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Gary Edwards

A history of the Mortgage - Housing dilemma by Arnold Kling | EconLog | Library of Econ... - 0 views

  • Method A suffered a breakdown in the 1970's, because inflation was allowed to get out of control. The 6 percent mortgage interest rates that were commonly charged by savings and loans became untenable when inflation and interest rates soared to double-digit levels. The savings and loan industry went out of business. Whether Method B could survive a similar shock is unclear. The right lesson to learn from the 1970's was not that we should use Method B. The right lesson to learn is that we should not let inflation get out of hand.
    • Gary Edwards
       
      Government inflation (thank you Jimmy Carter) as the cause of the savings and loan collapse!
  • The secondary mortgage market began in 1968, when the United States formed the Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA). GNMA pooled loans originated under programs by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and the Veterans Administration (VA) and sold these pools to investors. The purpose of this, as with the quasi-privatization of the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) that took place that year, was to take Federally guaranteed mortgage loans off of the books. President Johnson, fighting an unpopular war in Vietnam, wanted to save himself the embarrassment of having to come to Congress to ask for larger and larger increases in the ceiling on the national debt. Thus, the first steps toward mortgage securitization were taken in order to disguise financial reality using accounting gimmicks. It has been the same ever since.
    • Gary Edwards
       
      There it is, in all it'snaked glory. The government created the secondary mortgage market, spinning up Fannie, Freddie and Ginnie for the purpose of taking federally subsidized and guaranteed mortgages off the the official government books. hence the quasi-gov orgs. It's an accounting gimmick!!!!
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    Excellent study of how we got into this problem that the socialist are now using to kill forever the American Dream: "..... Forty years ago, depository institutions handled mortgage credit risk very differently than they do today. Back then, the depository institution, which was typically a savings and loan association, held mortgages that were underwritten by its own employees, given to borrowers and backed by homes in its own community. These were almost always 30-year, fixed-rate loans, with borrowers having made a significant down payment, often 20 percent of the price of the home. Call this approach to mortgage lending "Method A." Today, mortgage loans held by depository institutions are often in the form of securities. These securities are backed by loans originated in distant communities by unknown borrowers, underwritten by mortgage brokers or other personnel not employed by the depository institution. The loans are often not 30-year fixed-rate loans, and the borrowers have typically made down payments of 5 percent or less, including loans with no down payment at all. Call this approach to mortgage lending "Method B." If you compare the two methods using common sense, then Method B does not pass a simple sanity check. In fact, the current financial crisis consists of banks that are up to their necks in Method B......"
Gary Edwards

Robosigning Credit Cards: The Next Major Bank Scandal? | The Reformed Broker - 0 views

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    This article is definately a "must read".  The summary is that the credit card debt mess is far worse than the mortgage foreclosure mess.  The Banksters are guilty of massive illegal activities in foreclosure gate, including forging documents and signatures.  Apparently the same thing has happened with Credit Card Debt Collection!!!! excerpt:   From American Banker: "If sloppy record keeping and problems with false affidavits is a problem with mortgages, it's 100 times bigger in credit card accounts," says Michelle Weinberg of the Legal Assistance Foundation of Metropolitan Chicago. Worse than mortgages, even? Let's just review the mortgage situation: Robosigning consists of blatantly illegal practices in which banks and mortgage companies had their employees sign affidavits and other documents without verifying the information therein; forge signatures on documents; backdate documents; falsely notarize documents; create new documents to replace missing ones; or some combination of all the above. Did I mention that all of this is illegal? Contrary to what the banks would have you believe, robosigning was not a one-off - it happened on a systematic level. So much so that some of the nation's largest banks (including Bank of America Corp. and  JPMorgan Chase & Co., ) were forced to halt foreclosures to "review" these practices in late 2010. The companies that did this claimed that they had to cut corners because they couldn't keep up with all of the paperwork created by the housing boom last decade. But we now know that this is not true - there's evidence that robo-signing goes back all the way to at least 1998. This all means that thousands of Americans were foreclosed upon erroneously and that even homebuyers and sellers in good standing may be unable to prove their rightful ownership. The problem is so big that Sheila Bair, the former head of the FDIC, acknowledged that they don't even know how big it is. It's so big that the b
Gary Edwards

Why Banks Bought So Many Toxic Mortgage Bonds - 0 views

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    Half of all subprime mortgage backed securities wound up on the balance sheets of banks. This fact surprises many people who think that the problem with securitization is that it let banks off-load risky loans onto investors. If that was the strategy, however, banks wouldn't have wound up with such huge holdings of subprime securities. So why did banks snap up so many mortgage backed securities? Even banks that were originating mortgage loans preferred to securitize them, and then hold the securities. Why would they do that rather than just hold the loans? The answer is that bank regulations encouraged them to own securities rather than loans. Under the international Basel capital requirements, a well-capitalized bank was required to hold $4 for every $100 in individual mortgages-a 4% reserve requirement. But if it held the securitized the AAA and AA tranches, the bank only had to hold $1.60 in capital. That's a huge incentive to trade in a loan for a mortgage backed security. But the capital regulations did more than just create incentives to own mortgage backed securities. They allowed banks to dramatically increase their balance sheets. The lower reserve requirement allowed banks to buy even more securities than it could make loans. A bank with $4 billion in reserve could hold $100 billion in loans. But that same $4 billion could instead be used to invest in $250 billion worth of mortgage backed securities.
Gary Edwards

Reason Foundation - Out of Control Policy Blog > How Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Guarant... - 0 views

