UNIS philosophy

aims primarily at knowledge

ives unity and system to the body of the sciences, and the kind which results from a critical examination of the grounds of our convictions, prejudices, and beliefs

as soon as definite knowledge concerning any subject becomes possible, this subject ceases to be called philosophy, and becomes a separate science

astronomy

psychology

questions

no definite answer can be given, remain to form the residue which is called philosophy

There are many questions

must remain insoluble to the human intellect

plan or purpose

consciousness

good and evil

the answers suggested by philosophy are none of them demonstrably true

it is part of the business of philosophy to continue the consideration of such questions, to make us aware of their importance, to examine all the approaches to them, and to keep alive that speculative interest in the universe which is apt to be killed by confining ourselves to definitely ascertainable knowledge

We cannot, therefore, include as part of the value of philosophy any definite set of answers to such questions

he value of philosophy must not depend upon any supposed body of definitely ascertainable knowledge to be acquired by those who study it.

he value of philosophy is

in its very uncertainty

imprisoned in the prejudices

habitual beliefs of his age or his nation, and from convictions which have grown up in his mind without the co-operation or consent of his deliberate reason

enlarge our thoughts and free them from the tyranny of custom

Thus, while diminishing our feeling of certainty as to what things are, it greatly increases our knowledge as to what they may be; it removes the somewhat arrogant dogmatism of those who have never travelled into the region of liberating doubt, and it keeps alive our sense of wonder by showing familiar things in an unfamiliar aspect

philosophy has a value

through the greatness of the objects which it contemplates, and the freedom from narrow and personal aims resulting from this contemplation

instinctive man

philosophic life is calm and free

The private world of instinctive interests is a small one, set in the midst of a great and powerful world which must, sooner or later, lay our private world in ruins.

escape is by philosophic contemplation

it views the whole impartially

does not aim at proving that the rest of the universe is akin to man

enlargement of the Self

best attained when it is not directly sought

desire for knowledge is alone operative

adapts the Self to the characters which it finds in its objects

not obtained when, taking the Self as it is, we try to show that the world is so similar to this Self

form of self-assertion and, like all self-assertion, it is an obstacle to the growth of Self which it desires, and of which the Self knows that it is capable

Self-assertion, in philosophic speculation as elsewhere, views the world as a means to its own ends

In contemplation

we start from the not-Self, and through its greatness the boundaries of Self are enlarged; through the infinity of the universe the mind which contemplates it achieves some share in infinity.

those philosophies which assimilate the universe to Man

Knowledge is a form of union of Self and not-Self;

There is a widespread philosophical tendency towards the view which tells us that Man is the measure of all things, that truth is man-made, that space and time and the world of universals are properties of the mind, and that, if there be anything not created by the mind, it is unknowable and of no account for us

it has the effect of robbing philosophic contemplation of all that gives it value

What it calls knowledge is not a union with the not-Self, but a set of prejudices, habits, and desires, making an impenetrable veil between us and the world beyond

true philosophic contemplation,

satisfaction in every enlargement of the not-Self

barrier between subject and object, such personal and private things become a prison to the intellect

The free intellect will see as God might see, without a here and now, without hopes and fears, without the trammels of customary beliefs and traditional prejudices, calmly, dispassionately, in the sole and exclusive desire of knowledge -- knowledge as impersonal, as purely contemplative, as it is possible for man to attain

anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical

we might accidentally undermine capacities of equal value.

our specifies-specific form of intelligence may well be linked to species-specific form of desire.

Thus, if we start building upon and enhancing our capacity to protect and promote deeply held convictions and beliefs then due to the interconnectedness, it may well affect and remove our desire to perform such activities

In terms of risk, those radically enhanced to live longer may actually be the most risk adverse and fearful people to live. Taking the example of driving a car, a forty year-old senescing human being who gets into their car to drive to work and is involved in a fatal accident “stands to lose, at most, a few healthy, youthful years and a slightly larger number of years with reduced quality” (p.116). In stark contrast should a negligibly senescent being who drives a car and is involved in an accident resulting in their death, stands to lose on average one thousand, healthy, youthful years

with the end of ageing comes an increased sense of risk-aversion so the desire for risky activity such as driving will no longer be prevalent.

because we are living for longer we will not be in such a hurry to get to places! 

Bostrom and Ord argue that it boils down to a preference for the status quo; current human intellects and life spans are preferred and deemed best because they are what we have now and what we are familiar with

Agar discusses the fact that in his view, Bostrom falls into a focalism – focusing on and magnifying the positives whilst ignoring the negative implications. 

Agar goes onto develop and reiterate his earlier point that the sort of radical enhancements Bostrom et al enthusiastically support and promote take us beyond what is human so they are no longer human.

t therefore cannot be said to be human enhancement given the fact that the traits or capacities that such enhancement afford us would be in many respects superior to ours, but they would not be ours.

can foresee a situation where it would be very difficult for humans to ‘choose’ to remain human. 

The pressure to radically enhance would be considerable given the fact that the radically enhanced would no doubt be occupying the positions of power in society and would consider the moral obligation to utilise to the full enhancement techniques as being a moral imperative for the good of society.

the author proposes that we have two options: radical enhancement is either enforced across the board or banned outright.