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Nye Frank

CIV PRO OUTLINE - 0 views

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mandamus

shared by Nye Frank on 31 Dec 09 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 31 Dec 09
     
    This is the html version of the file http://students.law.ucdavis.edu/LSA/files/outlines/Civ%20Pro%20-%20Unknown%20-%200203.doc. Google automatically generates html versions of documents as we crawl the web. CIV PRO OUTLINE As of 5/1 1. WHAT'S CIVIL PROCEDURE? 1. Prescribes and administers process for enforcing rights and duties specified in substantive law 2. EVOLUTION OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (pgs. 18-32) 1. Significant Anglo-Saxon institutions at time of conquest: 1. Crown 2. Local tribunals 1. Slow and uncertain in operation 2. Earliest forms of royal intervention 1. Executive 2. Administrative 3. Writ 1. Written directive from king to royal official/to individual/group of individuals ordering addressees to do/refrain from doing designated act 2. Procedural steps by which prosecuted not uniform 3. Praecipe 1. Executive command made without inquiry 4. Novel disseisin/querela 1. Derived from procedure in which judicial inquest of complaints heard first and then executive action followed 4. king's direct entertainment of complaints of subjects 3. Early evolution of royal courts 1. Medieval central government 1. King's court/curia regis 2. Why separate branches? 1. Administrative necessity for orderly record keeping 2. Historical fact that early Plantagenet kings had domains in France that were more important to them than England and which required their presence on continent for long periods of time (king absent a lot) 4. Common law procedure 1. Background of all medieval litigation was hope of bringing parties to some sort of voluntary accord
Nye Frank

FindLaw | Cases and Codes - 0 views

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1983 indifference minimum in standard case

shared by Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09 - Cached
  • F.2d 272 (6th Cir. 1990) (noting that the Supreme Court's reasoning in Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), likely "preserve[d] Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process analysis for those instances in which a free citizen is denied his or her constitutional right to life through means other than a law enforcement official's arrest, investigatory stop or other seizure"), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 851 (1990).
    • Nye Frank
      Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09
       