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    A very brief summary of the way that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are continuing to bail out mortgage investors through their guarantee programs. Total bailouts to keep these bankster clowns in business is $169 Billion paid to mortgage investors via GSE's. And climbing. excerpt: When you get a mortgage, the rights to your loan payments are typically sold to a secondary source. There is a lot of debate over whether the originator of the loan should keep some of the risk, but currently they can make a loan, sell it, and basically be done with it unless they have lied about its contents and are forced to by it back down the road. So the mortgage is sold to the secondary market, likely Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac. In fact, the GSEs and FHA bought or guaranteed 95% of all new mortgages in fiscal year 2011! Mind blowing numbers compared to when 40% market share was seen as high in the early 2000s.  The GSEs then take your loan and put it in a package with other loans they buy and sell rights to the mortgage payments in that package (a mortgage-backed security). The investor is buying rights to part of the principal and/or interest payments, depending on the structure of the deal, on your and many other mortgages. 
Gary Edwards

Goldman Sachs mortgage-backed securities settlement - Business Insider - 0 views

  • “Goldman took $10 billion in TARP bailout funds knowing that it had fraudulently misrepresented to investors the quality of residential mortgages bundled into mortgage backed securities,” said Special Inspector General Christy Goldsmith Romero for TARP. 
  • “Many of these toxic securities were traded in a taxpayer funded bailout program that was designed to unlock frozen credit markets during the crisis.  While crisis investigations take time, SIGTARP is committed to working with our law enforcement partners to protect taxpayers and bring accountability and justice.”
  • $5 billion settlement with Goldman Sachs over the bank’s deceptive practices leading up to the financial crisis.
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  • The settlement includes an agreed-upon statement of facts that describes how Goldman Sachs made multiple representations to RMBS investors about the quality of the mortgage loans it securitized and sold to investors, its process for screening out questionable loans, and its process for qualifying loan originators. 
  • Contrary to those representations, Goldman Sachs securitized and sold RMBS backed by large numbers of loans from originators whose mortgage loans contained material defects.
  • In the statement of facts, Goldman Sachs acknowledges that it securitized thousands of Alt-A, and subprime mortgage loans and sold the resulting residential mortgage-backed securities (“RMBS”) to investors for tens of billions of dollars. 
  • During the course of its due diligence process, Goldman Sachs received pertinent information indicating that significant percentages of the loans reviewed did not conform to the representations it made to investors.
  • Goldman also received and failed to disclose negative information that it obtained regarding the originators’ business practices.  Indeed, Goldman’s due diligence vendors provided Goldman with reports reflecting that the vendors had graded significant numbers and percentages of sampled loans as EV3s, i.e., not in compliance with originator underwriting guidelines. 
  • In certain circumstances, Goldman reevaluated loan grades and directed that such loans be waived into the pools to be purchased or securitized. 
  • In many cases, 80 percent or more of the loans in the loan pools Goldman purchased and securitized were not sampled for credit and compliance due diligence. 
  • Nevertheless, Goldman approved various offerings for securitization without requiring further due diligence to determine whether the remaining loans in the deal contained defects.  A Goldman employee overseeing due diligence for a particular loan pool noted that the pool included loans originated with “[e]xtremely aggressive underwriting” and “large program exceptions made without compensating factors.”  Despite this observation, Goldman did not review the remaining portion of the pool, and subsequently securitized thousands of loans from the pool. 
  • Goldman made statements to investors in offering documents and in certain other marketing materials regarding its process for reviewing and approving originators, yet it failed to disclose  to investors negative information it obtained about mortgage loan originators and its practice of securitizing loans from suspended originators. 
  • Attorney General Schneiderman was elected in 2010 and took office in 2011, when the five largest mortgage servicing banks, 49 state attorneys general, and the federal government were on the verge of agreeing to a settlement that would have released the banks – including Bank of America – from liability for virtually all misconduct related to the financial crisis.
  • Attorney General Schneiderman refused to agree to such sweeping immunity for the banks. As a result, Attorney General Schneiderman secured a settlement that preserved a wide range of claims for further investigation and prosecution.
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    If this doesn't qualify as fraud, nothing does. "We now know more about the $5 billion settlement Goldman Sachs has agreed to pay related to residential mortgage-backed securities it sold between 2005 and 2007. Regulators announced details of the settlement on Monday. Goldman Sachs initially announced the settlement in January. That nearly wiped out fourth-quarter earnings for the firm. "Today's settlement is yet another acknowledgment by one of our leading financial institutions that it did not live up to the representations it made to investors about the products it was selling," said one regulator, U.S. Attorney Benjamin B. Wagner of the Eastern District of California, in a statement. Morgan Stanley announced a similar settlement in February. It agreed to pay $3.2 billion over charges that it misled investors on the quality of mortgage loans it sold. And on Friday, the Justice Department announced that Wells Fargo had agreed to pay $1.2 billion to settle "shoddy" mortgage-lending practices. Here's what we learned about the Goldman settlement on Monday:"
Gary Edwards

Speculators, Politicians, and Financial Disasters : A history of Banking and Socialism - 0 views

