Group items tagged

“While the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has found that spent nuclear fuel can be stored safely for at least 60 years in wet or dry cask storage beyond the licensed life of the reactor, the Committee has significant questions on this matter and is extremely concerned that the United States continues to accumulate spent fuel from nuclear reactors without a comprehensive plan to collect the fuel or dispose of it safely, and as a result faces a $15,400,000,000 liability by 2020. The Committee approved funding in prior years for the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future [BRC], which was charged with examining our Nation’s policies for managing the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle and recommending a new plan. The BRC issued a draft report in July 2011 with recommendations, which is expected to be finalized in January 2012. The Committee directs prior existing funding, contingent on the renewal of its charter, to the BRC to develop a comprehensive revision to Federal statutes based on its recommendations, to submit to Congress for its consideration.

“The Committee directs the Department to develop and prepare to implement a strategy for the management of spent nuclear fuel and other nuclear waste within 3 months of publication of the final report of the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future.  The strategy shall reduce long-term Federal liability associated with the Department’s failure to pick up spent fuel from commercial nuclear reactors, and it should propose to store waste in a safe and responsible manner. The Committee notes that a sound Federal strategy will likely require one or more consolidated storage facilities with adequate capacity to be sited, licensed, and constructed in multiple regions, independent of the schedule for opening a repository. The Committee directs that the Department’s strategy include a plan to develop consolidated regional storage facilities in cooperation with host communities, as necessary, and propose any amendments to Federal statute necessary to implement the strategy.

“Although successfully disposing of spent nuclear fuel permanently is a long-term effort and will require statutory changes, the Committee supports taking near- and mid-term steps that can begin without new legislation and which provide value regardless of the ultimate policy the United States adopts. The Committee therefore includes funding for several of these steps in the Nuclear Energy Research and Development account, including the assessment of dry casks to establish a scientific basis for licensing; continued work on advanced fuel cycle options; research to assess disposal in different geological media; and the development of enhanced fuels and materials that are more resistant to damage in reactors or spent fuel pools.

(Page 80) “The events at the Fukushima-Daiichi facilities in Japan have resulted in a reexamination of our Nation’s policies regarding the safety of commercial reactors and the storage of spent nuclear fuel.  These efforts have been supported by appropriations in this bill, and the Committee provides funding for continuation and expansion of these activities.

The report also contains extensive language regarding Nuclear Energy Research and Development: “Use of Prior Existing Balances. - If the Secretary renews the charter of the Blue Ribbon Commission, the Department is directed to use $2,500,000 of prior existing balances appropriated to the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management to develop a comprehensive revision to Federal statutes based on its recommendations.  The recommendation should be provided to Congress not later than March 30, 2012 for consideration.

“Nuclear Energy Enabling Technologies. - The Committee recommends $68,880,000 for Nuclear Energy Enabling Technologies, including $24,300,000 for the Energy Innovation Hub for Modeling and Simulation, $14,580,000 for the National Science User Facility at Idaho National Laboratory, and $30,000,000 for Crosscutting research.  The Committee does not recommend any funding for Transformative research. The Committee recommends that the Department focus the Energy Innovation Hub on the aspects of its mission that improve nuclear powerplant safety.

Light Water Reactor Small Modular Reactor Licensing Technical Support. - The Committee provides no funding for Light Water Reactor Small Modular Reactor Licensing Technical Support. “Reactor Concepts Research, Development, and Demonstration. - The Committee provides $31,870,000 for Reactor Concepts Research, Development and Demonstration. Of this funding, $21,870,000 is for Advanced Reactor Concepts activities. The Committee does not include funding for the Next Generation Nuclear Plant Demonstration project. The Department may, within available funding, continue high-value, priority research and development activities for high-temperature reactor concepts, in cooperation with industry, that were conducted as part of the NGNP program.  The remaining funds, $10,000,000, are for research and development of the current fleet of operating reactors to determine how long they can safely operate.

“Fuel Cycle Research and Development. - The Committee recommends $187,917,000 for Fuel Cycle Research and Development.  Within available funds, the Committee provides $10,000,000 for the Department to expand the existing modeling and simulation capabilities at the national laboratories to assess issues related to the aging and safety of storing spent nuclear fuel in fuel pools and dry storage casks. The Committee includes $60,000,000 for Used Nuclear Fuel Disposition, and directs the Department to focus research and development activities on the following priorities: $10,000,000 for development and licensing of standardized transportation, aging, and disposition canisters and casks; $3,000,000 for development of models for potential partnerships to manage spent nuclear fuel and high level waste; and $7,000,000 for characterization of potential geologic repository media.

“The Committee provides funding for evaluation of standardized transportation, aging and disposition cask and canister design, cost, and safety characteristics, in order to enable the Department to determine those that should be used if the Federal Government begins transporting fuel from reactor sites, as it is legally obligated to do, and consolidating fuel. The Committee notes that the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future has, in its draft report, recommended the creation of consolidated interim storage facilities, for which the Federal Government will need casks and canisters to transport and store spent fuel.

DOE views nuclear safety and assuring a robust safety culture as essential to the success of the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) and all of our projects across the DOE complex.

