welcome a more active and evenhanded U.S. role. It was former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert who said "if the two-state solution collapses, Israel will face a South-Africa style struggle for political rights." And once that happens, he warned, “the state of Israel is finished."

The editor of Ha’aretz, David Landau, conveyed much the same sentiment last September when he told former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice that the United States should "rape" Israel in order to force a solution. Landau's phrase was shocking and offensive, but it underscored the sense of urgency felt within some segments of the Israeli body politic.

The Justice Ministry said she is being tried in a closed hearing of Iran's revolutionary court, which handles national security cases.

Looking back, one begins to see that Europe has spent the best part of 10 years failing to get its act together. A decade that began with ambitious plans for a European constitution ends with the fate of a much more modest Lisbon treaty hanging on a dubiously democratic attempt to persuade the Irish to alter their "no" to a "yes". If we had spent half the time we wasted in that constitutional debate simply co-ordinating our actions better, under the existing treaties, we would be in a better position today. Europe talks the talk but does not walk the walk.

Every EU member state bears some responsibility for this shambles, as does the institutional leadership in Brussels. But its three largest member states are especially to blame.

It's nothing new that France and Britain are behaving like France and Britain. Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose. What's new is that Germany is now behaving like France and Britain.

In this constellation, neither the Americans nor the Chinese see Europe as a single, coherent partner. The G20 seems to be gaining acceptance as a new institutional framework for global collective action, at least in financial and economic policy. But it is just that: a framework. To make such frameworks work, you always need, behind the scenes, a strategic coalition of major players. Increasingly, here in Beijing as well as in Washington, one hears talk of a "G2" inside the G20. G2 means the US and China. Yet it's the EU, not China, that has an economy the size of the United States'. Especially in economic policy, the strategic coalition should be G3. But where is Europe?

But he said he was optimistic, due to President Obama's "different" approach.

Mr Qureshi also appealed for better equipment and training for Pakistan's armed forces.

In what appears to be a concession to win Labour's support, he and Barak agreed a joint platform that would commit the new government to working for a "comprehensive regional agreement for peace and co-operation in the Middle East", according to the Israeli press.Though that platform says the new government will work towards peace with its neighbours and will respect Israel's international agreements, there was no explicit mention of the creation of an independent Palestine.

Binyamin Netanyahu, head of the right-wing Likud party, will be prime minister and possibly finance minister.• Avigdor Lieberman, the far-right head of the Israel Our Home party, who campaigned in favour of a law demanding all Israel's Arabs swear an oath of loyalty to the country as a Jewish state, will be foreign minister.• Ehud Barak (below), head of the Labour party, who last month seemed resigned to going into opposition, will stay on as defence minister.• Eli Yishai, the head of the ultra-Orthodox Shas party, will be interior minister.