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“What they fail to realise is that they have no power, all the power is in the hands of those who make giant contributions.”

The head of the Electoral Commission said political campaigns should be paid for by the public purse, and that political organisations should find other ways to fund their campaigns

I believe a percentage of the budget should be allocated to the body that is responsible for election, ABEC, and that they will be charged with coming up with a formula to hand out donation to political parties for them to run their campaigns, and that private financing be totally banned,”

Marijuana Symposium, which was hosted by the University of the West Indies, Cave Hill Campus

“Politics of Ganja Decriminalisation”

Antigua & Barbuda.

not taking the marijuana discussion seriously.

“The average person disaggregates the issue and they just see a guy smoking a spliff and say he needs to stop

issue of crime when you make something criminal is something that is more academic, more refined.

“It really would do the workers a good deal of benefit if the major trade unions could see a difference between their trade union activities and any political interest they may have.

According to Grant, it could be uncomfortable for those members of the ABWU who are not necessarily supporters of the UPP, to hear comments coming from the UPP platform that they may not agree with.

Fallout from the collapse of the Stanford Financial Group’s companies, which had been one of the main providers of jobs in the country, as well as the global economic downturn and the consequent decline in tourism, continued to impact Antigua and Barbuda’s economy in 2012.

Antigua and Barbuda is an electoral democracy. The 1981 constitution establishes a parliamentary system, with a governor general representing the British monarch as ceremonial head of state.

Parliament is composed of the 17-seat House of Representatives (16 seats for Antigua, 1 for Barbuda), to which members are elected for five-year terms, and an appointed 17-seat Senate.

Antigua and Barbuda generally respects freedom of the press. However, defamation remains a criminal offense punishable by up to three years in prison, and politicians often file libel suits against opposing party members.

The government owns one of three radio stations and the public television station. There are no restrictions on access to the internet.

The government generally respects religious and academic freedoms.

Crime continues to be a problem in Antigua and Barbuda, and the government has responded with increased community policing, the reintroduction of roadblocks, and stiffer fines for firearms violations. The United Nations Development Programme’s 2012 Caribbean Human Development Report reported that Antigua and Barbuda suffers from a high rate of property crimes, such as robberies, with a lower violent crime rate. The country’s prison is overcrowded and conditions are very poor.

The 2005 Equal Opportunity Act bars discrimination on the basis of race, gender, class, political affinity, or place of origin. However, societal discrimination and violence against women remain problems.

Women hold only 10 percent of the elected seats of the House of Representatives. Male and female same-sex sexual activity also remains criminalized under a 1995 law, and there have been cases of excessive force and discrimination of people based on sexual orientation at the hands of the police. Antigua and Barbuda serves as both a destination and transit country for the trafficking of men, women, and children for the purposes of forced labor and prostitution.

Antigua and Barbuda’s political rights rating improved from 3 to 2 due to a decline in corrupt foreign business influence over the government.

The CSJ determined in 2011 that an article in the constitution banning indefinite reelection was a violation of Ortega’s right to be a candidate

Earlier the Supreme Electoral Council (CSE) cancelled the legal status of the leadership of the Independent Liberation Party (PLI), the largest member of the Coalition, and handed over PLI representation instead to a political faction supportive of the FSLN.

Social scientist Nicolás López Maltez, a member of Nicaragua’s Academy of Geography and History, said that the way Ortega has pursued his presidential aspirations is unparalleled in Central America in the past 150 years.

According to López Maltez and other analysts, Ortega has taken control of all government branches, and is therefore practically assured of victory at the ballot boxes in November.

Ortega has followed sound macroeconomic policies and this is recognised by both domestic and international organisations.

Opposition sectors claim the results of municipal elections in 2008 and of the 2011 general elections were fraudulent. Observers from the U.S. Carter Center and from the European Union observers/ said they lacked transparency.

But in May Ortega decided not to invite international or local electoral observers, whom he referred to as “shameless scoundrels.”

Humberto Meza, who holds a doctorate in social sciences, said that Ortega’s stratagems to perpetuate himself in power “will drastically affect the legitimacy of the elections,” no matter how high his popularity rating.The Supreme Court “is condemning a vast number of voters to non participation in the electoral process,” he told IPS.

Meza said the concern expressed by the OAS secretary general and any pressure exerted by the international community, led by the United States, were unlikely to have “much impact” on Nicaragua’s  domestic crisis

After being elected by only 38 percent of voters to a term that many expected to end in economic disaster, he was re-elected with more than 62 percent of the vote in 2011.