  • As the sorry tale of the S&L crisis suggests, the road to financial hell is sometimes paved with good intentions. There was nothing malign in attempting to keep these institutions solvent and profitable; they were of long standing, and it seemed a noble exercise to preserve them. Perhaps even more noble, and with consequences that have already proved much more threatening, was the philosophy that would eventually lead the United States into its latest financial crisis—a crisis that begins, and ends, with mortgages. A mortgage used to stay on the books of the issuing bank until it was paid off, often twenty or thirty years later. This greatly limited the number of mortgages a bank could initiate. In 1938, as part of the New Deal, the federal government established the Federal National Mortgage Association, nicknamed Fannie Mae, to help provide liquidity to the mortgage market.
  • it was, ironically, the New Deal that institutionalized discrimination against blacks seeking mortgages. In 1935 the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), established in 1934 to insure home mortgages, asked the Home Owner’s Loan Corporation—another New Deal agency, this one created to help prevent foreclosures—to draw up maps of residential areas according to the risk of lending in them. Affluent suburbs were outlined in blue, less desirable areas in yellow, and the least desirable in red. The FHA used the maps to decide whether or not to insure a mortgage, which in turn caused banks to avoid the redlined neighborhoods. These tended to be in the inner city and to comprise largely black populations. As most blacks at this time were unable to buy in white neighborhoods, the effect of redlining was largely to exclude even affluent blacks from the mortgage market.
  • In 1977, responding to political pressure to abolish the practice, Congress finally passed the Community Reinvestment Act, requiring banks to offer credit throughout their marketing areas and rating them on their compliance. This effectively outlawed redlining.
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  • in 1995, regulations adopted by the Clinton administration took the Community Reinvestment Act to a new level. Instead of forbidding banks to discriminate against blacks and black neighborhoods, the new regulations positively forced banks to seek out such customers and areas. Without saying so, the revised law established quotas for loans to specific neighborhoods, specific income classes, and specific races. It also encouraged community groups to monitor compliance and allowed them to receive fees for marketing loans to target groups.
  • the Clinton changes in 1995. As part of them, Fannie and Freddie were now permitted to invest up to 40 times their capital in mortgages; banks, by contrast, were limited to only ten times their capital. Put briefly, in order to increase the number of mortgages Fannie and Freddie could underwrite, the federal government allowed them to become grossly undercapitalized—that is, grossly to reduce their one source of insurance against failure. The risk of a mammoth failure was then greatly augmented by the sheer number of mortgages given out in the country.
    • Gary Edwards
       
      wow, there's that "40 to 1" lending to asset ratio that took down the big five investment banks in October of 2008!
  • Since banks knew they could offload these sub-prime mortgages to Fannie and Freddie, they had no reason to be careful about issuing them. As for the firms that bought the mortgage-based securities issued by Fannie and Freddie, they thought they could rely on the government’s implicit guarantee. AIG, the world’s largest insurance firm, was happy to insure vast quantities of these securities against default; it must have seemed like insuring against the sun rising in the West.
  • remaining at the heart of the financial beast now abroad in the world are Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and the mortgages they bought and turned into securities. Protected by their political patrons, they were allowed to pile up colossal debt on an inadequate capital base and to escape much of the regulatory oversight and rules to which other financial institutions are subject. Had they been treated as the potential risks to financial stability they were from the beginning, the housing bubble could not have grown so large and the pain that is now accompanying its end would not have hurt so much.
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    Fueled by easy credit, the real-estate market had been rising swiftly for some years. Members of Congress were determined to assure the continuation of that easy credit. Suddenly, the party came to a devastating halt. Defaults multiplied, banks began to fail. Soon the economic troubles spread beyond real estate. Depression stalked the land. The year was 1836.
Gary Edwards

Walking Away From Your Mortgage: Is it moral? Or is it a legitamate financial option b... - 0 views

  • MM CA said: Mar. 04, 1:28 PM Borrower_underwater: and your point is? defending the banks and mortgage industry? who said his house was dump? he said it was his dream home... pay attention... either way the man and his fmaily were smart enough to save 300k for a down payment. i live in california and the appreciation of housing the past 10 years was irrational and unsustainbale. he boguht three years ago. there was no crisis then. Why woudlnt he buy. Renting now is smart but then? i think you need to inderstand the crisis better. i understand a little bit more than you think i do: see my list of issues/predcitons i developed 3 mtonhs ago... most are coming true...
  • So here lies the squeeze. Originator gets paid per loan made. People in an iron lung are getting approved for subprime. Bank hopes to package loan into CMO and sell to Helsinki or some such. Who is supposed to make sure that the house is really worth what the guy in the iron lung is willing to pay? The appraiser. Not the Originator. Not the bank (we're clearly not talking the good old commmunity bank days were your loan officer knew your neighborhood).
  • it is easy to see where the bank's first protection against a borrower default, correctly establishing a home's value at the time of purchase, falls to the side. That's where it starts to look like the "pay me to rate you" goons at the rating agencies. The populace and ultimate debt holders have counted on the ratings and home valuation process to be clean but simple economic incentives should tell us otherwise.
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  • I agree that the argument that "it's priced into the rate" is insufficient, what is sufficient is the fact that the consequences of walking away are actually in the contract! If I stop paying, you take the house. That's why the bank gets to have a lien. It's all part of the deal we signed, remember?. I don't think walking away from the mortgage is even "breaking" the contract. We will simply be exercising a different clause of the contract: foreclosure in lieu of payment.
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    Mortgage lenders absolutely hate borrowers who walk away from underwater mortgages, especially those who could actually afford to keep paying off their mortgages but just decide it isn't worth it. They hate them so much that the term-of-art for these borrowers is "ruthless." But the ethics of mortgage lenders don't have much to recommend them. We need to decide for ourselves whether or not there's a moral obligation to keep paying off a mortgage. For some it's practically a patriotic duty. For others it's a matter of being a good neighbor, since foreclosures could hurt their home values also. Still others say it's just a matter of being a moral person who keeps promises. Great comments to this story. Check out the predictions from MM_CA. They have a diigo highlight. At the time of my reading of this story, the DOW was down 200 pts to 6678.95. The Supreme Leader is busy conducting a healthcare summit, claiming that "fixing" (read "nationalizing") the healthcare system will result in so many jobs that the economy will turn around. The comments are well worth the time!
Gary Edwards