Even while some initiatives are already underway, we recognize the need to continue improving nuclear safety at WTP and across the complex. To that end, DOE has developed a comprehensive action plan to address the Board's specific recommendations to strengthen the safety culture at WTP. Initial steps are discussed below:

Even though the Department cannot accept the allegations without the opportunity to evaluate the Board's full investigative record, in the spirit of continual improvement DOE accepts the Board's recommendations to assert federal control to direct, track, and validate corrective actions to strengthen the safety culture at WTP; conduct an extent of condition review to assess safety culture issues beyond the WTP project; and support the ongoing Department of Labor (DOL) review of Dr. Tamosaitis' case.

In October 2010, HSS completed its investigation, which included interviews with more than 250 employees. While HSS found that the fundamentals of a robust safety culture were present at WTP, the report identified the need for improvement in key areas, including, among others: more clearly defining federal roles and responsibilities; identifying mechanisms to strengthen trust among the workforce and better communicate information to employees; and putting in place processes to ensure nuclear safety programs remain robust and effective during project changes.

The corrective actions that address the recommendations from the HSS report will be fully implemented by September 30, 2011. HSS will then conduct a follow-on visit to assure that these steps were executed effectively across the project, as well as to perform additional analysis to determine if cost and schedule pressures are challenging the implementation of a robust nuclear safety culture.

DOE and Bechtel National, Incorporated (BNI)--the prime contractor on the WTP project--have been engaged in a variety of initiatives to strengthen the nuclear safety culture at WTP for over a year. Steps that have already occurred include completing a revision to the WTP Project Execution Plan, currently under review, to more clearly delineate federal roles and organizational responsibilities at WTP and the Office of River Protection (ORP), and conducting a number of employee forums to ensure that employees clearly understand the changes in those roles and responsibilities.

Also in response to the HSS recommendations, BNI commissioned a confidential survey of more than 300 WTP employees to assess if a Nuclear Safety Quality Culture (NSQC) gap existed at the site and to identify additional areas for improvement. As a result, the contractor assigned a retired Navy Admiral and former nuclear utility executive experienced in application of Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) methods as the Manager of NSQC Implementation for the project. To date, approximately 1,600 people at the site, including all senior managers, have received training focused on making the workforce comfortable with raising issues and systematically moving issues through to resolution. In addition, over the last 13 months, BNI has conducted three all-hands meetings with DOE project team participation to emphasize the importance of a robust nuclear safety culture.

Over the past year, the Department has undertaken a broad range of steps to assure a strong and questioning safety culture at WTP and sites across the DOE complex. We will only be successful if we remain committed to continuous improvement and teamwork. DOE takes all safety concerns--whether from our employees, our contractors, the Board, or third-parties--very seriously. This input is an integral part of the Department's efforts to constantly strengthen nuclear safety at our facilities.

The Deputy Secretary and I will continue to be personally engaged in asserting federal control to ensure the specific corrective actions to strengthen safety culture within the WTP project in both contractor and federal workforces--consistent with DOE Policy 420.1--are tracked and validated. Federal control within the WTP project has been and will continue to be asserted and regularly reinforced through our direct involvement.

This will include a series of ``town-hall'' style meetings hosted by senior DOE officials to highlight for workers the importance of maintaining a strong nuclear safety culture at each of our sites and to solicit their input. These forums across the DOE complex will also help improve the direct communication of safety issues between senior managers and employees. To address the concern regarding extent of condition, HSS will independently review the safety culture across the entire complex. This review will provide insights into the health of safety culture within Headquarters organizations, different program offices, and different field sites.

In addition, DOE and BNI are arranging Safety Conscious Work Environment (SCWE) training for BNI and ORP managers and supervisors with a firm that conducts SCWE training for the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations Senior Nuclear Plant Manager's course. We will also be joining with BNI to sponsor an independent, executive-level

assessment of the project's nuclear safety culture by a group of nuclear industry subject matter experts, who have experience in INPO evaluations and/or Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) inspections. At both a site and corporate level, we are also taking steps to enhance reporting mechanisms for safety-related concerns. At the Hanford site, we have combined the Employee Concerns Programs for ORP and the Richland Operations Office to leverage existing resources to both strengthen this important program and increase its visibility at the site.

Within EM Headquarters, we have established ombudsmen to act as advocates for employees and their concerns.

We have made it easier for employees to use a variety of avenues to raise concerns, including: the line management for each project, site employee concerns programs, union representatives, EM's Office of Safety and Security Programs, HSS, and DOE's Chief of Nuclear Safety. Each office now offers employees access to both a hotline number and general email inbox, so that workers will have the opportunity to ask questions or voice concerns either directly or anonymously.

We will also require that both EM Headquarters and field sites assess nuclear safety culture and the implementation of a safety conscious work environment in their annual submittals for Integrated Safety Management System (ISMS) declarations. The specific criteria will build on the existing requirements for the ISMS declarations and will be expanded to include safety culture principles not only from DOE, but also from INPO and NRC.

DOE does not agree with all of the findings included in the Board's report. Specifically, the conclusions drawn by the Board about the overall quality of the safety culture at WTP differ significantly from the HSS findings and are not consistent with the safety culture data and field performance experience at WTP. We are concerned that your letter includes the October 2010 HSS review in the list of ``other examples of a failed safety culture.''

The Department disagrees with this categorization and believes the HSS report provided an accurate representation of the nuclear safety culture-- and existing gaps--at the WTP.