He owes his popularity to the success of popular social programs and improvements to the economy

his political opponents and some outside observers are highly critical of Ortega and the FSLN’s domination of Nicaragua’s political institutions.

corruption allegations in the 2008 municipal elections resulted in the loss of U.S. and European aid.

Opponents liken Ortega to Anastasio Somoza, calling him a corrupt dictator.

The resulting political imbalance has left the opposition with virtually no leverage in the legislature with regard to either policy or appointments.

Many presume that either Ortega will run for—and win—a fourth term, or that he will be succeeded by his wife, Rosario Murillo, or their son Laureano.

All of this has made for a particularly polarized political environment, much of it revolving around Ortega himsel

Capitalizing on the demobilization and reintegration experience gained in the CIAV-OAS peace mission in Nicaragua (1990-1997), the OAS led an extremely successful reinsertion project

This conflict prevention and management program helped Guatemalans address ongoing social and political tensions by providing them with training on negotiation, mediation and conflict resolution skills.

Secretary General was asked to take urgent action to defuse a conflict in Nicaragua that threatened to upset the institutional order.

Experience in Bolivia, Ecuador, Haiti and Nicaragua showed that the OAS played a decisive role in resolving the political and institutional crises in those countries, and took an active part in overcoming various situations that threatened democratic stability.

Once again, Nicaragua finds itself in a nefarious cycle in which advocates of change must depend on external pressure to compensate for an inability of the country to find domestic solutions to its problems of governance. The only piece of good news seems to be that Mr. Ortega’s apparent strength rises from clay feet. As Somoza’s experience demonstrated, in a one-person regime that aspires to be a one-family dictatorship, the inevitable corruption and repression that it cultivates eventually make the regime unsustainable.

Several Latin American leaders would like to succeed him, but no one meets the necessary conditions: Cuba's blessing, a fat wallet, a country that carries enough demographic, political and economic weight, potent charisma, a willingness to take almost limitless risks, and sufficient autocratic control to allow him or her to devote major time to permanent revolution away from home.

Cuba has made Venezuela into its foreign-policy proxy, the Castro brothers need Caracas to remain the capital of the movement for it to retain any vitality. While Cuba is dependent on the roughly 100,000 barrels of heavily subsidized oil Chávez's regime supplies to Cuba daily, the island nation has a grip on Venezuela's intelligence apparatus and social programs. Chávez himself acknowledged last year that there are almost 45,000 Cuban "workers" manning many of his programs, though other sources speak of an even larger number. This strong connection allows Cuba to exercise a vicarious influence over many countries in the region. Caracas's clout in Latin America stems from Petrocaribe, a mechanism for helping Caribbean and Central American countries purchase cheap oil, and ALBA, an ideological alliance that promotes "21st century socialism."

Critical in all of this is the money at Maduro's disposal. The sales of PDVSA, the state-owned oil cash cow, amounted to $124.7 billion in 2011, of which one-fifth went to the state in the form of taxes and royalties, and another fourth was channeled directly into a panoply of social programs. This kind of management makes for very bad economics, a reason why the company needs to resort to debt to fund its basic capital expenditures, and for decreasing productivity,

China has helped mitigate the impact. The China Development Bank and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China have lent Caracas $38 billion to fund some social programs, a bit of infrastructure spending, and purchases of Chinese products and services. Another $40 billion has been promised to fund part of the capital expenditures needed to maintain the flow of oil committed to Beijing.

In June, the pro-Ortega Supreme Court ousted the opposition’s likely presidential candidate, Eduardo Montealegre, from his own party in favor of a pro-Ortega opponent who had sued for control

Mr. Ortega’s allies in the National Assembly expelled 16 lawmakers (and 12 alternates) from Mr. Montealegre’s party who refused to accept the court-imposed new party leader.

Nicaragua’s backsliding, after a brief period of relatively transparent politics in the 1990s, has proceeded with nothing but mild verbal opposition from Washington

the State Department has also pronounced itself “gravely concerned” by the crushing of the political opposition.

"the Colombianization of the country,"

various residual groups of ex-combatants, some of whom are known by the government to be involved with international weapons and drug smuggling cartels, have started to take control of parts of the socially and economically isolated Caribbean region of Nicaragua.

Initially dismissed by the government as "hotheads," "groups of delinquents" or "dogs of war" left over from the 1980s, the rebel groups appear to be anything but a rag-tag army.