      The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a particular amendment `provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, `that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
  • But when a law enforcement officer arbitrarily acts to deprive a person of life and personal security in the course of pursuing his official duties, constitutional due process rights may be implicated. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331 ("The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government."). Section 1983 "contains no state-of-mind requirement independent of that necessary to state a violation of the underlying constitutional right." Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330 . See Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330 . The underlying constitutional rights at issue here are substantive due process rights to life and liberty or personal security. In Daniels, the Supreme Court held that where an official's or government entity's conduct constitutes mere negligence, no substantive due process violation occurs. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 328 . Daniels expressly left open the question whether something less than intentional conduct such as recklessness or gross negligence would suffice "to trigger the protections of the Due Process Clause." Id. at 334 n.3. But in City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989), the Court held that nonintentional government conduct can violate the Due Process Clause and thus lead to S 1983 liability. City of Canton held that a municipality may be liable for a failure to train its employees when such failure demonstrates "deliberate indifference to rights of persons with whom police come into contact." Id. at 388.
  • Five circuits have addressed S 1983 liability in the context of high-speed pursuits. These circuits have applied various labels to the standard of conduct that may lead to liability. See, e.g., Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296 (3rd Cir. 1994) (en banc) (overruling previous reckless indifference standard and adopting shocks the conscience standard); Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1496 (10th Cir. 1992) (reckless disregard); Temkin v. Frederick County Comm'rs, 945 F.2d 716, 723 (4th Cir. 1991) (shocks the conscience), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1095 (1992); Roach v. City of Fredericktown, 882 F.2d 294, 297 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding gross negligence insufficient but not stating what standard should be applied); Jones v. Sherrill, 827 F.2d 1102, 1106 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding gross negligence or outrageous conduct sufficient in some circumstances). 4
  • ...8 more annotations...
  • In one such due process case, we held that either "gross negligence, recklessness, or `deliberate indifference'" was sufficient to state a substantive due process violation. Wood v. Ostrander, 851 F.2d 1212, 1214 (9th Cir. 1988) ("Wood
  • I"), reh'g granted and opinion modified by, 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989) ("Wood II"), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 938 (1990). Relying on the standard set out in Wood I, we later held that "grossly negligent or reckless official conduct that infringes upon an interest protected by the Due Process Clause is actionable under S 1983." Fargo v. City of San Juan Bautista, 857 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1988). But Fargo's grossly negligent standard was explicitly based on Wood I, which was modified on rehearing and superseded by Wood II. In Wood II, we stepped back from the grossly negligent standard. We noted that an intervening Supreme Court decision, City of Canton, 489 U.S. 378 , had called into question this standard as set forth in Wood I and Fargo. Wood II, 879 F.2d at 588.
  • In Fargo, we defined gross negligence as "`more than ordinary inadvertence or inattention, but less perhaps than conscious indifference to the consequences.'" Fargo, 857 F.2d at 641 (quoting W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts S 34, at 212 (5th ed. 1984)). We also noted that an officer's state of mind is not an issue in a claim based on gross negligence, "although the contrary may be true where the claim involves recklessness." Id. at 642. Although we declined to decide whether an innocent state of mind would negate recklessness or "whether recklessness may be presumed conclusively from conduct," we did note that recklessness and deliberate indifference are equivalent in the sense that they both generally refer to conduct involving "a `conscious disregard' of public safety." Id. at 642 n.7. We also said that, "where state officials have notice of the possibility of harm, `negligence can rise to the level of deliberate indifference to or reckless disregard for' the victim." Id. (quoting Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 357 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)). Because we concluded that a triable issue of fact remained as to whether the police officer's conduct might have been grossly negligent, we found it unnecessary to determine whether the officer's conduct might have risen to the more culpable standard of recklessness. Id. at 643
  • In Wood II, we redefined the standard forS 1983 substantive due process violations by police officers. As explained above, we recognized that the Supreme Court's decision in City of Canton, 489 U.S. 378 , had called into question our decisions in Wood I and Fargo that gross negligence was sufficient. Wood II, 879 F.2d at 588. Analyzing the facts in Wood under City of Canton's deliberate indifference standard, we concluded that there remained a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the police officer in Wood had been deliberately indifferent to the plaintiff's interest in her personal security. Id. at 588.
  • Wood II makes clear that, in this circuit, an officer can be held liable for a S 1983 claim if that officer's conduct is delib erately indifferent to or in reckless disregard of a person's right to life and personal security.
  • Here, plaintiffs have alleged that Officer Smith violated the Sacramento County Sheriff's Department General Order regarding pursuits ("General Order")6 by instituting and then continuing the pursuit even when a reasonable officer would have known that to do so was in reckless disregard of Lewis's and Willard's safety. A violation of police procedures is relevant to determine whether a substantive due process violation has occurred. Fargo, 857 F.2d at 642. Police procedures are designed, in part, to guide officers when they engage in conduct that poses a serious risk of harm to either a suspect or to the general public. See id.
  • The General Order requires an officer to communicate his intention to pursue a vehicle to the sheriff's department dispatch center. But defendants concede that Smith did not contact the dispatch center. The General Order requires an officer to consider whether the seriousness of the offense warrants a chase at speeds in excess of the posted limit. But here, the only apparent "offense" was the boys' refusal to stop when another officer told them to do so. The General Order requires an officer to consider whether the need for apprehension justifies the pursuit under existing conditions. Yet Smith apparently only "needed" to apprehend the boys because they refused to stop. The General Order requires an officer to consider whether the pursuit presents unreasonable hazards to life and property. But taking the facts here in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, there existed an unreasonable hazard to Lewis's and Willard's lives. The General Order also directs an officer to discontinue a pursuit when the hazards of continuing outweigh the benefits of immediate apprehension. But here, there was no apparent danger involved in permitting the boys to escape. There certainly was risk of harm to others in continuing the pursuit.
  • In City of Canton the Supreme Court held that deliberate indifference was the minimum standard of culpability necessary to maintain a S 1983 due process action against a municipality for a policy or custom of inadequate training of police officers. City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388 . The Court reasoned that a municipality's inadequate training of its employees can only constitute a "policy or custom" when such inadequate training "evidences a `deliberate indifference' to the rights of its inhabitants." Id. at 389. But the Court also specified that the deliberate indifference standard "does not turn upon the degree of fault (if any) that a plaintiff must show to make out an underlying claim of a constitutional violation." Id. at 388 n.8. City of Canton thus did not explicitly overrule our decisions in either Wood I or Fargo because they involved claims of substantive due process violations against individual police officers.
  • Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09
     
