Group items tagged

Keck and Sikkink (1999) identify three categories of transnational actor, motivated either by (1) instrumental goals, for example transnational corporations and banks; (2) shared causal ideas, as in scientific groups or epistemic communities; or (3) shared principled ideas or values (Keck and Sikkink 1998).

This creates a perception that TANs are inherently public-interest oriented. However, Scholte (2004) argues that the involvement of such coalitions in global policy is not necessarily benign. Such movements can also reflect coercive power structures, claim authority without representation, and may promote harmful, unhealthy, undemocratic or oppressive ideas and interests.

Walker (2012) argues that corporations are increasingly engaging in a relational approach with civil society groups, focused on building relationships over time, in ways that foster legitimacy, in order to gain access to policy arenas when needed. Bonardi and Keim (2005) note that, to prevent a policy idea that is harmful to a firm’s interests from becoming a ‘salient issue’, the firms may strategically use third parties to promote public debate and discord. To date, analyses of corporate political activities aimed at developing relationships with third parties have focused on efforts to influence national policy or individual organizations. There has been limited attention paid to the potential benefits corporations derive from relationships with transnational networks.

We began by systematically searching the website of each signatory to the letter that ICAPP sent to the WHO for information about the purpose, funding sources and relationships of each of these with other organizations. Relationships were defined as partnerships (as listed on websites and in annual reports), having collaborated on projects, or having shared personnel.

ionships identified through these documents are thus more suggestive than conclusive. Despite these limitations, we use the TTID collection to identify other ICAPP members with a history of working with, or receiving funding from, the tobacco industry. Building on the authors’ previous work, we then determined whether each ICAPP signatory was a member of the Atlas Network (Smith et al. 2017), one of the largest global networks of think tanks and a ‘strategic ally’ of the tobacco industry (PM 1999) (see below).

FCTC measures include Article 5.3, which requires parties to protect public health policies related to tobacco control from the ‘commercial and other vested interests of the tobacco industry’. Article 5.3 restricts the ability of the tobacco industry to engage directly with policy making processes. This has led TTCs to develop strategies that include third-party allies (Fooks et al. 2017). There is now substantial evidence of extensive efforts by the industry to work through front groups, think tanks and other third parties operating across jurisdictions in ways that conceal its role, improve access to policy makers, and enhance the perceived legitimacy of industry-led campaigns (McDaniel et al. 2008)

In all cases, the tobacco industry campaigned against plain packaging; it launched several legal challenges, supported local opposition, and commissioned studies arguing that plain packaging violated intellectual property rights, represented undue government interference in the economy, and increased risks of illicit tobacco trading (Chassin 2017; Cumming 2012; Hawkes 2012).

The letter – widely disseminated through social media, email lists, newsletters, websites and press releases – argued that plain packaging violates intellectual property rights, does not reduce tobacco use, limits the amount of information consumers need to make informed choices, and contributes to increases in the illicit tobacco trade.

Established as the Atlas Research Foundation in the USA in 1981 to foster new think tanks of libertarian persuasion around the world, Atlas promotes free market values among its partners through training programmes, such as its think tank MBA programme, awards and networking events.