States negotiating immunity for banks over foreclosures - 0 views

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    Thanks to Marbux.  Seems like nothing will stop the Banksters from seizing it all.  I think i've previously posted that when i was with Virtual Realty (VRi), we were forever trying to crack into the MERS electronic database.  Wow did the Banksters screw this one up.  Now only their corrupt sycophants in Congress and the Coursts can save them.  Not even the lap dog media will touch this. excerpt: A coalition of all 50 states' attorneys general has been negotiating settlements with five of the biggest U.S. banks that would include payment of up to $25 billion in penalties and commitments to follow new rules. In exchange, the banks would get immunity from civil lawsuits by the states, as well as similar guarantees by the Justice Department and Department of Housing and Urban Development, which have participated in the talks. State and federal officials declined to say if any form of immunity from criminal prosecution also is under discussion. The banks involved in the talks are Bank of America, Wells Fargo, CitiGroup, JPMorgan Chase and Ally Financial. REUTERS REPORT PROMPTS LETTER Reuters reported Monday that major banks and other loan servicers have continued to file questionable documents in foreclosure cases. These include false mortgage assignments, and promissory notes with suspect or missing "endorsements," which prove ownership. The Reuters report also showed continued "robo-signing," in which lenders' employees or outside contractors churn out reams of documents without fully understanding their content. The report turned up several cases involving individuals who were publicly identified as robo-signers months ago. Reuters found that such activity has continued even after 14 major mortgage lenders signed settlements with federal bank regulators promising to halt such practices and give remediation to some homeowners who were harmed. In response to these disclosures, Sen. Robert Menendez (D-NJ), chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Housing, Trans
Gary Edwards

The Farce-Hole Gets Deeper: Obama's "Bankster Robo-Settlement For Votes" Cost To Taxpay... - 1 views

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    Incredible.  The Banksters were caught perpetrating a massive fraud on mortgage holders in default.  They set up document mills packed with "robo" signers forging legal documents to prove in a foreclosure procedure that they are in fact the mortgage provider for that property.  The fraud itself revelas the essentials of what went wrong with the entire mortgage securities scam that brought down the worlds financial structures in 2008. The MERS (Mortgage Electronic Registration systems, Inc.) electronic database was set up in 1995 as a means to enable participating Banksters to side step the quilt of State and County laws governing real estate transactions, non judicial foreclosure rights, and property ownership recording requirements.  MERS was essential to the bundling and trade in mortgage-backed securities.  In essence, MERS replaced public recordation requirements with a private, Bankster owned one. This all sounded good until waves of home owners facing default began to take their banksters to court.  Turns out that MERS mortgages lacked the legal documentation to establish a legal chain of ownership.  Realizing their mistake, and with thousands upon thousands of foreclosures hanging in the balance, the Banksters created the robo document industry, forging millions of foreclosure documents overnight.  Criminal fraud on steroids. The banksters got caught, with State Attorney Generals launching massive consumer protection law suits against the big banksters.  This put a halt to the illegal foreclosures, forcing banksters to turn to short sales on homes in default.  The short sale industry rocketed in 2011, but the to perfect a short sale, the banksters were taking the loss; sometimes as much as $100K to $250K per home.  But the real estate market inventory was effectively being cleared and market pricing corrected. The Banksters were unhappy.  Seeking to get back on the foreclosure track but facing what amounted to across the boards class action la
Gary Edwards

Predatory lending with a smiley face; How tax payer subsidized "loan modification" prog... - 0 views

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    They say California is a harbinger of the future. If so, we should all be thinking about possible safe havens. The article begins with a description of loan modification seminars attended by the same mortgage brokers whose predatory lending practices got us into this fix. At the seminars, these predators learn how to make even more money off of the exact same clients they pushed off the ledge. It's all about fees and high pressure churning techniques. With one very big difference: Obama is banking on tax payer funded "loan modifications" to help struggling homeowners. The ugly truth is that mortgage brokers are the real winners. Just like mortgage brokers, loan mod companies are under no obligation to act in borrowers' financial interests, short- or long-term. Under California's model contract, which brokers are encouraged to emulate in their dealings with borrowers, almost any change to a mortgage is an acceptable result, whether or not it saves a borrower money. And while the client has to accept the proposed deal in order for the company to get paid in full, the sales forces at these firms are veterans of pressure pitches to people in tough financial situations. Both Carlson and a spokesman for Mortgage Bailout Assistance indicate that their clients almost invariably take the offers they are given. The proverbial fox is helping the hens hold on to their coops, and not just in California. Seventeen states now have laws on the books effectively banning "foreclosure consultants," but most make an exception for mortgage brokers. As consumer complaints about fraudulent loan mod operations proliferate across the country, other government officials, including New York's City Council, are now following California's lead and exploring the creation of an official registry of mod brokers.
Gary Edwards

Everything You Need to Know About Wall Street, in One Brief Tale | Matt Taibbi | Rollin... - 0 views

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    Another great piece of writing about the 2008 financial collapse, from Mike Taibi. excerpt: At first,  I couldn't remember where I knew that name from. But then I looked it up and saw an explosive Atlantic magazine story, published last year, called, "E-mails Suggest Bear Stearns Cheated Clients Out Of Millions." And then I remembered that piece, and it hit me: Jeffrey Verschleiser is one of the biggest assholes in the entire world! The story begins at Bear Stearns, where Verschleiser used to work, up until the company exploded, in large part because of him personally. Back in the day, you see, Verschleiser headed Bear's mortgage-backed securities operations. Toward the end of his tenure, his particular specialty began with what at the time was the usual industry-wide practice, putting together gigantic packages of crappy subprime mortgages and dumping them on unsuspecting clients. But Verschleiser reportedly went beyond that. According to a lawsuit later filed by a bond insurer called Ambac, Verschleiser also masterminded a kind of double-dipping scheme. What he would do is sell a bunch of toxic mortgages into a trust, which like all mortgage trusts had provisions written into their pooling and servicing agreements (PSAs) that required the original lenders to buy the loans back if they went into default. So Verschleiser would sell bad mortgages back to the banks at a discount, but instead of passing the money back to the trust, he and other Bear execs allegedly pocketed the funds. From the Atlantic story:
Gary Edwards

