Victims of Crime

F.2d 272 (6th Cir. 1990) (noting that the Supreme Court's reasoning in Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), likely "preserve[d] Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process analysis for those instances in which a free citizen is denied his or her constitutional right to life through means other than a law enforcement official's arrest, investigatory stop or other seizure"), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 851 (1990).

But when a law enforcement officer arbitrarily acts to deprive a person of life and personal security in the course of pursuing his official duties, constitutional due process rights may be implicated. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331 ("The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government."). Section 1983 "contains no state-of-mind requirement independent of that necessary to state a violation of the underlying constitutional right." Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330 . See Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330 . The underlying constitutional rights at issue here are substantive due process rights to life and liberty or personal security. In Daniels, the Supreme Court held that where an official's or government entity's conduct constitutes mere negligence, no substantive due process violation occurs. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 328 . Daniels expressly left open the question whether something less than intentional conduct such as recklessness or gross negligence would suffice "to trigger the protections of the Due Process Clause." Id. at 334 n.3. But in City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989), the Court held that nonintentional government conduct can violate the Due Process Clause and thus lead to S 1983 liability. City of Canton held that a municipality may be liable for a failure to train its employees when such failure demonstrates "deliberate indifference to rights of persons with whom police come into contact." Id. at 388.

Five circuits have addressed S 1983 liability in the context of high-speed pursuits. These circuits have applied various labels to the standard of conduct that may lead to liability. See, e.g., Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296 (3rd Cir. 1994) (en banc) (overruling previous reckless indifference standard and adopting shocks the conscience standard); Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1496 (10th Cir. 1992) (reckless disregard); Temkin v. Frederick County Comm'rs, 945 F.2d 716, 723 (4th Cir. 1991) (shocks the conscience), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1095 (1992); Roach v. City of Fredericktown, 882 F.2d 294, 297 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding gross negligence insufficient but not stating what standard should be applied); Jones v. Sherrill, 827 F.2d 1102, 1106 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding gross negligence or outrageous conduct sufficient in some circumstances). 4

Fargo's claims were barred by Daniels, 474 U.S. 327 , because the officer's conduct, at most, constituted mere negligence. We rejected that argument, holding that 'grossly negligent or reckless official conduct that infringes upon an interest protected by the Due Process Clause is actionable underS 1983.'

. Plaintiffs also contend on appeal that the District Court erred by making credibility judgments in its summary judgment ruling. Specifically, they argue that the District Court should not have determined that the actions of Scheer were reasonable or made in good faith. We reject this argument summarily. As discussed above, plaintiffs proffered no evidence of acts by Scheer that rose to a level of arbitrariness that shocks the conscience and therefore failed to state the kind of deprivation that might rise to the level of a constitutional violation. in the District Court's construction of Scheer's behavior in this case

Title I of the Justice for All Act also provides grants for state, tribal and local prosecutors' offices, law enforcement agencies, courts, jails, correctional facilities and qualified public or private entities to develop, implement and maintain programs to enforce victims' rights and systems to provide notification of court dates and developments in the criminal proceedings to victims in a timely and efficient manner.  Jurisdictions that have victims' rights laws would qualify for grants under these provisions.  The legislation authorizes $20 million over five years for notifications systems, but does not specifically authorize funding for enforcing victims' rights.

Along with Section 504 of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act requiring nondiscrimination on the basis of disability in all aspects of programs or activities receiving federal funds, the above-mentioned laws were stepping stones to the landmark 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act. (See sidebar.)