    The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a particular amendment `provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, `that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
Nye Frank

elder abuse - 0 views

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elder abuse financial

shared by Nye Frank on 30 Jun 10 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 30 Jun 10
     
    This is Google's cache of http://www.ncea.aoa.gov/ncearoot/main_site/Library/CANE/CANE_Series/CANE_FinancialExploitation.aspx. It is a snapshot of the page as it appeared on Jun 27, 2010 13:10:27 GMT. The current page could have changed in the meantime. Learn more Text-only versionThese search terms are highlighted: financial elderly person includes constitute property crimes regardless age victim california These terms only appear in links pointing to this page: exploytation acts thin includes U.S. Administration on Aging Home NCEA E-News State Resources Calendar About NCEA What We Do NCEA Partners NCEA Initiatives Find Help Help Hotline ElderCare Locator Find State Resources Resources for Families Adult Protective Services FAQ's Frequently Asked Questions Basics Resource for Professionals Nursing Home Abuse Resources Community Outreach Newsletter NCEA Listserve Online Links Promising Practice Library CANE Publications Events & Webcast Laws Statistic & Research Training Library Abuse Statistics Survey, Reports & Testimonies Research Briefs & Agenda National Incident Study Home > Library > CANE Printer Friendly Text Size: T T T Financial Exploitation of the Elderly: An Update of the Literature Financial exploitation of the elderly is becoming an increasingly familiar problem. Regular review of news headlines reveals that elders and vulnerable adults are victimized routinely by frauds, scams and identity theft, at the hands of strangers as well as loved ones, not only in the United States, but throughout the world. As technology advances, perpetrator
Nye Frank

http://www.diigo.com/post?url=http://search.universalclass.com/fastcgi/search... - 0 views

www.diigo.com/post?url=http://search.universalclass.com/fastcgi/search.htm?SearchString=evidence&SUBMIT=Find+Course&title=UniversalClass™+Online+Course+Search&desc=

evidence

shared by Nye Frank on 30 Jun 10 - No Cached
  • Nye Frank on 30 Jun 10
     
    Join Now | Sign In | Shopping Cart Areas of Study Home Course Catalog A-Z List Teach Online My Transcript My Classes Accounting Alternative Medicine Arts and Photography Business Career Training Computers & Tech Cooking Crafts & Hobbies Entrepreneurship Finance GED Training General Education Health & Medicine History Home and Garden Homeschooling How To / Do It Yourself Industrial Technology Language Arts Law/Legal/Criminal Mathematics Medical Billing New Age Office Skills Parenting and Family Performing Arts Personal Care Pet and Animal Care Psychology Real Estate Reference Religious Studies Science Self-Help Social Work Special Education Spiritual Studies Staff Picks Teacher Tools Terminology Test Preparation Web Development Writing Skills New Courses WELCOME!VIEW COURSE LISTINGFAQs FAQs What are the technical requirements? Will I get a certificate at course completion? What are CEUs? Why is this class so cheap? Is there an instructor available to answer questions? How many hours will it take to complete this course? How long do I have to complete this course? What happens if I need more time to complete this course? Are there any additional costs? Do I need to buy any textbooks? Is this cost per lesson, per session, or for the entire course? Do you have a Demo Class I can try? What is your refund policy? I'm enrolling several students. How do I get a group discount? How can my school/company integrate UniversalClass™ courses? More Frequently Asked Questions...TOP 20 SEARCHES TOP 20 SEARCHES 1. accounting 2. medical terminology 3. psychology 4. medical billing 5. creative writing 6. basic writing 7. grammar and punctuation 8. spelling 9. science courses 10. shorthand 11. business 12. vocabulary 13. marketing 14. professional organizer 15. ms excel 16. event planning 17. american revolution 18. conflict resolution 1
Nye Frank

