Group items tagged

Behaviourism

unctionalism,

mind-brain identity theory

omputational theory of mind

nature of mind and consciousness

ndirectly modify behaviour

ealist views say that physical states are really mental.

empirical

product of our collective experience

Dualist views

the mental and the physical are both real and neither can be assimilated to the other.

ato's Phae

rue substances are not physical bodies, which are ephemeral, but the eternal Forms

bodies are imperfect copies

Plato's dualism is not, therefore, simply a doctrine in the philosophy of mind, but an integral part of his whole metaphysics.

Aristotle did not believe in Platonic Forms, existing independently of their instances. Aristotelian forms (the capital ‘F’ has disappeared with their standing as autonomous entities) are the natures and properties of things and exist embodied in those things.

Aristotle t

particular soul exists as the organizing principle in a particular parcel of matter.

Descartes

mechanist about the properties of matter.

The main uncertainty that faced Descartes

but how two things so different as thought and extension could interact at all.