The Legend of the Phoenix - 0 views
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It would seem the CIA has gone back into their archives, blown the dust off the Phoenix Program, and put it into play again as the “Drone War.” The similarities with the Drone War are readily evident to anyone old enough to know of the Phoenix Program. For those who aren’t old enough or who have forgotten, the Phoenix Program is usually referred to as an assassination program and was the subject of investigation by the Senate’s “Church Committee.” Indisputably, thousands of South Vietnamese civilians were killed under this CIA directed program.
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Phoenix was far more than a mere assassination program , however. It was a Counter-Insurgency, COIN, program, using the tactic of counter-terrorism, including assassination, against the insurgent’s so-called infrastructure. This was the Vietnamese civilian population in which the insurgent, the Viet Cong guerilla, operated and from some of whom they drew their support. To the U.S., these civilians were the Viet Cong Infrastructure, the VCI. And the VCI was the target to be terrorized by any means necessary in the hope that they would turn against the Viet Cong. The VCI would have included the families, close and extended kinship groups, of alleged active Viet Cong combatants, fellow villagers, and other Vietnamese civilians who were not actively opposed to the Viet Cong. Some of this “support” was voluntary and some coerced. As the Phoenix Program went on, with its assassinations, torture practices, and “disappearances,” more support became voluntary as Vietnamese peasants turned against the U.S. and the South Vietnamese government as a result of the program. An error in identification of a victim was irrelevant to those in control of the program, the CIA, as it still served the purpose of terrorizing the civilian population, which was the true purpose of the program.
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For the Viet Cong, this was a classic example of achieving the guerilla’s goal of having a civilian population turn against a government by a government’s own harsh over-reaction to the guerilla threat. Today, a guerilla and the people whom they are amongst are deemed “terrorists” if they find themselves on the wrong side of a domestic conflict that the U.S. has taken a side in, such as Yemen. As we saw in Libya, and see in Syria, these guerillas can become instant U.S. allies who must be supported, if, or when, the U.S. makes policy changes. But unless those U.S. policy changes occur, these groups remain part of the global terrorist network of “associated forces” with al Qaeda, in the eyes of CIA and military officials, and targeted with drones. From the relatively large number of civilian victims of drone attacks as claimed by residents of Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the political party, Pakistan Tehreek Insaf (PTI), this Drone Program has all the hallmarks of the Phoenix Program.
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Spot on analysis by a retired Navy lawyer who knows his U.S. military history.The striking parallels he points to between contemporary U.S. drone terrorism and the notorious Viet Nam War Phoenix Program terrorism are no accident. Among the super-hawks of the War Party, there has been a persistent meme that the U.S. military suffered no defeat in Viet Nam, that the vaunted "counter-insurgency" strategy and tactics were working, and that the war was lost by politicians and the American public who lost the nerve to continue the war. If you put your blinders on firmly enough to pretend that the North and South Vietnamese were separate people, there's an element of truth to that myth. The South Vietnamese Viet Cong guerrillas were decimated by 1970. But the North and South Vietnamese were in fact one people of a single nation, who had united to defeat and evict the French military force. The division into two nations was to have been only a one-year thing, prelude to national election of a government for a reunited Viet Nam. It was the U.S. puppet government of the South that, realizing they could not win the election, reneged on allowing it in the South. Long before the Viet Cong became a shadow of its former force, the Vietnamese from the North had responded to the betrayal of the treaty by sending North Vietnamese regular army troops ("NVA") to the South, spearheaded by the same battle-hardened men who had defeated the French. And the U.S. military was well and truly overwhelmed by the NVA's strategy and tactics, forced to retreat into strongholds from which they ventured only in force. The NVA's Tet Offensive in 1968 failed to succeed in the effort to capture multiple Vietnamese cities concurrently. But the number, weaponry, and power of their force caused Lyndon Johnson to realize that the U.S. generals had been lying to him, that the U.S. was not on the brink of victory, and that there was a very long slog ahead with an unknown outcome if the U.S. continu