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John Locke (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) - 0 views

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    Some philosophers before Locke had suggested that it would be good to find the limits of the Understanding, but what Locke does is to carry out this project in detail. In the four books of the Essay Locke considers the sources and nature of human knowledge. Book I argues that we have no innate knowledge. (In this he resembles Berkeley and Hume, and differs from Descartes and Leibniz.) So, at birth, the human mind is a sort of blank slate on which experience writes. In Book II Locke claims that ideas are the materials of knowledge and all ideas come from experience. The term 'idea,' Locke tells us "…stands for whatsoever is the Object of the Understanding, when a man thinks" (Essay I, 1, 8, p. 47). Experience is of two kinds, sensation and reflection. One of these - sensation - tells us about things and processes in the external world. The other - reflection - tells us about the operations of our own minds. Reflection is a sort of internal sense that makes us conscious of the mental processes we are engaged in. Some ideas we get only from sensation, some only from reflection and some from both.
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Formalism in the Philosophy of Mathematics (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) - 0 views

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    "The guiding idea behind formalism is that mathematics is not a body of propositions representing an abstract sector of reality but is much more akin to a game, bringing with it no more commitment to an ontology of objects or properties than ludo or chess. This idea has some intuitive plausibility: consider the tyro toiling at multiplication tables or the student using a standard algorithm for differentiating or integrating a function. It also corresponds to some aspects of the practice of advanced mathematicians in some periods-for example, the treatment of imaginary numbers for some time after Bombelli's introduction of them, and perhaps the attitude of some contemporary mathematicians towards the higher flights of set theory. Finally, it is often the position to which philosophically naïve respondents will gesture towards, when pestered by questions as to the nature of mathematics."
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Faith and Reason - 0 views

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    "Traditionally, faith and reason have each been considered to be sources of justification for religious belief. Because both can purportedly serve this same epistemic function, it has been a matter of much interest to philosophers and theologians how the two are related and thus how the rational agent should treat claims derived from either source. Some have held that there can be no conflict between the two-that reason properly employed and faith properly understood will never produce contradictory or competing claims-whereas others have maintained that faith and reason can (or even must) be in genuine contention over certain propositions or methodologies. Those who have taken the latter view disagree as to whether faith or reason ought to prevail when the two are in conflict. Kierkegaard, for instance, prioritizes faith even to the point that it becomes positively irrational, while Locke emphasizes the reasonableness of faith to such an extent that a religious doctrine's irrationality-conflict with itself or with known facts-is a sign that it is unsound. Other thinkers have theorized that faith and reason each govern their own separate domains, such that cases of apparent conflict are resolved on the side of faith when the claim in question is, say, a religious or theological claim, but resolved on the side of reason when the disputed claim is, for example, empirical or logical. Some relatively recent philosophers, most notably the logical positivists, have denied that there is a domain of thought or human existence rightly governed by faith, asserting instead that all meaningful statements and ideas are accessible to thorough rational examination. This has presented a challenge to religious thinkers to explain how an admittedly nonrational or transrational form of language can hold meaningful cognitive content."
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Danielle on Vimeo - 0 views

shared by Adam Clark on 25 Jun 14 - No Cached
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    I attempted to create a person in order to emulate the aging process. The idea was that something is happening but you can't see it but you can feel it, like aging itself. Still Photographer: Keith Sirchio Animator: Nathan Meier Animator: Edmund Earle Nuke Artist: George Cuddy Music: Mark Reveley
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Allegory of the Cave - 1 views

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    A short succinct description for students who may be struggle with the idea of Plato's Forms.
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Jon Meacham on Why We Question God | TIME.com - 0 views

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    "Hamilton was no militant atheist. He was not contemptuous of faith or of the faithful-far from it; he was a longtime churchgoer-and he was therefore, I think, all the more a threat to unreflective Christianity. At heart, he was questioning whether the Christian tradition of encouraging a temporal moral life required belief in a divine order. Could someone, in other words, live by the ethical teachings of Jesus while rejecting the existence of a creator and redeemer God? The questions with which he grappled were eternal, essential, and are with us still: how does a culture that tends to be religious continue to hold to a belief in an all-powerful, all-loving divinity beyond time and space given the evidence of science and of experience?"
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Video Full Clip - Browse - Big Ideas - ABC TV - 0 views

