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I'll tell you something about Windows: Joe Wilcox does the numbers - 0 views

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    Microsoft already got its big Windows 7 sales bang -- 400 million licenses sold since the operating system shipped nearly two years ago. The global install base of PCs is around 1 billion. The majority of licenses are going to emerging markets. Microsoft estimates that they totaled 40 million PC shipments for the quarter or -- get this -- half of global volume. It's simply a stunning number that represents faster recovering economies in many emerging markets and new sales. The majority of Windows sold in developed markets are resales -- to existing customers. Microsoft is still getting some bang from businesses. During yesterday's earnings conference call, Bill Koefoed, general manager of Microsoft Investor Relations, said that "business PC refresh cycle continued and drove estimated business PC growth of 8 percent". Those business deployments won't last forever, however. The reality is this: If not for Windows Vista's market failure, successor 7's sales situation might be a whole lot worse today. Windows 7 released with about 80 percent of the install base on XP. Upgrades were inevitable in developed markets. Whenever Windows 8 ships, much of the established install base will be on 7 or moving that way. Enterprises don't deploy overnight. For now, Koefoed says that "90 percent of enterprises have committed to a deployment plan" and one-quarter of their desktops have Windows 7. Windows 7's lifeblood is two-fold, then: Pent-up demand from businesses still using Windows XP and sales to emerging markets. It's not a sustainable growth business, although legacy sales should keep the Windows & Windows Live division profitable for some time. Microsoft's Business Division long ago passed Windows as the big revenue and profit generator, $5.78 billion and $3.6, respectively, in fiscal Q4. Windows & Windows Live generated $4.7 billion in revenue and $2.9 billion in profit. Actually, Server and Tools division nearly generated as much revenue as Windows & Windows Live -- $4.6 b
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Five reasons why Microsoft can't compete (and Steve Ballmer isn't one of them) - 2 views

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  • 1. U.S. and European antitrust cases put lawyers and non-technologists in charge of important final product decisions.
  • The company long resisted releasing pertinent interoperability information in the United States. On the European Continent, this resistance led to huge fines. Meanwhile, Microsoft steered away from exclusive contracts and from pushing into adjacent markets.
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  • Additionally, Microsoft curtailed development of the so-called middleware at the core of the U.S. case: E-mail, instant messaging, media playback and Web browsing:
  • Microsoft cofounder Bill Gates learned several important lessons from IBM. Among them: The value of controlling key technology endpoints. For IBM, it was control interfaces. For Microsoft: Computing standards and file formats
  • 2. Microsoft lost control of file formats.
  • Charles Simonyi, the father of Microsoft, and his team achieved two important goals by the mid 1990s: Established format standards that resolved problems sharing documents created by disparate products.
  • nsured that Microsoft file formats would become the adopted desktop productivity standards. Format lock-in helped drive Office sales throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s -- and Windows along with it. However, the Web emerged as a potent threat, which Gates warned about in his May 1995 "Internet Tidal Wave" memo. Gates specifically identified HTML, HTTP and TCP/IP as formats outside Microsoft's control. "Browsing the Web, you find almost no Microsoft file formats," Gates wrote. He observed not seeing a single Microsoft file format "after 10 hours of browsing," but plenty of Apple QuickTime videos and Adobe PDF documents. He warned that "the Internet is the most important single development to come along since the IBM PC was introduced in 1981. It is even more important than the arrival of the graphical user interface (GUI)."
  • 3. Microsoft's senior leadership is middle-aging.
  • Google resembles Microsoft in the 1980s and 1990s:
  • Microsoft's middle-management structure is too large.
  • 5. Microsoft's corporate culture is risk adverse.
  • Microsoft's
  • . Microsoft was nimbler during the transition from mainframe to PC dominance. IBM had built up massive corporate infrastructure, large customer base and revenue streams attached to both. With few customers, Microsoft had little to lose but much to gain; the upstart took risks IBM wouldn't for fear of losing customers or jeopardizing existing revenue streams. Microsoft's role is similar today. Two product lines, Office and Windows, account for the majority of Microsoft products, and the majority of sales are to enterprises -- the same kind of customers IBM had during the mainframe era.
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    Excellent summary and historical discussion about Microsoft and why they can't seem to compete.  Lot's of anti trust and monopolist swtuff - including file formats and interop lock ins (end points).  Microsoft's problems started with the World Wide Web and continue with mobile devices connected to cloud services.
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