Reverse osmosis has been identified by EPA as a “best available technology” (BAT) and Small System Compliance Technology (SSCT) for uranium, radium, gross alpha, and beta particles and photon emitters. It can remove up to 99 percent of these radionuclides, as well as many other contaminants (e.g., arsenic, nitrate, and microbial contaminants). Reverse osmosis units can be automated and compact making them appropriate for small systems. via EPA, Radionuclides in Drinking Water

However, EPA designed its recommendations for the contaminants typically found in municipal water systems, so it doesn’t specify Iodine-131 by name. The same document goes on to say, “Reverse osmosis does not remove gaseous contaminants such as carbon dioxide and radon.” Iodine-131 escapes from damaged nuclear plants as a gas, and this is why it disperses so quickly through the atmosphere. It is captured as a gas in atmospheric water, falls to the earth in rain and enters the water supply.

Dissolved gases and materials that readily turn into gases also can easily pass through most reverse osmosis membranes,” according to the University of Nevada Cooperative Extension. For this reason, “many reverse osmosis units have an activated carbon unit to remove or reduce the concentration of most organic compounds.” Activated Carbon

That raises the next question: does activated carbon remove iodine-131? There is some evidence that it does. Scientists have used activated carbon to remove iodine-131 from the liquid fuel for nuclear solution reactors. And Carbon air filtration is used by employees of Perkin Elmer, a leading environmental monitoring and health safety firm, when they work with iodine-131 in closed quarters. At least one university has adopted Perkin Elmer’s procedures. Activated carbon works by absorbing contaminants, and fixing them, as water passes through it. It has a disadvantage, however: it eventually reaches a load capacity and ceases to absorb new contaminants.

Ion Exchange The EPA also recommends ion exchange for removing radioactive compounds from drinking water. The process used in water softeners, ion exchange removes contaminants when water passes through resins that contain sodium ions. The sodium ions readily exchange with contaminants.

Ion exchange is particularly recommended for removing Cesium-137, which has been found in rain samples in the U.S., but not yet in drinking water here. Some resins have been specifically designed for capturing Cesium-137, and ion exchange was used to clean up legacy nuclear waste from an old reactor at the Department of Energy’s Savannah River Site (pdf).

Cumulative radiation dose is neither an accurate nor an appropriate measure of cancer induction risk for protracted or fractionated ionizing radiation exposure except for describing the virtual threshold for various exposures; and Cancer promotion risk for ongoing lifetime biological processes is a relative process as seen in the RERF (Radiation Effects Research Foundation) studies of the Japanese atomic bomb survivors for brief high dose-rate exposures to ionizing radiation. It cannot be used to estimate cancer induction risk from protracted or fractionated ionizing exposures over long times and at low dose rates.

RecommendationsThe current ICRP radiation protection recommendations certainly provide a high level of safety and protection for radiation workers and the public. Radiation safety has been the most important goal of the ICRP, and their recommendations have met that goal with distinction. However, the ICRP risk estimates and response models for protracted or fractionated ionizing radiation exposures and long-lived internal emitters seriously overestimate the risks of low doses. Reasonably accurate cancer induction risk estimates are needed to avoid expensive over-regulation and to bolster the scientific foundation of radiation safety regulations and analysis. Many of the current environmental radiation safety standards are inappropriately low and prohibitively expensive to enforce.

The current ICRP models of radiation carcinogenesis can be misleading. Revision of the radiation safety standards is needed that clearly distinguishes between radiation cancer promotion as observed in the atomic bomb survivor studies and radiation cancer induction as observed for long-lived internal emitters. In particular, the ICRP needs to revisit and revise the standards currently recommended for ionizing radiation-induced cancer. Recommended standards should be considered that are based on lifetime average dose rate to sensitive tissues in the case of internally-deposited, relatively long-lived radionuclides and other protracted or fractionated exposures rather than on cumulative or committed dose.

28,079 Abandoned Wells in Gulf of Mexico In an explosive report at Sky Truth, John Amos reveals from government data that “there are currently 24,486 known permanently abandoned wells in the Gulf of Mexico, and 3,593 ‘temporarily’ abandoned wells, as of October 2011.” [6] TA wells are those temporarily sealed so that future drilling can be re-started. Both TA wells and “permanently abandoned” (PA) wells endure no inspections.

Not only cement, but seals, valves and gaskets can deteriorate over time. A 2000 report by C-FER Technologies to the Dept. of Interior identified several  different points where well leaks can occur, as this image (p. 26) reveals.  To date, no regulations prescribe a maximum time wells may remain inactive before being permanently abandoned. [13] “The most common failure mechanisms (corrosion, deterioration, and malfunction) cause mainly small leaks [up to 49 barrels, or 2,058 gallons]. Corrosion is historically known to cause 85% to 90% of small leaks.” Depending on various factors, C-FER concludes that “Shut-In” wells reach an environmental risk threshhold in six months, TA wells in about 10-12 years, and PA wells in 25 years.  Some of these abandoned wells are 63 years old.

