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All countries with well-established nuclear programs have found themselves requiring spent fuel storage in addition to spent fuel pools at reactors. Some, like the US, use dry storage designs, such as individual casks or storage vaults that are located at reactor sites; other countries, Germany for one, use away-from-reactor facilities. Sweden has a large underground pool located at a centralized facility, CLAB, to which different reactors send their spent fuel a year after discharge, so spent fuel does not build up at reactor sites. Dry storage tends to be cheaper and can be more secure than wet storage because active circulation of water is not required. At the same time, because dry storage uses passive air cooling, not the active cooling that is available in a pool to keep the fuel cool, these systems can only accept spent fuel a number of years after discharge.6

The United States had been working toward developing a high-level waste repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada; this fell through in 2010, when the Obama administration decided to reverse this decision, citing political “stalemate” and lack of public consensus about the site. Instead, the Obama administration instituted the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future to rethink the management of the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle.8 The US can flaunt one success, though. The Waste Isolation Pilot Project (WIPP), located near Carlsbad in southern New Mexico, is actually the only operating deep geologic repository for intermediate level nuclear waste, receiving waste since 1998. In the case of WIPP, it only accepts transuranic wastes from the nuclear weapons complex. The site is regulated solely by the Environmental Protection Agency, and the state of New Mexico has partial oversight of WIPP through its permitting authority established by the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. The city of Carlsbad is supportive of the site and it appears to be tolerated by the rest of the state.9

France has had more success after failing in its first siting attempt in 1990, when a granite site that had been selected drew large protests and the government opted to rethink its approach to nuclear waste disposal entirely. In 2006, the government announced that it needed a geologic repository for high-level waste, identified at least one suitable area, and passed laws requiring a license application to be submitted by 2015 and the site to begin receiving high-level waste by 2025.

Canada recently rethought the siting process for nuclear waste disposal and began a consensus-based participatory process. The Canadian Nuclear Waste Management Organization was established in 2002, after previous attempts to site a repository failed. The siting process began with three years’ worth of conversations with the public on the best method to manage spent fuel. The organization is now beginning to solicit volunteer communities to consider a repository, though much of the process remains to be decided, including the amount and type of compensation given to the participating communities.

the most difficult part of the back end of the fuel cycle is siting the required facilities, especially those associated with spent fuel management and disposal. Siting is not solely a technical problem—it is as much a political and societal issue. And to be successful, it is important to get the technical and the societal and political aspects right.

After weathering the Fukushima accident, and given the current constraints on carbon dioxide emissions and potential for growth of nuclear power, redefinition of a successful nuclear power program is now required: It is no longer simply the safe production of electricity but also the safe, secure, and sustainable lifecycle of nuclear power, from the mining of uranium ores to the disposal of spent nuclear fuel. If this cannot be achieved and is not thought out from the beginning, then the public in many countries will reject nuclear as an energy choice.

Certain elements—including an institution to site, manage, and operate waste facilities—need to be in place to have a successful waste management program. In some countries, this agency is entirely a government entity, such as the Korea Radioactive Waste Management Organization. In other countries, the agency is a corporation established by the nuclear industry, such as SKB in Sweden or Posiva Oy in Finland. Another option would be a public– private agency, such as Spain’s National Company for Radioactive Waste or Switzerland’s National Cooperative for the Disposal of Radioactive Waste.

Funding is one of the most central needs for such an institution to carry out research and development programs; the money would cover siting costs, including compensation packages and resources for local communities to conduct their own analyses of spent fuel and waste transportation, storage, repository construction, operations, security and safeguards, and future liabilities. Funds can be collected in a number of ways, such as putting a levy on electricity charges (as is done in the US) or charging based on the activity or volume of waste (Hearsey et al., 1999). Funds must also be managed—either by a waste management organization or another industry or government agency—in a way that ensures steady and ready access to funds over time. This continued reliable access is necessary for planning into the future for repository operations.

the siting process must be established. This should include decisions on whether to allow a community to veto a site and how long that veto remains operational; the number of sites to be examined in depth prior to site selection and the number of sites that might be required; technical criteria to begin selecting potential sites; non-technical considerations, such as proximity to water resources, population centers, environmentally protected areas, and access to public transportation; the form and amount of compensation to be offered; how the public is invited to participate in the site selection process; and how government at the federal level will be involved.

The above are all considerations in the siting process, but the larger process—how to begin to select sites, whether to seek only volunteers, and so on—must also be determined ahead of time. A short list of technical criteria must be integrated into a process that establishes public consent to go forward, followed by many detailed studies of the site—first on the surface, then at depth. There are distinct advantages to characterizing more than one site in detail, as both Sweden and Finland have done. Multiple sites allow the “best” one to be selected, increasing public approval and comfort with the process.

he site needs to be evaluated against a set of standards established by a government agency in the country. This agency typically is the environmental agency or the nuclear regulatory agency. The type of standards will constrain the method by which a site will be evaluated with regard to its future performance. A number of countries use a combination of methods to evaluate their sites, some acknowledging that the ability to predict processes and events that will occur in a repository decrease rapidly with each year far into the future, so that beyond a few thousand years, little can be said with any accuracy. These countries use what is termed a “safety case,” which includes multiple lines of evidence to assure safe repository performance into the future.