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    Do the languages we speak shape the way we think? And can learning new ways to talk change how you think? Stanford psychologist Lera Boroditsky examines these questions and more in this insightful look at the developing field of cognitive linguistics.
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Networked Knowledge and Combinatorial Creativity | Brain Pickings - 1 views

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    "combinatorial creativity"
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Why Facts Don't Change Our Minds | The New Yorker - 0 views

  • reason may have more to do with winning arguments than with thinking straight.
    • Adam Clark
       
      Sums up one of the main points of the article right here.
  • Once formed,” the researchers observed dryly, “impressions are remarkably perseverant.”
    • Adam Clark
       
      Impressions or beliefs remain even in the face of compelling evidence to the contrary. Sounds like confirmation bias to me.
  • Even after the evidence “for their beliefs has been totally refuted, people fail to make appropriate revisions in those beliefs,”
  • ...22 more annotations...
  • reason is an evolved trait
  • Reason developed not to enable us to solve abstract, logical problems or even to help us draw conclusions from unfamiliar data; rather, it developed to resolve the problems posed by living in collaborative groups.
  • If reason is designed to generate sound judgments, then it’s hard to conceive of a more serious design flaw than confirmation bias.
  • The fact that both we and it survive, Mercier and Sperber argue, proves that it must have some adaptive function, and that function, they maintain, is related to our “hypersociability.”
    • Adam Clark
       
      Here the counter-argument couched in evolutionary psych about its adaptive function - hypersociability.
  • Humans, they point out, aren’t randomly credulous. Presented with someone else’s argument, we’re quite adept at spotting the weaknesses. Almost invariably, the positions we’re blind about are our own.
  • reflects the task that reason evolved to perform, which is to prevent us from getting screwed by the other members of our group.
  • “This is one of many cases in which the environment changed too quickly for natural selection to catch up.
    • Adam Clark
       
      Environment changed too quickly for our evolutionary progress to keep up.
  • People believe that they know way more than they actually do. What allows us to persist in this belief is other people.
  • “One implication of the naturalness with which we divide cognitive labor,” they write, is that there’s “no sharp boundary between one person’s ideas and knowledge” and “those of other members” of the group.
  • When it comes to new technologies, incomplete understanding is empowering.
  • it gets us into trouble, according to Sloman and Fernbach, is in the political domain
  • If your position on, say, the Affordable Care Act is baseless and I rely on it, then my opinion is also baseless.
  • We’ve been relying on one another’s expertise ever since we figured out how to hunt together,
    • Adam Clark
       
      This is the opposite side to doubting our group members, once we trust them, we can be somewhat blind in our trust.
  • This is how a community of knowledge can become dangerous,
  • If we—or our friends or the pundits on CNN—spent less time pontificating and more trying to work through the implications of policy proposals, we’d realize how clueless we are and moderate our views.
  • In a well-run laboratory, there’s no room for myside bia
    • Adam Clark
       
      This connects to the "methodology" of the Natural Sciences very clearly.
  • the system
    • Adam Clark
       
      aka Area of Knowledge
  • They cite research suggesting that people experience genuine pleasure—a rush of dopamine—when processing information that supports their beliefs.
    • Adam Clark
       
      The dopamine, however, functions to reward adaptive behaviors so is not the ultimate aim in and of itself.
  • Providing people with accurate information doesn’t seem to help; they simply discount it.
  • emotions may work better, but doing so is obviously antithetical to the goal of promoting sound science
  • figure out how to address the tendencies that lead to false scientific belief.”
  • Steven Sloman, a professor at Brown, and Philip Fernbach, a professor at the
    • Adam Clark
       
      This is where the second section begins, arguing that our evolutionary emphasis on social collaboration also operates to short-circuit or undermine the effectiveness of reason as a WOK.
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