Leaking abandoned wells pose a significant environmental and economic threat. A three-month EcoHearth investigation revealed that a minimum of 2.5 million abandoned wells in the US and 20-30 million worldwide receive no follow up inspections to ensure they are not leaking. Worse: “There is no known technology for securely sealing these tens of millions of abandoned wells. Many—likely hundreds of thousands—are already hemorrhaging oil, brine and greenhouse gases into the environment. Habitats are being fundamentally altered. Aquifers are being destroyed. Some of these abandoned wells are explosive, capable of building-leveling, toxin-spreading detonations. And thanks to primitive capping technologies, virtually all are leaking now—or will be.” [11] Sealed with cement, adds EcoHearth, “Each abandoned well is an environmental disaster waiting to happen. The triggers include accidents, earthquakes, natural erosion, re-pressurization (either spontaneous or precipitated by fracking) and, simply, time.”

Over a year ago, the Dept. of Interior promised to plug the “temporarily abandoned” (TA) wells, and dismantle another 650 production platforms no longer in use. [7] At an estimated decommissioning cost of $1-3 billion [8], none of this work has been started, though Feds have approved 912 permanent abandonment plans and 214 temporary abandonment plans submitted since its September 2010 rule. [9] Over 600 of those abandoned wells belong to BP, reported the Associated Press last year, adding that some of the permanently abandoned wells date back to the 1940s [10].  Amos advises that some of the “temporarily abandoned” wells date back to the 1950s. “Experts say abandoned wells can repressurize, much like a dormant volcano can awaken. And years of exposure to sea water and underground pressure can cause cementing and piping to corrode and weaken,” reports AP.

As far back as 1994, the Government Accountability Office warned that there was no effective strategy in place to inspect abandoned wells, nor were bonds sufficient to cover the cost of abandonment. Lease abandonment costs estimated at “$4.4 billion in current dollars … were covered by only $68 million in bonds.” [12] The GAO concluded that “leaks can occur… causing serious damage to the environment and marine life,” adding that “MMS has not encouraged the development of nonexplosive structure removal technologies that would eliminate or minimize environmental damage.”

The AP noted that none of the 1994 GAO recommendations have been implemented. Abandoned wells remain uninspected and pose a threat which the government continues to ignore. Agency Reorganization The Minerals Management Service (MMS) was renamed the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE) last May after MMS drew heavy fire for malfeasance, including allowing exemptions to safety rules it granted to BP. An Office of Inspector General investigation revealed that MMS employees accepted gifts from the oil and gas industry, including sex, drugs and trips, and falsified inspection reports. [14] Not only was nothing was done with the 1994 GAO recommendations to protect the environment from abandoned wells, its 2003 reorganization recommendations [15] were likewise ignored.  In a June 2011 report on agency reorganization in the aftermath of the Gulf oil spill, the GAO reports that “as of December 2010,” the DOI “had not implemented many recommendations we made to address numerous weaknesses and challenges.” [16] Reorganization proceeded.  Effective October 1, 2011, the Dept. of the Interior split BOEMRE into three new federal agencies: the Office of Natural Resources Revenue to collect mineral leasing fees, the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) and the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) “to carry out the offshore energy management and safety and environmental oversight missions.” The DOI admits:

“The Deepwater Horizon blowout and resulting oil spill shed light on weaknesses in the federal offshore energy regulatory system, including the overly broad mandate and inherently conflicted missions of MMS which was charged with resource management, safety and environmental protection, and revenue collection.” [17] BOEM essentially manages the development of offshore drilling, while BSEE oversees environmental protection, with some eco-protection overlap between the two agencies. [18] Early this month, BSEE Director Michael R. Bromwich spoke at the Global Offshore Safety Summit Conference in Stavanger, Norway, sponsored by the International Regulators Forum. He announced a new position, Chief Environmental Officer of the BOEM:

This person will be empowered, at the national level, to make decisions and final recommendations when leasing and environmental program heads cannot reach agreement. This individual will also be a major participant in setting the scientific agenda for the United States’ oceans.” [19] Bromwich failed to mention anything about the abandoned wells under his purview. Out of sight, out of mind. Cost of the Macondo Blowout

On Monday, the GAO published its final report of a three-part series on the Gulf oil disaster. [20]  Focused on federal financial exposure to oil spill claims, the accountants nevertheless point out that, as of May 2011, BP paid $700 million toward those spill claims out of its $20 billion Trust established to cover that deadly accident. BP and Oxford Economics estimate the total cost for eco-cleanup and compensatory economic damages will run to the “tens of billions of dollars.” [21] On the taxpayer side, the GAO estimates the federal government’s costs will exceed the billion dollar incident cap set by the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (as amended). As of May 2011, agency costs reached past $626 million. The Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund’s income is generated from an oil barrel tax that is set to expire in 2017, notes GAO.

With Monday’s District Court decision in Louisiana, BP also faces punitive damages on “thousands of thousands of thousands of claims.” U.S. District Judge Carl Barbier denied BP’s appeal that might have killed several hundred thousand claims, among them that clean up workers have still not been fully paid by BP. [22] Meanwhile, destroying the planet for profit continues unabated. It’s time to Occupy the Gulf of Mexico: No more oil drilling in our food source.

But the Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff’s report does not call for moving more of the fuel.When the commission received an oral report from a six-member “task force” it appointed to study the safety implications of Fukushima, one commissioner, William C. Ostendorff, said he had received letters from members of Congress asking for wider use of the casks, however.But Charles L. Miller, who led the task force, replied that removing the fuel would not do much to reduce the basic problem, which is that fuel rods remain in the pool, and if cooling is knocked out, the water that provides protection against melting and the release of radioactive materials will boil away.