According to testimonies from local sources, the rearmados are well-armed, expertly trained, equipped with modern methods of communication

In response to increased rebel activity in a gold and silver mining area called the "Mining Triangle" (Siuna, Bonanza and La Rosita), the Nicaraguan Army declared a military offensive

The legacy of war and violence in Nicaragua is both heart-breaking and angering. In the recent history of the country, violence has always been answered with more violence.

During the U.S.-backed Somoza dynasty the state-sponsored repression of the poor by the National Guard was answered by the violence of the Sandinista Revolution, the triumph of which led to the violence of an eight-year-long, U.S.-funded war

Human rights organizations and independent media alleged some killings during the year were politically motivated.

rison conditions continued to deteriorate due to antiquated infrastructure and increasing inmate populations. Many prisoners suffered mistreatment from prison officials and other inmates. Inmates also suffered from parasites, inadequate medical attention, frequent food shortages, contaminated water, and inadequate sanitation

“Recent developments aimed at undermining the political opposition are simply a continuation of Ortega’s ongoing efforts to consolidate his control over all aspects of Nicaraguan political life

Nicaragua's legal system is plagued by corruption and is burdensome.

Nicaragua's police are corrupt and enjoy impunity. Prosecution and criminal sanctions against police officers in corruption cases are delayed due to bribery, ineffectiveness and an opaque justice system (HRR 2013)

Foreign companies encounter red tape and corruption when dealing with Nicaragua's public services administration.

Foreign companies experience discriminatory and arbitrary treatment and extortion in meetings with tax officials in Nicaragua. Tax audits of foreign firms are reported to be frequent and lengthy, which often hinders normal business operations and increases corruption risks and business costs (ICS 2014).

The overall implementation and enforcement of Nicaragua's anti-corruption legislation is weak, and the level of compliance with the law is poor among Nicaragua's public officials.

The Constitution of Nicaragua provides for freedom of the press, but the government restricts and controls all information available to the public.

The question is not so much about his results but his methods. He has a reputation for being merciless and brutal, and as the accolades have stacked up, he has cracked down on his own people and covertly supported murderous rebel groups in neighboring Congo

In some areas of the country, there are rules, enforced by village commissars, banning people from dressing in dirty clothes or sharing straws when drinking from a traditional pot of beer, even in their own homes, because the government considers it unhygienic. Many Rwandans told me that they feel as if their president is personally watching them. “It’s like there’s an invisible eye everywhere,” said Alice Muhirwa, a member of an opposition political party. “Kagame’s eye.”

why has the West — and the United States in particular — been so eager to embrace Kagame, despite his authoritarian tendencies?

Kagame has become a rare symbol of progress on a continent that has an abundance of failed states and a record of paralyzing corruption. Kagame was burnishing the image of the entire billion-dollar aid industry. “You put your money in, and you get results out,” said the diplomat, who insisted he could not talk candidly if he was identified. Yes, Kagame was “utterly ruthless,” the diplomat said, but there was a mutual interest in supporting him, because Kagame was proving that aid to Africa was not a hopeless waste and that poor and broken countries could be fixed with the right leadership.

Though Rwanda has made tremendous strides, the country is still a demographic time bomb. It’s already one of the most densely populated in Africa — its 11 million people squeezed into a space smaller than Maryland — and despite a recent free vasectomy program, Rwanda still has an alarmingly high birthrate. Most Rwandans are peasants, their lives inexorably yoked to the land, and just about every inch of that land, from the papyrus swamps to the cloud-shrouded mountaintops, is spoken for.

much has improved under his stewardship. Rwandan life expectancy, for instance, has increased to 56 years, from 36 in 1994. Malaria used to be a huge killer, but Kagame’s government has embarked on a wide-scale spraying campaign and has distributed millions of nets to protect people when they are sleeping — malarial mosquitoes tend to feed at night — and malaria-related deaths plummeted 85 percent between 2005 and 2011.

Kagame hopes to make more money from coffee, tea and gorillas — Rwanda is home to some of the last remaining mountain gorillas, and each year throngs of Western tourists pay thousands of dollars to see them.

aid flows to Rwanda because Kagame is a celebrated manager. He’s a hands-on chief executive who is less interested in ideology than in making things work. He loves new technology — he’s an avid tweeter — and is very good at breaking sprawling, ambitious projects into manageable chunks. Rwanda jumped to 52nd last year, from 158th in 2005, on the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business annual rating, precisely because Kagame set up a special unit within his government, which broke down the World Bank’s ratings system, category by category, and figured out exactly what was needed to improve on each criterion.