Moving forward

France, Canada, and Germany also have experienced a number of iterations of repository siting, some with more success than others. In the 1970s, Germany selected the Gorleben site for its repository; however, in the late 1990s, with the election of a Red–Green coalition government (the Greens had long opposed Gorleben), a rethinking of repository siting was decreed, and the government established the AkEnd group to re-evaluate the siting process. Their report outlined a detailed siting process starting from scratch, but to date too much political disagreement exists to proceed further.

Notes

Nuclear wastes are classified in various ways, depending on the country or organization doing the classification. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) notes six general categories of waste produced by civil nuclear power reactors: exempt waste, very short-lived waste, and very low level waste can be stored and then disposed of in landfill-type settings; low level waste, intermediate level waste, and high-level waste require more complex facilities for disposal.

Sweden is currently the country closest to realizing a final solution for spent fuel, after having submitted a license application for construction of a geologic repository in March 2011. It plans to open a high-level waste repository sometime after 2025, as do Finland and France.

Some countries, such as Sweden, Finland, Canada, and, until recently, the US, plan to dispose of their spent fuel directly in a geologic repository. A few others, such as France, Japan, Russia, and the UK have an interim step. They reprocess their spent fuel, extract the small amount of plutonium produced during irradiation, and use it in new mixed oxide (MOX) fuel. Then they plan to dispose of the high-level wastes from reprocessing in a repository.

Neither Swedish, Finnish nor Norwegian authorities have been  informed about any releases of radioactivity anyplace in northern Europe.  The source is most likely a reactor or a isotope-source at a hospital, according to the press-note from NRPA.

Progress on its new EPR is being closely monitored because of its plans to build four identical ones in Britain, the New Civil Engineer trade magazine reported.

The Flamanville EPR and another in Finland -- which is also facing delays and cost overruns -- were the targets of criticism

As the world’s ninth largest emitter of greenhouse gases, it should be (and is) a major priority for Korea to reduce emissions, and realistically that can only be accomplished by increasing the use of nuclear power. As Barack Obama noted with regard to the United States’ energy consumption, “Nuclear energy remains our largest source of fuel that produces no carbon emissions. It’s that simple. (One plant) will cut carbon pollution by 16 million tons each year when compared to a similar coal plant. That’s like taking 3.5 million cars off the road.” Environmentalists have traditionally disdained nuclear power, but even green activists cannot argue with that logic, and increasing numbers of them ― Patrick Moore, James Lovelock, Stewart Brand and the late Bishop Hugh Montefiore being prominent examples ― have become supporters of the smart use of nuclear power.

Second, the immediate dangers to human health of conventional air pollution outweigh the dangers of nuclear radiation. In 2009, the Seoul Metropolitan Government measured an average PM10 (particulate) concentration in the city of 53.8 g/m3, a figure that is roughly twice the level in other developed nations. According to the Gyeonggi Research Institute, PM10 pollution leads to 10,000 premature deaths per year in and around Seoul, while the Korea Economic Institute has estimated its social cost at 10 trillion won. While sulfur dioxide levels in the region have decreased significantly since the 1980s, the concentration of nitrogen dioxide in the air has not decreased, and ground-level ozone levels remain high. Unlike fossil fuels, nuclear power does not result in the release of any of these dangerous pollutants that fill the skies around Seoul, creating health hazards that are no less serious for often going unnoticed.

And third, the environmental and safety consequences of extracting and transporting fossil fuels are far greater than those involved with the production of nuclear power. Korea is one of the largest importers of Indonesian coal for use in power plants, for example. This coal is not always mined with a high level of environmental and safety protections, with a predictable result of air, water, and land pollution in one of Asia’s most biologically sensitive ecosystems. Coal mining is also one of the world’s more dangerous occupations, as evidenced by the many tragic disasters involving poorly managed Chinese mines. While natural gas is certainly a better option than coal, its distribution too can be problematic, whether by ship or through the recently proposed pipeline that would slice down through Siberia and North Korea to provide direct access to Russian gas.

What about truly green renewable energy, some might ask ― solar, wind, geothermal, hydroelectric, and tidal energy? Of course, Korea would be a safer and more sustainable place if these clean renewable resources were able to cover the country’s energy needs. However, the country is not particularly well suited for hydroelectric projects, while the other forms of renewable energy production are expensive, and are unfortunately likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. The fact is that most Koreans will not want to pay the significantly higher energy prices that would result from the widespread use of clean renewables, and in a democratic society, the government is unlikely to force them to do so. Thus, we are left with two realistic options: fossil fuels or nuclear. From an environmental perspective, it would truly be a disaster to abandon the latter.

By Andrew Wolman Andrew Wolman is an assistant professor at the Hankuk University of Foreign Studies Graduate School of International and Area Studies, where he teaches international law and human rights.

The latest decision appears to imply a step back from building "conventional islands" - the non-nuclear plant in nuclear power stations - an area in which Siemens has remained active.

He also gave his backing to the German government's planned switch to renewable energy sources, calling it a "project of the century" and claiming Berlin's target of reaching 35% renewable energy by 2020 was achievable