Peter J. Wallison: The Price for Fannie and Freddie Keeps Going Up - WSJ.com - 0 views

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    Whoa.  This is bad stuff.  The facts, the numbers, the players.  They all point to our Federal government, the Clinton Administration in 1993, Democrat obstruction of much needed reform, and a Democratic Congress in 2007 as the catalist that blew an $18 Trillion dollar hole in our economy.  Miserable socialist bastardos!! excerpt:  Fannie and Freddie's congressional sponsors-some of whom are now leading the administration's effort to "reform" the financial system-have a lot to answer for. Rep. Barney Frank (D., Mass.), chairman of the House Financial Services Committee, sponsored legislation adopted in 2008 that established a new regulatory structure for the GSEs. But by then it was far too late. The GSEs had begun buying risky loans in 1993 to meet the "affordable housing" requirements established under congressional direction by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Most of the damage was done from 2005 through 2007, when Fannie and Freddie were binging on risky mortgages. Back then, Mr. Frank was the bartender, denying that there was any cause for concern, and claiming that he wanted to "roll the dice" on subsidized housing support. View Full Image Associated Press In 2005, the Senate Banking Committee, then controlled by Republicans, adopted tough regulatory legislation that would have established more auditing and oversight of the two agencies. But it was passed out of committee on a partisan vote, and with no Democratic support it never came to a vote. By the end of 2008, Fannie and Freddie held or guaranteed approximately 10 million subprime and Alt-A mortgages and mortgage-backed securities (MBS)-risky loans with a total principal balance of $1.6 trillion. These are now defaulting at unprecedented rates, accounting for both their 2008 insolvency and their growing losses today. Since 2008, under government control, the two agencies have continued to buy dicey mortgages in order to stabilize housing prices. There is more to th
Paul Merrell

Bank Of America's $17 Billion Mortgage Crisis Settlement Could Be A Total Bust | ThinkP... - 0 views

  • Bank of America has agreed to a legal settlement with the Department of Justice (DOJ) to avoid prosecution for the hundreds of billions of dollars in bad mortgage loans that it and its subsidiaries sold to unwitting investors in the run-up to the financial crisis, according to multiple new reports. The total on-paper cost of the deal is reportedly at least $16 billion and perhaps as high as $17 billion, which makes it the largest corporate legal settlement with the government in U.S. history. But that record price tag is deceptive. The deal is unlikely to cost Bank of America anywhere close to that amount.
  • the government’s decision to pursue civil settlements rather than criminal cases against banks that inflated the toxic mortgage bubble means that shareholders pay the price while executives who oversaw the misconduct earn large bonuses.
  • “If you let a thief buy his way out of jail, you should really make sure the check doesn’t bounce,” HDL national campaign director Kevin Whelan said in an email. “Even a record $17 billion settlement is a small fraction of the damage done by B of A and Countrywide. But it could do real good for a lot of families,” Whelan said. “The fact that the JP Morgan Chase settlement has not delivered any noticeable relief to families makes us skeptical.”
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  • Even at face value, the reported settlement is minuscule compared to the harm caused by Bank of America companies. The on-paper cost of the deal is less than 7 percent of the value of the mortgage deals Bank of America and its subsidiaries Countrywide and Merrill Lynch made before the crisis that have since gone bad. (Bank of America bought Countrywide and Merrill Lynch at the height of the crisis.) Those three companies issued just shy of a trillion dollars in mortgage-backed securities in the run-up to the financial collapse, and $245 billion of those products have gone bad, according to Bloomberg. Bank of America had pushed for a much smaller settlement for months, arguing that it should not have to pay for the sins of the firms it bought at bargain-bin prices when the economy was reeling. But a court ruling last month regarding Countrywide’s most notorious mortgage swindle caused the bank to change its tune, according to the New York Times. Judge Jed Rakoff ordered the bank to pay about $1.3 billion for one tranch of defective mortgages sold under a program that Countrywide nicknamed “Hustle” because of its fraudulent nature. Having lost one court case over Countrywide’s notorious misdeeds, the Times says, Bank of America decided to stop resisting federal officials’ settlement demands.
  • After tax deductions, the settlement could easily shrink below the roughly $15 billion in profits the company has reported since 2011. And because the financial crisis sucked something like $14 trillion out of the economy and destroyed tens of trillions of dollars in wealth for homeowners, the DOJ can hardly claim to have delivered a proportional response. The department’s claims about the Bank of America settlement are likely to draw political scrutiny. A bipartisan bill from Sens. Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) and Tom Coburn (R-OK) would require government officials to state the full tax deductibility and true cost of corporate legal settlements in all public statements about them. That bill, inspired by the revelations that JP Morgan’s sweetheart deal with the DOJ didn’t come close to the portrait that Attorney General Eric Holder painted of it, was passed out of committee late last month.
Paul Merrell