$375,000 SETTLEMENT IN ELDER ABUSE/NEGLECT CASE - Experienced San Francisco Personal In... - 0 views

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elder abuse neglect statutory law

shared by Nye Frank on 18 Mar 10 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 18 Mar 10
     
    Welfare & Institutions Code § 15657 provides: "Where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that a defendant is liable for . . . neglect as defined in Section 15610.57, . . . and that the defendant has been guilty of recklessness, oppression, fraud, or malice in the commission of this abuse, in addition to all of the remedies otherwise provided by law: (a) the court shall award to the plaintiff reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. . . . (b) the limitations imposed by Section 337.34 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the damages recoverable shall not apply . . . (c) the standards set forth in subdivision (b) of Section 3294 of the Civil Code regarding the imposition of punitive damages on an employer based upon the acts of an employee shall be satisfied before any damages or attorneys' fees permitted under this section may be imposed against an employer". Welfare & Institutions Code § 15610.57 defines "neglect" as the negligent failure of any person having care or custody of an elder to exercise that degree of care that a reasonable person in a like position would exercise, and includes the "failure to protect from health and safety hazard". Civil Code § 3294(b) provides that an employer shall not be liable for punitive damages based upon acts of an employee unless the employer had advanced knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others, or authorized or ratified the employee's wrongful conduct, or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud or malice. With respect to a corporate employer, the authorization or ratification of an act of recklessness, oppression, fraud or malice must be on the part of an officer, director or managing agent of the corporation.
Nye Frank

Carney & Sugai, LLP - Estate Planning Links - 0 views

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law links research

shared by Nye Frank on 18 Mar 10 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 18 Mar 10
     
    RESTRAINING OR PROTECTIVE ORDER: AGGRESSOR AB 258, MA, CH. 92 PEN 836 Replaces the term "primary aggressor" with "dominant aggressor" in provisions establishing liability for arrest of parties in violation of mutual domestic violence protective orders.
Nye Frank

- California Legislation laws Elder Fraud - 0 views

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Fraud elder abuse

shared by Nye Frank on 18 Mar 10 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 18 Mar 10
     
    RESTRAINING OR PROTECTIVE ORDER: AGGRESSOR AB 258, MA, CH. 92 PEN 836 Replaces the term "primary aggressor" with "dominant aggressor" in provisions establishing liability for arrest of parties in violation of mutual domestic violence protective orders.
Nye Frank

Nye Frank Racing, Homicide Cover up, Riverside Cou: Da Victim Advocate (15) - 0 views

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municipal liability evidence Rod Pacheco corruption Homicide Elder abuse

shared by Nye Frank on 30 Dec 09 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 30 Dec 09
     
    Pattern in Riverside County of closing elder cases, not giving case numbers so there is no way to get help and the news does not write about it.
  • Nye Frank on 30 Dec 09
     
    Brian Floyd Legilative Corruption is alledged to be at the bottom of this. Also he is the campaign manager for sheriff, chp, fire, da. Is he at the bottom of guardianship money being used for elections of these guys? What happened to whistle blower case?
Nye Frank

EVIDENCE OUTLINE - 1 views

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municipal liability outline evidence

shared by Nye Frank on 29 Dec 09 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 29 Dec 09
     
    Evidence outline
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