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Jonas Patrick

Identity Theft Prevention Services - 0 views

www.slideshare.net/...keep-myid-services

identity theft prevention identity theft protection protect my id id theft services identity theft fraud

shared by Jonas Patrick on 07 Jun 13 - No Cached
  • Jonas Patrick on 07 Jun 13
     
    This presentation will give you brief look of what actually offer to protect your identity. KeepmyID introduced new identity theft prevention services in reasonable rate.
wolf hesse

Denial of service denial | Science Blog - 3 views

www.scienceblog.com/...nial-service-denial-25704.html

security ddos dos defense architecture protocol research

shared by wolf hesse on 02 Oct 09 - Cached
Tsudo liked it
  • However, current filters usually rely on the computer being attacked to check whether or not incoming information requests are legitimate or not. This consumes its resources and in the case of a massive DDoS can compound the problem.
  • The user's computer has to present a filter value for the server to do a quick check. The filter value is a one-time secret that needs to be presented with the pseudo ID. The pseudo ID is also one-time use. Attackers cannot forge either of these values correctly and so attack packets are filtered out.
  • Indeed, the IPACF takes just 6 nanoseconds to reject a non-legitimate information packet associated with the DoS attack.
Jackie Fields

IT Management Conference & Expo in NYC Oct.14-16 - 0 views

www.diigo.com/...agement-conference-expo-in-nyc

IT Management Leadership CIO CTO CEO MySQL PHP Zend PMP

shared by Jackie Fields on 26 Jul 09 - Cached
  • Jackie Fields on 26 Jul 09
     
    http://www.manageit.me ---The greatest minds in IT in 50+ presentations : top industry-leaders: Creator of MySQL Michael "Monty" Widenius, Internet Celebrity Gary Vaynerchuk, Co-Creator of PHP & Zend CTO Zeev Suraski, Richard Sheridan, CEO of Menlo Innovations & Pioneer of Agile eXtreme Programmi...
Skeptical Debunker

Web Posts May Make You Vulnerable To Crime : NPR - 0 views

www.npr.org/...story.php

risk location social networking publication PleaseRobMe.com

shared by Skeptical Debunker on 25 Feb 10 - Cached
  • Skeptical Debunker on 25 Feb 10
     
    It's fun to brag when you're at a great bar or going off on vacation. Social networking sites and location-based apps have made it easy to broadcast that kind of information to your friends. The problem is that you may not just be making your friends jealous, but supplying criminals with useful information as well. A new Web site called PleaseRobMe.com has drawn attention to the issue by repurposing posts from foursquare, a social networking site that lets people share the latest about their whereabouts. PleaseRobMe demonstrates that it's easy for anyone to find out you're not at home - and therefore, are presenting an "opportunity" for burglary. "There are physical and economic safety risks when you're publicizing to the world where you are," says Kevin Bankston, a senior staff attorney with the Electronic Frontier Foundation. "It's obviously a treasure trove of information for criminals. PleaseRobMe is a good demonstration of how easy it is."
Skeptical Debunker

Browser history hijack + social networks = lost anonymity - 0 views

arstechnica.com/...al-networks-lost-anonymity.ars

social networking phishing identity exposure research

shared by Skeptical Debunker on 25 Feb 10 - Cached
  • Skeptical Debunker on 25 Feb 10
     
    Simply joining a few groups at social networking sites may reveal enough information for hackers to personally identify you, according to some recent computer science research. In a paper that will be presented at a security conference later this year, an international team of academics describes how they were able to build membership sets using information that social networking sites make available to the public, and then leverage an existing attack on browsing history to check for personal identity. That information, they argue, can then be combined with other data to create further security risks, such as a personalized phishing attack.
Seçkin Anıl Ünlü

Plugging the CSS History Leak at Mozilla Security Blog - 0 views

blog.mozilla.com/...plugging-the-css-history-leak

security web history mozilla online browsers privacy bugfix

shared by Seçkin Anıl Ünlü on 17 Apr 10 - Cached
  • History Sniffing
  • Links can look different on web sites based on whether or not you’ve visited the page they reference.
  • The problem is that appearance can be detected by the page showing you links, cluing the page into which of the presented pages you’ve been to. The result: not only can you see where you’ve been, but so can the web site!
  • ...18 more annotations...
  • The most obvious fix is to disable different styles for visited versus unvisted links, but this would be employed at the expense of utility: while sites can no longer figure out which links you’ve clicked, neither can you.
  • David Baron has implemented a way to help keep users’ data private while minimizing the effect on the web, and we are deploying it to protect our users.
  • The biggest threats here are the high-bandwidth techniques, or those that extract lots of information from users’ browsers quickly.
  • The JavaScript function getComputedStyle() and its related functions are fast and can be used to guess visitedness at hundreds of thousands of links per minute.
  • we’re approaching the way we style links in three fairly subtle ways:
  • Change 1: Layout-Based Attacks
  • First of all, we’re limiting what types of styling can be done to visited links to differentiate them from unvisited links.
  • can only be different in color
  • the CSS 2.1 specification takes into consideration how visited links can be abused:
  • implement other measures to preserve the user’s privacy while rendering visited and unvisited links differently
  • Change 2: Some Timing Attacks
  • we are changing some of the guts of our layout engine to provide a fairly uniform flow of execution to minimize differences in layout time for visited and unvisited links.
  • when the link is styled, the appropriate set of styles is chosen making the code paths for visited and unvisited links essentially the same length.
  • Change 3: Computed Style Attacks
  • JavaScript is not going to have access to the same style data it used to.
  • Firefox will give it unvisited style values.
  • it’s the right trade-off to be sure we protect our users’ privacy.
  • fixing CSS history sniffing will not block all of these leaks. But we believe it’s important to stop the scariest, most effective history attacks any way we can since it will be a big win for users’ privacy.
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