“Before you can take it out of the pool, it has to be at least five years old, and by that time, we call it, for lack of a better word, cold fuel,’’ Mr. Miller said.At the briefing on Tuesday, Mr. Fertel mentioned other recommendations from the task force, including better instruments for altering operators to how much water is in the pools and new ways of adding water in an emergency. Pulling more fuel out, he said, would provide certain advantages but is also certain to expose workers to radiation in the course of the transfer.

Fukushima used dry casks as well, and those appear to have survived without damage, Mr. Fertel said, although they have not been thoroughly inspected. “They’re fine, but so are the pools,’’ he said.

They were not unscathed, however; debris flew into the pools after the buildings surrounding them blew up in hydrogen explosions.

The task force also refrained from recommending changes in emergency planning zones, despite the embassy’s recommendation during the crisis for Americans to stay 50 miles away from Fukushima. In the United States, emergency evacuation planning is required within 10 miles of any reactor.

Mr. Fertel said the recommendation to evacuate to 50 miles “was based not on information, but on the lack thereof.’’

Opponents of nuclear power have argued that the commission should cease all extensions of reactors’ operating licenses until it has digested the lessons of the accident in Japan. But Mr. Fertel noted that since March 11, the commission has issued 20-year license extensions for the Vermont Yankee, Palo Verde, Prairie Island, Salem and Hope Creek reactors, and allowed higher power outputs for Limerick and Point Beach.

Yet much more is known today about quake vulnerability, the potential for flooding and other safety factors than when many plants were designed. As a result, according to the task force’s report, sometimes two adjacent reactors that were designed at different times will apply different assumptions about the biggest natural hazard they face.One of the study’s recommendations is that the reactors be periodically re-evaluated for hazards like floods and earthquakes.

There are a dozen recommendations in all. The commission’s chairman, Gregory B. Jaczko, said the five commissioners should decide within 90 days (the same period it took to develop the recommendations) whether to accept or reject them, although actually acting on them would take far longer.

Making Existing Reactors More Secure against Terrorist Attacks The NRC should revise its assumptions about terrorists' capabilities to ensure nuclear plants are adequately protected against credible threats, and these assumptions should be reviewed by U.S. intelligence agencies. The NRC should modify the way it judges force-on-force security exercises by assessing a plant's "margin to failure," rather than whether the plant merely passes or fails. The U.S. government should establish a program for licensing private security guards that would require successful completion of a federally supervised training course and periodic recertification. Making New Reactors More Secure against Terrrorist Attacks The NRC should require new reactor designs to be safer than existing reactors. The NRC should require new reactor designs to be more secure against land- and water-based terrorist attacks.

Improving the NRC's Cost-Benefit and Risk-Informed Analyses The NRC should increase the value it assigns to a human life in its cost-benefit analyses so the value is consistent with other government agencies. The NRC should require plant owners to calculcate the risk of fuel damage in spent fuel pools as well as reactor cores in all safety analyses. The NRC should not make decisions about reactor safety using probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs) until it has corrected its flawed application of this tool. Ensuring Public Participation The NRC should fully restore the public's right to obtain information and question witnesses in hearings about changes to existing power plant licenses and applications for new licenses.

That may not sound like an urgent timetable to some people. But to put it into perspective, the commission is still struggling with issues raised by the Browns Ferry fire of 1975.

Mr. Jaczko cautioned that the nuclear safety effort should follow a principle used in medicine: first, do no harm. But the commission should exercise leadership promptly, he said. And the commission is trying to stick to its current schedule of issuing its first new construction license by the end of the year. But the industry, group, the Nuclear Energy Institute, took note of something else in the 90-day report: an observaiton that information from Japan was “unavailable, unreliable and ambiguous.”

changes in the hardened vents, which are supposed to route hydrogen out of the buildings before it can cause explosions, were premature because no one is sure what went wrong with the ones at Fukushima, Mr. Peterson said. Figuring that out could take years, he said.Meanwhile, leaders of the Republican majority on the House Energy and Commerce Committee released a letter they had sent to Mr. Jaczko warning him that “it is essential that the commission have the benefit of the full and deliberate process of review.’’

That consent order covers 33 underground canals of radioactive waste below the barrels, but not the barrels, which are awaiting transfer to the Waste Isolation Pilot Project in southern New Mexico. A record 170 shipments of the legacy waste from the nation's premier nuclear weapons facility were taken to WIPP in the fiscal year that just ended, but the equivalent of some 40,000 barrels remain."The governor wants to get the (barrels) off the hill and protect the groundwater and wastewater," said Ed Worth, who oversees waste cleanup at the lab.The same top priority was approved last week by the Citizens Board, volunteers comprised of former lab workers, retirees, public employees and others, chartered by DOE to make recommendations on establishing the order of cleanup initiatives."All we do is tell them they should," said Lawrence Longacre, a board member expressing frustration that the priority recommendations had no teeth. "Is there any way we can hold their feet to the fire and say do A, B and C?"

