What Went Wrong with Coronavirus Testing in the U.S. | The New Yorker - 0 views
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n February 5th, sixteen days after a Seattle resident who had visited relatives in Wuhan, China, was diagnosed as having the first confirmed case of COVID-19 in the United States, the Centers for Disease Control, in Atlanta, began sending diagnostic tests to a network of about a hundred state, city, and county public-health laboratories. Up to that point, all testing for COVID-19 in the U.S. had been done at the C.D.C.; of some five hundred suspected cases tested at the Centers, twelve had confirmed positive. The new test kits would allow about fifty thousand patients to be tested, and they would also make testing much faster, as patient specimens would no longer have to be sent to Atlanta to be evaluated.
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Before a state or local lab could use the C.D.C.-developed tests on actual patients
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verification
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"Sharfstein, too, thinks that it's fair to criticize the federal government for not recognizing that its pandemic plans had a single point of failure. The C.D.C. quickly developed a working test, and it was understandable, at some level, that people at the Centers thought that fixing the faulty reagents for the public-health labs would be faster than shifting to an entirely different protocol. Nevertheless, Sharfstein said, "Why are we relying only on the C.D.C.? What the F.D.A. could have done, and eventually did do, is say, 'You can use other approaches.' " Even so, he said, "I don't think it's quite fair to totally blame the F.D.A. for this. The F.D.A. can design an approach to support the public-health strategy, but someone has to tell F.D.A. the public-health goal." The delay in clearly establishing those goals, he said, shows why the decision to shut down the N.S.C. directorate was so consequential. "People talk about, like, why does it matter that they closed the White House office on pandemic preparedness? This is one reason.""