E-Mails Show Flaws in JPMorgan's Mortgage Securities - NYTimes.com - 0 views

  • When an outside analysis uncovered serious flaws with thousands of home loans, JPMorgan Chase executives found an easy fix. Rather than disclosing the full extent of problems like fraudulent home appraisals and overextended borrowers, the bank adjusted the critical reviews, according to documents filed early Tuesday in federal court in Manhattan. As a result, the mortgages, which JPMorgan bundled into complex securities, appeared healthier, making the deals more appealing to investors.
  • The trove of internal e-mails and employee interviews, filed as part of a lawsuit by one of the investors in the securities, offers a fresh glimpse into Wall Street’s mortgage machine, which churned out billions of dollars of securities that later imploded. The documents reveal that JPMorgan, as well as two firms the bank acquired during the credit crisis, Washington Mutual and Bear Stearns, flouted quality controls and ignored problems, sometimes hiding them entirely, in a quest for profit.
  • The lawsuit, which was filed by Dexia, a Belgian-French bank, is being closely watched on Wall Street. After suffering significant losses, Dexia sued JPMorgan and its affiliates in 2012, claiming it had been duped into buying $1.6 billion of troubled mortgage-backed securities. The latest documents could provide a window into a $200 billion case that looms over the entire industry. In that lawsuit, the Federal Housing Finance Agency, which oversees Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, has accused 17 banks of selling dubious mortgage securities to the two housing giants. At least 20 of the securities are also highlighted in the Dexia case, according to an analysis of court records.
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  • The Dexia lawsuit centers on complex securities created by JPMorgan, Bear Stearns and Washington Mutual during the housing boom. As profits soared, the Wall Street firms scrambled to pump out more investments, even as questions emerged about their quality.
  • Dexia’s lawsuit is part of a broad assault on Wall Street for its role in the 2008 financial crisis, as prosecutors, regulators and private investors take aim at mortgage-related securities. New York’s attorney general, Eric T. Schneiderman, sued JPMorgan last year over investments created by Bear Stearns between 2005 and 2007.
  • In a statement shortly after he sued JPMorgan Chase, Mr. Schneiderman said the lawsuit was a template “for future actions against issuers of residential mortgage-backed securities that defrauded investors and cost millions of Americans their homes.”
Gary Edwards

Dan Ferris - The real story on financial regulation you need to see - 0 views

  • Like everyone else, Lewis ignored the fact that the CDS market is private only because the Commodity Futures Modernization Act made it that way. It was regulated underground. Without the CFMA, a transparent public futures market in CDSs could have formed and was, in fact, being discussed before the law put the kibosh on it. Everybody and his brother would have seen prices on CDSs for Lehman Brothers and AIG rising during the summer of 2008, harbingers of impending doom, way ahead of the ratings agencies. What's more, banks sold prime mortgage loans and bought "triple-A-rated" collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) only because the Basel II Capital Accords established lower capital requirements for triple-A-rated securities than for prime mortgage loans. When capital requirements drop, you suddenly have more money you can spend on other things. Basel II made the ratings agencies instantly more powerful and important to a bank's competitive position than the behavior of its own underwriters. Throw in the Community Reinvestment Act, two ill-managed massive entities making markets in mortgages (Fannie and Freddie), and the Federal Reserve – a government-created private banking cartel – and you have a government-led financial disaster. There's plenty of blame to go around, I know. But how anyone could miss the massive role of the misguided, heavy-handed regulation is beyond me. Everyone who ought to know better – from hedge-fund managers to our elected representatives – says we need more regulation, not less. Isn't that curious? The solution is never less regulation, and the fault is never too much regulation. If I were more paranoid, I'd cry conspiracy.
  • delivering an oligopoly to JPMorganChase, Bank of America, and Citigroup.
  • The only reason the industry isn't paying for its failures is the government interfered and staged the biggest bailout in history! The government creates a problem, and the solution is somehow always... more government.
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    Like everyone else, Lewis ignored the fact that the CDS market is private only because the Commodity Futures Modernization Act made it that way. It was regulated underground. Without the CFMA, a transparent public futures market in CDSs could have formed and was, in fact, being discussed before the law put the kibosh on it. Everybody and his brother would have seen prices on CDSs for Lehman Brothers and AIG rising during the summer of 2008, harbingers of impending doom, way ahead of the ratings agencies. What's more, banks sold prime mortgage loans and bought "triple-A-rated" collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) only because the Basel II Capital Accords established lower capital requirements for triple-A-rated securities than for prime mortgage loans. When capital requirements drop, you suddenly have more money you can spend on other things. Basel II made the ratings agencies instantly more powerful and important to a bank's competitive position than the behavior of its own underwriters. Throw in the Community Reinvestment Act, two ill-managed massive entities making markets in mortgages (Fannie and Freddie), and the Federal Reserve - a government-created private banking cartel - and you have a government-led financial disaster. There's plenty of blame to go around, I know. But how anyone could miss the massive role of the misguided, heavy-handed regulation is beyond me. Everyone who ought to know better - from hedge-fund managers to our elected representatives - says we need more regulation, not less. Isn't that curious? The solution is never less regulation, and the fault is never too much regulation. If I were more paranoid, I'd cry conspiracy.
Gary Edwards

Bruce Krasting: The Fed's Plan - Rumors of News - 1 views

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    Incredible post from Bruce Krasting concerning the upcoming Obama "Jobs" speech to Congress.  Bruce puts a lot of pieces together and comes up with a view that the Federal Reserve is going to pump $1 Trillion into the economy through a massive Fannie/Freddie ReFi Mortgage plan.  It's audacious.  And it's also very likely to happen.  Beware the unintended consequences.  Great comments to this post! excerpt: "Okay. Put these pieces together. What do you have? Assume for the sake of discussion that the President does announce a major new initiative to ReFi F/F mortgages. Assume further that the cost of the millions of ReFi's would come from existing sources (the $35b of already issued and funded Hope Now Bonds), or better yet, the costs would be crammed down the neck of the banks who are servicing the loans (necessary to get DeMarco to go along). Say, for the sake of discussion, that the targeted mortgages are those who have not yet defaulted, but are desperately in need of a break. That amount would come to about $1.4 Trillion. This is a very big amount. Assume finally that the new mortgage rate would be about 4%. This (if accomplished) would be a very big shot in the arm for the economy as a whole. Now do a flow of funds for this mega transaction.
Gary Edwards