Worth told the board their recommendations are being heard and taken seriously, noting that President Obama's budget request this year for lab cleanup "was more than we ever expected."Congress, however, has cut the Los Alamos cleanup request for $358 million to $185 million, raising the question of the lab's ability to meet the consent decree

In a news release issued late Tuesday, the NRC said that the 12 steps recommended in the report would "increase safety and redefine what level of protection to public health is regarded as adequate." The full report will be released on Wednesday, the NRC said.

The three-month investigation was triggered by the March 11 earthquake and tsunami that cut off all electrical power to the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant

members admit that the current patchwork of regulations is not given equal consideration or treatment by power plant operators or by the NRC, during its technical reviews and inspections

But Republican Sen. James Inhofe of Oklahoma, ranking member of the Senate environment committee, said such sweeping changes were premature. "Changes in our system may be necessary," Inhofe said, but "a nuclear accident in Japan should not automatically be viewed as an indictment of U.S. institutional structures and nuclear safety requirements."

"A 90-day review does not permit a complete picture of the still-emerging situation," said Steve Kerekes, a spokesman for the Nuclear Energy Institute. "Therefore, we strongly recommend that the NRC seek additional information from Japan that would help establish the basis for actions."

Eisuke Matsui, a lung cancer specialist who is a former associate professor at Gifu University's School of Medicine, argued in his papers submitted to the conference that the victims of Chernobyl in the neighboring present-day country of Belarus have suffered from a raft of other problems, including congenital malformations, type-1 diabetes and cataracts. Matsui cited a lengthy and detailed report of research by the Russian scientists Alexey V. Yablokov, Vassily B. Nesterenko and Alexey V. Nesterenko that was published in 2007, and republished in English in 2009 by the New York Academy of Sciences under the title "Chernobyl: Consequences of the Catastrophe for People and the Environment." Matsui stressed that, based on such evidence, the Japanese government should approve group evacuations of children — at the expense of the plant's operator, Tokyo Electric Power Co. — from certain parts of Fukushima Prefecture. He cited some areas of the city of Koriyama, 50 to 60 km from the stricken nuclear plant, where soil contamination by radioactive cesium-137 has reached 5.13 Curies per sq. km. That is the same as in areas of Ukraine where residents were given rights to evacuate, Matsui said. In fact in June, the parents of 14 schoolchildren in Koriyama filed a request for a temporary injunction with the Fukushima District Court, asking it to order the city to send their children to schools in safer areas.

In the ongoing civil suit, those parents claim that the children's external radiation exposure has already exceeded 1 millisievert according to official data — the upper yearly limit from all sources recommended by the ICRP for members of the public under normal conditions. Following a nuclear incident, however, the ICRP recommends local authorities to set the yearly radiation exposure limit for residents in contaminated areas at between 1 and 20 millisieverts, with the long-term goal of reducing the limit to 1 millisievert per year. Meanwhile, Hisako Sakiyama, former head researcher at the National Institute of Radiological Sciences, delved into the non-cancer risks of exposure to radiation. In her presentation, she referred to a report compiled in April by the German Affiliate of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW). Titled "Health Effects of Chernobyl: 25 years after the reactor catastrophe," this documents an alarmingly high incidence of genetic and teratogenic (fetal malformation) damage observed in many European countries since Chernobyl.

Sakiyama also pointed out that the German report showed that the incidence of thyroid cancer due to radiation exposure was not limited to children. For instance, she cited IPPNW survey findings from the Gomel district in Belarus, a highly-contaminated area, when researchers compared the incidence of thyroid cancer in the 13 years before the Chernobyl explosion and the 13 years after. These findings show that the figures for the latter period were 58 times higher for residents aged 0-18, 5.3 times higher for those aged 19-34, 6 times higher for those aged 35-49, and 5 times higher for those aged 50-64. "In Japan, the government has a policy of not giving out emergency iodine pills to those aged 45 and older (because it considers that the risk of them getting cancer is very low),"' Sakiyama said. "But the (IPPNW) data show that, while less sensitive compared to children, adults' risks go up in correspondence with their exposure to radioactivity."

Further post-Chernobyl data was presented to the conference by Sebastian Pflugbeil, a physicist who is president of the German Society for Radiation Protection. Reporting the results of his independent research into child cancers following the Chernobyl disaster, he said that "in West Germany ... with an exposure of 1 millisievert per year, hundreds of thousands of children were affected." He noted, though, that any official admissions regarding health damage caused by the 1986 disaster in the then Soviet Union came very slowly and insufficiently in Europe. Indeed, he said the authorities denied there were health risks for years afterward. In response, an audience member who said he was a science teacher at a junior high school in Kawaguchi, Saitama Prefecture, asked Pflugbeil to exactly identify the level of exposure beyond which residents should be evacuated. While acknowledging that was a very difficult question, the German specialist noted later, however, that he would think pregnant women should probably leave Fukushima — adding, "I have seen many cases over the years, but I come from Germany and it's not easy to judge (about the situation in Japan)."

At a round table discussion later in the day, as well as discussing specific issues many participants made the point that science belongs to the people, not just experts — the very point that underpinned the entire event. As Wataru Iwata, director of the Fukushima-based citizens' group CRMS, one of the forum's organizers (which also conducts independent testing of food from in and around Fukushima Prefecture) put it: "Science is a methodology and not an end itself." In the end, though the citizens' forum — which ran from 9:30 a.m. to 10 p.m. — arrived at no clear-cut conclusions, organizers said that that in itself was a good outcome. And another conference involving citizens and scientists is now being planned for March 2012.

