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Architect of Fukushima Daiichi Reactor 3, Uehara Haruo, the former president of Saga University had an interview on 11/17/2011. In this interview, he admitted Tepco’s explanation does not make sense, and that the China syndrome is inevitable. He stated that considering 8 months have passed since 311 without any improvement, it is inevitable that melted fuel went out of the container vessel and sank underground, which is called China syndrome.

He added, if fuel has reaches a underground water vein, it will cause contamination of underground water, soil contamination and sea contamination. Moreover, if the underground water vein keeps being heated for long time, a massive hydrovolcanic explosion will be caused. He also warned radioactive debris is spreading in Pacific Ocean. Tons of the debris has reached the Marshall Islands as of 11/15/2011.

In late March and early April NISA had JNES secretly do calculations on a full melt through scenario at Fukushima. While JNES was running scenariios of different full meltdowns, TEPCO was telling the public of slight fuel damage. It is unknown if this information was conveyed to the national government cabinet and no reasoning was given for taking half a year to release this data to the public. Read more at Daily Yomiuri 

Nuclear reactors are operated by fallible human beings, and at least two meltdowns have been caused by poor human decisions: the 1961 meltdown of an experimental military reactor in Idaho, which killed three operators when one of them withdrew a control rod six times as far as he was supposed to (carrying out a high-tech murder-suicide over a love triangle, according to some accounts), and the Chernobyl accident, which was caused by an ill-conceived experiment conducted outside approved protocols.

So, if nuclear safety is a matter of human behavior as well as sound technical infrastructure, we should look to the social sciences in addition to engineering to improve reactor safety. After all, the machines don't run themselves. The social sciences have five lessons for us here: The blind spot. In what we might call the frog-in-boiling-water syndrome, human cognition is such that, in the absence of a disaster, individuals often filter out accumulating indications of safety problems that look like obvious red flags in retrospect -- just as frogs do not jump out of a pot of water on a stove as long as the temperature goes up slowly. Diane Vaughan's award-winning book on the Challenger disaster demonstrates a clear pattern in earlier space shuttle launches of O-ring performance degrading in proportion to declining launch temperatures -- the problem that would ultimately kill Challenger's ill-fated crew. Some shuttle engineers had become concerned about this, but the organizational complex responsible for the space shuttle could not bring this problem into full cognitive focus as long as the missions were successful. Operational success created a blinding glow that made this safety issue hard to see.

The whistle-blower's dilemma. The space shuttle program provides another example of human fallibility, explored in William Langewische's account of the Columbia space shuttle accident: Large, technical organizations tend to be unfriendly to employees who harp on safety issues. The NASA engineers who warned senior management -- correctly, as it turned out -- that the Columbia shuttle was endangered by the foam it lost on takeoff were treated as pests. (The same is true of Roger Boisjoly, the Morton Thiokol engineer who was ostracized and punished for having warned correctly that the Challenger shuttle was likely to explode if launched at low temperature.) Large technical organizations prioritize meeting deadlines and fulfilling production targets, and their internal reward structures tend to reflect these priorities. This is especially true if the organizations operate in a market environment where revenue streams are at stake. In such organizations, bonuses tend not to go to those who cause the organization to miss targets and deadlines or spend extra money to prevent accidents that may seem hypothetical. It is not the safety engineers, after all, who become CEOs. Those with safety concerns report that they often censor themselves unless they are deeply convinced of the urgency of their cause. Indeed, there is -- sadly -- substantial literature on the various forms of mistreatment of engineers who do come forward with such concerns.

It turned out to be true that water vapor (steam) was splashing (erupting) from underground in June. 10/13/2011, Tepco conducted measurements by robot around where water vapor was splashing. They measured 4.7 Sv/h, where it was 4.0 Sv/h in June. It is located at South east side of the reactor 1. According to Tepco, it was splashing from underground in June, but now it’s stopped. They assume it is the highly contaminated water that fills the basement floor. It is assumed that melted fuel rods are sinking deep underground, which is called China Syndrome. (Source)

FUKUSHIMA, Oct. 17 — Mochizuki of the Fukushima Diary website has provided a summary of an Oct. 15 report by NHK that reveals “it turned out to be true that water vapor (steam) was splashing (erupting) from underground in June” at Fukushima Daiichi’s No. 1 reactor. “According to Tepco, it was splashing from underground in June, but now it’s stopped,” the summary continues. An Oct. 13 measurement in the same location of Reactor No. 1 detected radiation of 4.7 Sv/hr, almost a 20% increase over June’s measurement of 4.0 Sv/hr. Mochizuki finishes by noting, “It is assumed that melted fuel rods are sinking deep underground, which is called China Syndrome.”