AEI - The Error at the Heart of the Dodd-Frank Act - 0 views

  • The underlying assumption of the Dodd-Frank Act (DFA) is that the 2008 financial crisis was caused by the disorderly bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers.
  • This is evident in the statements of officials and the principal elements of the act, which would tighten the regulation of large financial institutions to prevent their failing, and establish an "orderly resolution" system outside of bankruptcy if they do.
  • The financial crisis, however, was caused by the mortgage meltdown, a sudden and sharp decline in housing and mortgage values as a massive housing bubble collapsed in 2007. This scenario is known to scholars as a "common shock"—a sudden decline in the
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  • 27 million loans—were subprime or otherwise weak and risky loans.
  • The reason for this was the US government's housing policy, which—in the early 1990s—began to require that government agencies and others regulated or controlled by government reduce their mortgage underwriting standards so borrowers who had not previously had access to mortgage credit would be able to buy homes. The government-sponsored enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the Federal Housing Administration, and banks and savings and loan associations (S&Ls) subject to the Community Reinvestment Act were all required to increase their acquisition of loans to homebuyers at or below the median income in their communities. Often, government policies required Fannie, Freddie, and the others to acquire loans to borrowers at or below 80 percent, and in some cases 60 percent, of median income.
  • Sometimes it is argued that the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) prevented more failures. That seems highly unlikely. The first funds were made available under TARP on October 28, 2008, about six weeks after the panic following Lehman's failure. By that time, any firm that had been mortally wounded by Lehman's collapse would have collapsed itself. Moreover, most of the TARP funds were quickly repaid by the largest institutions, and many of the smaller ones, only eight months later, in mid-June 2009. This is strong ¬evidence that the funds were not needed to cover losses coming from the Lehman bankruptcy. If there were such losses, they would still have been embedded in the balance sheets of those institutions. If the funds were needed at all—and many of the institutions took them reluctantly and under government pressure—it was to restore investor confidence that the recipients were not so badly affected by the common shock of the decline in housing and mortgage values that they could not fund orderly withdrawals, if necessary. However, even if we assume that TARP funds prevented the failure of some large financial institutions, it seems clear that the underlying cause of each firm's weakness was the decline in the value of its MBS holdings, and not any losses suffered as a result of Lehman's bankruptcy.
  • This analysis leads to the following conclusion. Without a common shock, the failure of a single Lehman-like firm is highly unlikely to cause a financial crisis. This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that in 1990 the securities firm Drexel Burnham Lambert—then, like Lehman, the fourth largest securities firm in the United States—was allowed to declare bankruptcy without any adverse consequences for the market in general. At the time, other financial institutions were generally healthy, and Drexel was not brought down by the failure of a widely held class of assets. On the other hand, in the presence of a common shock, the orderly resolution of one or a few Lehman-like financial institutions will not prevent a financial crisis precipitated by a severe common shock.
  • In effect, by giving the government the power to resolve any financial firm it believes to be failing, the act has added a whole new policy objective for the resolution of failing firms. Before Dodd-Frank, insolvency law embodied two basic policies—retain the going concern value of the firm and provide a mechanism by which creditors could realize on the assets of an insolvent firm that cannot be saved.
  • DFA will have important adverse effects on ¬insolvency law.
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    The underlying assumption of the Dodd-Frank Act (DFA) is that the 2008 financial crisis was caused by the disorderly bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. This is evident in the statements of officials and the principal elements of the act, which would tighten the regulation of large financial institutions to prevent their failing, and establish an "orderly resolution" system outside of bankruptcy if they do. The financial crisis, however, was caused by the mortgage meltdown, a sudden and sharp decline in housing and mortgage values as a massive housing bubble collapsed in 2007. This scenario is known to scholars as a "common shock"-a sudden decline in the value of a widely held asset-which causes instability or insolvency among many financial institutions. In this light, the principal elements of Dodd-Frank turn out to be useless as a defense against a future crisis. Lehman's bankruptcy shows that in the absence of a common shock that weakens all or most financial institutions, the bankruptcy of one or a few firms would not cause a crisis; on the other hand, given a similarly severe common shock in the future, subjecting a few financial institutions to the act's orderly resolution process will not prevent a crisis. Apart from its likely ineffectiveness, moreover, the orderly resolution process in the act impairs the current insolvency system and will raise the cost of credit for all financial institutions. 
Paul Merrell

Risky Business » CounterPunch: Tells the Facts, Names the Names - 0 views

  • Last week, the country’s biggest mortgage lenders scored a couple of key victories that will allow them to ease lending standards, crank out more toxic assets, and inflate another housing bubble.  Here’s what’s going on. On Monday,  the head of the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), Mel Watt, announced that Fannie and Freddie would slash the minimum down-payment requirement on mortgages from 5 percent to 3 percent while making loans more available to people with spotty credit. If this all sounds hauntingly familiar, it should. It was less than 7 years ago that shoddy lending practices blew up the financial system precipitating the deepest slump since the Great Depression. Now Watt wants to repeat that catastrophe by pumping up another credit bubble.
  • Here’s the story from the Washington Post: “When it comes to taking out a mortgage, two factors can stand in the way: the price of the mortgage,…and the borrower’s credit profile.” On Monday, the head of the agency that oversees the mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac outlined … how he plans to make it easier for borrowers on both fronts. Mel Watt, director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency, did not give exact timing on the initiatives. But most of them are designed to encourage the industry to extend mortgages to a broader swath of borrowers.
  • Here’s what Watt said about his plans in a speech at the Mortgage Bankers Association annual convention in Las Vegas: Saving enough money for a downpayment is often cited as the toughest hurdle for first-time buyers in particular. Watt said that Fannie and Freddie are working to develop “sensible and responsible” guidelines that will allow them to buy mortgages with down payments as low as 3 percent, instead of the 5 percent minimum that both institutions currently require.”
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  • It might be worth noting at this point that Watt’s political history casts doubt on his real objectives.   According to Open Secrets, among the Top 20 contributors to Watt’s 2009-2010 campaign were Goldman Sachs, Bank of America, Citigroup Inc., Bank of New York Mellon, American bankers Association, US Bancorp, and The National Association of Realtors. (“Top 20 Contributors, 2009-2010“, Open Secrets)
Paul Merrell