According to the draft of the recommendation in July, the Food Safety Commission was aiming at setting "100 millisieverts lifetime limit" that would include the external radiation exposure from the nuclides in the air. However, based on the opinions from the general public, the Commission decided that the effect of external radiation exposure was small and focused only on internal radiation exposure from food.

If we suppose one's lifetime is 100 years, then 1 millisievert per year would be the maximum. The current provisional safety limit assumes the upper limit of 5 millisievert per year with radioactive cesium alone. So the new regulations will inevitably be stricter than the current provisional safety limits.

In addition, the Commission pointed out that children "are more susceptible to the effect of radiation", but it didn't cite any specific number for children. The Commission explained that it would be up to the Ministry of Health and Labor and other agencies to discuss" whether the effect on children should be reflected in the new safety limits.Oh boy. So many holes in the article.First, I suspect it is a rude awakening for many Japanese to know that the current provisional safety limits for radioactive materials in food presuppose very high internal radiation level already. The Yomiuri article correctly says 5 millisieverts per year from radioactive cesium alone. The provisional safety limit for radioactive iodine, though now it's almost irrelevant, is 2,000 becquerels/kg, and that presupposes 2 millisieverts per year internal radiation. From cesium and iodine alone, the provisional safety limits on food assume 7 millisievert per year internal radiation.

(The reason why the radioactive iodine limit is set lower than that for radioactive cesium is because radioactive iodine all goes to thyroid gland and gets accumulated in the organ.)I am surprised that Yomiuri even mentioned the 5 millisieverts per year limit from cesium exposure alone. I suspect it is the first time ever for the paper.Second, the article says the Commission decided to exclude external radiation from the "100 millisieverts" number because of the public opinion. Which "public" opinion are they talking about? Mothers and fathers with children? I doubt it. If anything, the general public (at least those who doesn't believe radiation is good for them) would want to include external radiation so that the overall radiation limit is set, rather than just for food.

Third, and most importantly, if the proposed lifetime limit of 100 millisieverts is only for internal radiation from FOOD, then the overall internal radiation could be much higher. Why? Because, pre-Fukushima, the natural internal radiation from food in Japan was only 0.41 millisievert per year (mostly from K-40), or 28% of total natural radiation exposure per year of 1.45 millisievert (average). Of internal radiation exposure, inhaling radon is 0.45 millisievert per year in Japan, as opposed to the world average of 1.2 millisievert per year.Now, these so-called experts in the government commission are saying the internal radiation from food can be 1 millisievert per year (assuming the life of 100 years), in addition to the natural internal radiation from food (K-40) which is 0.41 millisievert per year. Then, you will have to add internal exposure from inhaling the radioactive materials IN ADDITION TO radon which is 0.45 millisievert per year.

Winter in the Pacific Ocean side of east Japan is dry, particularly in Kanto. North wind kicks up dust, and radioactive materials in the dust will be kicked up. The Tokyo metropolitan government will be burning away the radioactive debris from Iwate Prefecture (Miyagi's to follow) into the wintry sky. So-called "decontamination" efforts all over east Japan will add more radioactive particles in the air for people to breathe in.

For your information, the comparison of natural radiation exposure levels (the world vs Japan), from the Nuclear Safety Research Association Handbook on treating acute radiation injury (original in Japanese; my translation of labels). Japan has (or had) markedly lower radon inhalation than the world average, and much lower external radiation from the ground and from cosmic ray. It makes it all up by overusing the medical X-rays and CT scans, and even the Nuclear Safety Research Association who issued the following table says Japan tends to use too many X-rays and scans and that the medical professionals should make effort not to overuse them.

4. Brief Overview of Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing (from June 16 hearing charter)  Nuclear reactors generate about 20 percent of the electricity used in the U.S. No new nuclear plants have been ordered in the U.S. since 1973, but there is renewed interest in nuclear energy both because it could reduce U.S. dependence on foreign oil and because it produces no greenhouse gas emissions.  One of the barriers to increased use of nuclear energy is concern about nuclear waste. Every nuclear power reactor produces approximately 20 tons of highly radioactive nuclear waste every year. Today, that waste is stored on-site at the nuclear reactors in water-filled cooling pools or, at some sites, after sufficient cooling, in dry casks above ground. About 50,000 metric tons of commercial spent fuel is being stored at 73 sites in 33 states. A recent report issued by the National Academy of Sciences concluded that this stored waste could be vulnerable to terrorist attacks.

Under the current plan for long-term disposal of nuclear waste, the waste from around the country would be moved to a permanent repository at Yucca Mountain in Nevada, which is now scheduled to open around 2012. The Yucca Mountain facility continues to be a subject of controversy. But even if it opened and functioned as planned, it would have only enough space to store the nuclear waste the U.S. is expected to generate by about 2010.  Consequently, there is growing interest in finding ways to reduce the quantity of nuclear waste. A number of other nations, most notably France and Japan, ''reprocess'' their nuclear waste. Reprocessing involves separating out the various components of nuclear waste so that a portion of the waste can be recycled and used again as nuclear fuel (instead of disposing of all of it). In addition to reducing the quantity of high-level nuclear waste, reprocessing makes it possible to use nuclear fuel more efficiently. With reprocessing, the same amount of nuclear fuel can generate more electricity because some components of it can be used as fuel more than once.

