Group items tagged

Turkish policymakers perceived changes in the external environment, the first condition for a state's changing its foreign policy.

President Turgut Ozal

"Peace at home and peace abroad,"

Kemal Ataturk, founder of the Turkish Republic

most cherished goal of becoming an equal member of the Western world of nations.

Aptlahat Akin, first Turkish Ambassador to Syria

Turkey's international orientation was non-alignment,

need of internal reconstruction, which made seeking peace a necessity.

to create a strong, modern state which could defend its territorial integrity and political independence, without external assistance, against external aggression; and to make Turkey a full, equal member of the Western European community of nations.

to avoid interference with that region's affairs.

Sadabad Pact

leaving the Arabs alone.

1956 Suez Crisis was a test case for Turkey's Middle East policy.

During the early years, republican Turkey refrained from making overtures against anyone. In her weakness, she wished to give no cause for complaint. Other than the Hatay plum, which ripened and fell into the Turkish lap, the Turks pursued a non-committal policy, even up to the closing months of the World War II."

The fact that relations with the West were given top priority sometimes led Turkey to avoid entanglement with the Middle Eastern states.

Things did not change much after the end of the War

attitudes toward the newly independent Middle East states seemed to be one of accepting the existing situation but nothing more.

Active Turkish involvement in Middle East affairs and enthusiasm to cooperate with the U.S. forces during the DP administration can be regarded as a part of the same effort.

they argued that "only the Turks really understood the Arabs and therefore were in a position to approach the Arab states" for the proposed defense organization.

to secure its eastern and southeastern borders from a direct or indirect Communist threat.

it was impossible for Turkey to satisfy everyone, and thus it had decided that the West must be given top priority.

Turkey's economy also became dependent upon the West

"achieving first, national security, second, economic aid, and third, at expanding influence in the area."

Turkey's core foreign policy objectives remained the same except for dropping the phrase "without external assistance."

went forward with the idea of a Middle Eastern Defense Organization and then the Baghdad Pact shows Turkey's willingness to be subservient to the will of its allies, and especially the United States into whose sphere of influence it had entered.

Turkey's voting record in the UN was one of those problematic issues.

was shaped as an "extension" of its pro-Western policy with the ultimate aim of minimizing dangers to its core objectives.

The Baghdad Pact, largely due to its divisive nature, came to be regarded as a failure.

The policies of the 1950s were accepted as mistakes not to be repeated so that the so called new Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East, drafted in the mid-1960s, was intended to become a continuity in negation.

Turkey became the second state after Jordan to recognize the new regime.

Turkish policymakers remained cautious and made known their desire that Turkish-Soviet relations remain within the framework of East-West relations.

The Middle East countries' support of the Greek Cypriots caused the Turks to come to terms with their cultural and historical bonds.

Turkey's pre-1960 policies toward the Middle East produced a negative feedback that led to cognitive inconsistency in and increased opposition to its policies.

emphasis on multi-faceted policy making.

this policy required less cooperation with the United States, and a more balanced attitude towards the Arab-Israeli dispute

CENTO (Central Treaty Organization, the name the Baghdad Pact took after Iraq's withdrawal in 1958

Turkey adopted a policy of caution in its attitudes towards Middle East crises as it carefully weighed the pluses and minuses of each potential action and decided accordingly.

Turkey's threat perceptions began to intensify.

one should not go too far in claiming that Turkey's relations with the United States were weakened in the post-Menderes era or that Turkey adopted a principle to overrule any U.S. request for the use of NATO bases in Turkey for non-NATO purposes. On the contrary, it may be argued that Turkey's national role conception remained that of a faithful ally of both NATO and the United States, although the latter was less pronounced.

Without changing the basic tenets of their foreign policy, Turkish policymakers were able to pull the Middle East states to their side -to the extent that was possible.

was defined as: non-interference in the domestic affairs of Middle East countries and in inter-country relations; equality among states; maintaining both diplomatic relations with Israel and political support for the Arab cause; preserving links with the West in regard to their impact on Turkey's relations with the Middle East and vice versa; development of bilateral relations.

t in trying to prove that Turkish foreign policy in the Gulf Crisis constituted a deviation from the traditional/Kemalist foreign policy.

a "major break from decades of established Turkish policy concerning non-involvement in Middle Eastern conflicts."

it is disputable whether Turkey's involvement in the anti-Iraqi camp regarding the Kuwait crisis, was a change in Turkey^Òs foreign policy toward the Middle East.

Turkish foreign policy makers--even when following a multi-faceted foreign policy, which aimed at rapprochement with Middle East states--did not completely rule out cooperation with the United States, which also remained an important priority.

Turkey's foreign policy toward the Middle East shows continuity.

Cautious to distinguish between pragmatism and opportunism, the foreign policy establishment did not deviate from past practices

accelerated or decelerated relations and ad hoc reactions cannot be categorized as change given the historical perspective.

that liberalization, which is connected to EU integration, is weakening the role and power of the military

more compatible with the outside world.

the Mediterranean Union, the brainchild of the French President Nicholas Sarkozy, as an alternative path for Turkey’s interaction with Europe.

"Turkey wants a globally effective NATO, a stronger Turkish-American cooperation, as well as Turkey in the EU. It is vital for the peace, stability, and cooperation," says a senior Turkish diplomat who visited Washington last month.

Turkey is among the most anti-American Muslim societies. Anti-Semitism,

Prime Minister Erdogan smashed Israel’s operation in Gaza as "inhumane", coming across as a Hamas supporter.

high-level contacts between Turkey and Armenia

Turkey supports territorial integrity of Georgia, including Abkhazia and South Ossetia as part of Georgia.

the U.S. and EU will be accommodated or integrated into the Caucasus initiative.

Russia and Turkey, together with the three South Caucasus countries ( Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan), but omitted the U.S. and EU, as well as Iran.

Turkey is an important energy transit country.

Abdullah Gul, Ilham Aliev and Gurbanguli Berdymuhammedov, in port of Turkmenbashi on the Caspian coast

It also showed that Turkey could play a major role in its implementation.

Turkey played a positive role in Afghanistan,

watch closely how the incoming Obama administration deals with the Armenian genocide resolution, which the Armenian lobby and its supporters in Congress propose yearly to the U.S. government.

Turkey is willing to participate in tighter sanctions against Iran, if and when sanctioned by the U.N. Security Council

the relations between the U.S. and Turkey will remain complex,

from the Caucasus to Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan, which dictate further dialogue

.Throughout the 1990s we had certain problems with almost all of our neighbors. Now we have excellent relations with all of our neighbors."

Security for both sides is vital, since in the Middle East, if we want to have a real peace, security for the Palestinians should be equal to security of Israelis.

f Russia advances in the Caucasus and Central Europe through bullying or more militant methods, which side will Turkey choose?

Davutoglu's strategy of being friends with everyone seems an ideal policy for Turkey.

the Ankara regime's moves closer to the Iran-led alliance.