Jamie Dimon's $13 Billion Secret | The Nation - 0 views

  • In the end, the abject fear of Ben Wagner got Jamie Dimon to cave.For much of 2013, Dimon, the chairman and chief executive of the formidable JPMorgan Chase & Company, was telling anyone who would listen that it was unfair and unjust for federal and state prosecutors to blame him and his bank for the manufacture and sale of mortgage-backed securities that occurred at Bear Stearns & Company and at Washington Mutual in the years leading up to the financial crisis. When JPMorgan Chase bought those two failing firms in 2008, Dimon argued, he was just doing what Ben Bernanke, Hank Paulson and Timothy Geithner had asked him to do. Why should his bank be held financially accountable for the bad behavior at Bear and WaMu?It was a clever argument—and wrong. Dimon's relentless effort to spin his patriotic story soon collided with the fact that Wagner, the US Attorney for the Eastern District of California, had uncovered evidence that JPMorgan itself was guilty of many of the same greedy and irresponsible behaviors. Piles of subpoenaed documents and e-mails revealed that JPMorgan bankers and traders had underwritten billions of dollars' worth of questionable mortgage-backed securities that Dimon had been telling everyone had originated at Bear Stearns and WaMu. Worse, the bad behavior had occurred on Dimon's watch.
  • The likelihood that the Justice Department would file Wagner's civil complaint last fall—exposing publicly for the first time the litany of wrongdoing at JPMorgan and threatening to push it off the perch that Dimon had so artfully constructed for it over the years—ultimately brought Dimon to the table. On September 26, just weeks after the Justice Department shared a draft copy of Wagner's complaint with Dimon, the two sides arranged for a summit meeting between Dimon and Attorney General Eric Holder. By mid-November, the bank had agreed to pay $13 billion in a comprehensive settlement of mortgage-related securities claims with various branches of the federal government and a group of states, led by the attorneys general of New York, California, Illinois, Massachusetts and Delaware.It was the largest financial settlement of all time, and it kept Wagner's complaint away from the prying eyes of the public. One thing is clear: Dimon's claim that his own bankers and traders had done nothing wrong in the years leading up to the financial crisis wasn't true. "The investigators and the lawyers were uncovering very viable evidence," explains Associate Attorney General Tony West, who headed up the settlement negotiations on behalf of the Justice Department. "I think there was recognition that we had enough evidence there that would support the complaint and would support a robust lawsuit."
  • [A disclosure of my own: after JPMorgan Chase fired me as a managing director in January 2004, I brought—and lost—a wrongful-dismissal arbitration against the bank. Separately, I remain in litigation with the bank as the result of a soured investment I made in 1999.]
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  • Dimon was more circumspect. In a conference call the day the settlement was announced, he mostly kept quiet while Marianne Lake, the firm's CFO, led financial analysts through the details, including how $7 billion of the $13 billion fine would be tax-deductible.
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    In a Matt Taibbi-quality lengthy report, William Cohan takes the reader inside the lengthy negotiations of JPMorgan's $13 billion settlement with state and federal prosecutors. JPMorgan admitted to criminal wrongdoing, and the settlement does not include immunity from criminal prosecution for anybody. But the author notes that there is not even a hint that anyone is working on criminal charges. There's a lot of discussion of dissension within the ranks of different state and federal attorneys involved. The article paints Ben Wagner, the US Attorney for the Eastern District of California, as the hero.  In my book, no one involved deserves hero status because no criminal charges have been filed against any JPMorgan managers or board members, hence there is still no incentive for any of the fraudsters who brought down the economy in 2008 to behave differently in the future. JPMorgan emains not too big to fail but too politically connected for its principals to be jailed. According to the article, the government lawyers had iron-clad proof that a group of JPMorgan managing directors had been informed that pools of mortages they were planning to buy were toxic but "buy two of the loan pools anyway, including those with the squirrelly mortgages. JPMorgan then proceeded to bundle "hundreds of millions of dollars of loans from those pools into one security." Wagner found that between the start of 2006 and the middle of 2007-when the mortgage securitization frenzy was at its peak-JPMorgan packaged and sold securities containing thousands of mortgages that were rated by a third-party evaluator to be of extremely low quality, meeting few, if any, of the bank's underwriting standards." If true, that is very serious fraud deserving of the directors' prosecution for criminal fraud and lengthy prison sentences.   The article touches on A.G. Holder's too big to jail argument but that argument, in my opinion, deserves no credibility before antitrust actions are filed to c
Gary Edwards

Neil Barofsky, Matt Stoller, and Your Humble Blogger on Why the Mortgage Sett... - 0 views

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    Two interview videos explaining the Obama Bankster Mortgage Settlement:  the first is with Yves Smith of Naked Capitalism.  The second is a Bloomberg interview with Neil Barofsky and Matt Stoller providing a nice high-level overview of why the mortgage settlement is terrible. It's particularly useful if you are looking for a few key issues to present to someone who has bought the Obama administration PR or is late to the topic.  Don't miss the property rights comments at the end of the Bloomberg interview.  Or should i say, former property rights?   the repercussions of the Obama Mortgage and Foreclosure assistance settlement promise to be far reaching and lasting.  And you thought the 14th Amendment changed the legal definition of property rights?  Watch out for this Marxist prize.
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