The greatest drawback of reprocessing is that current reprocessing technologies produce weapons-grade plutonium (which is one of the components of the spent fuel). Any activity that increases the availability of plutonium increases the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation.  Because of proliferation concerns, the U.S. decided in the 1970s not to engage in reprocessing. (The policy decision was reversed the following decade, but the U.S. still did not move toward reprocessing.) But the Department of Energy (DOE) has continued to fund research and development (R&D) on nuclear reprocessing technologies, including new technologies that their proponents claim would reduce the risk of proliferation from reprocessing.

The report accompanying H.R. 2419, the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2006, which the House passed in May, directed DOE to focus research in its Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative program on improving nuclear reprocessing technologies. The report went on to state, ''The Department shall accelerate this research in order to make a specific technology recommendation, not later than the end of fiscal year 2007, to the President and Congress on a particular reprocessing technology that should be implemented in the United States. In addition, the Department shall prepare an integrated spent fuel recycling plan for implementation beginning in fiscal year 2007, including recommendation of an advanced reprocessing technology and a competitive process to select one or more sites to develop integrated spent fuel recycling facilities.''

During floor debate on H.R. 2419, the House defeated an amendment that would have cut funding for research on reprocessing. In arguing for the amendment, its sponsor, Mr. Markey, explicitly raised the risks of weapons proliferation. Specifically, the amendment would have cut funding for reprocessing activities and interim storage programs by $15.5 million and shifted the funds to energy efficiency activities, effectively repudiating the report language. The amendment was defeated by a vote of 110–312.

But nuclear reprocessing remains controversial, even within the scientific community. In May 2005, the American Physical Society (APS) Panel on Public Affairs, issued a report, Nuclear Power and Proliferation Resistance: Securing Benefits, Limiting Risk. APS, which is the leading organization of the Nation's physicists, is on record as strongly supporting nuclear power. But the APS report takes the opposite tack of the Appropriations report, stating, ''There is no urgent need for the U.S. to initiate reprocessing or to develop additional national repositories. DOE programs should be aligned accordingly: shift the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative R&D away from an objective of laying the basis for a near-term reprocessing decision; increase support for proliferation-resistance R&D and technical support for institutional measures for the entire fuel cycle.''  Technological as well as policy questions remain regarding reprocessing. It is not clear whether the new reprocessing technologies that DOE is funding will be developed sufficiently by 2007 to allow the U.S. to select a technology to pursue. There is also debate about the extent to which new technologies can truly reduce the risks of proliferation.

 It is also unclear how selecting a reprocessing technology might relate to other pending technology decisions regarding nuclear energy. For example, the U.S. is in the midst of developing new designs for nuclear reactors under DOE's Generation IV program. Some of the potential new reactors would produce types of nuclear waste that could not be reprocessed using some of the technologies now being developed with DOE funding.

5. Brief Overview of Economics of Reprocessing

The economics of reprocessing are hard to predict with any certainty because there are few examples around the world on which economists might base a generalized model.  Some of the major factors influencing the economic competitiveness of reprocessing are: the availability and cost of uranium, costs associated with interim storage and long-term disposal in a geologic repository, reprocessing plant construction and operating costs, and costs associated with transmutation, the process by which certain parts of the spent fuel are actively reduced in toxicity to address long-term waste management.

Costs associated with reducing greenhouse gas emissions from fossil fuel-powered plants could help make nuclear power, including reprocessing, economically competitive with other sources of electricity in a free market.

 It is not clear who would pay for reprocessing in the U.S.

Three recent studies have examined the economics of nuclear power. In a study completed at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 2003, The Future of Nuclear Power, an interdisciplinary panel, including Professor Richard Lester, looked at all aspects of nuclear power from waste management to economics to public perception. In a study requested by the Department of Energy and conducted at the University of Chicago in 2004, The Economic Future of Nuclear Power, economist Dr. Donald Jones and his colleague compared costs of future nuclear power to other sources, and briefly looked at the incremental costs of an advanced fuel cycle. In a 2003 study conducted by a panel including Matthew Bunn (a witness at the June 16 hearing) and Professor Steve Fetter, The Economics of Reprocessing vs. Direct Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, the authors took a detailed look at the costs associated with an advanced fuel cycle. All three studies seem more or less to agree on cost estimates: the incremental cost of nuclear electricity to the consumer, with reprocessing, could be modest—on the order of 1–2 mills/kWh (0.1–0.2 cents per kilowatt-hour); on the other hand, this increase represents an approximate doubling (at least) of the costs attributable to spent fuel management, compared to the current fuel cycle (no reprocessing). Where they strongly disagree is on how large an impact this incremental cost will have on the competitiveness of nuclear power. The University of Chicago authors conclude that the cost of reprocessing is negligible in the big picture, where capital costs of new plants dominate all economic analyses. The other two studies take a more skeptical view—because new nuclear power would already be facing tough competition in the current market, any additional cost would further hinder the nuclear power industry, or become an unacceptable and unnecessary financial burden on the government.

6. Background